Britain, France and the Middle East 1900-1920

A multimedia examination of the events leading to and following from the Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916

MUSIC - Theme from Lawrence of Arabia



click on map to see enlarged version

Events Surrounding the Sykes-Picot Agreement

The Anglo-French discourse concerning the fate of the various people and lands of the Middle East began with the 1904 Anglo-French Entante Cordiale, continued in the 1909-1910 railway agreements concerning Syria and with the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, and appeared to conclude with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. In reality, however, this agreement was only the beginning, and diplomatic negotiations continued until 1920. During the course of these negotiations the boundary lines between Syria-Lebanon and Palestine were redrawn numerous times as Britain attempted to gain as many territorial concessions as possible and France vainly held to the original terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Access to water for irrigation and power, as well as control of oil-rich areas were the key strategic goals of Great Britain and these geologic factors drove the prolonged negotiations. Aside from minor concessions to Syrian nationalism, no regard was given to the desires of the Arab populations of the Middle East and they were never consulted about what should become of their lives and land. Therefore the existing Arab divisions of culture and identity played no part in the drawing up of new national boundaries.

1904 - Anglo-French Entante Cordiale resolved the tension between Britain and France over Egypt

1905

1906 - Aqaba Incident

1907

1908

1909 - Anglo-French railway agreements over Syria

1910

1911

1912 - Grey assures Pioncare that Entante still stands

1913

1914 - Ottoman Empire joined WWI as an ally of Germany; French influence in Syria declining

1915-18 - Four Allied campaigns against the Turks take place, with the British spearheading the effort

1916 - Sykes-Picot Agreement LANDMARK EVENT

1917

1918 - British seek to alter the terms set in place by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and so enter into negotiations with the French concerning British rights in Syria, Mosul and Palestine

1919 - WWI ends; Anglo-French relations are strained by disagreements over Syria

1920 - Anglo-French negotiations take place concerning the borders of Palestine & the San Remo Conference establishes the mandate system for dividing the territory of the Ottoman Empire

Actors Archives/References British Justification Deauville Line Francois Picot Key Locations

King-Crane Commission Line through Syria Mosul San Remo Sir Sykes

Map from University of Michigan Map Library


THE MIDDLE EAST.
Scale of Miles.
100 50 0 100 200 300
BLACK SEA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
RED SEA
CASPIAN SEA
PERSIAN GULF
ARABIA
EGYPT
SYRIA
ASIA MINOR
MESOPOTAMIA
ARMENIA
CAUCASIA
AZERBAIJAN
PERSIA
LURISTAN
KHUZISTAN
ARABISTAN
LARISTAN
AL HASA
NEJD
HEJAZ
CILICIA
CYPRUS
Sinai Peninsula
Constantinople
Chatalja
Gallipoli
Haidar Pasha
Izmid
Dardanelles
Sinope
Batum
Tiflis
Trebizond
Baku
Angora
Sivas
Erzinjan
Erzerum
Smyrna
Aidin
Konia
Bulgurlu
Eregli
Tarsus
Adana
Bitlis
Van
Diarbekr
Astara
Tabriz
Enzeli
Resht
Astarabad
Meshed
Urmia
Saiz Bulag
Birejik
Jerablus
Ras al'Ain
Alexandretta
Aleppo
Mosul
Greater Zab R.
Lesser Zab R.
Sharqat
Kirkuk
Sulaimaniya
Tehran
Hamadan
Kermanshah
Khurramabad
Isfahan
Yezd
Kerman
Shiraz
Bushire
Bahrein I.
Qatar
Doha
Oqair
Riyadh
Hail
Kuwait
Fao
Umm Qasr
Basra
Zubair
Abadan
Mohammerah
Shushtar
Maidan-i-Naftun
Ahwaz
Amara
Qal'a Salih
Ezra's Tomb
Qurna
Nasiriya
Samawa
Najaf
Karbala
Hilla
Kut al Amara
Musaiyib
Falluja
Hit
Tikrit
Samarra
Kifri
Qasr-i-Shirin
Delli Abbas
Shahriqan
Ba'quba
BAGHDAD
Beirut
Damascus
Homs
Haifa
Jaffa
Jerusalem
Alexandria
Port Said
Cairo
Suez
Aqaba
R. Nile
R. Euphrates
R. Tigris
Shatt al Arab
Lake Habbaniya
Lake Shinkafiya
Lake Hamrin
Lake Shamiya
Lake Razzaza
Lake Tharthar
Lake Urmia
Rishm I.
Lingeh
Basido
Jask
Gulf of Oman
Anti Taurus
Armenian Taurus
Caucasus Mts.
Kuh-i-Rang Range
Pusht-i-Kuh Hills
Jebel Hamrin
Jebel Makhul
Jebel Sinjar
Jebel Abyad
Jebel Shammar
Jebel Tuwaiq
Jebel Aja
Jebel Salma
Jebel Tubaiq
Jebel Ithlib
Jebel Ramm
Jebel Shara
Jebel Asir
Jebel Tuwair
Jebel Zukur
Jebel Qaraqir
Jebel Qaraqir
Jebel Qaraqir

Aqaba Incident - 1906

In order to understand British action in the Middle East in the early 20th Century it is necessary to understand the importance of Egypt, and specifically of the Suez Canal, to Great Britain. The ability to route shipping thought the Canal rather than around the horn of Africa greatly simplified travel between the British homeland and India. The British considered it essential to maintain access to the Canal. Therefore when a dispute arose between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire about the location of Egypt's eastern border the British quickly became involved in the conflict. The Ottoman Emperor claimed the Sinai region, which had traditionally belonged to Egypt. The British feared that if the Turks gained a foothold in the Sinai desert they would be in a position to challenged Egyptian, and therefore British, control of the Suez Canal. They also feared the Ottoman plan to build a railroad connecting Aqaba to the Suez Canal. This would put the Turks in a position to move from the interior of their empire to the Suez Canal in a fairly short amount of time and so posed a serious threat to the British.

The British neutralized this threat and reaffirmed its control over the region. However, this incident awakened the British to the threat to their position coming from the East and increased their interest in Syria and Palestine as potential buffers between the deeper Middle East and the jewel of Egypt. This awakened interest would continue to grow throughout the second decade of the 20th Century and would impact future Anglo-French negotiations. (Khalidi, 1980, 17-48).

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Google
Pointer 30°10'35.71" N 34°07'53.60" E elev 1166 ft Streaming 100%
Eye alt 242.40 mi

Anglo-French Railway Agreements over Syria 1909-1910

As the first decade of the 20th Century drew to a close, much of the world had been divided by the great powers, notably Great Britain, France and Germany, into formal colonies or informal spheres of influence. The major area lying outside of these spheres was the Ottoman-controlled Middle East. As the great powers struggles amongst themselves to gain influence in this area, their primary tool was the railroad. By establishing a railway contract within a Middle Eastern area the great power nation could gain political and economic power over the affairs of that area.

In 1909-1910 Britain and France entered into a prolonged struggle over the railway concessions in Syria. Both nations knew that by gaining permission to build railroads in Syria they would be gaining influence in the country as well as the ability to restrict the activity of the other nation within Syria.

The leaders of the Ottoman Empire were aware both of the importance of railroads in the establishing and maintaining of influence in a region and of the imperialistic designs of the European powers upon areas under Ottoman control. Therefore they supported the building railroads that would consolidate Ottoman control and stave off advances by the European powers. Two such railways were the Hijaz Railway, connecting southern Syria, the Hijaz and the Yemen to the rest of the Empire, and the planned Baghdad Railway, which would do the same for southeastern Anatolia, northern Syria and Mesopotamia. Britain and France were not particularly interested in promoting Ottoman interest but they were willing to appease the Turks when it furthered their goals.

This struggle over influence in Syria marked the beginnings of the Anglo-French partition of the Middle East that would be facilitated through the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and would come to fruition following WWI. These railway agreements divided the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence, with the French gaining exclusive access to Syria and the British to Mesopotamia. These same divisions would form the basis for the future Sykes-Picot Agreement. Not until 1918 would the British seriously challenge French dominance in Syria but during the intervening years the British would become increasingly aware of Syria's significance in any attempt to defend Egypt and the Suez Canal from Eastern invasion (Khalidi, 1980, 113-186).

The Sykes-Picot Agreement contained a section specifically addressing the importance of railways in the governing and control of the Middle East:

"That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates

valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two governments.

That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polgon Banias Keis Marib Salkhad tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b)." - terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916

click here to view the map to which the statement refers

Sykes-Picot Agreement: May 19th 1916



Click on Union Jack to learn more about Sir Mark Sykes



Click on French flag to learn more about Francois Picot

Original Zones of Influence under the Sykes-Picot Agreement c. 1916



Click on the map to see a still version of the Sykes-Picot Map over the google map

Link to text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement

The Agreement had two main facets, one concerning Anglo-French relations and possessions in the Middle East and the other regarding the interaction between the Anglo-French allies and the indigenous Arabs. However it is important to recognize that the Agreement was only between the French and the British. It refers to the Arabs but does not include them as participants in the Agreement. In this Agreement France and Great Britain divided the areas currently known as Palestine/Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq into five zones of influence. The terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement are as follows (the specifications of blue, red, A and B zones refer to the map below):

1. In zones A and B (roughly corresponding to modern day Syria and Iraq-Jordan respectively) the western powers would an independent Arab State to rule*, but France would have exclusive influence, economic and political, in zone A and Britain in zone B.

2. France and Britain were given the right to establish governments in their areas of influence, in arrangement with the Arab State

3. The area of Palestine was reserved for international administration.

4. Deals with ports and water supply accorded to Great Britain.

5. Details British trading rights.

6. Considers railway rights and the Baghdad Railway.

7. Gives Britain the right to build, control and use a railway connecting Baghdad with Haifa.

8. Lists the agreement concerning custom tariffs, custom barriers and custom duties in the four zones influenced by the French and British.

9. States that France will not cede its influence in the blue area or in area A to any party other than the Arab State without the approval of the British government.

10. The British and French agreed that no other nation would be allowed to gain control over territories in the Arabian peninsula

11. Concerns the method for future negotiations with the Arab State.

12. Contains the Anglo-French agreement to look into controlling the importation of arms into Arab territories.

Map from www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/sykes-picot-1916

* It seems as though, at the time of the creation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the British and French were seriously considering promoting the existence of an independent Arab State, which would rule much of the area freed from the rule of the Turks. In light of future actions the statements in the Agreement concerning Arab self-rule could seem hypocritical, but at the time they accurately reflected British diplomatic intentions (Nevakivi, 1969, 37).

1918 Time-line

January
February

March - British Eastern Committee begins meeting to consider possible means of altering the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement to increase British influence in Syria, an area given to the French in the earlier Agreement. At this point the recommendations of the committee are purely theoretical, but following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire it becomes possible for Britain to attempt to enact them. Therefore, the Eastern Committee will meet six times between September and December in an attempt to dismantle the Sykes-Picot Agreement for the benefit of Britain's position in the Middle East, specifically to gain Syria as an area of influence.

April
May
June
July
August
September

October - Lloyd George tells British War Cabinet that the Sykes-Picot agreement is out of date because it does not take into account British military efforts in the Middle East in 1917. Therefore Lloyd George states the agreement no longer applies. Click here to learn more about British justification for demanding an alteration in the terms of the Sykes-Picot treaty. The British goals for the ensuing negotiations with France were to obtain rights to the oil-rich city of Mosul and the adjustment of the northern borders of Palestine. Greater influence in in Syria would be nice but the British were also willing to use Syria as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the French regarding Mosul and Palestine.

November - 7th - Anglo-French declaration promising a representative Arab government in Syria (not Palestine or Mesopotamia)

December - Anglo-French settlement is arranged by Lloyd George and Clemenceau concerning the Middle East. French Premier Clemenceau agrees to give Palestine and Mosul to Great Britain, even though such concessions go against the conditions set down in Sykes-Picot. In return the French received some territory formerly belonging to Austria. Clemenceau was willing to make this trade for a couple of reasons. In the first place, French public opinion valued increase security against future German

	aggression above territorial expansion in the geographically distant Middle East. The French also lacked the resources to exploit the oil reserves in Mosul and so were only sacrificing a potential and not an actual resource. This was a verbal, non-written agreement but both leaders remained faithful to it and this verbal agreement laid the foundation for the British claim concerning Palestine.

*Hughes, 1999, 113-28.

1919 Time-line

January - On the 30th Lloyd George and Clemenceau again meet to discuss altering the Sykes-Picot agreement.

February - In early February the French wrote a memorandum giving Mosul and Palestine to the British. The French understanding is that the issue is now closed. Mosul and Palestine belong to the British and a shrunken Syria belongs exclusively to the French. However the British responded with new territorial demands considering the memorandum to contain insufficient concessions. They now wanted to further diminish the scope of Syria by shifting the border of Palestine north and east, to the Litani River and including the Yarmuk valley, and that of Mesopotamia west to include Tadmor and Deir-es-Zor. French public opinion would not allow Clemenceau to submit to such demands.

March - On the 20th a group of high profile diplomats, including Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Allenby, Pichon, Balfour and President Wilson, met to discuss the question of Syria. During this meeting Lloyd George cited the British wartime military efforts in an attempt to manipulate the French into making concessions regarding Syria. He also brought up up the question of Arab nationalism and said that the French would need to consider the wishes of the native population (a hypocritical statement because Britain had no intention of considering the wishes of the native populations of any area over which it had control). Pichon responded by stating that all the French asked for was possession of Syria, as was their right according to Sykes-Picot. The meeting ended with President Wilson suggesting that an American team be commissioned to determine the wishes of the Syrian Arabs regarding who should rule them. For more information on the King-Crane Commission click here.

April - Long-Berenger oil agreement, including details about rights over Mosul's oil, is negotiated

May - On May 21-22 Clemenceau and Lloyd George met again to continue the discussion concerning Syria. Clemenceau reminded Lloyd George of the agreement they had made in December of 1918 and states that, as the French had already given up Mosul and Palestine, they would not allow a British railway or land strip to bisect Syria. The discussion became unpleasant with both statesmen becoming upset. It ended with Clemenceau insisting that there would be no British line through Syria and Lloyd George threatening that no French troop would be allowed to set foot in Syria

until Britain was granted a strip through Syria. Lloyd George formally canceled the December 1918 agreement and halted the Long-Berenger Oil Agreement, which only needed ratification before it would be put into effect. This marked the high point of Britain's Syrian ambitions. In only a few months the British position would change diametrically.

June - Versailles Conference - Great Britain presents maps with Palestine's borders pushed north & east of original lines in Sykes-Picot – French reject this, surprised by the British claims.

July
August

September - Due to financial problems resulting from the tremendous cost of WWI, Great Britain realized it would need to vastly reduce expenditure. One way to cut costs was to decrease the British military presence in distant locations. As a response to this financial reality the British government began to constrict its empire, consolidating its hold on strategic countries and allowing other areas to slip out of British control. Syria was one such area. Great Britain was no longer in a position to control added territory were France convinced to concede it, and so the British government proposed withdrawing troops from Syria and Lebanon and leaving the area to French control.

October - Great Britain evacuates troops from Syria, but not to the boundaries detailed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. French objected to the lack of border alignment with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. According to the terms of this Agreement the British were still occupying French land. Lord Allenby responded by moving further south but not all the way to the line established by Sykes-Picot. The British justified their lack of compliance with the terms of Sykes-Picot by citing Lloyd George's claim in September 1919 about Palestinian borders, the so called Deauville line, which the French had never agreed to. Despite the French lack of agreement the Deauville line was the de facto border until border finalized in 1923.

November

December - The English and French corresponded about the Palestinian border/ water needs. The French agreed to minor concessions about water use but these concessions did not satisfy the British and so a meeting was arranged between Philippe Berthelot, the Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, and Lord

	Curzon. Berthelot maintained the legitimacy of the border lines established by Sykes-Picot but offered to give Palestine 33% of the water power generated from the Rivers south of Mt. Hermon. Lord Curzon insisted on the Deauville line and so the two remained at an impasse and the meting ended without an agreement being reached.

*Hughes, 1999, 132-52.
*McTague, 1982, 100-112.

1920 Time-line

January

February - Anglo-French discussions about Palestinian border resumed in London, but without Clemenceau who had been replaced by Millerand as French Premier. This made the negotiations somewhat more complicated because of the verbal nature of the December 1918 agreement between Clemenceau and Lloyd George, concerning the allotment of Palestine and Mosul to the British. Lloyd George attempted to use diplomatic persuasion to convince Berthelot that the British assumption of responsibility in Palestine was more of a burden than a privilege. He argued that, while the waters north of Palestine, according to the Sykes-Picot agreement, were unimportant for the welfare of Syria, they were essential to the prospering of Palestine. After two days of discussion Lloyd George arranged for another meeting between Berthelot and Lord Curzon. After three days of negotiation between the two men, Berthelot agreed to the Deauville line with this approval being conditional upon the approval of Millerand. It is suspected that he made this concession in exchange for increased French oil rights in Mesopotamia. However, Millerand had been issuing strong statements about his intention not to allow border changes, so his approval was not an assured fact.

March

April - At the San Remo Conference Berthelot announced French acceptance of the Deauville line as the border between Palestine and Syria. However the British seemed to have reconsidered their territorial ambitions since the February meetings and so announced that the final decision about the border location must await the approval of Emir Faisal, the man chosen to lead Syria under the French mandate. Berthelot was irritated at this British attempt to use Syrian nationalism so extort further border concessions from the French, but he agreed to postpone the final decision concerning the border of Palestine. And so the San Remo Conference awarded the Mandates for Palestine and Mesopotamia to the British and the Mandate for Syria to the French, but the exact boundaries separating these areas were not defined.

May

June - French public opinion turned against Britain because of Lloyd George's continuing demands concerning Palestine and Millerand rejected the concession made by Berthelot in February. The British tried to negotiate the inclusion of the Yarmuk River in Palestine, or at least secure irrigation rights to the river, but the French refused. They believed that had already made three unfavorable revisions to the Sykes-Picot Agreement without receiving anything in return and they were not willing to give in again. Members of the British

government wanted to press the issue but the British diplomats knew that the situation was not promising and that Britain did not have much leverage in the situation. Zionists pushed the British government to ask for greater concessions from the French, but the French felt they had already given more than could be expected and so were intransigent.

August
September
October
November

December - A final conference was held between the British and the French at which time Lloyd George stated that he had made an agreement with Clemenceau concerning the borders between Syria and Palestine, the so called Deauville line, and that he was prepared to accept this line as the official border. Berthelot accepted the proposal and added that the French would give Palestine water rights for the upper Jordan and the Yarmuk river, and it was agreed that an international team would investigate the water supply issue in the area. The borders were finalized at a Anglo-French Convention on December 23, and these borders remain the legal boundaries between Syria-Lebanon and Palestine. A Boundary Commission determined the exact location of these boundaries and they went into effect after the signing of an agreement on March 7, 1923.

*McTague, 1982, 105-10.

Politicians, Diplomats & Influential Personages

British Diplomats and Politicians

Lord Allenby

Commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force after June 1917 and High Commissioner of Egypt from 1919-25. For a full biography click here or consult Hyges, M. (1999). *Allenby and British strategy in the Middle East*. Portland, Frank Cass Publishers.

Lord Curzon

British Foreign Secretary from 1919-24. For a full biography click here



David Lloyd George

British Prime Minister from 1916-22. He was an active participant in the Anglo-French negotiations over territory in the Middle East and many of the British territorial gains, including Palestine and Mosul, can be traced to Lloyd George. For a full biography click here



Sir Edward Grey

British Foreign Secretary from 1892-95 and again from 1905-16. For a full biography click here

French Diplomats and Politicians

Philippe Berthelot

French diplomat serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was active in the negotiations between Great Britain and France during WWI. For a full biography click here



Paul Cambon

France's ambassador to Britain from 1898-1920. He was involved in many of the Anglo-French negotiations over the alterations of the Sykes-Picot agreement. For a full biography click here



Georges Clemenceau

French Prime Minister from 1906-09 and again from 1917-20. He negotiated with Lloyd George concerning territorial distribution in the Middle East and was responsible for conceding Mosul and Palestine to the British. For a full biography click here



Alexandre Millerand

Replaced Clemenceau as French Premier in February 1920. He finished the negotiations with Lloyd George concerning the Middle East. For a full biography click here

References & Further Reading	Document Archives
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British Justification for Altering Terms of Sykes-Picot Agreement

MUSIC - Rule Britannia

Although WWI began in 1914 the military efforts of Great Britain in the Middle East were still negligible in 1916 when the Sykes-Picot Agreement was formed. Neither the British nor French had leverage when making the agreement and so the terms were fairly equitable and followed the precedent established in 1909-10 through the Anglo-French railroad agreement. However, by 1918 the situation had changed dramatically. Great Britain has expended considerable military resources moving north from Egypt into the Ottoman Empire. The military had moved all the way to Mosul, in northern Iraq, and the British felt that their military efforts should be rewarded. They did not like the fact that, according to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, after the war they would need to give to the French land they were currently occupying. They considered the territory they had won through military might theirs by right and were willing to pressure France to make concessions. The French had frequently offered to help Great Britain obtain its military objectives in the Middle East but their help was always refused. This refusal allowed Great Britain to maintain its leverage and justification for change in the division of the Middle East. (McTague. 1982, 101) & (Hughes, 1999, 143).

In addition to pressuring the French to make concessions based on British military efforts, the British also used Syrian nationalism and the WWI drive towards self-determination to tip negotiations in favor of Great Britain. As the war came to a close American President Woodrow Wilson increased his call for governmental self-determination in areas freed from imperial domination. The Middle Eastern areas previously controlled by the Ottoman Empire fit this definition and so were prime candidates for national self-determination. Clearly the British did not want self-determination in the areas assigned to them, but they realized that the threat of nationalism could be used to pressure the French to make concessions in the areas designated for French control. This tactic was made more effective by the good relationship enjoyed between Great Britain and the Syrian national leader Feisal (Hughes, 1999, 143).

Deauville Line

The so called Deauville line was proposed as a boundary line between Palestine, Syria and Lebanon by David Lloyd George in September of 1919. According to this proposal, the border of Palestine would follow the ancient Israelite boundary, running from Dan to Beersheba. (McTague, 1982, 102-05).





Map from www.bible.org/assets/netbible/ot5.jpg

Francois Picot

MUSIC - La Marseillaise

Biography of Picot

Surprisingly little is recorded about the French diplomat who signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Francois Georges Picot, who lived from 1870-1951, is almost exclusively known for his role in diving up the Middle East in 1916. Encyclopedias such a the World Book and Encyclopedia Britannica include no entry for Picot and examination of articles that make mention of him provides meager additional information, such as the fact that Picot served as a consul general in Beirut and was connected to a shady execution in Lebanon. It is likely that more information about Picot is available in French, his native language. Certainly the English speaking world appears not to take much interest in Picot. It is safe to say that the most politically significant and memorable action of Francois Picot's life was his participation in creating the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Few other details of his life may be remembered, but he will live on in history, perhaps in infamy, for the Agreement that bears his name.

Key Locations Affecting Anglo-French Negotiation

Tadmore	Currently known as Palmyra, Tadmore is a oasis in the middle of Syria. Its strategic position in the Syrian desert, midway between Mosul and the Mediterranean made it a coveted location for the British. After having received oil-rich Mosul as a concession from the French, the British requested Tadmore as well, stating that they needed a "line" through Syria, including this oasis, to make travel and transport between Mosul and the Mediterranean realistic. The French, who had already made significant alterations to the Sykes-Picot Agreement without compensation, refused to give Tadmore to the British. Click here to see a map of the debate over the location of the proposed "line". (Hughes, 1999, 121, 137, 143-46).

Mosul	According to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement Mosul, a city in northern Iraq, was well inside of the area of French influence. However, after oil was discovered in Mosul the British were loath to leave it in French control. In December of 1918 British Prime Minister Lloyd George negotiated with French Premier Clemenceau to transfer control of Mosul from the French to the British. For more on the British justification for altering the Anglo-French areas of influence click here. Oil had become increasingly important to Great Britain as the British navy transitioned to the use of oil to power its ships. Therefore control over Mosul, and consequently the oil there, became an important British military aim. Click here to view maps showing the change of the French area of influence after the French concession of Mosul to the British. (Hughes, 1999, 120-22).
Mt. Hermon	Mt. Hermon became a sticking point in Anglo-French negotiations in 1918 when the British claimed that the northern border of Palestine needed to be enlarged to include the springs by Mt. Hermon and all of Galilee if Palestine was to have a viable economy based on agriculture. The French never agreed to give up Mt. Hermon, but they did agree to share some of the power generated from the springs. The final border of Palestine, established by the San Remo Conference in 1920, pushed Palestine's northern boarder up from the previous location specified in the Sykes-Picot Agreement but not all the way to Mt. Hermon. (Hughes, 1999, 140).
Yarmuk River	The terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement gave France influence over all of Syria, including the Yarmuk river valley and placed Mesopotamia (modern Iraq) under British control. However, the British soon realized that a land corridor connecting Mesopotamia to Palestine and Egypt would be of great strategic worth. This land strip would provide a route for oil pipelines to transport oil from Mosul to the Mediterranean Sea and would allow British air and land military to move between the British holdings in the Middle East. The British were optimistic about the likelihood of gaining French approval of this plan, but the French maintained that the territorial concessions of the Sykes-Picot agreement were valid and so would not acquiesce to British desires. (Hughes, 1999, 132-35).

King-Crane commission



The King-Crane commission consisted of a team of two Americans, Henry King and Charles Crane, who traveled to the Middle East and attempted to determine which mandatory power the indigenous people would prefer to rule over them. The commission showed that the Syrian Arabs' hierarchy of preferences were as follows: first independence, then rule by the Americans, then rule by the British and as a last choice rule by the French. However, neither the British nor the French had any intention of being influenced by the findings of the commission, and so the commission had little, if any effect. (Hughes, 1999, 1146-48).

For more on the King-Crane commission click here
For a full text of the commission report click here

British Line Through Syria



Notice that the British and French had different ideas about where the proposed line through Syria should be located.

* Baker, R.S. (1922). Turkish empire as booty: Secret deals among European nations, each striving to

seize what it could. From New York Times.

Mosul

Notice how Mosul moves from being a part of the area under French influence in the first map to a part of the territory administered by the British in the second map. This illustrates the results of the Anglo-French negotiations in 1918-1919 as agreed upon in the treaty of San Remo in 1920.

Original Zones of Influence under the Sykes-Picot Agreement c. 1916



Map from www.firstworldwar.com/.../sykespicot

Final Zones of Influence Following the Final Anglo-French Agreement at San Remo in 1920



Map from www1.umn.edu/urelate/kiosk/1101kiosk/3iraq

Results of the San Remo Conference

Link to text of San Remo Resolution - April 25, 1920

Notice how the borders of British and French areas of influence closely correspond to the modern day national boundaries of Jordan and Palestine and the borders between Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Palestine


Image © 2007 TerraMetrics
Pointer 33°03'11.42" N 38°57'59.81" E
Streaming 100%
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Sir Mark Sykes

MUSIC - God Save the Queen

Picture from www.dailymail.co.uk

Sir Sykes and the Middle East

"Sykes served in the South African (Boer) War (1899–1902) and was personal secretary (1904–05) to George Wyndham, British chief secretary in Ireland. After traveling in Asiatic Turkey for several years, he wrote vivid accounts of his journeys, including *Through Five Turkish Provinces* (1900) and *The Caliph's Last Heritage* (1915). He was elected to Parliament in 1911.

Early in World War I, the British government employed Sykes on diplomatic missions in the Balkans and Turkey. He then was chief British representative in the negotiations with France and tsarist Russia that resulted in a secret accord known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May 1916). Under its terms, Syria and Iraq were to be divided into spheres of French and British influence and even direct administration; Palestine was to be subject to international control. When made public by the Russian Revolutionary government in 1917, these arrangements infuriated the Arabs, who had been led to expect postwar independence. Until the end of the war Sykes undertook Middle Eastern missions for the British Foreign Office." Taken from the Encyclopedia Britannica Online

	Click here to view two obituaries for Sir. Sykes.

Current Event Connection

There are currently plans to exhume the body of Sir Sykes, who died in the 1919 flu epidemic, in an attempt to find a cure for the flu. Scientists fear a new flu pandemic and think that the virus contained in Sir Sykes' body may hold the key to a cure. For more details click here for a link to a BBC article on the topic and here for a link to an article in Guardian Unlimited, another British news source.

Sykes-Picot Agreement Map

Map from www.dartmouth.edu/~gov46/sykes-picot-1916

Map of the Boundaries of the Sykes-Picot Agreement



Text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916

It is accordingly understood between the French and British governments: That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and protect an independent Arab states or a confederation of Arab states (a) and (b) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab state or confederation of Arab states.

That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other allies, and the representatives of the sheriff of Mecca.

That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His majesty's government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government.

That Alexandretta shall be a free port as regards the trade of the British empire, and that there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards British shipping and British goods; that there shall be freedom of transit for British goods through Alexandretta and by railway through the blue area, or (b) area, or area (a); and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against British goods on any railway or against British goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That Haifa shall be a free port as regards the trade of France, her dominions and protectorates, and there shall be no discrimination in port charges or facilities as regards French shipping and French goods. There shall be freedom of transit for French goods through Haifa and by the British railway through the brown area, whether those goods are intended for or originate in the blue area, area (a), or area (b), and there shall be no discrimination, direct or indirect, against French goods on any railway, or against French goods or ships at any port serving the areas mentioned.

That in area (a) the Baghdad railway shall not be extended southwards beyond Mosul, and in area (b) northwards beyond Samarra, until a railway connecting Baghdad and Aleppo via the Euphrates valley has been completed, and then only with the concurrence of the two governments.

That Great Britain has the right to build, administer, and be sole owner of a railway connecting Haifa with area (b), and shall have a perpetual right to transport troops along such a line at all times. It is to be understood by both governments that this railway is to facilitate the connection of Baghdad with

Haifa by rail, and it is further understood that, if the engineering difficulties and expense entailed by keeping this connecting line in the brown area only make the project unfeasible, that the French government shall be prepared to consider that the line in question may also traverse the Polgon Banias Keis Marib Salkhad tell Otsda Mesmie before reaching area (b).

For a period of 20 years the existing Turkish customs tariff shall remain in force throughout the whole of the blue and red areas, as well as in areas (a) and (b), and no increase in the rates of duty or conversions from ad valorem to specific rates shall be made except by agreement between the two powers.

There shall be no interior customs barriers between any of the above-mentioned areas. The customs duties leviable on goods destined for the interior shall be collected at the port of entry and handed over to the administration of the area of destination.

It shall be agreed that the French government will at no time enter into any negotiations for the cession of their rights and will not cede such rights in the blue area to any third power, except the Arab state or confederation of Arab states, without the previous agreement of His Majesty's government, who, on their part, will give a similar undertaking to the French government regarding the red area.

The British and French government, as the protectors of the Arab state, shall agree that they will not themselves acquire and will not consent to a third power acquiring territorial possessions in the Arabian peninsula, nor consent to a third power installing a naval base either on the east coast, or on the islands, of the red sea. This, however, shall not prevent such adjustment of the Aden frontier as may be necessary in consequence of recent Turkish aggression.

The negotiations with the Arabs as to the boundaries of the Arab states shall be continued through the same channel as heretofore on behalf of the two powers.

It is agreed that measures to control the importation of arms into the Arab territories will be considered by the two governments. Link to original source

INTERESTING SIDE NOTE: while most sources agree that the Agreement was concluded by Sir Mark Sykes and Francois Picot, as the name itself indicates, one sorce indicated that the agreement was negotiated by Sir Edward Grey and Paul Cambon rather than by Sir Mark Sykes and Francois Picot. For a link to this site click here

September 1919 Time-line

1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th

10th –Anglo-French meeting at Deauville in northern France called by Lloyd George to discuss details of British troop withdrawal from Syria. Lord Allenby stressed the economic importance of Great Britain retaining control of the headwaters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk River. Lloyd George wanted Lake Tiberias to remain in British control. Neither of these claims were in line with the details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but GB had already abandoned the specific content of this agreement. This was simply a continuation of the British movement away from the terms of Sykes-Picot.

11th
12th

13th - The British gave the French a document stating that Great Britain would withdraw from Syria and Cilicia but not Palestine, which area they defined according to the ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba. This border line became known as the Deauville line.

14th

15th - Clemenceau accepted British withdrawal from Syria but did not accept the suggested changes to the border of Palestine. He reiterated the same rejection a month later, citing the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement as the source of the legal boundary line for Palestine.

16th
17th
18th
19th
20th

21st
22nd
23rd
24th
25th
26th
27th
28th
29th
30th

*Hughes, 1999, 150-53.
*McTague, 1982, 102-05.

Anglo-French Negotiations over the Boundaries of Palestine, 1919-1920

John J. McTague Jr.

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Anglo-French Negotiations Over the Boundaries of Palestine, 1919-1920

JOHN J. McTAGUE JR.*

Ever since the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, the question of Israel's borders has been a bitter source of dispute. Having captured the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights during that conflict, the Israelis have insisted upon a readjustment of their pre-1967 borders. Those boundaries in turn resulted from the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 which divided up the territory of the former British Mandate of Palestine. The events of those years are well known to all students of Middle Eastern history, but far less familiar are the negotiations which created the perimeters of Palestine in the first place. These dealings took place between the British and French governments, with the Zionist Organization as an interested third party, in the years 1919-1920; they established the present-day boundaries which exist between Israel and Jordan on the one hand, and Syria and Lebanon on the other. The following article will describe these negotiations.

In the Ottoman Empire, no political entity called "Palestine" existed at all. The Holy Land was divided up into three *sanjaqs,* one independent and the other two part of a larger *vilayet.* The *Sanjaq* of Jerusalem extended from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River and Dead Sea, with its northern boundary slightly north of Jaffa and its southern border touching Egypt. Farther north were the *sanjaqs* of Nablus and Acre in the *Vilayet* of Beirut, each ranging from the sea to the Jordan. The northern border of Acre was quite close to the current Lebanese-Israeli boundary, particularly on the

* John J. McTague Jr., teaches history at Saint Leo College in Florida.

western side. All the land east of the Jordan was included in the *Vilayet* of Syria.

During the course of the First World War, the British and French governments anticipated the defeat of the Turks, and in the famous Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 they divided the Ottoman Empire up amongst themselves, the Italians and the Russians. In this treaty, the three *sanjaqs* were placed in an area slated for international control, but the territory north of Acre and the Sea of Galilee was to be under direct French rule. The Acre-Haifa area was reserved for the British, to give them an outlet on the Mediterranean for their holdings further east in Trans-Jordania and Mesopotamia.[1]

This agreement was concluded by the Asquith government, but once David Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916, the British began to take a much more active interest in the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular. A British army (the Egyptian Expeditionary Force) crossed the Sinai in the autumn of 1917 and in the course of the following year succeeded in clearing the Turks out of all the territory up to Damascus. Therefore, at the war's end the British were occupying most of the area known as the Levant.[2]

This new situation caused the Lloyd George government to take a rather dim view of the provisions of Sykes-Picot. In early October 1918, the Prime Minister informed the War Cabinet that the Agreement was outdated and did not apply to the current circumstances. In what was to become the standard British argument for revision of the treaty, he told his colleagues that "having been concluded more than two years ago, it entirely overlooked the fact that our position in Turkey had been won by very large British forces, whereas our Allies had contributed little to the result."[3] Consequently, he soon took steps to rectify this alleged inequity.

French Premier Georges Clemenceau visited London in early December, a few weeks after the armistice, and Lloyd George managed to get him to agree to hand over Palestine and Mosul to Britain, despite the terms of Sykes-Picot. This new arrangement was never put into writing but the Prime Minister revealed it in his memoirs.[4] The only other record of it was made by Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, in his diary. His version was

[1] J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East,* Vol. II (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1956), pp. 18-22.

[2] *Times,* Sept. 23, 1918, p. 8; Oct. 28, 1918, p. 6; Nov. 1, 1918, p. 8.

[3] War Cabinet Meeting, Oct. 3, 1918, Cabinet Papers, CAB 23/8/482. The Cabinet Papers are located in the Public Records Office, London.

[4] David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties,* Vol. II (London: Gollancz, 1938), p. 1038.

almost identical but he admitted, "That was only secondhand from Ll.G. for I was not present."[5] Despite the informality of this agreement, Lloyd George and Clemenceau held to it and it became the basis for legitimizing the British claim to Palestine.

However, the French maintained that the boundary between Lebanon-Syria and Palestine — whether internationalized or British — would remain as Sykes and Picot had drawn it. Consequently, they were quite surprised — and unpleasantly so — when at the Versailles Conference (June 1919) the British delegation presented several maps which pushed Palestine's border considerably north and east of the Sykes-Picot line. Clemenceau and his Foreign Minister, George Pichon, rejected these proposals out of hand.[6] Although the specific boundary lines are not known, they more than likely were based on suggestions which the Zionist Organization had submitted in February 1919. In their recommendations to the Peace Conference, the Zionists had suggested a boundary which started on the coast north of the Litani River, then ran due east until intersecting that river, whence it headed southeast to the Hejaz Railway. From there it ran south, parallel and slightly west of the Railway all the way to the Gulf of Aqaba, thus including both banks of the Jordan.[7] Consequently, this proposal considerably reduced the area under French control, and it is hardly surprising that the French refused to consider it.

The matter then rested until September, when the British proposed withdrawing their troops south from Syria and Lebanon to be replaced by French soldiers. The question then arose as to how far south they should withdraw. Lloyd George called a meeting of an informal group of advisers on September 10 at Deauville in northern France to discuss the issue. Lord Allenby noted the economic importance of retaining the headwaters of the Jordan and the Yarmuk River which was east of the Jordan, while the Prime Minister himself wanted Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee) included. Each of these areas was on the French side of the Sykes-Picot line, but British leaders had obviously decided by this time that that line would have to go.[8] As a result, three days later the Government presented the French with an *aide-mémoire* announcing their withdrawal from Syria and Cilicia. It went on to state that the army would continue to occupy Palestine, "defined in accordance with its ancient boundaries of Dan to Beersheba," a formula

[5] Stephen Roskill, *Hankey, Man of Secrets,* Vol. I (London: Collins, 1970), pp. 28-29.

[6] Minutes of the Council of Four, March 20, 1919, in Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement,* Vol. III (New York, 1922), pp. 6-7.

[7] Zionist Proposals to the Peace Conference, Feb. 3, 1919, in Meyer Weisgal (ed.), *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann* (LPCW), Series A, Vol. IX (New Brunswick, N.J., 1977), p. 392.

[8] Meeting of British Delegates to Peace Conference, Sept. 10, 1919, CAB 21/153.

which Lloyd George had derived from a book and an atlas on ancient Palestine written by a Scottish theologian named George Adam Smith.[9] The *mémoire* added that the Government was prepared to negotiate the boundary question, recommending that President Woodrow Wilson be allowed to arbitrate any disputes that might arise.[10] At a conference two days later, Clemenceau accepted the offer of the British withdrawal but he insisted that he was not conceding any of the other points in the *aid-mémoire*, including the definition of the border.[11] A month later he reiterated this claim in a letter to Lloyd George, reminding him that the Sykes-Picot line was still the legal boundary between the British and French territories.[12] Thus, a strict adherence to Sykes-Picot was to be the basis of the French position throughout most of the discussions.

The British army initially withdrew to a line which started in the west at the mouth of the Litani, followed that river until it turned north, then moved southeast to Dan (Banias), then south along the western edge of the Leja Desert to the Yarmuk.[13] Although the Foreign Office assured the French that this boundary was strictly provisional,[14] Clemenceau objected vigorously, claiming that the area around Tyre had clearly been given to his country.[15] Consequently, Lord Allenby agreed to retreat further south to territory within the jurisdiction of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA) South.[16] OETA had been established by Allenby in October 1918 to administer the conquered Ottoman lands, and it had been divided into three areas — North (Lebanon and coastal Syria), South (Palestine), and East (inland Syria and Trans-Jordania). OETA South corresponded to the *sanjaqs* of Jerusalem, Nablus and Acre, and therefore the new provisional border began just south of Ras al-Naqura and ran due east following watersheds to Lake Huleh, where it turned south to follow the Jordan into the Sea of Galilee.[17] This was a considerable distance below the earlier line, but the Quai d'Orsay still protested that it was beyond the

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] *Aide-Mémoire* in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandates, Sept. 13, 1919 in E.L. Woodward and R.A. Butler (eds.), *Documents on British Foreign Policy* (DBFP), Vol. I (London: H.M.S.O., 1952), pp. 700-701.

[11] Meeting of the Five Principal Allied and Associated Powers, Sept. 15, 1919, CAB 23/12/622, App. I.

[12] Clemenceau to Lloyd George, Oct. 10, 1919, *DBFP*, IV, p. 454.

[13] Meinertzhagen to Curzon, Nov. 17, 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 533-35.

[14] Curzon to Cambon, Nov. 22, 1919, *ibid.*, p. 550.

[15] Note by Lord Hardinge, Nov. 29, 1919, *ibid.*, p. 560.

[16] Allenby to Churchill, Nov. 29, 1919, *ibid.*, p. 591.

[17] Capt. Cyril Falls and Sir George McMunn (compilers), *Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine*, Vol. II (London: H.M.S.O., 1930), p. 607.

Sykes-Picot boundary.[18] Nevertheless, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, reminded them that Lloyd George had reserved the right at Deauville to retain Palestine from Dan to Beersheba (although the OETA border was south of Dan) and refused to heed their request.[19] This so-called Deauville Line remained the northern boundary until a permanent border was agreed to in 1923.

In seeking that permanent border, the British based their arguments on the issue of economic necessity. E.A. Stanton, a geographer who had studied Palestine, told the Government that the headwaters of the Jordan and other waters north of the legal boundary were essential for the successful development of agriculture.[20] His opinion was seconded by Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, a Zionist sympathizer who had recently been appointed Chief Political Officer for Palestine. He argued that both the Sykes-Picot Line and the Deauville Line were woefully inadequate for the development of Jewish agriculture. Therefore, he proposed a new boundary which began on the coast just north of the Litani and followed it east and then north beyond the headwaters of the Jordan before turning southeast. It moved due south until reaching the Gulf of Aqaba, remaining 25 to 30 kilometres west of the Hejaz Railway, but considerably east of the Jordan River. Thus, his proposal granted Palestine less territory than did the Zionist suggestion, but it was far more generous than either the Deauville or Sykes-Picot lines.[21]

Philippe Berthelot, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry, sent the Foreign Office a note early in December conceding some minor revisions of the Sykes-Picot Line and the use of water resources on the French side of the border. But Eric Forbes-Adam and Robert Vansittart, who reviewed his proposal at the Foreign Office, did not consider it satisfactory and, as a result, a meeting was held in London later in the month to discuss the issue, along with several other Middle Eastern questions.[22]

Berthelot was met across the table by Lord Curzon. The Frenchman began the discussion by claiming that Clemenceau insisted on the Sykes-Picot Line but was willing to grant Palestine 33 percent of the water power from rivers flowing south from Mount Hermon. The British then proposed that the Meinertzhagen Line be accepted but Berthelot quickly rejected that idea. Curzon noted that Lloyd George had publicly committed himself to a

[18] Ministère des affaires étrangères to Lord Derby, Dec. 26, 1919, *DBFP*, IV, p. 604.

[19] Curzon to Derby, Jan. 8, 1920, *ibid.*, p. 610.

[20] Stanton to Foreign Office, Oct. 22, 1919, Foreign Office Papers, F.O. 371/4184/144025. The Foreign Office Papers are located in the Public Records Office, London.

[21] Meinertzhagen to Curzon, Nov. 17, 1919, *DBFP*, IV, p. 533-35.

[22] Berthelot to Foreign Office, Dec. 12, 1919, and Comments by Forbes-Adam and Vansittart, Dec. 18, 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 577-87.

Palestine from Dan to Beersheba and could not now back down; Berthelot replied that France had never agreed to such a border. The meeting then adjourned with no agreement.[23]

Forbes-Adam concluded from these discussions that the French were being obstinate in order to gain some concessions elsewhere from Britain. Since Berthelot had hinted that France was interested in gaining Trans-Jordania and might give way on the Palestine boundary in return, Forbes-Adam suggested that His Majesty's Government go along and consider some type of bargain in order to gain their desiderata.[24] From this vantage point, it does appear that the French were justified in expecting some *quid pro quo;* they had already made two major concessions (handing over Palestine and Mosul) without receiving anything in return. Now they were being asked to agree to a third revision of Sykes-Picot, on the premise that Palestine needed certain waterways for its economy. One cannot fault them for their unwillingness to concede without some compensation.

The discussions were resumed in February 1920 at another conference in London, but by then a familiar figure had left the scene. Clemenceau had decided to run for the office of President of the Republic in January, but he had been defeated by Paul Deschanel, who then appointed Alexandre Millerand as Premier. This change made negotiations somewhat more difficult, for the Middle East settlement had been based on the verbal agreement made by Lloyd George and Clemenceau in December 1918. Nonetheless, at this new conference, the British leader used all of his considerable powers of persuasion on Berthelot; he protested that the British were taking on a heavy burden by assuming Palestine and that for the country to have any chance for prosperity, it would be necessary to have more than "the barren rocks of Judea." He argued that the northern waters, though on the French side of the Sykes-Picot Line, were vital to Palestine but of minor significance to Syria. He and Berthelot went back and forth for two days along familiar lines, and finally Lloyd George asked the Frenchman to meet privately with Curzon in an attempt to reach some compromise. Three days later Berthelot returned to announce that he would accept Palestine "to be defined in accordance with its ancient limits of Dan to Beersheba." He claimed that what had changed his mind had been Smith's book on Palestine (which Lloyd George had just given to him), but more than likely he and Curzon had arranged some trade-off, for the two negotiators immediately launched into a discussion of French oil rights in Mesopotamia. In any event, he qualified his acceptance of the boundary by

[23] Anglo-French Meeting in London, Dec. 23, 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 595-603.
[24] Memorandum by Forbes-Adam, Dec. 30, 1919, *ibid.*, pp. 607-9.

adding that it "must be regarded as provisional pending M. Millerand's approval."[25]

Such approval was to prove very difficult to come by, for the Premier was taking a much more intractable line in his own conversations. The Zionist Organization was not satisfied with the "Dan to Beersheba" formula and had been pushing for the Meinertzhagen Line as a minimum,[26] but when Nahum Sokolow interviewed Millerand on February 8 he found him uncompromising. The French Premier remarked that, while he wished to be helpful, the people of Syria would not allow him to turn over any additional territory or water power; therefore, he would not consent to any border rectifications.[27] As a result, the Foreign Office became convinced that they had better accept Berthelot's offer while it was on the table, and they recommended that Lloyd George do so at the next Allied Conference at San Remo in April.[28]

But the Prime Minister apparently hoped to win even more generous boundaries, for when Berthelot spoke at San Remo of finalizing the "Dan to Beersheba" formula, Curzon replied that the boundaries should not be fixed without consulting Emir Faisal, who was to rule Syria under a French mandate. This appears to have been a rather blatant attempt to use Faisal's influence to win further border concessions from the French. Berthelot was somewhat annoyed at this tactic, but he agreed to postpone consideration of the border question if the disposition of the mandates was settled. Consequently, Britain was awarded the Mesopotamia and Palestine mandates and France the one for Syria, but the borders between these territories were left undetermined.[29]

With the temporary cessation of Inter-Allied Conferences, the boundary question was now left to Vansittart, who was stationed in Paris. In June he reported that public opinion there was turning anti-British because of the seemingly incessant demands Lloyd George was making, and that Berthelot was under attack for being too conciliatory. Therefore, he feared that no further concessions would be gained for the time being.[30] A week later he had even worse news – that Millerand had rejected Berthelot's proposal of February and had substituted a new border which started just north of Acre, jumped north to include Dan, then followed the Jordan River south from

[25] Allied Conference in London, Feb. 17, 18, 21, 1920, *DBFP*, VII, pp. 99-119, 173-85.

[26] Weizmann to Lloyd George, Dec. 29, 1919, *LPCW*, IX, pp. 265-67, and Brandeis to Lloyd George, Feb. 16, 1920, *DBFP*, VII, pp. 183-84.

[27] Sokolow's interview with Millerand, Feb. 9, 1920, F.O. 371/5113/61/484.

[28] Foreign Office Memorandum, March 11, 1920, F.O. 371/2/1375.

[29] Allied Conference at San Remo, April 24-25, 1920, *DBFP*, VIII, pp. 159-77.

[30] Vansittart to Young, June 21, 1920, *DBFP*, XIII, pp. 291-94.

Lake Huleh.[31] Trying a new tack, Vansittart then attempted to win concessions on the eastern boundary, to include the Yarmuk River in Palestine, but once again he was rebuffed.[32] It was evident that the French had reached the conclusion that they had given in once too often, for they were now taking their most intransigent position of the whole negotiations.

But while Vansittart was painfully aware of the French position, Whitehall apparently was not. An Inter-Departmental Committee on Mandates which had been formed over the summer instructed him to push harder for inclusion of the Yarmuk in Palestine, or at least the use of the Yarmuk and Litani for irrigation.[33] That these demands were highly unrealistic was admitted by Curzon when he wrote Herbert Samuel that "we are, as you know, in a weak bargaining position in these negotiations,"[34] and a week later Vansittart replied that the French attitude was "that they have already made three important concessions on the Sykes-Picot agreement without receiving any counter consideration, and they will not and dare not go further."[35] He reiterated his pessimistic conclusions to Chaim Weizmann, President of the Zionist Organization, telling him that Palestine would not get either the Litani or Yarmuk Rivers or the east bank of the Sea of Galilee.[36] Curzon wrote back explaining that the Inter-Departmental Committee had not expected the French to make a further boundary adjustment but that water rights were essential, since "the foundation of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine... largely depends for its success on the future utilization of the waters of the Litani and the Yarmuk." He suggested that Vansittart offer to adjust the northern boundary as the French had requested in return for this concession.[37]

But when the Zionists heard that an agreement was forming along the lines of Millerand's June proposal, they protested vigorously.[38] In a letter to Curzon, Weizmann explained that his organization envisioned a system of irrigation and afforestation which would be impossible "if the regions where the works are to be laid are unsettled and beyond the jurisdiction of Palestine."[39] Thus, the British Government was now caught in the Middle

[31] Vansittart to Young, June 29, 1920, *ibid.*, pp. 298-301 and Weizmann to Samuel, July 29, 1920, *LPCW*, X, pp. 3-5.

[32] Vansittart to Curzon, July 27, 1920, F.O. 371/4164/9125.

[33] Curzon to Vansittart, Sept. 30, 1920, *DBFP*, XIII, pp. 349-52.

[34] Curzon to Samuel, Oct. 4, 1920, *ibid.*, p. 355, note 2.

[35] Vansittart to Curzon, Oct. 7, 1920, F.O. 371/4164/12403.

[36] Weizmann to Benjamin Cohen, Oct. 14, 1920, *LPCW*, X, pp. 61-63.

[37] Curzon to Vansittart, Oct. 16, 1920, *DBFP*, XIII, pp. 359-61.

[38] Weizmann's Letters to Balfour, Lloyd George and Samuel, Oct. 11, 1920, *LPCW*, X, pp. 57-61.

[39] Weizmann to Curzon, Oct. 30, 1920, *DBFP*, XIII, pp. 373-76.

between the Zionists – who wanted further border changes – and the French, who believed they had already granted too many.

Although concerned about a possible estrangement with the French,[40] the Foreign Office decided to back the Zionist claims, with Curzon noting sharply that the Government "cannot but continue to regard the attitude of the French Government in this matter as unreasonable...." Since he was under the impression that the French were anxious to finalize the mandates and other related matters, he reasoned that His Majesty's Government had considerable leverage to employ.[41]

Vansittart was quick to disabuse him of that notion, however. Responding to Curzon's arguments, he revealed that the French were far from eager to sign the proposed Convention but, on the contrary, would be delighted to see it rejected, in which case they would fall back on Sykes-Picot as the only legal boundary. The Quai d'Orsay was claiming that they had agreed to Lloyd George's "Dan to Beersheba" formula only to see the British now supporting more extravagant claims made by the Zionists. He suggested that HMG accept the French offer because "the Convention is better than nothing, plus the consequences of nothing."[42]

By this time, the French had become highly suspicious about the identity of views between the Zionist Organization and Whitehall, tending to regard the former as a front for British penetration in the Middle East. Vansittart noted this belief in another letter when he concluded: "Reduced to barest terms the proposition is that the French are increasingly anti-Zionist. They mistrust and fear our whole policy in Palestine.... It is this fundamental view, rather than any superficial desire to haggle about waters, that has lain at the root of their attitude throughout the negotiations and now emerges clearly."[43]

Apparently, Vansittart's letters finally succeeded in convincing Lloyd George that no further extension of the frontier could be wrung from Millerand. At another Anglo-French Conference held in London in early December, the Prime Minister conceded that "he had come to an agreement with M. Clemenceau that the limits of Palestine should be the historical ones of Dan to Beersheba. He was prepared to abide by this agreement, and he could not support the claims of the Zionists to territorial expansion outside historic Palestine." Pleased with this announcement, Berthelot replied that France would grant water rights on the upper Jordan and the Yarmuk (but

40 Memorandum by Young, Nov. 6, 1920, *ibid.*, pp. 376-80.
41 Curzon to Vansittart, Nov. 9, 1920, *ibid.*, p. 382.
42 Vansittart to Curzon, Nov. 13, 1920, *ibid.*, pp. 384-87.
43 Vansittart to Curzon, Nov. 16, 1920, *ibid.*, pp. 390-91.

not the Litani) for any surplus not required in Syria. Both sides agreed that the water supply should be studied by a team of French, British and Zionist engineers, with any disputes to be settled by the governments in London and Paris.[44]

It seems somewhat surprising that the French suddenly became conciliatory after having taken such an intransigent line, a turn of events which led Hankey to believe that Lloyd George had outmanoeuvred Berthelot. He noted in his diary that it "is a good illustration of Ll.G's methods of doing business – to produce a maximum of informality, to get a snap decision at the fag end of a long meeting on a difficult subject, and possibly to have no record."[45] It may be for that reason that the Prime Minister praised Berthelot so lavishly in his memoirs as "much the ablest official in the Quai d'Orsay,"[46] although Vansittart, who had less success in negotiating with the Frenchman, also had kind words to say about him.[47] On the other hand, there are strong indications that the British gave Syria reciprocal rights to electric power produced in Palestine, which may have been enough to satisfy Berthelot.[48]

Consequently, a Franco-British Convention, including a section on borders, was signed on December 23, 1920. This Convention, which established what are still the legal boundaries between Israel and Syria-Lebanon, represented only a minor change from the border proposed by Millerand in June. In the east it ran south from the Yarmuk almost to the Jordan but included the mouth of the Yarmuk in Palestine. It gave the French part of the eastern shore of the Sea of Galilee, but moving north it remained east of the Jordan, leaving it in Palestinian territory up to Banias. Here it turned northwest to skirt Metullah, then due south until reaching the latitude of Lake Huleh. Then it headed west following watersheds until reaching the coast just south of Ras al-Naqura.[49] The specific boundaries were determined by a joint Boundary Commission which completed its work in February 1922, and the two countries signed that agreement on March 7, 1923, at which time the new borders went into effect.[50]

[44] Anglo-French Conference in London, Dec. 4, 1920, *DBFP*, VIII, pp. 864-65.

[45] Roskill, *Hankey*, II, pp. 200-201 (diary of Dec. 11, 1920).

[46] Lloyd George, *Peace Treaties*, Vol. II, pp. 1103-4.

[47] Lord Vansittart, *The Mist Procession* (London, 1958), pp. 247-49.

[48] Tilley to Deedes, Dec. 21, 1920, *DBFP*, XIII, pp. 419-20, and Samuel to Curzon, Nov. 27, 1920, *ibid.*, p. 392, note 2.

[49] "Franco-British Convention of 23 December 1920, on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine, and Mesopotamia," *Parliamentary Papers*, 1921, XLII (Cmd. 1195).

[50] *Ibid.*

Thus, the final boundary between Syria-Lebanon and Palestine was the result of nearly two years of intense and sometimes bitter negotiations. A year later the eastern boundary was established at the Jordan and the Dead Sea when Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill decided to separate Trans-Jordania from Palestine,[51] while the southwestern border remained the pre-war one with Egypt. But these decisions were not controvesial compared to the one we have described. The basic problem derived from the fact that the British Government, backed by the Zionist Organization, wanted to revise the borders laid down in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Their argument was based on the importance for Palestinian agriculture of waters which flowed north of that boundary, but the French countered by stressing the sanctity of a written agreement. In Britain's favour was the indisputable fact that its troops had conquered the Middle East without French assistance but, on the other hand, France had already consented to two revisions of Sykes-Picot without any compensation. Throughout the year 1919, Lloyd George campaigned to move the border north as far as Dan (Banias), and in February 1920 Berthelot made that concession. But no sooner had he done so when British negotiators, at the request of the Zionists, began pushing for borders even further north and east as well. This impertinence greatly angered the French and as a result they took a much tougher line, refusing any further concessions. Vansittart attempted to negotiate with them throughout the summer and autumn of 1920, but with a singular lack of success. Then, fearing that they would lose everything if no agreement was signed, the Foreign Office convinced Lloyd George to accept the "Dan to Beersheba" he had originally demanded, which was therefore incorporated into the Franco-British Convention of December 1920.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of these negotiations was the complete absence of any input from the Palestinians. Despite the fact that they comprised roughly 90 percent of the population, leaders of the Palestine Arab community were never consulted about the borders of their own country; on the other hand, Zionist officials were regularly briefed by the Foreign Office on the state of conversations with the French. This was a typical example of the manner in which the Palestinian Arabs were treated after World War I — as a conquered people who had no right to determine their own future.[52] The only instance in which any Arab was mentioned in regard to the negotiations came at San Remo when Curzon suggested that

[51] Conversations between Churchill and Abdullah, March 28-30, 1921, CAB 24/126/1123, pp. 172-74.

[52] For a more complete discussion of this unfair treatment, see my unpublished dissertation "British Policy in Palestine, 1917-1922," University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1974.


The white area represents the area which the Zionist Organization wished to set aside for Jewish settlement, February 1919.
Meinertzhagen Line
Deauville Line
Sykes-Picot Line
Final Boundary Line
Mediterranean Sea
EGYPT (British)
Beirut
Litani
Damascus
Sidon
Tyre
Metullah
Banias (Dan)
Kuneitra
Acre
Safed
Haifa
Sea of Galilee
Tiberias
Nazareth
Yarmuk
Deraa
Beit Shean
Nablus
Jordan
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Amman
Jericho
Jerusalem
Bethlehem
Dead Sea
Gaza
Hebron
Rafah
Beersheba
El Arish
Maan
HEJAZ RAILWAY to Mecca
Aqaba
0 10 20 30
Miles

Faisal be consulted before final borders were fixed; but this was only a ruse to extract further concessions from the French. The British imperialist mentality was unable to admit the right of the Arabs to self-determination, and thus the Foreign Office never considered the possibility that the Palestinians might have their own ideas about the boundaries of their country. As a result, the borders of Palestine were drawn up to meet the needs, not of the indigenous Arabs, but of the Zionists, most of whom had never been any closer to the country than the pages of the Old Testament could take them.

BASIS OF THE SYRIAN CLAIMS

Friend of Prince Feisal, Son of the King of Hedjaz, Just Elected to the Throne, Tells of Hopes of the Arab Nationalists

The writer of this article was born in the Near East, and speaks Arabic. He has talked with Prince Feisal in his native tongue in Damascus and London. He was summoned from Beirut to Damascus by the Arab Government to confer with the Crane-King Commission; and he has discussed the Syrian problem with the late Sir Mark Sykes, who negotiated the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916.

By FREDERICK JONES BLISS,

Late Field Officer of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

THE events of the last five years appear to have led up almost inevitably to the nationalistic coup in Syria, which was expected to culminate on March 20 with the crowning of the Emir Feisal as King of Syria. According to late dispatches, Mr. Lloyd George has stated in Parliament that the British and French Governments cannot recognize as valid Feisal's recent election by the All-Syrian Congress at Damascus.

Let me say at once that Feisal has always been, and still desires to be, a loyal ally of England. Any straining of that loyalty is due to the results of British war diplomacy, which, perhaps necessarily, suffered from a lack of coordination among the agents of the Foreign Office. To hold that diplomacy during the time of war may be judged by the lofty ethical standards imperative in a time of peace, is to indulge in a dream of the reign of "a counsel of perfection," and is to forget the sudden and unforeseen exigencies of military necessity.

The above remark is offered not by way of excuse, but in explanation of the mutually excluding arrangements entered into by Great Britain with the French, the Arabs and the Zionists. These arrangements were made by different agents at different times, quite possibly unaware of the details of each other's negotiations. The Prime Minister, under whose final authority they were undertaken, was succeeded, before they could be carried into effect, by a man whose power lies rather in the "will-to-win" than in a knowledge of history, geography, and the whole art of foreign affairs, and who possesses a defective political memory.

For an Arab Empire.

As I have heard Feisal state, his chief aim has looked to an undivided Arab Empire including Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. Such was his understanding of the arrangement made in 1915 between Colonel Lawrence and his own father, Huessein, the Grand Sherif of Mecca and now King of the Hedjaz. The unity of Arabic-speaking lands was thus Feisal's main purpose. He accepted the principle of mandates, recognizing the need of his people for tuition in the art of government as well as in matters financial and economic, but he felt most strongly that the application of this mandatory principle should in no wise prejudice the all-controlling demand for unity.

The temporary division, pending the final settlements of the Peace Conference (made at the time of the occupation of Syria), into three zones, the British remaining in Palestine, the French in civil control of the Syrian littoral (with the Lebanon) and the Arabs, under himself, directing the internal administration of the hinterland from Damascus as a centre, but all three zones under British military control—this partition he took at its face value as a necessary and proper division of labor among the Allies associated in the conquest. When it was announced by the Supreme Council in September, 1919, that there would shortly go into effect a readjustment of the status quo by which the British military control of Syria proper should be replaced by French, his already awakened suspicions that the alleged temporary arrangements foreshadowed a predetermined crystallization were immensely strengthened. This news reached him on his arrival in Marseilles from Syria early in September. That the permanency of such a division would put an end to his hopes for an undivided Arab Empire from the Egyptian border to Persia was painfully plain. He saw that this partition would arouse the antagonism of the Nationalists—Moslem, Christian and Druse alike—whose program was clearly stated by the All-Arab Congress that met in Damascus in June, 1919.

Prince Feisal of Hedjaz, Recently Elected King of Syria.

Single Mandate Preferred.

Whatever difference of opinion there may have been as to the desirability of inviting this or that mandatory power, the conviction that there should be but one mandate was almost universal. The exception, of course, was in the "Ulster" of Syria, namely, the Lebanon, three-quarters of whose inhabitants are Maronite Roman Catholics, and who, at least in the early period of the armistice, would have welcomed a French mandate confined to the greater Lebanon. This party had thousands of adherents in Beirut and other coast towns. They probably do not include more than one-seventh of the entire population of Syria and Palestine.

I saw Feisal soon after his arrival in London, and he solemnly declared that the proposed change would result in a general uprising. His month's stay in England was spent in an attempt to convince the Foreign Office of the serious aspects of the case. Toward the end of his sojourn he told me that he had emphasized the conditions to various members of the British Cabinet, naming them one after another. His proposition to refer a reconsideration of the proposed change to a council of four—one British representative, one French, one American and himself—fell through. Clemenceau, however, consented to discuss the matter personally with him in Paris. These conversations were apparently unsatisfactory to the Prince, although it appears some sort of modus vivendi was agreed upon. The British withdrew from Syria in December. Feisal's landing at Beirut in January, 1920, was hailed with great acclaim by the Nationalists, whose bold proclamations of independence were not interfered with by the French, who, however, detailed a band of French soldiers to escort the procession with fixed bayonets. Feisal almost at once proceeded to Damascus.

Since then events have matured rapidly. The French set-back in Marash has doubtless had an influence in their determination. As to Feisal's attitude toward the Turkish nationalists, certain dispatches declare that he forbade the Arabs to co-operate with them, while others indicate that he has countenanced the threats of such co-operation, in case the unity of Syria is prejudiced by the decision of the powers. But no reliance can be placed on these reports in any way.

Who the Arabs Are.

Current newspaper comment on the Syrian situation too often shows considerable confusion in the use of the word "Arab." It sometimes differentiates the Moslems from the Christians by referring to the Moslems as Arabs, with the implication that the Christians are something quite different. As a matter of fact, the only fairly pure Arab blood in Syria and Palestine is found among the Bedawin and in a few noble families, in one case, certainly, Christian. All Syrians are as apt to refer to themselves as "children of the Arabs" as to use the term Syrians. The entire population may be called Arabic in virtue of a common language. At the time of the Arab conquest, roughly speaking, one-half of the already mixed population became Moslems and half remained Christians. Infusion of Arab blood was due to intermarriage with the conquerors, presumably much more common with the converts to Islam than with those that kept the faith. Christian and Moslem elements of the settled population have far more in common with each other than they have with the Bedawin.

Feisal's position rests on grounds both solid and valid, always provided that he has the backing of the majority of the Syrian and Palestinian population, which by all the indications seems assured. (I cannot speak for Mesopotamia). The matter is one of great simplicity. The United States has joined the Entente in certain promises, and it is our job to see that these are carried out. Two official utterances of France and England, grant to the Syrians the right of self-determination and, ipso facto, render null and void the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916 (which, inter alia, recognized two special zones of influence, Palestine for the British and Syria for the French).

One Official Declaration.

Here is a quotation from the "Text of declaration agreed to between the British and French Governments and communicated to the President of the United States of America": "The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in waging in the East the war let loose on the world by German ambition, is to insure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish national governments and administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the people themselves."

This declaration was published on Nov. 14, 1918, in the Palestine News, the official organ of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under General Allenby, and was reprinted (in translation) in the Arabic and French press. I questioned at the time my friend the late Sir Mark Sykes (who is said to have greatly regretted the treaty which he made with Picot) as to the authority of the above-quoted declaration, and he declared that every word thereof was carefully weighed, in repeated communications between Paris and London, and London and Paris. It is significant that so little has been heard since of this pronouncement.

Again, the Twenty-second Section (in part) of the League of Nations Covenant as adopted by the Peace Conference, April 28, 1919, declares: "Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independnt nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatary until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power."

In addition there are two statements by President Wilson: one constituting the twelfth of the Fourteen Points; the other contained in his address at Mount Vernon, May 4, 1918. These, among other matters, recognize the right of such nationalities as Syria to "an absolutely unwarranted opportunity of autonomous development" (twelfth point); and that their "political relationships" should rest "upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may deside a different settlement for the sake of its exterior influence or mastery." (Mount Vernon address.)

Despairs of Our Aid.

According to recent dispatches, Feisal's plan for the independent, undivided Arab Kingdom, including Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia, is not intended "to offset the present European administration," and would advocate "the assistance of British and French advisers." He has apparently lost hope of that American assistance which he so passionately desired. This almost universal Arab desire for American help (greatly stimulated by the hopes raised by the excellent, impartial work of the Crane-King Commission) was based on the belief that she alone of all the powers would disinterestedly treat the mandate as a mandate, educational, and therefore temporary.

The roots of the objection to the French, entertained for some time, but apparently at present modified, are not so easy to determine. The fear that she would come to stay might be equally entertained in regard to England. At any rate, the All-Syrian Congress of June, 1919, whose second choice was England, rejected the idea of French help. Possibly the preceding eight months of French administration in Beyrout had much to do with the matter. This administration was felt to lack in power, in efficiency, in impartiality and in tact. It grew less popular as time went on, even with the Maronites, who had so ardently welcomed it. As a matter of fact, the quite unseen success of the Allenby drive had suddenly thrown on the hands of the Allies a large territory, calling for administration. This fell to the French, who apparently had not the right men immediately available. Many of the officials have since been replaced by men of superior quality.

Feisal is apparently not averse to recognizing the autonomy of the Lebanon, under the suzerainty of the Arab Empire, analagous, mutatis mutandis, to its relation to the Turkish Empire.

Whether or not the proposed new Arab kingdom will be a success is a case of solvitur ambulando. One important element in that success, if it comes to pass, will be the character of Feisal. Looking back on my intimacy with him both in Damascus and in London, I can unhesitatingly register my conviction that there is a soul, democratic, liberal minded, strong, patriotic, not personally ambitious in any undesirable sense, of deliberate rather than of impulsive nature, eager for disinterested advice from any source, and by no means a religious fanatic. Among the most trusted and most devoted of his advisers are found Syrian Christians. He has said that one of his highest hopes is to see an American college at Jiddah, the port of Mecca. May it not be possibly significant that the day announced by the dispatches as the date of coronation was Saturday, and not the sacred Moslem Friday?

Feisal's charm of manner, in which reticence alternates with delightful frankness, is by no means his least asset. He is very adaptable. At the luncheon table of the Rochester Deanery, in old England, where we were together as guests, he might have passed for an Italian nobleman, in the most correct of European dress. Later the inevitable photograph was taken. The donning of the Arab head-dress and cloak instantly transformed him into a Prince of the Desert. His very walk was changed into the "stage-stride" of the Arab.

According to the best of my knowledge and belief, Feisal's personal character is beyond reproach. My opinion is shared by those closest to him. The surest hopes of the Arab Nationalists lie in the simple fact that their leader is a good man.

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FRENCH AND BRITISH AT OUTS OVER SYRIA

Differences That in Ordinary Times Would Be Serious Have Arisen in Asia Minor.

FRENCH STAND ON TREATY

Demand That Britain Turn Over Territory Allotted to France but Conquered and Held by British.

By CHARLES A. SELDEN.

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Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

PARIS, Aug. 3.—If there had not just been a war, if all the world were not helpless to start another war now, there would be in the present British-French situation in Asia Minor all the ingredients of at least what used to be called "war scare." The Fashoda incident offered nothing by comparison with present heartburnings in the French Foreign Office over the British policy in Syria since the war ended. But there is no war scare; not only no war scare, but Frenchmen most deeply resentful of the British attitude in Asia Minor scout the idea of their ever being another war between England and France. Perhaps even "strained relations" is too strong an expression to use in connection with this situation, for what strain exists is much more than offset by French gratitude to England at this moment for the prompt action of the British Parliament in ratifying the separate treaty to come immediately to French assistance in case of German aggression.

Nevertheless, in its gratitude for this British assurance of protection on the Rhine, France by no means is disregarding the fact that, in the opinion of the Quai d'Orsay, England is deliberately violating French rights in a big section of Asia Minor, where British troops of occupation and British civil administrators are kept in control, despite various urgent appeals from the French Foreign Office to have them withdrawn and the territory placed in French charge.

A Franco-British Treaty.

France bases her claims on the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, which was entered into between only France and England. The year previous there had been an agreement concerning the future disposition of Turkey in Asia made by England, France, and Russia. The present British view, as it is interpreted in France, is that with the collapse of Russia the agreement, including her and the Sykes-Picot Treaty both, became invalid. France disputes that on the ground that Russia was not a party to the Sykes-Picot Treaty, so her collapse was not in anyway a factor.

By the agreement to which Russia was a party that country was to have Constantinople and be allowed to push her own Armenian border further west into Turkish Armenia.

By the Sykes-Picot treaty France was to have the immense territory bounded by a line starting at Lammas, on the coast, and running northeasterly to Sivas thence through Kharput and Diarbekir and on east to the Persian border, thence back southwesterly to a point on the Mediterranean coast to Syria, just north of Akka. The Syrian coast, with the Mediterranean coast of Syria, just and as far north as Aintab, was to be under a direct French administration. The rest of allotment was under French supervision.

England, by the terms of this Sykes-Picot treaty, was to have the whole of Mesopotamia with Bagdad, plus the seaports of Akka and Haifa, just south of the French line where it reached the Syrian coast.

There was still a third agreement made about the same time by England, France, and Italy by which the latter country was to have a big southern section of Anatolia. That agreement is not a factor in the present controversy between France and England.

When the question of mandates first attracted attention France expressed willingness to surrender the northern triangular section of her Sykes-Picot allotment ending in an apex at Sivas, because that portion formed a big wedge in the territory which France hoped—still hopes—the United States will take as an Armenian mandate. The British recognition of the independence of the King of the Hedjaz wiped out practically the whole French claim under the treaty to the hinterland east of the Syrian coast.

The French Complaint.

"England is basing her policy on two grounds," said a French Foreign Office member to me today. "One is that Russia has collapsed, which we do not admit to be relevant at all to the Sykes-Picot treaty. The other ground is that it was British troops which conquered Mesopotamia and won all the other victories in Asia Minor with practically no assistance. That is true; France had at most only 5,000 troops there. But that does not invalidate the treaty agreement of 1916.

"We can get no satisfaction from the British Foreign Office in the matter, nothing but delays, postponements and evasions. England's official Government policy is vague and apparently colorless, but that is not what we fear most. It is the unofficial but very aggressive and positive policy of the Anglo-Indians and Anglo-Egyptians that France has to fear, for they are the real leaders who always determine the final British policy in all matters Asiatic. The whole past record entitles us to assume that they will prevail now.

"The cardinal point of this unofficial policy, which eventually will be official, is the protection of India. England in the present Asia Minor situation sees an opportunity to put a finishing touch on her work of the last thirty years to keep Russia from penetrating to India. England says now that these agreements of 1915 and 1916 concerning the future disposition of the Turkish empire are invalidated, because one of them included Russia, which is now out of existence. England knows Russia is not out of existence permanently, and fears her coming back to normal power and a resumption of her old Asiatic aims. France also knowing Russia will come back sooner or later, our Foreign Office is not in favor of a Turkish policy which would leave nothing for Russia in the future.

French Object to Independent States.

"The first violation of the Sykes-Picot treaty by the British was in their recognition of the independency of the kingdom of the Hedjaz, which included much of the French zone. They even recognized as one of the Arabian capitals the city of Damascus, which is in our territory. We submitted because war and European conditions in general made us helpless to do otherwise.

"During the war when her troops were making conquests in Asia England had some excuse, but the excuse does not hold now. Why do they continue to occupy and control territory which should pass under French administration? They are spending money lavishly for propaganda on the native populations whom we should administer. There is one most significant point of the propaganda. It is in encouraging the Syrians to think they are now competent for complete self-government and start a movement for that liberty. What would be the result of such an attempt? England knows very well it would be a failure. The Turks, Jews and Christians, left to themselves, would soon have a turmoil of disorder demanding intervention of troops to save life and property. British troops in Mesopotamia, being the nearest neighbors, would be the ones to do the intervening, and that would be an excuse for permanent British occupation and administration. The fact that there had been a hiatus during which self-government was tried and failed would serve as another argument for the invalidity of the treaty agreement with France.

"But we do not have to look to the future for a cause for anxiety. Present conditions are bad enough. The British refuse to leave our zone. They even send such French troops as there are away from the regions we should control to such places as Adana and elsewhere in Cilicia, which region may come under the American mandate for Armenia.

"The case of the town of Beirut, which is almost at the centre of the coastline allotted to France, furnishes a good example. The British control it. A Frenchman may have had business in Beirut before the war. Now he is not allowed to go there, but an Englishman who had no business there before the war now has no difficulty in going there to establish an entirely new enterprise.

"There was a time in European history when such conditions would surely have meant war, but, happily, there is no danger of that now, as bad as things are. We admit the Sykes-Picot treaty is badly riddled now. We are only trying to use that document as a basis of negotiation over what is left. We have lost much of what we want and are entitled to. Despite the British attitude, we still expect to get a Syrian coast strip from just north of Akka to Latakia."

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HOW TWO AMERICANS PLANNED TO SETTLE NEAR EAST PROBLEM

Second Part of Long-Hidden Crane-King Report Put Forth Definite Suggestions.

CUTTING UP OLD TURKEY

Powers Warned of the Dangers of Selfish Division and Exploitation.

PLAN FOR SEPARATE ARMENIA

In Which by 1925 Armenians Themselves Would Control—A Separate Constantinople.

By courtesy of the periodical, The Editor and Publisher, which has obtained from former President Wilson the long-withheld King-Crane report on conditions in the Near East, THE NEW YORK TIMES *presents to its readers the latter half of that report. The first part was published in yesterday's* TIMES. *The report was prepared by Henry Churchill King, President of Oberlin College, and Charles R. Crane, members of the American Commission on Mandates in Turkey, appointed after the Peace Conference in* 1919. *Mr. Crane is a Chicago manufacturer and served as United States Minister to China from May,* 1920, *to June,* 1021. *The Commission had in its survey of Syria the assistance of Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery and Captain William Yale, U. S. A., as advisers; of Captain Donald M. Brodie, U. S. A., as secretary and treasurer; of Dr. Sami Haddad, instructor in the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, as physician and interpreter; of Laurence S. Moore as business manager and of Sergt. Major Paul O. Toren as stenographer. The advisers had all been previously connected as experts with the Peace Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East.*

TEXT OF THE REPORT.

(Second Part.)

NON-ARABIC SPEAKING PORTIONS OF THE FORMER OTTOMAN EMPIRE.

The method of inquiry, in making our survey of the Asia Minor portion of our task, has necessarily differed from that followed in the study of Syria. For our ultimate duty, according to our instructions, is "to form an opinion • • • of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates which will be most likely to promote the order, peace and development" of the peoples concerned.

Now we faced in Turkey a unique situation as to mandates. In Syria we were in a region already virtually separated from the Turkish Empire, a region whose boundaries were in general clear, and a region recognized as under a temporary government. In such a territory it was entirely feasible to go from community to community to seek the desires of the peoples concerning a mandate. None of these conditions held for Asia Minor.

For in the case of the proposed State of Armenia, for example, the territory was not yet set off, nor its boundaries even approximately known; the Armenians were not largely present in any of the territory to be assigned; the wishes of the Armenians themselves as to mandate were already known; and the wishes of the rest of the population could not be taken primarily into account, since the establishment of the Armenian State would be in a sense penal for the Turkish people, and naturally to be accepted only as a necessity.

If a Constantinopolitan State were to be set off, similar difficulties in getting the wishes of the people upon a mandate would be encountered. For the primary interest in such a State is a world interest, rather than a local one; the population would be likely to shift considerably with so new a policy, and so the choice of the present population, especially in such troublous times, would not be particularly significant; and the fact that a large element of the population belongs to the official class would make an unbiased opinion hardly possible.

Even in the portions of Asia Minor sure to be left with the empire, an inquiry for choice of mandate, like that conducted in Syria, was not practicable. For the Peace Conference had not declared—at least up to the present—that Turkey must have a mandatory power over her, and consequently it was largely within her own choice whether she should have any mandatary at all. She had also long been an independent country, so that the mandate would be inevitably somewhat modified and adjusted ultimately somewhat modified and adjusted through agreement with the mandatary.

An Analysis Borne Out by Facts.

Moreover, even if an inquiry for choice of mandatary were feasible, it would be most difficult to get trustworthy results. For it is perfectly clear that opinion in Constantinople is not free to express itself. The Government pressure in various forms upon individuals and groups, and the partisan censorship of the press, are both manifest. In the case of an American mandate, too, it was not known whether America would take it at all; so that there was fear of punishment from some other power if declarations were made for America and she did not actually accept the mandate. Like conditions held in the interior, and there is even less understanding there of the political situation; so that it was felt that there would not be much gain from further inquiry in other parts of the empire, in addition to the frequent reports by various investigators to which we already had access.

The plainly imperative need of the whole country for as prompt a settlement as possible of its fate also led the commission to give up visits to various parts of the empire, in order not to defer its report and so possibly delay action by the Peace Conference. The Commissioners have had the less hesitancy hastening their report because it was believed that the essential facts upon which recommendations must be based were already in hand.

Digging Hard for Difficult Data.

In this situation the method for our inquiry in Asia Minor has been to build, first of all, on our two months' study in Paris of the Turkish problems, in the course of which we used the reports and other material of the Western Asia division of the American experts, and had many conferences with experts there and with able authorities coming direct from Turkey; to take full advantage of all the general work done in the survey of Syria, as part of the former Turkish Empire, with its fundamentally similar problems and its incidental side-lights; especially to see as many representative groups and individuals as possible in Constantinople, and so to get reports on all phases of our inquiry, and from all parts of Asia Minor, to supplement the information so received with reports, for recent months, of the American Embassy and Consular offices (through the kind co-operation of Admiral Bristol and Commissioner Ravndal), and to supplement still further with reports of personal investigations by American missionaries knowing the country thoroughly, and by representatives of the American Commission on Relief in the Near East, and of American business corporations.

In this way a large mass of valuable material has been brought together and studied by all three advisers—Dr. Albert H. Lybyer, Dr. George R. Montgomery and Captain William Yale, U. S. A.—who summarized their inferences from it, and reported on special phases of the common problem. To test our conclusions, expert advice at all possible points was also sought from American and other leaders—many of them personally known by members of the commission. The report of the Commissioners is based on the whole of the resulting evidence.

Our report falls naturally into five divisions; pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference, dangers from a selfish division and exploitation of the Turkish Empire, considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey, resulting problems and recommendations.

I.—Pertinent Action Already Taken by the Peace Conference.

To begin with, the action creating the commission, of which the Commissioners now reporting make the American Section, was taken by the Council of Four. Our instructions were called: "Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make inquiry in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as mandataries under the League of Nations." The instructions then go on to say: "It is the purpose of the conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas comprising, for example, Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the east of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put their development under the guidance of Governments which are to act as mandataries of the League of Nations."

So far as concerns Asia Minor, this commits the conference to two courses of action: Permanent separation from the Turkish Empire of "Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor," and dealing with these territories under the mandatory, not colonial, system.

That this is the deliberate purpose of the Council is further shown by the added statement: "It is expected that this will be done in accordance with the following resolutions, adopted by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, at a conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on Jan. 30, 1919."

The Resolutions.

1. Having regard to the record of the German Administration in the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and to the menace which the possession by Germany of submarine bases in many parts of the world would necessarily constitute to the freedom and security of all nations, the allied and associated powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German colonies be restored to Germany.

2. and similar and still more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the allied and associated powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The allied and associated powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to these territories the principles that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical positions, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandataries on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The allied and associated powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory State shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

Menaces and Sacred Trusts.

The resolutions clearly assert several things:

(1) That in settling the issues of the Turkish Empire, account may rightfully be taken of any "menace" to "the freedom and security of all nations";

(2) That "the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years" constitute a special reason for separation of territory, but "without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire";

(3) That this separation of territory should be taken as a special opportunity to apply "the principle that the well-being and development of subject peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League of Nations;

(4) That this principle should be carried out through the mandatory system, which the remaining resolutions carefully define.

The instructions then continue: "And it is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document, which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France":

The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations.

In order to give effect to these intentions, France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia already liberated by the allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognize such Governments as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to insure, by their support and effective assistance, that the Governments and Administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way. The functions which the allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to insure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy.

Frank Words of Warning.

This is as admirable a statement of the spirit in which mandates should be administered as could be asked, and reflects honor on the two great allies from whom it originally came.

Taken as a whole, the action of the peace conference, in which all the Allies have shared, reflected in the forming of the Commission on Mandates and embodied in the instructions to the commission, form a solid basis for the policy to be adopted in Asia Minor. It is no sentimental program; but it is just on the one hand, and considerate on the other. If the conference proceeds, in its further dealings with Turkey, honestly and strongly and consistently to build on the foundations so prepared, essential justice will be done to all the peoples concerned, rankling wrongs will be set right, and the purposes of the Allies will be just so far vindicated.

And the peace conference should not shut its eyes to the fact that vindication is greatly needed just now. For there are set directly over against such a procedure as that now outlined and to which the peace conference is in principle and in all honesty committed, the still active policies of the old diplomacy of secret treaties and understandings and of division of spoils among victors. The direct consequences of such selfish and ultimately self-destructive policies are to be seen in all the world today. It is to be feared that some of the highest aims of the Allies in the war have already been well nigh lost, because of these policies creeping in, in all manner of "settlements." It concerns the peace conference to decide whether the same fateful method is to be followed in Turkey.

II.—The Dangers of a Selfish Division and Exploitation of the Turkish Empire.

In considering recommendations concerning the future administration of large parts of the former Turkish Empire, involving millions of people, it is imperative that the Peace Conference should make clear to itself from the beginning the serious dangers involved in the selfish and divisive national and corporate policies into which the Allies have been drifting in their treatment of the Turkish Empire, and should squarely challenge that drift at once.

No doubt this policy of selfish exploitation in Turkey is in its entirety not the deliberate aim of any power. Much confusion has unavoidably prevailed. The demands upon the Allies and upon the peace conference have been beyond human power wholly to meet. Under the pressure of immediate necessity for some kind of action, many steps have been taken in good faith, which have later proved temptations to selfish advantage, and provocations to jealousy and suspicion. The situation, too, has been most complex, by reason of previous engagements and of countless inter-relations of interest—private, party, national and international. This complexity has often made it honestly difficult to disentangle exactly the right course.

But, however the drift toward selfish exploitation of the Turkish Empire has come about, there should be no mistake about the fact or its dangers. It needs to be said and heeded that Constantinople is once again a net of selfish, suspicious, hateful intrigue, reaching out over the whole empire, if not the world. What will it mean if this policy is allowed to prevail? In definitely raising this question, the Commissioners are not for an instant supposing that there is any easy and inexpensive solution of the Turkish problem. The justest solution at best will not be wholly welcome to Turkey, and will encounter her opposition. But in such a solution the Allies could at least know that their sacrifices were being made for the establishment of progressively righteous relations among men, not for sowing the seeds of endless and bitter discord.

A Test of War Aims.

In seeking, then, a practical plan for the righteous treatment of the Turkish Empire, the Allies should bear clearly in mind that their fidelity to their announced aims in the war is here peculiarly to be tested; and that, in the proportion in which the division of the Turkish Empire by the Allies is made a division of spoils by victors, and is primarily determined by the selfish national and corporate interests of the Allies, in just that proportion will grave dangers arise.

(1) Such a division, in the first place, would have to be forced upon the peoples concerned—not chosen by them. Every separate occupation of territory would be resented, and felt to be a constant injustice. The feeling of the Turkish people concerning the occupation of the Smyrna region by the Greeks is illustrative. They cannot be convinced that such seizure of territory can be harmonized with the professed principles of the Allies in the war. In such a case there is no possibility of laying the foundations of truly cordial relations with the Turkish people.

(2) In the second place, just because these occupations of territory have to be forced upon the Turks, a large number of troops would be required to establish and maintain each occupation. With the intolerable burdens which the war has brought upon all the nations, and with the insistent demands for the demobilization of troops, this would be certainly to pursue an increasingly serious situation. The number of troops required for an occupation looked upon as temporary and for police purposes is no measure of the forces required to maintain an aggressive and permanent seizure of territory, as the Turks themselves proved to their sorrow both in Macedonia in 1903-00 and in Yemen through a series of years. The selfishly divisive policy will go far toward turning Turkey into an armed camp and breeding a constant state of brigandage.

Smyrna—A Prophetic Utterance.

(3) It should not be forgotten, either, in the third place, that this selfishly divisive policy would naturally provoke violent retaliation, as in the whole region of Smyrna. Such retaliation, too, is likely to be visited not only upon the immediate aggressors, but also upon the Christian populations generally. For a selfish division and exploitation of territory may easily induce in the Turks the attitude that, since the worst from outside is probably to come upon them in any case, they may as well take the occasion to rid themselves entirely of those whom they look upon as internal enemies. In that case, the Allies would have to share the guilt of the Turks.

(4) Such selfish exploitation of Turkey also would not only certainly call out the resentment of the most solid portion of the American people, as emphatically not illustrating the ends for which America came into the war, but would also lose to alienate the best sentiment among all the Allies. To eliminate from the cause of the Allies this weight of moral judgment would involve a loss of influence in the world—already greatly diminished—not lightly to be faced.

(5) Such exploitation would mean, too, the deliberate sowing of dissension of the gravest kind among the Allies themselves, threatening the moral unity of their cause and entailing serious world consequences. This situation has already come to pass in no small degree. Only moral blindness can deny it. Suspicion and distrust are rife, and the meanest kind of intrigue against one another has been seen in not a few situations.

"Moral Unity" of Allies Doubted.

It may be doubted if the moral unity of the Allies is more than a fraction of what it was in the war or in the early days of the armistice. Now that is a calamity well nigh immeasurable, and it can be cured by no mechanics. Are the Allies to go on increasing this moral dissension among the world's leaders and deliberately inviting the moral shipwreck of the world by their policies in Turkey?

(6) Coupled with similar decisions already reached, selfish division and exploitation in Turkey would also go far to convince men of independent moral judgment all over the world—including many previously ardent upholders of the cause of the Allies—that the aims of the Allies had become as selfish and ruthless as those of the Germans had been. That would carry with it its own fateful consequences.

For example, no thoughtful man who had the opportunity of watching in France the upstream of American officers and soldiers and of able men enlisted for various forms of service to the soldiers, as they came and went, could fail to see among those men, as the armistice went on, the spread, like a contagion, of depression and disillusionment as to the significance of the war aims because of the selfish wrangling of the nations.

The fact should be squarely faced that thousands of Americans who served in the war have gone home disillusioned, greatly fearing, if not convinced, that the Allies had not been true to their asserted war aims, and have been consequently driven to an almost cynical view of the entire conflict—cynicism that made them feel like withdrawing all further American help, and henceforth washing their hands of the whole European imbroglio. This attitude has been reflected in many other American citizens who had been devoted supporters of the allied cause. Now that is not a good result for America, for the Allies or for the world.

Opportunity for Righteousness

But that situation, and similar situations among the best in all the Allies, can be changed only by some clear demonstration that somewhere, and on a large and impressive scale, the often asserted high and unselfish aims of the Allies have been honestly carried out. That would come like an invigorating breeze out of the north, bringing new faith in men and in the genuineness of human ideals and endeavor. That opportunity is offered, in a peculiar degree, in the righteous settlement of the problems of the Turkish Empire.

No namby-pamby, sickly, sentimental treatment is called for here. There are great and lasting wrongs in Turkey which must be set right. And there are world relations and interests honestly to be recognized and permanently to be satisfied. For the sake of justice to Turkey herself and to all her subject peoples; for the sake of the honor of the Allies and the renewed confidence of men in them; for the stemming of the tide of cynicism and selfish strife; for a fresh and powerful demonstration of moral soundness in the race, the Allies should recognize the grave danger of all selfish exploitation of Turkey and turn their backs on every last vestige of it.

III. Consideration Looking to a Proper Division of the Turkish Empire.

But if a selfishly exploiting division of the Turkish Empire is not justified it may be asked: Why is it necessary to divide Asia Minor, at least, at all? For such a division there are at least two great reasons: first, the hideous misgovernment and massacres of the Turkish rule; and second, Turkey's utter inadequacy to the strategic world position in which she is placed.

I. In the first place, there cannot be left out of account the hideous misgovernment of Turkey for centuries, even for citizens of the Turkish race.

(1) One may recognize fully the agreeable and attractive personal qualities of the Turks that commonly make them the best liked, probably, of all the peoples of the empire, and that almost unconsciously turn most foreigners who stay long in the country into pro-Turks. One may recognize, too, that there has long been in the Turkish Government a kind of negative, indolent tolerance of other peoples, that allowed them much of the time to go in their own ways, though constantly despised, robbed, oppressed. It may be granted, also, that the Turks have been successful in keeping, through long periods, widely scattered areas together and giving them a sort of unity, by the method of "divide and rule," of leaving regional governments pretty largely to themselves so long as the Turkish revenues were obtained, and of using other races very largely as officials. It is only fair, also, to remember the very considerable amount of demoralization caused by the perpetual intriguing of European powers in Turkish affairs.

Turkish Rule a Wretched Failure.

(2) But while all this may be freely admitted, it must still be clearly seen that the Government of the Turkish Empire has been for the most part a wretched failure, in spite of generally good laws. For that Government has been characterized by incessant corruption, plunder and bribery. It might almost be called a government of simple exploitation. So that Ramsey, who judges the Turk leniently, feels obliged to say: "The Turk is not naturally a good officer or a good official. • • • Bribery is the universal rule." And he speaks of the deep-seated mingled hatred and fear on the part even of the Turkish peasantry for Government officials. In fact it is hardly too much to say that Turkish history shows gross neglect of the most ordinary and essential duties of a government in the empire as a whole. And the treatment of the other subject races has been still worse than that of the Turks. For them nothing has been secure—whether property, lives, wives or children. To all this have been added the horrible massacres of the Armenians, especially since Abdul-Hamid's time, and somewhat similar deportations of the Greeks. Both races have proved themselves abler, more industrious, enterprising, and prosperous than the Turks, and so have made themselves feared and hated, doubtless not altogether without some provocation on their part in certain cases. And these massacres have been due to deliberate and direct government action, in which the Turkish people themselves have been too willing to share. They have not been crimes of the passion of the moment. And they have involved cruelties horrible beyond description.

The Bryce Report on Armenia.

For it must not be forgotten that this thing was not done in a corner. The evidence for few events in history has been more carefully gathered, sifted and ordered. The Bryce report upon "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916" leaves no room for doubt of the essential facts. It is idle to attempt to deny it or appreciably to mitigate its force.

Lord Bryce, himself a trained historian, says of the report: "Nothing has been admitted the substantial truth of which seems open to reasonable doubt. And in estimating the value of the evidence, he calls attention to these facts: (1) "Nearly all of it comes from eye witnesses"; (2) "the main facts rest upon evidence coming from different and independent sources"; (3) "facts of the same, or of a very similar nature, occurring in different places, are deposed to by different and independent witnesses,"—including Danish and German witnesses; (4) "the volume of this concurrent evidence from different quarters is so large as to establish the main facts beyond all question"; (5) "in particular it is to be noted that many of the most shocking and horrible accounts are those for which there is the most abundant testimony from the most trustworthy neutral witnesses. None of these cruelties rest on native evidence alone," and he adds: "A recollection of previous massacres will show that such crimes are a part of a long settled and often repeated policy of Turkish rulers. • • • The attempts made to find excuses for wholesale slaughter and for the removal of a whole people from its homes leaves no room for doubt as to the slaughter and the removal. The main facts are established by the confession of the criminals themselves. • • • The disproval of accusations which the Turks have put forward is as complete as the proof for the atrocities themselves."

Mr. Moorefield Storey, ex-President of the American Bar Association, records the natural verdict of one skilled in the weighing of evidence, when he writes to Lord Bryce: "In my opinion, the evidence which you print is as reliable as that upon which rests our belief in many of the universally admitted facts of history, and I think it establishes beyond all reasonable doubt the deliberate purpose of the Turkish authorities practically to exterminate the Armenians, and their responsibility for the hideous atrocities which have been perpetrated upon that unhappy people."

No Sign of Repentance.

It is not pleasant to call these dark facts to mind, but unfortunately there is only the slightest evidence that the Turkish Government or people as a whole have recognized or repudiated the crime of the Armenian massacres, or done anything appreciable to set them right. Some small groups of Turks have characterized these crimes aright, but there is almost nothing to show repentance or the fruits of repentance on the part of the great majority of the people or their leaders, or to give reasonable hope that the massacres might not be repeated; though there is doubtless some excuse for the comparative indifference with which these massacres have been regarded by the Turks, because of a certain amount of revolutionary activity on the part of Armenians in some cases, and because of the widespread wretchedness and want and sufferings of the whole Turkish population in ten years of war and disorder.

Now, these crimes—black as anything in human history—cannot be simply forgotten and left out of account in seeking a righteous solution of the Turkish problem. If the rankest conceivable wrongs are not to be passed over in silence, it is inevitable that any just settlement of the Turkish problem must contain that small measure of justice which it is now possible to render in this case.

Is it strange that Lord Bryce in reviewing all the evidence concerning the Armenian massacres of 1915-16 should feel compelled to say: "The record of the rulers of Turkey for the last two or three centuries, from the Sultan on his throne to the district Mutessarif, is, taken as a whole, an almost unbroken record of corruption, or injustice, of an oppression which often rises into hideous cruelty? • • • Can any one still continue to hope that the evils of such a Government are curable? Or does the evidence contained in this volume furnish most terrible and convincing proof that it cannot longer be permitted to rule over subjects of a different faith?"

Is it strange that he should be unable to shake off the conviction that these facts are inevitably knit up with a proper solution of the problem of Turkey? "It is evidently desirable," he writes, "that the public opinion of the belligerent nations—and, I may add, of neutral peoples also—should be enabled by knowledge of what has happened in Asia Minor and Armenia, to exercise its judgment on the course proper to be followed when, at the end of the present war, a political resettlment of the Nearer East has to be undertaken."

Surely the Peace Conference was justified in its resolution, "more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the allied and associated powers are agreed that Armenia • • • must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire."

Separate Armenia Needed.

That the formation of a separate Armenian State is the deliberate intention of the Peace Conference seems further indicated in the later actions of the conference concerning Armenia, like the appointment of Colonel Haskell as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the four great powers, and the appointment of Major Gen. Harbord by President Wilson to investigate conditions in Armenia. Many incidental things also indicate the general expectation on the part of the Allies that an Armenian State will be formed.

(4) The great and primary reason for this decision by the Peace Conference is undoubtedly to be found in the Armenian massacres which have just been reviewed. But it might still be asked whether the situation created by the massacres could be met only by the formation of a separate Armenia. For such a separation, it must be admitted, involves very difficult problems. Why, then, is it necessary to set off an Armenian State? What are the reasons?

The only possible substitute for a separate Armenia is a general mandate by one of the great powers over all Asia Minor, which should insure equal rights to all elements of the population—to all races and to all religions. If such a mandate were honestly carried out we should certainly hope for a far better Government on modern lines. But under the proposed mandatory system of the League of Nations it is intended that the mandate shall be for a limited period. Even if that period were considerably prolonged, what would happen when the mandatary withdrew? It is impossible, to be sure, if the Turks still constituted the majority, that the State would not slump back into many of its old evils, including oppression of other races. The history of the Turks, unfortunately, gives all too small reason to hope for more.

Armenians Earned Nationhood.

The reasons for a separate Armenia, then, may be said to be because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themselves; because of the adoption of repeated massacres as a deliberate policy of State; because of almost complete lack of penitence for the massacres, or repudiation of the crime—they rather seek to excuse them: because practically nothing has been done by the Turks in the way of repatriation of Armenians or of reparations to them—a condition not naturally suggesting a repetition of the experiment of Turkish rule; because, on the contrary, there is evidence of intense feeling still existing against the Armenians, and implicit threatening of massacre; because there has been sufficient proof that the two races cannot live peaceably and decently together, so that it is better for both that they have separate States; because of complete failure of the strong clauses of the treaty of 1878 to protect the Armenians; because the most elementary justice suggests that there must be at least some region in Turkey where Armenians can go and not have to live under Turkish rule; because nothing less than that could give to the Armenians any adequate guarantee of safety, consequently, nothing less will satisfy the conscience of the world upon the point, because in this field of opportunity for small nations under the League of Nations, the Armenians have surely earned the right, by their sufferings, their endurance, their loyalty to principles, their unbroken spirit and ambition and their demonstrated industry, ability and self-reliance, to look forward to a national life of their own; because such a separate State would probably make more certain decent treatment of Armenians in other parts of Turkey, and because there is no adequate substitute for such a State. In the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks and of the peace of the world alike, the formation of a separate Armenian State is to be urged.

Shall Turkey Hold the Bridge?

II. But the reasons for some righteous division of Turkey do not lie simply in that "historical misgovernment," which justly challenges her rule over any other people, but also in her utter unfitness for the strategic world position in which she is placed. The very fact of her ageslong misrule, coupled with her occupation of territory of critical significance to the world, constitutes her a "menace to the freedom and security of all nations," and makes unusual restriction in her case necessary, for the greater good of the world and of her own subject peoples.

(1) For Turkey is held, as Dominian has said, by "a people whose incompetence to convert nature's gifts into use or profit is historically patent." But, striking as has been their economic failure, the failure of the Turks has been far more than merely external or material. She has acted rather as a kind of blight upon all the peoples she has conquered. As Ramsey—possibly too strongly—puts it: "The action of the Turks in every department of life has simply been to ruin, never to rebuild. • • • They destroyed the intellectual and moral institutions of a nation; they broke up and dissolved almost the entire social fabric; they undermined every educating and civilizing influence in the land, and they brought back a great part of the country to the primitive simplicity of nomadic life. • • • There is hardly a social institution in Asia Minor showing any degree of social constructiveness that is not an older Anatolian creation, Moslemized in outward form, and usually desecrated in the process."

(2) Now the evil of this blighting influence of Turkish rule is vastly increased because of the critical significance of the territory which she occupies. First of all, in the words of another, Turkey is before everything else a roadway—a bridge-land • • • No solution of the political problem involved can be attained without full consideration of its geographic aspects • • • Turkey has been a highway of commerce and civilization between Europe on the one hand and Asia and Africa on the other. • • • The through roads converging into the Turkish territory are probably the oldest commercial routes of the world. At any rate they connote the sites on which the most ancient civilization rose."

Where Continents Join.

By position, then, Turkey lies "at the junction of three continents, and therefore on the main field of history," and is "the site of convergence of the main avenues of continental travel," and becomes thus, in a peculiar degree, "the meeting place of races which are generally associated with the three continents which the country unites. Aryan, Tatar and Semitic peoples therefore are strongly represented in the land."

With this advantage of position for her remarkable topography combined to "create Turkey's relation with the world beyond its borders." "This relation was facilitated by the admirable set of natural routes which lead in and out of the country"; by the Mediterranean Sea, Aegean Sea, Turkish Straits and the Black Sea, "the shores of which are closely dotted with the terminals of great avenues from Northwestern Europe, as well as all of Northern and Central Asia • • • and by 'the rift Valley of Syria.'" Hence "the Eastern question is as old as the history of civilization on this particular spot of the inhabited world"—always "this momentous international problem of determining which people or nation shall control the Straits between Europe and Asia, who shall get toll from the enormous transit trade of the region."

Now under the new conception of a League of Nations and of mandatory powers who are to think of the well-being and development of peoples temporarily placed under their care as a "sacred trust of civilization," it is proposed to change this age-old Eastern question from one of a selfish scramble among the nations to one of recognizing here a great and distinctly international or world interest; to make definite provision for this world interest, and yet not only with full justice to the Turkish people more immediately concerned, but to their greater advantage. For, except for a practically all-powerful nation, a position like that of Turkey makes the land inevitably a perpetual prey of warring powers, so that Dominian could say quite truthfully of Turkey: "The land staggers under the load of misfortune which its central position in the Eastern Hemisphere has heaped upon it." The situation has been inevitably one of exceeding difficulty for Turkey.

The "Debatable Land."

Is it not high time, then, in this crisis of the world's history, and after the immeasurable sacrifices of the great war, that intelligent men should recognize the stupid futility of the old method of incessant political and commercial national strife, and face this age-long Eastern question in a totally new spirit?

(3) But because Turkey has been so markedly a "bridge-land," it became also "the debatable land," so that Ramsey can say that at the present day the central movement in Asia is, what it always has been, a conflict between the Eastern and Western spirit. "About 1070 most of Asia Minor became Oriental in language and in Government." "For nearly eight centuries the Oriental element reigned supreme in Asia Minor and swept far into Europe. • • • But step by step Asia has been driven back, and in Asia Minor the old struggle has recommenced." "On the west coast of Asia Minor the Greek element has increased enormously in strength while the Turkish element has grown weaker." The Oriental element "dies out in these parts by a slow but sure decay." "A revival of Orientalism" was planned and directed by Abdul-Hamid and by the later Young Turk movement. "But even in the eastern part of Asia Minor the Oriental spirit is doomed." "Orientalism is ebbing and dying in the country."

Ramsey's analysis is probably correct and important. But is there not something far greater to be looked for than that gradual driving out of the "Oriental spirit" in Turkey? In one sense, doubtless, that spirit is doomed and must go. We are to be done with Oriental domination in Turkey, it may be hoped when we get States which know in their citizens no privileged and unprivileged classes, but only equals before the law. But are we not also to be freed from Occidental domination? Was not one of the greatest of the convictions of the Allies in the war that no nation, no "Kultur," however great and fine it might be, was good enough to blot out all others?

Are there not priceless Oriental values, gratefully to be recognized and sedulously to be preserved? And may not Turkey, just because she has been, through the ages, "bridge-land" and "debatable land," become in some rich and high sense mediating-land as well between the Occident and the Orient; teaching the nations how to combine the quietism of the East, and the pragmatism of the West; the religious dependence of the East, and the scientific mastery of natural forces of the West; the mental and spiritual fellowship of the East, and the mental and spiritual independence of the West?

Some Spiritual Values Left.

As illustrative of the spiritual values still resident in Islam, for example, may be mentioned the remarkable and inspiring achievements of the Semussi sect, in establishing a vast State in a most barren, uncompromising land, and in uplifting, organizing and harmonizing a most backward and degenerated population in the heart of Africa within a comparatively few years, and under influence purely Moslem. Such a State should not be needlessly encroached upon. It rather affords ample warrant for expecting that under new democratic processes and in due time the Moslems will prove themselves able to build up and manage their own States in the Arabian and Anatolian peninsulas. If the Entente powers are sincere in their declarations not further to harass the Moslem world and to give excuse for a Pan-Islamic movement, they should also at once definitely and publicly renounce all further political encroachments on that world and outline a clear policy of uplifting the Moslems, already subject to their control, by enlarged opportunities both in education and in public service.

(4) With the vision of such larger possible goals for this "bridge-land" and "debatable land" of the Eastern Hemisphere, one approaches the problem of the control of Constantinople and the Straits in a different spirit. The situation is so unique, the relations so complex and far-reaching, the responsibilities so heavy, and the possibilities so enthralling, that no one nation can be equal to the task—least of all a nation with Turkey's superlatively bad record of misrule. No situation in the world demands so compellingly international rule—not only to put an end here to the selfish scramble and perpetual intrigue of the nations, but also, above all, to rise to the possibilities of this strategic opportunity, for the benefit of all the race.

A Constantinopolitan State.

This calls for a Constantinopolitan State, directly and peramently vested in the League of Nations, but best managed probably through a single mandatary as trustee, steadily responsible to the League and removable by the League.

Such a solution, at first sight, will undoubtedly be unwelcome to most Turks. But Turkey is simply not conceivably equal to a great world responsibility; and the larger world interests must prevail. Moreover, it is certainly better for Turkey herself to be delivered from this intolerable responsibility, and to have her own government taken out of the midst of what has been, through the centuries, a centre of boundless intrigue. The common people of Turkey would lead a much happier life in a state freed from outreaching imperialism, and at liberty to devote itself to the welfare of its own citizens.

III. If one turns aside now for a moment from the immediate problem of Asia Minor to that of the former Turkish Empire as a whole, other reasons for division of the Turkish Empire may be suggested.

(1) For one thing, there would be real danger, even under a mandate, in keeping intact the Turkish Empire as a whole—the danger of a later revival of the Turkish Empire and a repetition of its past history, on account of the often revived jealousies of the powers. That danger is not to be lightly regarded.

Other Severances Necessary.

(2) The Turkish Empire, too, as it has existed, is not truly a unit from any point of view—certainly not the Arabic and the non-Arabic-speaking portions. Its interests—except those of good government—are not one. It is hardly too much to say that, however much the land has been a single unit with reference to intercontinental travel and trade, the fact remains that it has been clearly subdivided within itself. There would probably be distinct gain, consequently, in similarly dividing its problems, and seeking separate solutions for them. Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, for example, each has a kind of unity of its own.

It was natural, therefore, that the Peace Conference should have resolved that Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Arabia should be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. The first three have already been dealt with in the preceding reports of this commission. It may be briefly pointed out here, however, that these areas are naturally cut off from Turkey because of their different language, customs and civilization; that the people do not wish further connection with Turkey, but were rather greatly rejoiced to be freed forever from the Turkish yoke; and that there is opportunity in the Arabic-speaking portions of the former Turkish Empire for at least two strong national States—Syria, including Palestine, and Mesopotamia, in accordance with the hopes of the Peace Conference and the desires of the people themselves. Both Syria and Mesopotamia should be, of course, under mandataries for a time.

IV. RESULTING PROBLEMS.

The considerations now dealt with looking to a righteous division of the Turkish portion of the former Ottoman Empire clearly involve the setting off of an Arabian State and of a Constantinopolitan State; but as clearly imply the continuance of a distinctly Turkish State, with guarantees of justice to all its constituent peoples. The resulting problems, now to be considered, therefore, naturally become: the problem of a separate Armenia; the problem of an international Constantinopolitan State; the problem of a continued Turkish State; the problem of the Greeks and of other minority races.

A. The Problem of a Separate Armenia.

(1) The reasons why it is necessary that a separate Armenian State should be set up have already been fully given. They need not be restated.

(2) The conception of such a State. It is well to have in mind the exact nature of the State proposed in this report, in order to prevent misunderstandings on any side.

It is not proposed in such a State to establish the rule of a minority of Armenians over a majority of other peoples. That would inevitably seem to the Turks to be very unjust, and would at once excite resentment and unremitting opposition. Moreover, such an arrangement would be unfair to the Armenians as well. For it would place them from the start in a false and untenable position. It would put them, too, under great temptation to abuse of power. And it would be no fair trial of a truly Armenian State. It would of course, also make any mandate mean little or nothing, if not make it entirely impossible.

But such a separated State should furnish a definite area into which Armenians could go with the complete assurance that there they would never be put under the rule of the Turks. It should be also a region in which Armenians could gradually concentrate, and from which the Turkish population might tend increasingly to withdraw; though no compulsion should be put on any people.

All this necessitates a strong mandatory power. The State could not even start without such help. This separated State should be therefore a State definitely under the rule of a mandatory Government, organized on modern lines to do justice to all elements of the population; and a State from which the mandatary should not withdraw, until the Armenians constituted an actual majority of the entire population, or at least until the Turks were fewer than the Armenians. This would necessarily mean that full Armenian self-government would be long delayed. And that fact should be definitely faced as inevitable. The conditions are such that there is no defensible alternative.

(3) The term of the mandate is practically involved in the conception of the State which is forced upon us. It cannot be a short-term mandate, not because of any reluctance to withdraw on the part of the mandatary, but because under the peculiar circumstances a true Armenian State cannot be established in a brief period of time, however ardent the desires of both the Armenians and the mandatory power. For the Armenians cannot safely undertake the government independently until they constitute an actual majority. There is also the added consideration of the natural need of considerable time for the

solution of this difficult question. It is proposed that the Constantinopolitan State, as a great international interest, should be directly in charge of the League of Nations for the good of all the nations; in the sure conviction that even "national interests are often promoted better by international co-operation than by international competition."

The State would be administered through a mandatary for the League—a mandatary appointed by the League, responsible to the League and removable at the will of the League, but held permanent except for cause; for it is plain that there should not be any unnecessary shifting in the administrative power.

The mandatary, moreover, should be a real mandatary for the League, a trustee for international interests, not a power using its position to advance its own national interests. To this end the mandatary should be territorially and strategically disinterested.

Administration.

The Constantinople State could be administered by an international commission, like the notably successful commission on the Danube; but the problem here is more complex, and the single mandatary would seem to have some decided advantages over the commission plan. In the case of the Constantinopolitan State, for example, there would be actual government functions to be exercised, as there are not in the same sense in the control of traffic on the Danube. These could be better handled by a regularly organized Government. The mandatary, too, as directly controlled by the League of Nations, would be even more truly international than an international commission of the old kind. And practically, a single mandatary would naturally be better able to avoid friction, wrangling and divided counsels, and so to prevent exasperating and dangerous delays. It would also have more immediate power behind it.

Such a State should include Constantinople nad have charge of its administration. This is the more demanded, for Constantinople is a markedly cosmopolitan city, where the Turks are probably not even in the majority. This State should also have a reasonable territory on either side of the Straits. All fortifications should be abolished. This international territory would, of course, be open to all people for any legitimate purposes. Like the District of Columbia in America, it would be a natural place for great educational and religious foundations, so that such Moslem institutions could remain and be further built up. The Turkish population, equally of course, would be free to stay. But Constantinople would not longer be the capital of Turkey. In the administration of the State, however, all possible consideration should be given to Moslem sentiment, and reasonable practical adjustments arranged. The Sultan might even conceivably continue to reside at Constantinople if that were desired under the conditions named.

Problem of the Straits.

(2) The Reasons for Such a State—What are the reasons which make the establishment of an international Constantinopolitan State, as now conceived, imperative, in the final settlement of this war?

(i.) President Wilson himself, in the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, made much of by the Turks, points at least in this direction, when he writes: "The Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." It would seem that that end could be accomplished in no way so surely and so permanently as by an international State under the League of Nations. The need at least of some such internationalization is manifest when it is remembered that the Straits have been closed almost continuously since 1911.

(ii.) Woolf hardly overstates the need of drastic action in this matter when he says: "Constantinople and the narrow straits upon which it stands have occasioned the world more trouble, have cost humanity more in blood and suffering during the last five hundred years, than any other single spot upon the earth. Certainly during the last hundred years it has been the chief European centre of international unrest. From it and about it have radiated continually international rivalries and hatreds and suspicions. It was the direct origin and cause of a large number of the wars fought in the nineteenth century. It is not improbable that when Europe in her last ditch has fought the last battle of the great war we shall find that what we have again been fighting about is really Constantinople.' Now, this perpetual centre of intrigue and endless cause of trouble must be done away with.

(iii.) The closing of this greatest of wars, with its many new adjustments, and particularly with the break-up of the old Turkish Empire, gives an unrivaled opportunity to clear up, in a permanent way, once and for all, this great plague-spot of the world. If this opportunity is now neglected, or grasped only in nerveless, vacillating and selfish fashion, we shall have again the old intolerable situation. We are confronted by a great challenge. Timid counsels should not prevail. As Woolf puts it: "Constantinople is the test of the great war's result. If it can be, and is, given to any one State, it means the rule of the world by war; if * * * it be administered by all for all, Constantinople means the rule of the world by peace."

A Source of Future Wars.

(iv.) The responsibility for so fateful and strategic a world-centre is also too heavy for any single power, however great, to carry; least of all Turkey, with her terrible record of misgovernment and massacre. It would be hard to choose out of any list of leading nations a nation less fitted for this world task than she. She has completely forfeited any claim to such a responsibility.

(v.) Morever, as we have already seen, it would be to the distinct advantage of Turkey's own new democratic government to be definitely withdrawn from this centre of intrigue. Thoughtful Turkish leaders already realize the evils which have come from this intrigue, and might well welcome—even though with natural reluctance—the kind of surgery which should sever their State from such a seat of infection. At the same time, the Turks remaining within the boundaries of the international State, under a competent mandatary, would certainly have the best government they have ever had.

(vi.) The situation, furthermore, cannot be dealt with adequately or with any final satisfaction except internationally and through an international State. And the League of Nations and the mandatary system, as planned by the Peace Conference, would seem to suggest both a new and stable method for establishing and administering such a State, and a method growing directly out of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Until such an international State is definitely established there will be endless intrigues on the part of various powers to possess or control the Straits. So long as a State as weak as Turkey has any kind of hold upon this critically significant territory, intrigues will be encouraged. The Greeks, for example, have already declared their ambition to have Constantinople in their hands, and are conducting a campaign of propaganda to that end. That is typical of what may be expected to go on until a thorough-going and permanent solution of the problem of the Straits is adopted, in an international State.

(vii.) It deserves to be especially emphasized that the reason for the establishment of an international Constantinopolitan State is not to humiliate Turkey or any Moslem interest; but simply to face squarely and honestly a situation which is a constant menace both to the peace of Turkey and to the peace of the world; and, deceiving ourselves no longer with vain makeshifts, to determine upon the only fundamental solution. No such fundamental readjustment can be made, doubtless, without some disturbance and sacrifice; but it can be counted certain that all related interests—economic, political, social and religious—will in the end gain from a permanent solution of this vexing world question.

Question of Size.

(3) Extent and Boundaries—The discussion of the extent and boundaries of the Constantinopolitan State is by the General Adviser, Dr. Lybyer, and puts clearly the elements of that problem, anticipating a completer study on the ground by the special Boundaries Commission later recommended.

1. The primary reason for the setting off of a separate area at Constantinople, to be forever under a special regime controlled by the League of Nations, is that the straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, being a concern of many nations who cannot remain satisfied with the ownership of any one power, should be permanently and freely open.

2. Inasmuch as the Sea of Marmora is small, and in a sense may be regarded as simply an enlargement of the Straits, a minimum boundary must include not only the whole of both sides of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, but also the entire shore of the Sea of Marmora. The American experts in international law at Paris pronounced that serious complications might arise if an independent State should reach thus near to any point.

3. Constantinople is also the place where railways make the crossing between Europe and Western Asia; arrangements for the stations and yards of these need to be taken into account.

4. On account of the ready access by water and rail, the economic support of the city does not need to be confined to territory within the boundaries of the State, except as regards the water supply. It would be convenient, of course, to have room for dairy and vegetable farming, in view of the trouble of crossing frontiers.

5. Inasmuch as the population has always been greatly mixed—a condition which will undoubtedly continue—a slight one it may be assumed that the League of Nations will provide for the security of all elements without privilege or favor, there is no need to adjust the boundary to racial groups.

The European Side.

6. On the European side it is better, all things considered, to leave with Constantinople the present remnant of Turkey in Europe, accepting the Turco-Bulgarian frontier of 1915, subject to minor modifications. The Constantinople area needs no more land than is included in an adjustment of the Enos-Midia line, as shown on the accompanying map, but the question of disposing of the remainder of "Turkish Thrace" is so acute that the best solution is to leave this also with Constantinople.

i. The area was ceded to the Balkan allies early in 1913 and assigned to Bulgaria, but it was recovered by Turkey after the second Balkan war. Though Bulgaria continues to be kept out of her rightful lands in Macedonia she has some ground for claiming Turkish Thrace as a region for the settlement of refugees. As regards Turkish and Bulgarian Thrace, there has been a considerable exchange of population since 1915, so that few Bulgarians remain in the Turkish area, while the number of Turks has been increased.

ii. Greece has claimed the territory, but statistics submitted by the Greeks do not estimate that before 1912 the Greek population of the territory between the Enos-Midia line and the present Bulgarian frontier was more than 147,000, or 42 per cent. of the whole. Their own statements are that a large proportion of this number migrated between 1912 and the World War. They do not state the reciprocal fact that an approximately equal number of Turks migrated from territory acquired by Greece in 1913 and settled here, so that there was not a mere expulsion of Greeks, but a fair exchange of population. The Greek population was, then, probably not over 25 per cent. of the whole in 1914. It is less at present, but changes during the World War should hardly be taken into account. The claim of Greece to this area cannot be justified.

iii. On the basis of population, Turkish Thrace was really Turkish in 1914, the proportion reaching at least 60 per cent.

iv. There is no prospect that, without violent changes, any other element than the Turkish will become a majority of the population within a reasonable time. In case this should ultimately happen, in such way as to make alterations of boundaries desirable, the League of Nations could transfer a portion of Thrace out of the Constantinople area.

The Asiatic Side.

7. On the Asiatic side, the frontier beginning on the Black Sea coast a short distance east of the mouth of the Sakaria River might run east of the river to Ak Sofu Dagh, cross to Geuk Dagh, pass southwestward to the ridge between Isnik and Yeni Shehir, and proceed westward along the heights south of Mudania and Brusa as far as the boundary of the Sanjak of Bigha, which it might follow to the sea south of Mount Ida.

i. The line between the Black Sea and Ismid is located east of the Sakaria, including the Ismid area near the river's mouth, in order to facilitate engineering problems of drainage and provide an area suitable for dairy farming within the reach and control of Constantinople.

ii. Brusa would better be left to the Turks, because it has no relation to the defense of the Straits, because the local population is predominantly Turkish and because the Turks are sentimentally attached to this as the first Ottoman capital. To take from them all three capitals, Constantinople, Adrianople and Brusa, would be very severe.

iii. The Troad Peninsula, while predominantly Turkish, constitutes such a separate physical area that it cannot well be divided. Therefore, for the defense of the Dardanelles it must all go with the Straits.

8. The total population of this area would be at the outset about two millions, of whom about 60 per cent. would be Turks, 25 per cent. Greeks and 10 per cent. Armenians. The proportion of Turks would be likely in time to decrease and that of Greeks and Western Europeans to increase, especially in Constantinople and the smaller cities of the area.

What the Report Gives Turkey.

III. The Problem of a Turkish State.—We have now frankly recognized the necessity, in bare justice to the Armenians, for an Armenia separated from Turkey, and the equal necessity for a separated Constantinopolitan State, in response to a just and imperative world interest. Turkey is thus called upon to surrender her sovereignty over certain modest portions of Asia Minor, but is no way treated as her own conquerors treated territories won in war.

(1) General Extent.—But in pursuance of this different spirit shown in conquest, if the principles of national unity and of self-determination are to be truly applied to the Turkish people, Anatolia, the bulk of Asia Minor remaining, with ample outlets to the sea, should be left for a Turkish State, but under such conditions as may sacredly guard the rights of all minorities, whether racial or religious. This would give to Turkey a comparatively very large area—larger than France—having a population one-fourth of France—of approximately ten millions, of whom some 8,000,000 are Moslems (about 7,000,000 Turks) and 1,500,000 Greeks. This should assure to the new Turkey an ample opportunity of development. In the interests of a reasonable self-determination for some of the smaller racial groups it may be also necessary to allow their transfer, if they so choose, to Syria or Mesopotamia, or to grant them at least local autonomy.

(2) Reasons for a Mandate for the Turkish State.—It seems to be generally recognized by the Turkish people themselves that the surest and speediest road out of their present evil conditions is by way of a mandate under the League of Nations, and so shifting from an imperialistic state to a democratic one. And from every point of view that appears desirable. Indeed, it seems impossible to expect any satisfactory change in the Government of Turkey by any other method. And if the Turks had not themselves suggested a mandatary the Peace Conference might well have felt obliged to require one.

This general statement, indeed, may be said to include the specific reasons why Turkey should have a mandate: to secure genuinely good government, without oppression, bribery or corruption, for the Turks themselves; to guarantee the rights of all minorities, racial or religious; to deliver Turkey from the demoralization of incessant intrigue from outside; to secure, without selfish exploitation by the mandatary or any other outside power, Turkey's economic development and economic independence, for there is not the slightest doubt that she has been living far below her material possibilities; in line with the allied settlement with Germany, to disband the most of the Turkish Army and do away with all military conscription, depending upon a well organized gendarmerie for the larger police duties of the State—all this for the better good of the common people and to break the power of intriguing imperialists over them; to put beneath all Turkish life a national system of universal education that should lift her entire people; to train the various peoples of the State steadily into self-government; in a word, to make of Turkey a State of high order on a modern basis of equal rights to all before the law and of full religious liberty. This would inevitably result in a State not purely (though predominantly) Turkish in race and in control, a cosmopolitan State in which various racial stocks were contained and in whose government all representatively shared.

Reasons for a Mandate.

(3) Turkey's Desire for an American Mandate—Forty reasons given in an earlier section of the report—especially since the Peace Conference had not declared that Turkey must herself have a mandate, and because a free expression was not allowed—it has been very difficult to get clearly decisive evidence of the desires of the people of Turkey upon the choice of mandate. But many indications tend to confirm the opinion that the great majority of thoughtful Turkish leaders sincerely desire an American mandate.

That a nation so long independent should seek a mandate, in any sense of the term, is sufficiently remarkable, and it tends to confirm the opinion of a trustworthy and university trained Turkish journalist, who wrote: "The Turks have been so hardly tried by the events in the past that most of them are ready to submit themselves to some regular schooling instead of making any hazardous experiments with new, ignorant leaders." And he thus sums up Turkish public opinion concerning a mandate for Turkey:

The following divisions can be noticed: (1) The large majority which realizes that the country has only the choice between an American mandate and an eternal chaos, coupled with foreign occupation and the loss of national unity; (2) a minority which does not like to discuss any settlement which implies a theoretical restriction of sovereignty; (3) a minority of supporters of an English solution.

As giving an idea of the strength of the American majority, he calls attention to "The elements which make it up":

The National Congress, a body formed in Constantinople several months ago by the delegates of fifty-three different Turkish societies and organizations, is one of the chief supporters of the American mandate. As all the Turkish intellectual organizations are represented in the Congress, it may almost be considered as representative of the educated classes in general. The National League, containing about forty of the most respected citizens and Senators, is also for the American mandate. This means at the same time the majority in the Senate. The "Nationalist" party in Anatolia in general is in favor of the American mandate. The professors of different Faculties of the university favor the American mandate. So do most of the lawyers, teachers, technicians and merchants. At present most of the papers with large circulations are taking the same view for various things. This state of affairs is very surprising, because there is, on the one hand, a very active propaganda for the English mandate; on the other hand the Americans do not make any propaganda.

More Reasons for America.

Another journalist gave detailed corroborative evidence looking in the same direction. For example, he said that he had been carrying on a campaign in his Constantinople paper for three months for an American mandate, and that this campaign had called out only two letters of protest, while, to the contrary, many words of approval had come from men of all parties.

The delegations who have met the commission when the question of mandate was taken up, have generally favored an American mandate. A delegation representing the intellectual leaders among the women, including Presidents of educational institutions and of national and provincial educational associations, were especially emphatic in declaring for an American mandate. The general judgment of the most trustworthy observers whom the commission was able to consult confirmed these results. The delegates of a congress held a few months ago at Smyrna, and representing 1,800,000 people, have declared for an American mandate. The congress at Sivas, held on the 20th of August, probably the most representative recent gathering of the Turkish people, is expected by those in closest touch with the movement for which it stands to declare for an American mandate.

On the whole, it is highly probable that a large majority of the Turkish people wishing a mandate at all would favor the American mandate.

Anatolia.

(4) Territorial Conditions in Anatolia.—To complete the survey of the problems involved in a reconstitution of the Turkish State in Anatolia, a general discussion, in brief summary, of territorial conditions in Anatolia—touching also upon various subject races—seems called for. This is also furnished by the general adviser.

I. After setting off definitely from the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914 all the Arabic-speaking areas, Armenia, and the Constantinopolitan State, there remains a large mass of territory in which the greatest single element of population is Turkish (the word being limited to those persons whose mother-tongue is Turkish and who profess the Mohammedan religion). Claims have been advanced toward setting off portions of this remaining area, by Kurds for "Kurdistan;" by Greeks for "Pontus," by Italians for Adalia and the whole southwest, and by Greeks for Smyrna and the west. The only one of these portions that is advisable, in the opinion of the commission, actually to handle separately at present, is "Kurdistan." All will be discussed briefly in the order named.

II. Kurdistan.—The Kurds claim a very large area, on the basis of their distribution, but since they are greatly mixed with Armenians, Turks and others, and divided among themselves into Kizilbash, Shiite and Sunnites, it seems best to limit them to the natural geographical area which lies between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia on the south, with the divide between the Euphrates and the Tigris as the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed them under close mandatory rule, with the object of preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighboring areas in a larger self-governing union. It is possible to shift most of the comparatively small numbers of both Turks and Armenians out of the area by voluntary exchange of population and thus obtain a province containing about a million and a half people nearly all Kurds. Full security must needs be provided for the Syrian, Chaldean and Nestorian Christians now in the area. This plan would probably provide for all of the Sunnite Kurds in Turkey, and the Kizilbash group lies almost wholly to the west. The area contemplated looks more to the south than the west and lies wholly along the upper waters of the Tigris and its tributaries. It would seem better, therefore, unless the population strongly prefers the other plan, to place it under the control of the power which cares for Mesopotamia of the two which can best connect it with Armenia across the mountains at the north, or with Anatolia, with which it would have only narrow contact at the west.

III. "Pontus." About one-half of the area asked for by the Greeks of "Pontus" should be included in the Armenian State, in order to give it access to the sea. The remainder is needed by Anatolia for the same reason. There were approximately 200,000 Greeks in each of these portions in 1914. This would seem to be too small a minority in both Armenia and Anatolia to be erected into an autonomous province. The rights of the Greeks can in each State be provided for fully by general laws, enforced in each case by the mandatory power until such time as the States are ready for self-government with adequate protection of minorities.

Cilician Claims.

IV. Cilicia. Cilicia is claimed by both Armenians and Syrians, in each case by a minority which did not exceed 25 per cent. in 1914. Reasons are stated above for not giving it to the former. It is unimportant to Syria as an outlet, since that area has many ports. But it is very valuable to the areas both at the northeast and the north. It should not be separated, economically from Anatolia at present, and if at any future time the Armenians should receive it, provisions would have to be made for the use of its ports by the interior regions of Anatolia from Kaisariyeh to Konia.

The region between Cilicia and Armenia, containing Albistan, Malatia and Kharput is claimed by the Armenians, but should also be left with Anatolia. It contained in 1914 a mixture of Turks, Kizil-bash, Armonians, Sunnite Kurds and others, proportioned apparently in the order named. Strong mandatory control would be difficult because of the distance from the coast across rough, mountainous country, but it would be very necessary, lest the region become a hunting ground for Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian bands, each anxious to acquire the territory for its people.

V. Adalia and the Southwest. Italy's claim to the southwest of Asia Minor rests upon nothing that is compatible with the principles of the Commission's instructions. There are no Italians native to the country and no evidence exists that the population desires Italy as a mandatary for them. In this region the Moslems are to the Greek Orthodox Christians as ten to one. None of this area should be separated from Anatolia.

VI. Smyrna and the West. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, not because of the intrinsic situation, but because of the persistency of the Greek Government in demanding for an area there, and of the fact that a Greek army is in occupation.

Nowhere except perhaps in the Sanjak of Smyrna and certain coastal Kazas is the Greek Orthodox population in a majority, and the complete proof that it is in majority awaits an impartial census. If any question existed previously as to the unwillingness of the majority of the population in the area now occupied by the Greeks to be annexed to Greece, or to have Greece as a mandatary, the question has been answered by the circumstances of the occupation. (This is an allusion to the massacres of Moslems by Greeks, and subsequent atrocities, upon the occasions of the landing at Smyrna May 15, 1015. An official interallied inquiry has confirmed the fact of the atrocities.) The question has also been answered as to whether the Balkan State of modern Greece has reached such a degree of civilization that it can be entrusted with mandatory rule over a people of different faith and hostile feeling.

The Greek army and all authority of the Greek Government ought to be withdrawn from an area where better order was kept by twelve British officers than Greece has maintained by 100,000 Greek troops. There can be no settled peace until either a Greek conquest has swept far to the interior, with great destruction of property and life, or until the Greek power is wholly removed. In the latter case the question would still remain: Should an area of Western Asia Minor be set off as a special Greek region and placed under a separate mandate. The answer is in the negative for the following reasons:

(1) The character of the country is such that no good natural boundary can be found except high up in the hills. If such a boundary be traced, the population within it would be so markedly Moslem (about three to one) that the area could have no special Greek character.

(2) If, on the other hand, a more or less arbitrary line be drawn further west, it would not constitute a good barrier for defense against smuggles or brigand bands.

(3) Any line drawn now would be regarded, more or less, as an economic barrier, cutting off Smyrna and other coast cities from some of the trade with the interior, to mutual disadvantage.

Greek Hopes in the West.

(4) Neither Greeks nor Turks in Western Asia Minor would believe anything except that it is the intention of the League of Nations to permit Greece later to annex the territory set off, and perhaps to extend her holdings further. The elements would therefore be present for a Macedonian system of sustained brigand warfare, which could be kept down only by more military effort and expenditure than any mandatory power cares to assume.

Shall any measures be taken then to develop a special Greek area in Asia Minor? The maximum that would seem to be advisable at the present would be that a strong mandatory power should be entrusted with a single mandate for all Anatolia and should take special pains to protect Greeks and Turks alike and preserve order in the West, with the possibility of a limited locally autonomous Greek area. The question of a future spearated Greek area could then be left in abeyance, to be brought up again if circumstances justify.

VII. Mandate for Anatolia. While the instructions of the commission do not directly mention the assignment by the League of Nations of a mandatory nation to assist the Turks, many of the Turks themselves have suggested such a plan, and some have presented urgent requests for America as the mandatory power. The need of supervision over finance, public works, education, internal order, and all the processes of government is hardly less for the Turks, despite their centuries of political experience, than for the Armenians, Syrians and Mesopotamians. It is in fact impossible to discern any other method of setting Western Asia in order. The Turks left to themselves are in a condition of poverty, ignorance and general exhaustion, with a feeling that they had been unjustly treated and then abandoned by all the world, could not fail to be a source of trouble and disturbance until another crisis, with perhaps another great war, would necessitate some such solution as is now suggested, but under conditions less favorable to success.

Advantages of a Mandatary.

VIII. The Desirability of a Single Mandatary for Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople: While it is desirable that Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople should be placed under separate mandates and governed by separated Administrations, it is also desirable that the three mandates should be held by one great power

(1) Those areas have been held together for several centuries, and have a great number of close ties of all sorts, the delicate adjustment of which can be best accomplished under one power.

(2) Unity of economic control, with similar commercial laws, coinage, weights and measures, and language of business is advantageous to all concerned.

(3) Problems of repatriation and exchange of populations can be arranged more justly and promptly under one mandatary.

(4) The adjustment of the public debt will be easier.

(5) The building of railroads and the improvement of routes of travel can be better arranged.

(6) Police control and suppression of brigandage will be far simpler. On the contrary, the holding of the three areas by separate powers permits the taking of refuge by bandits and criminals across the borders.

(7) Unity is urged by many well-informed foreigners, looking from various points of view. Many of these favor not merely a single mandatory power but a single mandate. Practically all the benefits can be obtained by the first plan that could be obtained by the second, and many serious difficulties can be avoided, such as arise from persecution of Armenians, interference with navigation and complications of intrigue.

(8) Friction which might arise between three mandataries, and which might conceivably lead to a great war, could be eliminated.

(9) The transition would be more easily acceptable by the Turkish people than if two or three powers should take control of the three areas. The fact that the mandatary would probably establish a central control in Constantinople would aid the transition still further.

In the foregoing discussion of territorial conditions in Anatolia various minority peoples have been briefly studied. It seems necessary to consider further, at this point, only the rather pressing problems of the Greeks.

IV.—The Problem of the Greeks.

(1) The situation of the Greeks is not that of the Armenians. The Greeks have suffered much in deportations by the Turks, but there have been no such extensive massacres of the Greeks as of the Armenians. The Greeks, too, in the adjacent Greek islands, have a possible congenial refuge within former Turkish territory, such as the Armenians do not have. The Greeks also have, in territories recently acquired by Greece, opportunities for settlement on Greek soil, for which there is no parallel for the Armenians. The general situation of the Greeks, too, in diminished numbers, is much less desperate than that of the Armenians. Moreover, the Greeks are more widely scattered in small groups through Turkey than the Armenians. The drastic remedy of establishing a State for the Greeks completely separated from Turkey seems, therefore, both less possible and very much less desirable.

(2) The results of the Greek occupation of Smyrna do not seem to indicate that the Greeks of Turkey should now be given rule over others or be granted their own full independence. Local autonomy in a territory strictly confined to a district in which they were in a decided majority would seem the most that could be recommended at present.

(3) The ability of the Greeks is not in question, nor their enthusiasm for education. On the contrary, both factors make it the more probable that they could continue to hold their own within the Turkish State. Indeed, the special gifts of the Greeks generally make them particularly successful as colonists. The probability is that they would lose on the whole, rather than gain, in being completely set off from Turkey. In spite of the violent antagonisms of recent years, Ramsay may well be right in saying: "The Turks and the Greeks will united make a happier country than either race could by itself." The two races supplement each other.

(4) There is to be added that the apparent purpose of the Turks to ask for a mandate, and of the Peace Conference to appoint such a mandate, gives promise of a new Turkey, in which the rights of the Greeks would be fully guarded at least for the terms of the mandate.

A trial certainly should be made by the Greeks of life in the Turkish State under the new conditions, before further independence should be sought. The constitution of a new Turkey on modern lines, the steady watchers and influence of the mandatary, and the supervision of the League of Nations and the right of appeal to it—all combine to give the Greeks every assurance of fair treatment and equality of opportunity, at least during the term of the mandate. It will be the business, too, of the mandatary to do all possible to develop the whole people into capacity for self-government. The help of a national system of education, too, would do much to assure that the abuses of the old time would not return; and the term of the mandate would naturally continue until there was good promise of Turkey's success as a modern State. Even after the mandate had expired the League of Nations could still act, upon necessity, to prevent all gross invasions of the rights of minorities.

In the light of all these considerations it would seem best not to set off any independent Greek territory for the present, in the belief that in the long run the better good both of the Greeks and of the Turks is to be found in their union in one cosmopolitan State.

V. Recommendations.

The recommendations dealing with mandates in the Asia Minor portion of the former Ottoman Empire follow naturally upon the preceding discussions of pertinent action already taken by the Peace Conference; of dangers arising from a selfish division and exploitation of Turkey; of considerations looking to a proper division of Turkey, and of problems naturally resulting. For the recommendations are built directly on foundations already laid by the Peace Conference. They aim to prevent a selfish exploitation and division of Turkey. They intend not less surely to ground such division of Turkey as is recommended solely upon considerations of justice and the good of all men. And in this spirit they endeavor honestly to face the grave problem arising, and to seek their solution in the light of the full discussion which precedes. That discussion has been so full that the recommendations of the Commissioners need do little more than summarize conclusions, except upon two points—the reasons for a general American mandate, and the conditions upon which such a mandate might be taken by America.

1. The formation, under a mandatary, of an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section of the report, for reasons already fully given.

2. The similar formation, under a mandatary, of an International Constantinopolitan State, completely separated from Turkey, as defined in the preceding section, also for reasons already fully given.

3. The appointment of a mandatary for the continued Turkish State, in line with the apparent wishes of the majority of the Turkish people; the major terms of the mandate to be defined by the Peace Conference or the League of Nations, and further adjustments to be arranged between the mandatary and Turkey. The reasons for the mandate and its necessary scope have been already fully given.

4. That, for the reasons already stated, no independent territory be set off for the Greeks; though local autonomy be granted to that portion of the Sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided majority of Greeks, but under the general mandate for Turkey.

5. That a commission or commissions on boundaries in Asia Minor be appointed to study on the ground and to exactly define the boundaries of the States named in the first three recommendations, and the precise limits of any locally autonomous area in Smyrna. The definition of the boundaries of the Turkish State would require the study and definition of the northern boundaries of Syria and Mesopotamia as well, with special reference to allowing to the Kurds a measure of autonomy under the mandatory rule, possibly in connection with Mesopotamia, and with the clear understanding that the rights of the Syrian, Chaldean, and Nestorian Christian minorities in this whole region shall be carefully guarded.

Single Mandate for Asia Minor.

6. A general single mandate for the whole of Asia Minor (not assigned to Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under it the mandate for Armenia, the mandate for the Constantinopolitan State, and the mandate for the continued Turkish State, each with a Governor of its own to insure full attention to its particular interests, besides a Governor-General over the whole. The various interrelations and common concerns of the constituent States would thus be studied and cared for, as well as their individual needs. The reasons for such a general mandate have been fully given and need not be repeated here.

7. That the United States of America be asked to take this general single mandate, together with its inclusive mandates for the Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the continued Turkish State. This recommendation is made for the following reasons, which need to be developed in full:

(1) As already pointed out, it seems to be generally desired that America should take the mandate for Armenia. In this, both the Armenians and the Allies seem agreed—and even the Turks, if there must be an Armenian State at all. Nevertheless, America cannot wisely take this mandate without at the same time taking a mandate for the rest of Asia Minor as well.

For, in the first place, this Armenian mandate would be in many respects the most difficult of all: because it would begin in relations of bitter hostility; because the State would have to build from the bottom under most peculiar circumstances; and because the mandate would have to be prolonged against the impatience of the Armenians. And these difficulties would all be accentuated if the surrounding conditions could not be determined. It conterns the world that this Armenian State should clearly succeed. Its mandatary should not be needlessly handicapped

In the second place, the problems of the different States in Asia Minor are too closely related to be wisely entrusted to entirely different powers, with different ideals and methods. That situation would inevitably tend to produce friction, waste and bad feeling, and unsatisfactory conditions in one State would naturally spread to other States also.

In the third place, if the rest of Turkey, outside of a modest Armenian State, were divided into spheres of influence and exploitation areas, the direct hindrance to the working out of a truly conceived mandate in Armenia would be well nigh insuperable.

Why America Should Take It.

The American mandate for Armenia, thus, calls for a general mandate over all of Asia Minor.

(2) America is also the most natural power to take the mandate for the international Constantinopolitan State, as well as for Armenia; for the simple reason that she is the only great power territorially and strategically disinterested. The mandatary for this international State should be herself strong, to discourage any further intrigue for control of the Straits: disinterested, to command the confidence of all the nations concerned; and in unmistakably earnest sympathy with the aim of such a State, and with those international means by which this aim is to be achieved—the League of Nations and its mandatory system. These needed qualifications are best met by America. Now the full fruits of such an international State cannot be secured, unless the rest of Asia Minor is made a fit environment for such a State, practically embodying the same great principles.

The mandate for the Constantinopolitan State also calls for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

(3) It is to be added that America is also the most natural power for the mandate over the new Turkish State, because the Turkish people want her, and generally trust her, as the evidence previously given indicates; and because America is peculiarly prepared to meet the needs of the Turkish people in this crisis in their history, as the reasons to be given for a general American mandate will later bring out.

The desired American mandate for the new Turkish State, then, calls also for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

(4) The best solution for mandates in Asia Minor would seem then to be to combine all three mandates in a composite mandate, which would be put in the hands of America as the single mandatary.

The general reasons for a single mandatary for all Asia Minor, already given, are not to be lightly regarded. They give solid grounds for a composite supervisory mandate.

Further Reasons.

The further direct reasons for making America that single mandatary should now be considered. To begin with, there is the recognized fact that all the other Great Allies are already loaded with colonial responsibilities, which of itself suggests a special obligation here for America. But the positive reasons—if there are any—lie necessarily in some special fitness of America for the particular task in hand—a fitness growing naturally out of her experience as a great growing democracy, largely freed hitherto from European entanglements. These reasons, that is, lie inevitably in certain dominant national convictions of America; in a certain idealistic international faith; in her record in these internationdl relations; and in the indications of her duty at this critical point in human history. All of these considerations concern the Turkish situation.

In the first place, we have found both the Syrian and Turkish peoples recognizing that at the foundation of the common life of America were to be found certain great dominant convictions. They saw that she had a passion for peace and for the possibility of its attainment, in spite of all sordid manifestations to the contrary, and that to bring such a righteous peace nearer she entered this war. They saw that she had a passion for democracy, for the common man everywhere, in spite of inconsistencies at home and abroad, and could treat men of all races with a genuine respect born of some insight into their own individual gifts. They felt sure that she would not go into any situation simply to dominate and to stamp American customs on a people. They knew that, because she really believed in democracy, she had also a passion for universal education, as possible for the rank and file of every nation, and as absolutely essential to a democracy. They believed, therefore, that as a mandatary she would gird herself to help a people fulfill its own highest possibilities. They believed, indeed, that she had a passion for the development of a national spirit in every people, not as narrow conceit, but as faith in a divine individuality, to which the people must be true, if they were to be significant members of that larger fellowship of nations for which the world longs. They instinctively felt, thus, that she combined in a way fairly unique, educational emphasis wth respect for the values of another people. They knew, too, that with a high religious idealism, America somehow combined belief in the principle of the separation of Church and State in governmental administration, for the highest good both of religion and of the State, and was thus especially fitted to render help to a State like Turkey at so peculiarly critical a point in her transition from an imperialistic to a democratic state on modern lines and with complete religious liberty.

Belief in Our Faith.

In the second place, with these mastering convictions, the Syrians and Turkish people believed that America combined a certain idealistic international faith, in her stubborn belief in the League of Nations and in the possibilities of its mandatory system, when honestly carried out. She was naturally prepared, therefore, they believed, to throw herself into the responsibilities of a mandate; steadfastly to seek to train the people entrusted to her care into self-government and into economic independence; and promptly to withdraw when that task was complete; for she would measure the success of her stewardship by both the completeness and the promptness with which her task was accomplished.

In the third place, both the Syrian and the Turkish people, in expressing their desire for an American mandate, have laid steady emphasis upon the assurance which came from America's record in dealing with other peoples. They believed in her unselfish aims in the war, and that she was now seeking for no share in the spoils of the war. They believed that she had no territorial or imperialistic ambitions. They believed in her high and unselfish aims in dealing with Cuba and the Philippines. They believed that she was not involved in any joint plan for an exploiting division of either Syria or Turkey. They believed in the high quality of her relief service, and, especially of her educational service in both countries—a service so fine, that so competent and impartial an observer as Ramsay can say: "I firmly believe that Robert College has done more to render possible a safe solution of the 'Eastern Question' in Turkey than all the ambassadors of all the European powers have succeeded in doing to render that solution difficult." They believed that, so far was America from scheming to obtain a mandate in Asia, she was honestly reluctant to undertake such a mandate of any kind.

In the fourth place, America is peculiarly fitted to be the single mandatory power for all Asia Minor, not only because of her national convictions, her international faith, and her record, but also because the course of duty for her would seem to lie in this direction.

Obligations Upon Us.

It is no part of the task of the commissioners to determine whether America is now willing to accept the general single mandate for Turkey, with its three involved subordinate mandates. It is their business to point out where in their honest judgment that mandate belongs (if proper conditions can be fulfilled), and so give an opportunity to the Peace Conference to put the resulting obligation squarely up to the American people.

Can America deny all obligation in this matter of a mandate for Turkey? She has believed, perhaps more than any other people, in the high possibilities of the League of Nations; but, if the League of Nations is not to be a sham and a delusion, all nations must be willing to bear their share in the resulting responsibilities. America, certainly, cannot be an exception. She came into the war, too, with the ardent faith and hope that a more democratic world might result. Is she willing to carry those war purposes through to the end? Here in Turkey is an unrivaled opportunity to try these purposes out for the good not only of a single people, but of the entire world; for here in Turkey has been through centuries a centre of intrigue and strife that has engulfed all nations in its consequences. Moreover, America's intervention in the war went far to determine the war's issue. Was that intervention justified? America must still do her utmost to complete the proof.

But America's obligation goes still deeper, in this desperate hour of human need. Men still need peace—long deferred. They need far better provision for bodily wants. They need simple, homely happiness. But beneath all this they need renewed faith in one another and in one another's honest purposes of good.

The New Cynical World.

The war destroyed that faith between the hostile forces; the settlements of the war, it is to be feared, have gone far to destroy that faith among the Allies themselves. It is not rosecate dreaming, but practical politics of the most imperative sort, to do something to bring back men's faith in men. If we can see the radical necessity of such faith, to prevent or break a financial panic, are we to see less clearly in times like these, of a moral world panic? Cynicism and disillusionment, as we have seen, are rife. Can they be conquered? Only by indisputable examples to the contrary. It may be doubtful, then, if America could do anything so significant for the human race today as to prove that she had not forgotten her own ideals and purposes in the war, but was willing to incur new and even greater proof of them in undertaking unselfishly a difficult and distasteful, but highly important and far-reaching task—by taking on the general mandate for Turkey (as well as for Syria, if the Peace Conference thought best). In fidelity to herself does not America owe that demonstration to the world? It is hard to estimate the immense effect of so important a mandate under the League of Nations being carried through with absolutely honest unselfishness. It would mean a reality of the League of Nations. It would make a reality of the mandatory system. It would set a new standard in international relations. It would renew men's faith in one another. It would help to save America herself from a disastrous reaction from her genuinely high aims in the war.

Nothing has been said of America's ample means for the economic development of Turkey's large resources; though it is not suggested that the financial relations of Turkey to America should be finally other than those of self-respecting independence. Turkey's present condition, however, is so necessitous in a thousand ways that very large amounts of capital would be profitably required and returns at first would be small and slow. Indeed, the mandate ended a fair return on capital put into direly needed public improvements and the development of natural resources might properly be expected, at the same time that Turkey's own interests were guarded against selfish and monopolistic exploitation. America should not come into the Turkish mandate with the expectation of large financial profits. But if even so favorable a result as that indicated proved quite impossible, America might well spend millions to insure relations of peace and good-will among nations, rather than the billions required for another war sure to come if the present cynical national selfishness and lack

separation scheme are undoubtedly
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realize that no other power than Fr
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situation.

Many of their followers, espec
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but there was evidence that many
them would prefer America to Fra
if there were a certainty of accepta

In all Syria surprising few, aside f
the Druses, declared for Britain as
choice—not nearly so many as
France. The fact is that Britain
America were classed together, wit
distinct preference for America, but
were greatly preferred to France.
Jews and the majority of the G
Orthodox, and some of the Protesta
were for Britain. The great majorit
the Moslems were for Britain as sec
choice. Most of those who made Bri
their first choice were for America
second choice. Practically no one
for America or England as first ch
and France as second choice.

Moslems All for America.

Practically all of the Moslems,
number about four-fifths of the popu
tion of Syria, are for America as t
first choice. It is true that there
little direct expression of this in Pa
tine, since after their first declarati
at Jaffa the question of choice of m
date was held up and referred to Dam
cus. Possibly this was done under
structions from the Emir Feisal,
may have been trying to hold the fi
for Britain. If so, the evidence of
cere declaration for America is all
stronger, since the Congress reacl
unanimity for America.

As for the Christians, while compa
tively few declared directly for Amer
as first choice—only a part of the Pr
estants and Syrian Orothodox and Arm
nians—they were bound by old ties
recent agreements to declare for Brit
or France, but a large proportion m
tioned America as a second choice
stated that they would welcome h
while there were abundant assuran
that an American mandate would
satisfactory to practically all.

The members of the commission
entertain no doubt of the genuineness
the desire for the United States as ma
datory power, in view of the countl
earnest appeals, both by individuals a
groups, and of the manifest enthusia
shown on many occasions, in spite of
commission's discouragement of demo
strations and avoidance of every form
ostentation. It was, furthermore, alwa
possible to ask why a group or in
vidual objected to France or Englar
but not to ask why a group failed
declare for the United States. It is,
course, also a fact that France, and o
less openly England, were making bi
for the mandate, while the United Stat
was not.

Reasons for Their Attitude.

The principal reasons advanced for d
siring an American mandate were as f
lows:

i. Confidence in President Wilson
mainly responsible for the freedom
Syria and as championing the rights
small and oppressed peoples.

ii. Gratitude to America for relief
the starving and naked. Thanks to Pre
ident Wilson and America was express
in a thousand forms and with the grea
est emotion, independently of the desi
as regards a mandate.

iii. The feeling that America can
into the war for no selfish reason, ar
could be trusted to take care of a sma
people in an unselfish way.

iv. The knowledge that America is n
a colonizing power, seeking to gove
for the advantage of its own people, ar
to exploit the governed. The exampl
of Cuba and the Philippines were fr
quently cited.

v. The feeling that America can
relied upon to withdraw from the cou
try when her work is done, which is t
case with no other power. The exper
ence of Cuba was contrasted with th
of Egypt and Algeria.

vi. The feeling that America is ric
and abundantly able to advance t
means for the desirable speedy develo
ment of the country economically.

vii. A hearty approval of and desi
for the extension of American educatio
in the country. England has done litt
educationally for Syria. While Franc
has done much, she seeks to denatior
alize the native peoples and mak
Frenchmen of them. America, especia
ly through the Syrian Protestant Co
lege, has taught Syrian nationalism. Th
American training and the Anglo-Saxo
literature and civilization are regarde
as morally superior to the French.

viii. A conviction that America wi
be absolutely fair and just as betwee
the different religons and sects. Franc
would be expected to favor Christians
especially Roman Catholics, and Eng
land to favor Moslems.

ix. America is abundantly supplie
with trained men, from whom expert
can be supplied in "various branches o
science, industry, administration, an
above all, education."

x. The Americans are "lovers of hu
manity."

Many British officials, not exceptin
General Allenby, think the best solutio
to be an American mandate over th
whole of Syria. England might be ver
glad to get out of the difficulties of th
situation in this way. As for France
she cannot desire to take the whole o
Syria, when so much of it is utterl
adverse to her. She also may ultimatel
conclude that the best way out is com
plete withdrawal. This would, perhaps
not hurt her pride seriously if at th
same time England were to withdraw
and if her special prewar relationship
be scrupulously continued.

III. Special Discussions.

It is evident that the French feel re
sentment toward the British as not hav
ing played a fair game in the Syrian
area. Without going into historical de
tails, the Sykes-Picot agreement pro
vided that France should have owner
ship or influence in a large area,
including Damascus and Cilicia, and ex
tending to Sivas and Harpoot, while
England should be in a similar position
toward the former Turkish area south
east of this. At the present moment,
France is threatened with the loss of
all her sphere, while England complac
ently holds all that was then assigned
to her, and extends her influence toward
much of the rest.

America, by showing interest in Ar
menia, and even by the sending of the
Commission on Mandates to Syria,
seems to the French to be an accom
plice of England in despoiling France.
The French feel that the English took
advantage of their dire necessity, by
reason of which they were obliged to
keep practically all of their men in
France, to occupy more than a due
share of Syria and to seduce the affec
tion of the Arabs.

They also resent the payment by the
English to the Emir Feisal of a large
monthly subsidy, which they claim cov
ers a multitude of bribes and enables
the British to stand off and show clean
hands while Arab agents do dirty work
in their interest. They feel that in arm
ing the Arabs the British are again
working against the French. They
claim further that the British are more
or less directly responsible for the un
deniably strong anti-French feeling
shown by practically all the Moslem and
non-Catholic Christian elements of
Syria. They feel that Britain has been
unable to resist the desire to connect
Egypt with Mesopotamia under one
control as a bulwark of India, and as a
new field for profitable commercial
exploitation.

British Withdrawal Advocated.

It cannot be denied that some of the
French contentions are difficult of refu
tation, and that the whole situation is
such that British honor would seem
cleaner if Britain were to withdraw
wholly from Syria. Yet the aversion of
the people to France, however it may
have arisen, is so great and deep-
seated that England cannot leave Syria
to France without seeming to abandon
her friends to their enemies, a process
which would probably react strongly in
Egypt and elsewhere in the Moslem
world. There is good reason for the
position of many Englishmen, who are
strongly desirous that America should
take the whole situation off their hands,
including with the French and Arab en
tanglements the promise to Zionism.

The denial in the "Damascus Pro
gram" that the French have "rights"
anywhere in Syria leads to an inquiry
into the bases on which such rights
might be claimed. (France was given,
and now holds, a mandate over Syria,
including Damascus. She held Cilicia
for a time, but surrendered it to the Na
tionalist Turks). In brief, there have
been in Syria Roman Catholic mission
ary workers, using principally the
French language, for several centuries.
These have developed an extensive sys-

tem of churches, schools and monas
teries. France has had commercial re
lations and small groups of resident citi
zens since the Middle Ages. French has
long been the principal Western lan
guage used in Syria. France has taken
a special interest in the Maronites and
intervened on their behalf in the Leba
non in 1860.

None of these relationships, however,
give the least "right" to claim terri
tory or mandatory control. Otherwise
it could be held that America, through
her missionary work and business rela
tionships, had acquired a measure of po
litical rights in India, China, South
America and Syria itself. France her
self could claim all of Turkey with near
ly the same justification.

It would comprise all the missionary
work in the world if the doctrine were
admitted that such work established po
litical claims. No doubt the French have
acquired many personal relationships
and sentimental attachments. But there
is no reason why any tie that France
has had with Syria in the past should be
severed or even weakened under the con
trol of another mandatory power or in
an independent Syria.

3. The "Greater Lebanon."

The latest policy pushed by the French
in the Lebanon region contemplates com
plete separation of the country from
Tyre to Tripoli, as far inland as the
crest of the Anti-Lebanon, to be given
to France in case the remainder of Syria
should go to another mandatory power.
Such a plan is objectionable for many
reasons:

i. It is apparently contrary to the
wish of the majority of the people in the
area itself.

ii. The Syrians outside the area are so
opposed to the plan as to be inclined to
make war rather than accept it.

iii. If put into effect by overwhelming
force a state of settled equilibrium could
probably never be attained, because of
such questions as the just control of
"Hollow Syria," where the Christians
by their own figures own 65 per cent. of
the property, but have only 40 per cent.
of the population; the water supply of
Toms, which comes from territory
claimed for the "Greater Lebanan";
the commercial access to the sea of the
regions of Damascus and Aleppo. In
short, the land is too small, and too in
timately connected, to be capable of sat
isfactory division.

iv. The separation off of the Greater
Lebanon, especially if accompanied by a
separation off of Palestine, would inten
sify the religious differences in Syria,
which it is most desirable to diminish in
favor of the growth of national feeling.
The tendency would be for Christian
Syrians to concentrate in the Lebanon,
Jews in Palestine, and Moslem Syrians
in the remainder of the country.

v. The Government in each area would
countenance and probably conduct in
trigue in the other regions.

vi. The three areas would be implicit
ly hostile, and must either carry heavy
burdens of armament against each other,
or be protected at great expense by the
mandatory powers

vii. The mandatory powers would
themselves be in danger of hostility over
the questions which would inevitably
arise between the portions of a country
and a people thus unnaturally severed.

A plan which would add to the Greater
Lebanon the remainder of O. E. T. A.
West, extending from Tripoli to Alexan
dretta, and give the whole to France,
and at the same time give the interior
to Britain, would intensify all the above
difficulties, and would besides cut off
Aleppo and Western Mesopotamia from
access to the sea.

4. The Emir Feisal's Position.

Unless the attempt be made to rule
Syria as a conquered country, or unless
the experiment of republican govern
ment be tried in the old land, the obvi
ous plan is that the Emir Feisal should
be head of the State, third son of the
Shereef of Mecca, Hussein, who was rec
ognized during the war as King of the
Hedjaz, the Emir Feisal led the Arabs in
co-operation with the Allies against the
Turks, and entered Damascus in triumph.
He spent several months in Paris, and
returned a few weeks before the arrival
of the commission. He had agreed with
Clemenceau to labor at allaying the
Arab feeling against the French, but
believing after a time that the French
were playing false with him, he ceased
his efforts. Shortly before the arrival
of the commission in Damascus he en
deavored to obtain declarations in favor
of a British mandate. He assured the
commission that he would be pleased
with either Britain or America as man
datory power.

The British Government has been ad
vancing money to his Government for a
long time, and at present allows it $750,-
000 per month (£150,000). Of this Fei
sal draws about $200,000 per month for
his personal expenses, staff, propaganda
agents, &c. The balance is spent on the
administration and the army of 7,000
and gendarmerie of 4,500, in supplement
to the inadequate receipts from taxation.

The estimate was made that the Prince
could manage under settled conditions
with a salary of $125,000 per year, and
that after a few years the country could
carry itself by taxation, maintaining a
very small army. This does not allow
for carrying a portion of the Ottoman
debt, nor for large expenditure on need
ed public improvements.

The present attachment of the popula
tion to Prince Feisal varies in the dif
ferent regions. Not many Christians de
clared themselves positively in favor of
him. Some others said he is a good man,
with bad advisers. Others fear him be
cause of his membership in a powerful
Moslem family. The Moslems of Pales
tine made almost no declarations in his
favor. It was said that if he would come
to Palestine, all Arabs would be enthusi
astically for him. In the O. E. T. A.
East, and among the Moslems of the
West, he was asked for, often with en
thusiasm. An exception was found in
some Moslems of the North, who said
they do not know him.

Emir Feisal gave the impression of
being kindly, genial and wise. Whatever
was the case previously, he has had dur
ing the past two years in the desert and
at Damascus and Paris an excellent po
litical education. He desires the friendly
co-operation of the Moslems and Chris
tians of Syria, and wishes to promote
the education of Moslem women. Some
say that he is not as strong as the men
around him, but he gave the impression
of being able to maintain his leadership.
He promises well as a constitutional
monarch, who could work amicably in
co-ordination with a mandatory power.

It should be provided, in case he re
mains the head of the Syrian State, that
he renounce all rights of inheritance of
the crown of the Hedjaz; otherwise se
rious complications might arise in the
future.

5. The "Rights of Minorities."

One clause in the Damascus program
promises full recognition of the "rights
of minorities" in the Syrian constitution.

On account of the evident fears of
many Christians, based on the policy of
massacre that has been employed so
often in Turkey, the Commissioners took
pains to inquire of many Moslem groups
what they propose to do to insure the
rights of the smaller sections of the
population. The answer was sometimes
given, logically enough, that there would
be no minorities, since all would be
absolutely equal in the new State. But
ordinarily the promise was made of con
stitutional guarantees.

There was discussion in the Damascus
Congress of a proposal to grant Moslems
one-half of the seats in the future legis
lative assembly, while the other half
would be distributed among the rest of
the population. What method might be
used in apportioning seats to different
groups and sects, as the Druses, Maro
nites, Shiites, Nusairiyeh, Ismailians,
Turks, Jews, Greek Orthodox, Greek
Catholics, &c., was not discussed; the
mere enumeration suggests the diffi
culty of the problem.

Mention has been made already of the
agreements made by Prince Feisal with
the Druses and the Greek Orthodox. He
promised in return for the Greek Ortho
dox support that he would govern under
seven conditions:

(1) He would rule in the fear of God
without despotism.
(2) He would establish constitutional gov
ernment.
(3) He would respect all religions.
(4) Equal rights should be enjoyed by
all.
(5) Public security should be guaran
teed for all; the private carrying of rifles
should be prevented.
(6) Public instruction should be equal;
Greek Orthodox schools should be on the
same basis as Moslem schools.
(7) No one should hold office because of
family or influence, but only because fit
ted for the place.

These conditions are superior in form
from the standpoint of a modern State to
the Turkish system of recognizing a cer
tain measure of autonomy and self-gov
ernment in various religious groups,
thus perpetuating differences and mak
ing concessions which later become privi
leges and the source of friction. It
would be better to aim at one system of
education, wherein certain hours each
week should be set aside for religious
instruction under special teachers for
each group than to have several State
supported school systems. But these are
details for future adjustment. Suffice it
to say that great readiness was shown
by the majority group to provide ade
quately for the protection and rights of
the other groups, and it remains only to
bring this purpose into action.

It is desirable to bear in mind that
the Moslem and Druse minority in the
Lebanon is also in need of protection,
and that in the event of a Jewish major
ity in Palestine, Moslems and Christians
would need protection there. A former
Governor of the Lebanon stated that a
large part of his work was given to
watching lest the Maronites and other
Christians infringe the rights of the
Moslems and Druses.

6. "Complete Independence."

One item in the Damascus program
deserves special attention, as going be
low the problem of a mandate, namely,
the request for "complete independ
ence." The protest against the applica
tion to Syria of Article 22 of the Cove
nant is closely related to this. The feel
ing that the Syrians are in at least as
advanced a condition as were the differ
ent Balkan States when their independ
ence was arranged for was present in
the first Moslems whom the commission
met in Syria, and the same note was
sounded everywhere by some of the dele
gations.

The groups which were inclined to sup
port this view in an extreme form were
Bedouins, villagers of the south and
east, and some of the younger Moslem
men. The Syrian Union Party declared
in this direction, and the few but prom
inent men and women related to the
"Arab Martyrs"—the men who were ex
ecuted by Jemal Pasha for intrigues
against the Turkish Government—were
very emphatic against any form of re
lationship to another nation; the Syrian
Union Party ask that the League of Na
tions guarantee the independence and
the Constitution of Syria. The declara
tion was made that when Syrians now
abroad return, there will be a suffi
ciency of educated and trained men to
govern the country well.

On the other hand, a large proportion
of the learned men and of others from
the older and wiser among the Moslems,
recognized fully that some form of man
datory control is necessary, since the
Syrians have long been in subjection,
few of them are educated and the coun
try is poor and backward in its develop
ment. The Christians, and most other
non-Moslem groups, are unanimous in
the belief that a strong mandate is nec
essary for a considerable time, because
they do not feel confidence in an Arab
Government, which in a country four-
fifths Moslem might be too favorable
to the majority.

The nations in forming the league
have pronounced in the Covenant that
Syria should be under mandatory con
trol. The commission did not find rea
son to recommend modification of this
decision but abundant cause for holding
it to be just. The failure of the Young
Turkish attempt to conduct a self-gov-

erning State in which Moslems and
Christians should be equal makes it es
pecially desirable that the new Syrian
State should in its first years be
watched closely, since it has the addi
tional difficulty to be overcome of
emergence from subjection.

The fourth article of the "Damascus
Program" provides for the possibility
of a mandate, defining it "as equivalent
to the rendering of economical and tech
nical assistance that does not preju
dice our complete independence." Here
also the restriction may be too great.
The mandatory power should have a
real control over the Administration,
so as to eliminate as far as possible
corruption, waste, inertia, serious er
rors of judgment, &c.

In spite of all that was said in favor
of complete independence, it is alto
gether probable that either America or
Britain would be allowed without re
sistance as much control as the Council
of the League of Nations judges to be
wise. In fact, assurance was given on
very high authority that the demand for
complete independence is to an extent
artificial, being in part motivated by
the fear of a French mandate, and in
part by apprehension of the conversion
of mandatory control into permanent
possession. If adequate assurances be
had against both these possibilities, the
objectors to a mandate, limited so as
to secure its exercise in the interests of
Syria, will be reduced to a small and
impotent group. In time, when all things
are ready, a true and lasting "com
plete independence" can be awarded by
the League of Nations.

7. Syrian Nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Islamism.

The programs presented to the com
mission by all the Moslems and about
two-thirds of the Christians of Syria
were nationalistic; that is to say, they
called for a United Syria under a demo
cratic constitution, making no distinc
tions on the basis of religion. In re
sponse to repeated questions in many
places, it was steadily affirmed by the
Moslems that they had no desire what
ever for Moslem privilege in the govern
ment, nor for political union with the
Arabs of the Hejaz, whom they felt to
be in another state of civilization. They
asked regularly for the independence of
Mesopotamia, and a few of them hoped
for some form of political union with
that area. A few asked for the indepen
dence of all Arab countries.

The commissioners often asked the
question of Moslems, whether they con
sidered the Caliphate to be at Stamboul
or at Mecca. With very few exceptions
they replied that it belongs now to King
Hussein in Mecca. One or two said
that it belongs still to the Turkish Sul
tan, and cannot be changed except by an
agreement of all the Moslems in the
world. All affirmed that King Hussein
is in no sense their political head, but
only their religious head. Prayers are
said in his name, and certain seals for
public documents bear his name.

Certain Christians, on the other hand,
affirmed that the sentiment of Syrian
Nationalism is new and feeble, and that
the expressions of it made before the
commission gave a false impression.
They claimed that the Christians who
adhere to this view do so as making a
desperate effort to live on good terms
with the Moslem majority, and that the
Moslems much prefer a pan-Arabic or
Pan-Islamic scheme, and would quickly
abandon Syrian nationalism if they saw
a chance for the success of either of
these ideas. It would seem safe to as
sume that those who speak for them
selves strike nearer the truth than others
who assume to speak for them. Never
theless, it is worth while to give con
sideration to the criticism.

The Turkish National Pact.

Pan-Arabism [this is the portentous
program set forth in the Turkish Na
tionalist Pact. It would apparently
eliminate both France and Great Britain
from the confines of the former Ottoman
Empire] in a narrower sense would unite
under one independent Government the
Arab-speaking portions of the former
Turkish Empire. This would not neces
sarily be a theoretic Moslem State,
though the large majority would
belong to the different Moslem sects. It
is hard to see how much a federated
State, with its territory largely desert
and lacking a centre and speedy com
munications, could be more of a danger
to the world than the Turkey of which it
forme a part.

In a larger sense Pan-Arabism would
wish to add also the Arab-speaking belt
across North Africa. Since this is held
by three great powers, each of whom
has a larger population and infinitely
greater resources than the Pan-Arab
area contains, its accomplishment
against their will is a mere dream.

Pan-Islamism in a narrow sense would
re-establish one Government in the for
mer Turkish Empire by agreement of
the two Moslem groups of north and
south—the Turks and the Arabs. The
commission found no sign of a desire for
the re-establishment of the rule of Tur
key over the Arabs. One former deputy
in the Turkish Parliament did indeed
suggest that an Ottoman prince might
be chosen as king of Syria, but this was
an individual opinion. On the other
hand, there were many expressions of
joy and thankfulness because of the end
of Turkish rule. If there is any thought
of a federation of Arabs with Turks or
of a political union of any sort the
commission saw no trace of it. Still less
was there any sign of movement toward
the realization of a larger Pan-Islamic
idea. The Turks had some thought of
this early in the war, but it disappeared
in favor of a Pan-Turanian idea on a
racial or linguistic rather than a relig
ious basis, from the time when Jemal
Pasha hanged the leaders of the Syrian
Arabs.

One may conjure up the picture of an
attempt at restoring the Saracen Em
pire, by the stages of Syrian, Arabian
and Mesopotamian independence, follow
ed by federal union in a strong conquer
ing state, which would then become im
perialistic in the directions of Persia,
Armenia, Turkey and North Africa; but
the commission discerned no trace of
such a notion, nor is it practically con-

ceivable under present world conditions.

If the European civilization has suf
ficient wisdom to avoid further extensive
self-destruction, it can with the greatest
ease control the Moslem world; it is not
necessary for those who labor to estab
lish the League of Nations to contem
plate the opposite possibility.

Western Attitude to Moslems.

The fundamental question in this con
nection, and, indeed, in several other
great immediate problems, is the basal
attitude of the Christians toward the
Moslem world: Shall this be friendly or
hostile? In the war now ending Christ
ian Governments gave their Moslem al
lies promises of fair treatment and full
rights. Now the Moslems of Syria offer
their hands to their non-Moslem fel
low-citizens with the promise of putting
religious separation out of sight. Shall
they be taken at their word? Or shall
they be told: We do not believe what
you say; we do not trust you; we think
it best to break our word with you,
so that you may not have the oppor
tunity to break your word with us?

The western world is already commit
ted to the attempt to live in peace and
friendship with the Moslem peoples, and
to manage governments in such a way
as to separate politics from religion.
Syria offers an excellent opportunity to
establish a state where members of the
three great monotheistic religions can
live together in harmony; because it is
a country of one language, which has
long had freedom of movement and of
business relations through being unified
under the Turkish rule. Since now the
majority declare for nationalism, inde
pendent of religion, it is necessary only
to hold them to this view through man
datory control until they shall have
established the method and practice of
it. Dangers may readily arise from un
wise and unfaithful dealings with this
people, but there is great hope of peace
and progress if they be handled frankly
and loyally.

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TURKISH EMPIRE AS BOOTY

Secret Deals Among European Nations, Each Striving to Seize What It Could—More Peace Conference Records From Wilson's Steel Box

AMERICA AND THE WORLD PEACE

By RAY STANNARD BAKER

(Eleventh Instalment)

The chapters of the two previous weeks concerned Europe's secret treaties.

WE come now to the most illuminating of all the exhibits of the old diplomacy—the group of "secret treaties," "arrangements," "conversations," by which the old Turkish Empire was to be carved up between the allied nations. We can now set forth not only the terms of these treaties but the whole enlightening history of their stormy progress through the Peace Conference, where in secret councils the real purposes of the nations were bluntly set forth.

Turkey was by all odds the richest spoils of the war, richer than Shantung. There were indeed colonies in Africa and islands in the Pacific, there were thin border provinces in Europe, like Alsace-Lorraine and Dalmatia, but none of them compared in sheer undeveloped wealth with the old Empire of the Turks. Here were untouched deposits of oil, copper, silver, salt; vast riches in agricultural land easily within reach of the irrigation engineer. Here, above all, were large and industrious populations, long enured to labor, which, given a stable government, would immediately become great producers of wealth and creators of trade. Moreover the break-up of Turkey meant new arrangements in Egypt and new possibilities of opening to communication and exploitation another old empire—that of Persia. The control of the Mediterranean also turned upon the possession of the coastal cities of Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine.

Germany had had a clear vision of the enormous importance of the Near East. Before the war she had projected and partly built the Berlin-Bagdad railroad and had attempted "peaceful penetration" by every means in her power. The great war has even been described as primarily a struggle for the domination of the Near East.

It was quite natural that allied diplomats, once the war broke out, should begin to consider what would happen if they won and Germany lost: What was to be done with Turkey?

In the case of the secret treaties with Italy, Rumania and possibly Japan, the Allies had the excuse that such arrangements were necessary in order to bring in new nations to support the allied cause in their desperate struggle with Germany, but in the case of the Turkish treaties, except possibly for the slice of Turkish territory given Italy, there can be no such excuse. These were frankly arrangements for the division of the spoils of the war.

Secret negotiations began almost at once, and in the Spring of 1915 the very first of the important secret treaties among the Allies (described in the last chapter) gave Russia, "provided the war is successfully terminated," her ancient ambition—Constantinople. Great Britain in return was to have certain rather vague but vast "satisfactions • • • within the Ottoman Empire, and in other places."

Italy's Bargain in Turkey.

So far, so good. But about the same time the Allies were raising heaven and earth to get Italy into the war. Germany and Austria had dangled glittering offers before the Italians to get them in on their side. Italy knew her power and drove a hard bargain with the Allies. She also looked with longing eyes toward the Turkish treasure-house and provided in the London treaty (also described in the last chapter) for a "right, in case of the partition of Turkey, to a share equal to theirs (Great Britain, France and Russia) in the basin of the Mediterranean—that part of it which adjoins the province of Adalia."

These "rights" and "shares" were vague, especially after Italy came in, and to the diplomats, particularly the French, extremely unsatisfactory. For the British were actually on the ground and had been negotiating with the Arab King, Hussein, as to the creation of an independent Arab State in return for Arab assistance in the war. The French were fearful that the British would become too powerful in that part of the world, get too strong a grip on Turkey. Therefore, they began negotiating with their old friends the Russians, and at the same time demanded a "showdown" with the British. The result was two new secret treaties devoted wholly to the disposal of Turkey.

First, the Sazonoy-Paléologue treaty between Russia and France (disclosed in a memorandum of the old Russian Foreign Office dated a year later, March, 1917) dealing with Northern Asiatic Turkey. Under this arrangement Russia staked out a vast domain, 60,000 square miles, between the Persian frontier and the Black Sea, with rich resources of copper, silver and salt. The fortress of Erzerum and the important Port of Trebizond were included in this territory.

The French for their share were given a great slice to the south and west reaching to the Mediterranean, the actual boundaries of which she was to determine by arrangements with the British.

Second, Northern Turkey having thus been disposed of, arrangements were made between France and Great Britain regarding the vast southern part of Asiatic Turkey. Sir Mark Sykes represented Great Britain and M. Picot represented France in these negotiations, and the resulting secret treaty of May, 1916, was called the Sykes-Picot treaty. Under this arrangement (see map):

France got all the important coast of Syria on the Mediterranean as far south as Akka, and all the ports—except that Alexandretta was to be free to British trade. France also got a great hinterland—a veritable principality—reaching east as far as the Tigris River.

Great Britain got for direct administration only the Mediterranean ports of Akka and Haifa and the portion of Mesopotamia between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf—a tidy bit of territory with great riches in oil and in agricultural land when irrigated.

Between these claims, and north of the Arabian peninsula, lay a great interior mass of Turkish territory still not disposed of, including the important

(Continued on Page 2.)



HOW TURKEY WAS CARVED BY SIX SECRET AGREEMENTS:

The Franco-Russo-British Agreement of March, 1915, Gave Russia Constantinople.

The Sazonov-Paleologue Treaty of April 26, 1916, Delimited the French and Russian Shares in Asia.

The Sykes-Picot Treaty of May, 1916, Divided What Lay Beyond Between France and Great Britain.

The Treaty of London, April 26, 1915, Gave Italy the Region of Adalia.

The St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, Completed in August, 1917, Promised Italy Smyrna and the Rest of the Territory Shown.

The Clemenceau-Lloyd George Understanding of December, 1918, Transferred Mosul to Great Britain, but Left a Dispute as to Whether the New Line Should Run East or West of Tadmar.

SECRET

I.C.-163A. (This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government).

NOTES OF A CONFERENCE held in the Prime Minister's Flat at 23 Rue Nitot, Paris, on THURSDAY, MARCH 20, 1919, at 3 p.m.

Present:

United States of America.	British Empire.
President Wilson:	The Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George, M.P..
	The Rt. Hon. A.J.Balfour, O.M., M.P.,
	General Allenby:
	General Bols:
	Lt.-Col. Sir M.P.A.Hankey, K.C.B.,
France.	**Italy.**
M. Clemenceau:	M. Orlando:
M. Pichon:	Baron Sonnino:
M. Berthelot:	

Interpreter Prof. P.J.Mantoux.

could have priority of right of enterprise and local loans and. . . . shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. Was France prepared to accept that? This, however, was not a question between Great Britain and France. It was a question between France and an agreement which we had signed with King Hussein.

(At this point M. ORLANDO and GENERAL DIAZ entered).

M. PICHON said he wished to say one word. In the new arrangements which were contemplated no direct administration whatsoever was claimed by France. Since the Agreement of 1916, the whole mandatory system had been adopted. If a mandate were granted by the League of Nations over these territories, all that he asked was that France should have that part put aside for her.

MR LLOYD GEORGE said that we could not do that. The League of Nations could not be used for putting aside our bargain with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon intended to occupy Damascus with French troops? If he did, it would clearly be a violation of the treaty with the Arabs.

M. PICHON said that France had no convention with King Hussein.

MR LLOYD GEORGE said that the whole of the agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot), was based on a letter from Sir Henry McMahon to King Hussein from which he quoted the following extracts:-

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits of boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits of boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally France, I am empowered, in the name of the Government of Great Britain, to give the following Assurance and make the following reply to your letter:-

'Subject to the above modifications Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within territories included in the limits of boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.' -- (Extract from a letter from Sir H. McMahon to King Hussein, Oct. 24, 15).

M. PICHON said that this undertaking had been made by Great (Angleterre) Britain alone. France had never seen it until a few weeks before when Sir Maurice Hankey had handed him a copy.

MR LLOYD GEORGE said the agreement might have been made by England (Angleterre) alone, but it was England (Angleterre) who had organised the whole of the Syrian campaign. There would have been no question of Syria but for England (Angleterre). Great Britain had put from 800,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field against Turkey, but Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak.

GENERAL ALLENBY said it had been invaluable.

MR LLOYD GEORGE, continuing, said that it was on the basis of the above quoted letter that King Hussein had put all his resources into the field which had helped us most materially to win the victory. France had for practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement. This had not been M. Pichon, but his predecessors. He was bound to say that if the British Government now agreed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be included in the sphere of direct French influence, they would be breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face this. He was particularly anxious for M. Clemenceau to follow this. The agreement of 1916 had been signed subsequent to the letter to King Hussein. In the following extract from the agreement of 1916 France recognised Arab independence:-

"It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments:--

(1) That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in the areas A. and B. marked on the annexed map under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief."

Hence, France, by this act, practically recognised our agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo from the blue zone of direct administration, for the map attached to the agreement showed that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo were included, not in the zone of direct administration, but in the independent Arab State.

M. PICHON said that this had never been contested, but how could France be bound by an agreement the very existence of which was unknown to her at the time when the 1916 agreement was signed? In the 1916 agreement France had not in any way recognised the

Hedjaz. She had undertaken to uphold "an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States", but not the King of the Hedjaz. If France was promised a mandate for Syria, she would undertake to do nothing except in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of States. This is the rôle which France demanded in Syria. If Great Britain would only promise her good offices, he believed that France could reach an understanding with Feisal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he would now seek to establish his place in the Conference. Up to the present he had had none. He could only be here, like his colleague M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to establish the peace of the world. This was his only interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both parties to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between the British and French Governments, and was interested to know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 agreement, but it was not permissible for him to express an opinion thereon. He would, however, like to point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence, the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one of the parties had gone out. This seemed to him to alter the basis of the agreement. The point of view of the United States of America was, however, indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in the United States of America thought. Hence, the only idea from the United States of America point of view was as to whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the

THE MOST SECRET MEETING—These Extracts Are From Minutes Taken at an Informal Gathering of the "Big Four" on March 20, 1919. The Four Had Not Been Formally Organized as the Council of Four, and Their First Official Meeting Was on April 19—a Month Later. The March 20 Session Was Held in Lloyd George's Flat, Not at Wilson's House. The Minutes Were Never Bound With the Official Secret Volumes of the Paris Peace Conference. The Purpose of the Meeting Was to Discuss Turkey and the Near East.

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TURKISH EMPIRE AS BOOTY

(Continued from Page 1.)

cities of Damascus, Homs and Aleppo. This was adjudged to some hypothetical "Arab State or confederation of Arab States," with which France and Great Britain were to come to an understanding later. But this territory also was divided into zones of influence in which the respective powers should have "prior rights over local enterprises and loans" and "be the only ones to furnish foreign advisers and officials."

There remained Palestine, and this was set aside also for future agreement.

Exclusive Nature of the Treaty.

But this secret treaty not only dealt with divisions of territory. It also contained a solemn agreement on the part of the French and British to allow no other nations any rights in all this great part of the old Turkish Empire—this undoubtedly meant their ally, Italy—and plans were made to begin economic development by building a new railroad from Bagdad direct to Aleppo, where Great Britain could get connection out to the sea at Alexandretta for her Mesopotamian oil.

No sooner were these secret agreements made between the French and British than the Italians, no doubt learning of the general provisions in the roundabout ways known to the old diplomacy, became much discontented. They saw that France was getting a much larger share in Turkey than was Italy, under the secret treaty of London. So new secret negotiations began, this time including the Italians, and dragged along during all the year just before the Americans came into the war and at the very time that allied statesmen were issuing declarations of unselfish war aims.

In April, 1917 (America declared war April 6), Mr. Lloyd George met the French and Italians at St. Jean de Maurienne and tried to patch up the disagreements and so satisfy the Italians. There were other important matters at issue here—proposals for a separate peace with Austria-Hungary just launched by the "Sixtus letters," and the prosecution of war in the Near East, in which France and Great Britain needed unqualified Italian support. And the Italians never gave their support for nothing!

To get this Lloyd George offered to give Smyrna and certain other Turkish territory to the Italians.

Mr. Balfour, his Foreign Minister, it will be remembered, was just then in America, helping to cheer along American participation in the war. He told Wilson and Clemenceau during a meeting of the Council on May 11, 1919 (Secret Minutes):

> While I was away Mr. Lloyd George, no doubt for reasons which appeared to him sufficient, had, at St. Jean de Maurienne, agreed to let the Italians have Smyrna on certain conditions.

But even this did not satisfy the Italians. The negotiations dragged along and finally a secret agreement was reached giving Italy not only Smyrna, but also a zone of influence of great value north of it, inhabited chiefly by Greeks and Turks. This agreement was, however, to be dependent upon the approval of the Russians. But the Russian Government, which had just been overthrown by the revolutionists, never gave that consent. The result was that a vast controversy developed at the Peace Conference as to whether or not the promises to the Italians of St. Jean de Maurienne were binding upon France and Great Britain.

In January, 1918, the Fourteen Points were set forth by President Wilson as a proposed basis of the peace and Lloyd George told the world (Jan. 5) that the Allies were no longer fettered by the secret treaties in discussing the future of Turkey; yet these secret discussions kept right on, for the spoils to be divided were indeed rich.

The Negotiations Go On.

In November, at the armistice with Germany, the President's program of settlement was accepted by every one as the basis of the coming peace. It included Point I. providing for open diplomacy, and Point XII. relating to Turkey. Yet these secret conversations between the British and the French relating to their Turkish claims kept right on. We have the most unimpeachable evidence of this in the words of M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a secret meeting of the Four in Lloyd George's apartment, on March 20, 1919. I shall speak further of this meeting later, for it was important in many respects. M. Pichon said at this time that after the agreement with the Italians in 1916 "there had been a long further correspondence and an exchange of many notes between France and Great Britain" concerning these Turkish claims.

Of course, these conversations were secret, and it appeared that it was the British now who were not satisfied. They were doing the brunt of the fighting without French help, and they wanted more concessions in Turkey. Lloyd George's immensely clever gesture (in January, 1918,) of putting the old treaties regarding Turkey aside not only helped to reassure Labor in England, whipped up recruiting in India where the Moslems were fearful regarding the future of Turkey, and gave evidence of support of President Wilson, but it also frightened the French to such an extent that they were willing to buy a confirmation of the Skyes-Picot treaty by consenting to its revision. Never was there a cleverer stroke. It did duty at once in three different causes and in both kinds of diplomacy! It backed up the open diplomacy of Wilson, it scored a point in the secret dealings with the French.

Here we have again Pichon's narrative (Secret Minutes, March 20):

> As the difficulties between the two Governments continued, and as the French Government particularly did not wish them to reach a point where ultimate agreement would be compromised, the President of the Council (Clemenceau), on his visit to London in December, 1918, had asked Mr. Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two countries. Mr. Lloyd George had replied that he saw no difficulty about the rights of France in Syria and Cilicia, but he made demands for certain places which he thought should be included in the British zone, and which, under the 1916 agreement, were in the French zone of influence, namely, Mosul. He also asked for Palestine.

This was in December, 1918, after the close of the war, when, it must be remembered, all the Allies had accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis of the peace. It was also just at the time when President Wilson was ready to sail for Europe to help make the peace.

But even then the discussions were not at an end. They continued privately between the British and French (unknown either to the "associated" Americans or the "allied" Italians) even after the Peace Conference began to sit. The French hated to yield and Clemenceau's final acceptance of the British proposal was not given until Feb. 15—a month after the Peace Conference meetings began. The difficulty lay in drawing the new line of demarcation. The French still wished to retain all the hinterland of Syria; while the British insisted that the line should run far enough to the northwest to give them the oasis of Tadmor and complete control of a line of railway (to be built) passing through it between Bagdad and the port of Haifa on the Mediterranean. In short, they insisted on having a railroad line entirely within their own sphere of influence, else in case of war their oil supplies from Mesopotamia might be held up by the French. On this point the transaction was still hanging fire when the conference of March 20 was called at Lloyd George's apartment and the whole entanglement was disclosed.

Crucial Meeting of the Council.

As I have said, this meeting of March 20 was one of the great and crucial meetings of the peace conference. It was held long before the policy of the small secret conferences of the "Big Four" had been formally adopted. The Council of Ten was then the official body. So that this meeting of March 20 was secret even from the other members of the ten, and the minutes of it were not even included with those of the "Big Four," and are not to be found there today. Most of the "Big Four" meetings were in President Wilson's study, but this was across the street in Lloyd George's flat in the Rue Nitot. President Wilson represented America; Lloyd George, Balfour and General Allenby represented the British Empire; Clemenceau, Pichon and Berthelot represented France, and Orlando and Sonnino, Italy.

It was evidently considered a vital meeting. President Wilson had only just returned from America. Before he had gone away he had done two very important things. First, he had forced the adoption, after fierce controversy, of the mandatory principle for the control of the "old empires" and of the former German colonies. Second, he had made (Feb. 1, Council of Ten) a blunt declaration of the American attitude toward the old secret treaties, although at that time he knew definitely of only a few of them, and had no idea of the vast web of secret diplomacy yet to be revealed:

> "As the United States are not bound by any of the (secret) treaties in question they are quite ready to approve a settlement on a basis of facts."

There had evidently been some hard thinking about these pronouncements of the President while he was away. What did he mean? How far did he intend to go? For if the mandatory system were to be sincerely adopted as the policy of the world it meant a knockout blow to many of the advantages of foreign spheres of influence in which the old diplomacy was so deeply interested. It meant, for example, the "open door"! And of what use was colonial expansion without economic control or privilege?

And a settlement on a "basis of facts"! The old order wanted possession, not facts. They would let in at once inquiries, not of what they, the Great Powers, wanted for themselves, in oil, silver, copper, pipe-lines, but what the people who inhabited all these vast regions, of whom nobody was thinking, what they wanted, and how their true welfare was to be secured. Facts meant all sorts of embarrassing inquiries into oil supply, control of railroads, domination of ports and sea-channels, armament of natives, fortifications, even customs duties and finances.

These two principles of the President, then, if carried out, would knock the old diplomacy sky-high, and rob the secret treaties of every shred of their importance or value.

Hence the importance of this meeting of March 20. The French had put up on the wall of Lloyd George's study a large map of Asiatic Turkey with territories colored to show the entire history of the secret negotiations. This was the first occasion, I believe, that President Wilson had ever heard of the Sykes-Picot treaty, or of the agreements at St. Jean de Maurienne.

I remember afterward of his speaking to me with great disgust of this Sykes-Picot treaty; said that it sounded like the name of a tea; called it "a fine example of the old diplomacy."

Clash of French and British.

Pichon opened the meeting with a long statement of the whole history of the effort to carve up Turkey, made a defense of French claims and objected to the British demand for more rights in Turkey. Lloyd George followed with a defense of British claims, at the same time charging that the French were preparing to encroach upon the Arabs. He argued bluntly that the British had done the fighting in Turkey almost without French help, and, therefore, ought to have what they wanted. Here are some of the things he said (secret minutes, March 20):

> He had begged the French Government to co-operate, and had pointed out to them that it would enable them to occupy Syria, although, at the time, the British troops had not yet occupied Gaza. This had occurred in 1917 and 1918, at a time when the heaviest casualties in France also were being incurred by British troops. From that time onward most of the heavy and continuous fighting in France had been done by British troops, although Marshal Pétain had made a number of valuable smaller attacks. This was one of the reasons why he had felt justified in asking Marshal Foch for troops (for use in Turkey). He had referred to this in order to show that the reason we had fought so hard in Palestine was not because we had not been fighting in France.

Mr. Lloyd George then disclosed the fact of a secret arrangement of the British with King Hussein of the Arabs which was older than the Sykes-Picot treaty. And it instantly appeared that not even the French had previously known of it. It was secret from them! Here is what Pichon says:

> M. PICHON said that this undertaking had been made by Great Britain (Angleterre) alone, but it was England (Angleterre) who had organized the whole of the Syrian campaign. There would have been no question of Syria but for England (Angleterre). Great Britain had put from 900,000 to 1,000,000 men in the field against Turkey, but Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak.
>
> General ALLENBY said it had been invaluable.
>
> * * * * * * *
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> M. PICHON said that this had never been contested, but how could France be bound by an agreement the very existence of which was unknown to her at the time when the 1916 agreement was signed?

At this point, the controversy having become heated, President Wilson broke in with a blunt inquiry as to why he was at the conference.

President Wilson said that he would not seek to establish his place in the conference. Up to the present he had had none. He could only be here, like his colleague, M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to establish the peace of the world. This was his only interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both parties to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between the British and French Governments, and was interested to know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 agreement, but it was not permissible for him to express an opinion thereon.

Wilson Proposes an Inquiry.

He then made observations in which he again set forth clearly the American position and program.

First, the right of self-determination of these people. Here are his words:

> The United States of America was indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in the thought of the United States of America. Hence, the * * * United States (wanted to know) whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the desires of the population of these regions.

2. He wanted a settlement on a basis not of secret diplomacy but of facts.

> The present controversy broadened out into a case affecting the peace of the whole world. It was to this he was told that if France insisted on occupying Damascus and Aleppo there would be instant war. He therefore suggested a commission of inquiry in Turkey, and he gave his opinion of exactly what they should do.
>
> Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the conference what they found with regard to these matters. * * * He would convince the world that the conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement. The commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. He would send it with carte blanche to tell the facts as they found them.

The President grew most enthusiastic and urgent in pressing this idea. M. Clemenceau said he "adhered in principle" to an inquiry—one of the favorite phrases of diplomacy—but if an inquiry was made he wanted it to apply not only to Syria and the French claims but to Palestine and Mesopotamia, where the British were. While Lloyd George also accepted the idea "in principle," and said he was ready to support such an inquiry, he was lukewarm. However, the President considered his suggestion accepted. I saw him shortly afterward, and he told me with enthusiasm about his plan:

> "Baker, I want to put the two ablest Americans now in Europe on that commission."

He asked me if I could make any suggestions as to possible appointees. I went over hastily in my mind various men not already connected with important governmental or military work and finally suggested President Henry Churchill King of Oberlin College. I had long known of him as a man of sound judgment and high ideals. The President immediately asked me to get in touch with President King and he was appointed, with Charles R. Crane, as a member of the commission.

But the French refused to appoint their members, and the British blew hot and cold, and finally, after long delays, the American commissioners started out alone, made their investigations in Turkey and brought back a report.

Of further developments, however, in the Turkish controversy, I shall treat in a later chapter, my only purpose here being to present and illustrate the methods of the old secret diplomacy. Suffice it to say that President Wilson's proposal to base a final settlement on the findings of a disinterested commission bore no fruit in the end, for it was frustrated by the French with the tacit support of the British.

Mesopotamian Oil.

One more development in the struggle, however, must be noted because it illustrates vividly the concern of secret diplomacy not only with political and territorial expansion, but—far more important—with immediate economic exploitation. Although nothing was settled regarding Turkey, though no peace had been made, it suddenly emerged in the secret councils, May 22, that powerful British and French commercial interests were at that moment negotiating for the laying of a pipe line from the Mesopotamian oil fields to the port of Tripoli in the French zone of Syria. These negotiations had been initiated by the British—represented by Mr. Walter Long—though Lloyd George told the council emphatically that he (Lloyd George) had not been spoken to about them. On the part of the French they were managed by M. Berenger, and Clemenceau also denied that he had known anything about them.

> He [Clemenceau] had only heard this very morning [narrates the secret minutes] of the negotiation between M. Beranger and some British petroleum people for laying a pipe line to the coast. He knew nothing of the details of the arrangement. He was not very much interested in this matter, as Lloyd George had erroneously assumed on the previous day.

To this Lloyd George replied:

> Of the pipe line he knew nothing, and was very annoyed when he first learned of it. There seemed to have been some negotiation between the people in Paris interested in oil and those in London. Consequently, at the moment when M. Clemenceau had said that he did not like the arrangement (M. Clemenceau interjected that he had referred to something quite different), he had canceled it. He did not want to be mixed up with oil trusts in London or America or Paris, as he was afraid it would vitiate the whole business. Consequently, on the previous afternoon, he had written to M. Clemenceau to cancel the whole of these oil negotiations.

In this connection it is to be noted, as evidence of the trend of the times, that these private compacts are becoming more and more predominantly economic in character. The Sykes-Picot agreement was political in its main features, though with a strong economic flavor pervading all its terms; the latest Franco-Turkish treaty (1921) is almost wholly economic—indeed, the French renounce a narrow political position in return for broader economic advantages. In the negotiations concerning the railroads and pipe line which followed the Sykes-Picot treaty, economic considerations overrode political transactions. It is such economic "deals" that are undoubtedly going on in every corner of the world today. Although concerned primarily with the production and exchange of commodities, they often profoundly affect the destinies of large local populations and the whole scheme of international relations. Although frequently negotiated by industrial and financial, rather than diplomatic, agents, Governments stand behind them with the armed force of nations. The old order changes its methods, but not its spirit.

Such were, in general, the desires, needs, ambitions of the allied Governments set forth in the secret treaties. So they intended, if they won the war, to divide up the world; so they actually tried to divide it up at the Peace Conference. Though outwardly they were combating imperialism as symbolized by Germany, they were themselves seeking vast extensions of their own imperial and economic power. They kept these agreements secret from their own people, fearing their effect on the great masses of the workers and the liberal groups; they kept them secret also from their smaller allies, like Serbia, and they kept them secret from America both before and after America came into the war. These treaties, partly disclosed in enemy countries through the publication of the Bolsheviki, and greatly exaggerated there, were powder and shot—army corps!—the enemy, for they were used to prove the contentions of the German war lords that the Allies were really fighting to gobble up the world.

And finally they bore a crop of suspicion, controversy, balked ambition, which twice, at least, nearly wrecked the Peace Conference, poisoned its discussions and warped and disfigured its final decisions.

Wilson's Labor for Remedies.

I am conscious that this makes a pretty dark picture, but it is necessary to look squarely at it in considering the atmosphere in which the Paris negotiations were carried on. And yet, through it all, the President not only combated, steadily and with determination, settlements based upon these old secret desires and agreements, but patiently worked out provisions in the Covenant of the League of Nations which, in future, should wipe out the entire disgraceful old system. Article XVIII. of the Covenant reads:

> Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the league shall be forthwith registered with the secretariat and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

This provision, if once all the nations go into the league with determination and good-will, is of an importance that can scarcely be exaggerated. It would cut away all secret diplomacy; it would usher in the new era of open diplomacy.

Yet everything depends upon the good-will and sincerity with which the nations support and carry out these provisions. President Wilson could help give the world an instrumentality for expressing its good-will, but he could not give them good-will. Since the League of Nations came into existence more than 150 treaties have been registered under this provision—a great step—and yet we know that "secret arrangements" are still being made, all or parts of which have not been registered.

I have endeavored thus to set forth the ripe products of the old diplomacy. To a certain extent, of course, these arrangements were forced upon the Allies as a measure of war; for Germany also was making secret offers to Italy, to Rumania, to Bulgaria, to Turkey, and probably to Japan, which had to be countered. We know that Germany even tried secret diplomacy with Mexico. Leaders of liberal and progressive minds on all domestic issues, like Asquith and Grey, were forced, owing to the antiquated and evil system of the old diplomacy, to take part in such secret practices.

In the high emotional time of danger and suffering, under the leadership of President Wilson these old aims, these secret desires, were apparently forgotten, apparently disclaimed. The whole world was momentarily lifted to a higher moral plane. The people of the world were with the President. But the moment the war closed the reaction began. The old Governments and the old system were in control, and there was a portentous "slump in idealism" which I shall describe in the next chapter.

Next Sunday's instalment will be a chapter on the slump in idealism coincident with the opening of the Paris Peace Conference.

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direct. It was curved out towards Mosul and drawn so as to prevent the British from having the oasis of Tadmor. railway This would put the British/entirely at the mercy of the French oil interests. All that was asked was that the line should go direct and give us Tadmor. He did not wish to be at the mercy of oil interests, whether they were British or French. Unless the map he had presented was agreed to, he would have to await the report of the Commission before withdrawing the British troops. If they reported that the British were not wanted there, then the British would have no right to stay, neither would the French if the report was against them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he must deal with two or three of Mr. Lloyd George's arguments. First, there was the question as to whether the Sykes-Picot agreement held. He claimed that it did, of course. Mr. Lloyd George had not questioned it in London. He had declared that this was the Treaty to which he intended to remain faithful and that the word of the British Government was engaged. A Treaty was a Treaty and could not be departed from, but he declared on his honour that Mr. Lloyd George had said repeatedly he would remain faithful to it, so He, himself, adhered to it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether this included Damascus? when

M. CLEMENCEAU said of course/ he gave Mosul he realised he would share in Damascus and Aleppo on corresponding terms. Of course, he recognised that Damascus was Arab He had two things to say. When he had agreed that Mosul should be included in the British zone, Mr. Lloyd George had never told him that it involved this considerable alteration in the line. He would never have agreed

– 6 –

FROM "BIG FOUR" SECRET MINUTES.

Extract From a Discussion on May 22, 1919, Showing How the European Diplomats Placidly Told of "Giving" Cities to This Country or That in the Course of Their War Bargaining.

The New York Times
Published: March 12, 1922
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Selves and Others

Link to article

The Independent

A typically Lebanese story of betrayal at the hands of so-called civilised nations

Saturday May 21st, 2005, by Robert Fisk

Many believe the name Martyrs' Square refers to the victims of the 15-year civil war. Not so

In Beirut last week, they announced the winners of a competition to redevelop Martyrs' Square, which had once been Lebanon's civil war front line and on the edge of which the tomb of the murdered ex-prime minister Rafiq Hariri now stands.

There were two remarkable things about this event. The first was the brilliant decision by the redevelopment firm Solidere - in which Hariri held 10 per cent of the shares - to announce the results not in one of Beirut's swank hotels but in a war-ruined shopping centre and cinema complex that still lies next to the square.

The great cone-shaped wreckage - known as the "egg" to Beirutis - was washed out, shored up and carpeted so that when we arrived to hear the winners, we had to walk between walls torn up by so many bullets that they looked like Irish lace. Amid the literal ruins of war, we were invited to contemplate a new future.

The second extraordinary development was the winning design by two Greek companies. Their plans called for the sea - at present a quarter of a mile away beyond a landfill - to be brought, via tunnels and bridges, right up to the archaeological remains at the edge of the square. Thus would the Mediterranean be returned to the Roman city of Berytus where it originally lapped, washing steadily past the ancient Ottoman tower which once guarded Beirut port. The old world would come to the rescue of the new.

But history cannot be "rescued", and even today many Lebanese - preparing for national elections in a few days' time which will once again emphasise the respective Christian and Muslim religion of the voters - believe the name Martyrs' Square refers to the victims of the country's 15-year civil war.

Not so. In 1773, the Russians stormed into Beirut to humiliate the Ottomans and placed a massive portrait of Catherine the Great on the city gates. All who entered were forced to bow before the picture or, at the least, dismount from their horses. And the biggest naval gun aboard their offshore fleet was then set down in the middle of the city square. So for almost a century and a half, it became the Place du Canon.

But under Ottoman rule in 1915 and 1916, the square acquired a grim new history as a place of gallows. The story is dark enough - and laced with enough foreign betrayal to make it truly Lebanese. Prior to the First World War, 33 Arabs in what is now Lebanon and was then Syria had appealed to the French consul in Beirut to help them to gain independence from the Turks - or at least offer French protection.

The letters - from both Muslims and Christians, one from a Palestinian and another from a senior officer in the Ottoman army - were written in secret and duly reached the consul. But when France broke off relations with the Sublime Porte on the outbreak of war, the diplomat - rather than pack those subversive letters off to his new residence in Egypt - hid them in the abandoned consulate.

And so it came to pass that the local French-language interpreter at the consulate, imprisoned in Damascus, sought to gain his freedom with Ahmed Jemal Pasha, commander of the Turkish Fourth Army in Syria, by betraying to him the exact location where the consul had hidden the documents. Ottoman security agents then broke into the consulate - which was supposed to be under the protection of the still-neutral United States - and found the incriminating letters. Jemal Pasha's fury was now directed against these treacherous letter writers with Saddam-like fury.

They were dragged from their homes, taken to the hill town of Aley, brutally tortured and sentenced to be hanged by a drum-head military court. And hanged they duly were, only a few feet from the spot where the sea will now wash up to the square and scarcely 50 metres from the tomb where Rafiq Hariri now lies. A priest was hanged in his robes. The Ottoman officer went to his death in full military uniform.

And three days after the last batch of Lebanese patriots were hanged in 1916, François Georges Picot signed his infamous secret agreement with Sir Mark Sykes to divide up the Middle East, taking Syria for France - and Palestine for the Brits - which would ensure that the French government rather than an independent Lebanese government took over Lebanon.

Now here's the rub. Not only had every leading Lebanese patriot been liquidated just before the Sykes-Picot agreement. But the French diplomat who had shamefully left those fatal letters behind in his consulate in Beirut was - wait for it - the very same François Georges Picot.

His reaction to the hangings remains unknown, but the condemned men at least let the world know what they thought about their fate. Unusually for the Turks, they allowed the men to speak briefly from the scaffold and their words were printed in a book published in Cairo in 1922 which, 60 years later, I discovered in an Egyptian antiquarian bookshop.

With the rope round his neck, Abdul-Karim al-Khalil - his surviving Muslim family is well known in modern-day Lebanon - cursed the Turks and asked "the civilised nations of the world for our independence and freedom. O paradise of my country, carry our feelings of brotherly love to every Lebanese, to every Syrian, to every Arab, tell them of our tragic end and tell them: ′For your freedom we have lived and for your independence we are dying!′".

Then he kicked away the step ladder to the gallows, effectively hanging himself.

For a quarter of an hour, two brothers, Mohamed and Mahmoud Mahmessani, stood on the gallows, Mohamed holding Mahmoud in his arms, all the while trying to comfort him. He asked the executioner that they should be hanged at the same moment and his wish was granted. Joseph Bishara Hani, a Christian, cried out that "I have lived a blameless life and I die without fear". Then the hangman kicked the ladder from beneath Hani′s feet. All were dumped in a mass grave on the beach.

But the records show that the sectarian tensions between pro-French Christians and Arab nationalists which boiled over in the 1975-90 civil war were present even then; before the executions, most of the Muslims shouted a blessing to their "fellow Arabs" while most of the Christians shouted "Vive la France!".

When the Emir Feisel heard of their deaths in Damascus, he leapt to his feet and shouted: "Arabs! Death will now be a pleasure for us." Sound familiar? Let the waters of the Mediterranean now wash into the square where their gallows stood.

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Obituaries for Sir Mark Sykes

COL. SIR MARK SYKES DIES.

He Was in Paris with British Delegation to Peace Conference.

PARIS, Feb. 17.—Lieut. Col. Sir Mark Sykes, who came here with the British delegation to the Peace Conference, is dead, following an attack of influenza.

Lieut. Col. Sir Mark Sykes, sixth baronet, was born on March 16, 1879. He completed his education at Jesus College, Cambridge, and soon afterward entered the British Army. He served in the South African campaign. He was made Captain in 1902, and in 1908 was promoted Major of the 5th Battalion of the Yorkshire Regiment. He was made a Lieutenant Colonel in 1911.

Colonel Sir Mark wrote a number of books and was a contributor to journals and reviews. He wrote "Through Five Turkish Provinces," "D'Ordels Tactics," "Five Mansions of the House of Othman," "The Caliph's Last Heritage," "Dar-ul-Islam," and "Pantechnicon."

Louis Edward Levy.

PHILADELPHIA, Feb. 17.—Louis Edward Levy, inventor and scientist, died suddenly on the street here today. He was a pioneer in the engraving industry. Mr. Levy was the inventor of a process of photo-chemical engraving, a process which has enabled newspapers to print half-tone pictures direct from the stereotype plate. Two other inventions that brought Mr. Levy fame were the Levy line screen and the Levy acid blast. Mr. Levy was in his seventy-fourth year.

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Obituary: Lieut.-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M. P.
The Geographical Journal, 53(5), 357-58. © 1919

Lieut.-Colonel Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M.P.

Sir Mark Sykes, only son of the late Sir Tatton Sykes, was a traveller from early boyhood. In his book 'Dar-ul-Islam' he speaks of having been taken three times by his father to the Jebel Druse before he was fourteen, and of going again alone when eighteen. In the comparatively few succeeding years of his short life he made many more journeys to Asiatic Turkey, and in his several books, and the papers communicated to our own and to other societies, he displays the rare versatility, acute observation, rapid confident judgment and humour that made him the most amusing of companions and in latter days a most useful of counsellors. Full of enthusiasm for the genuine East, with all its disadvantages, he was unsparing in his dislike of the hybrid between East and West. His latest and most ambitious book—'The Caliphs' Last Heritage'—gave a brilliant sketch of history, followed by the diary of his later journeys, in which the town Armenian, the Young Turk, and all who show the results of contact with the West are dealt with pungently.

In 1902 he was gazetted to the Yorkshire Regiment, saw service in South Africa, and, with considerable intervals of leave for travel, was with the regiment until 1908. In 1911 he was elected to Parliament by Central Hull, and his occasional speeches on Eastern affairs were welcomed for the same qualities that distinguish his books: wide knowledge, trenchancy, and humorous good sense. Since the outbreak of the European War he had been employed with the Council of Imperial Defence and on several missions to the East, whence he had returned to Paris for the Peace Conference, where pneumonia following influenza killed him at the moment when his wide knowledge was employed in the highest and most intricate task that has ever faced geographers. His death at the early age of thirty-nine, in the fullness of his powers, is a tragic loss to our science, and leaves it but a speculation how much more he might have done with leisure to judge and perhaps to revise the brilliant impressions of the moment.

Elected a Fellow in 1907, he was in 1918 chosen for the Council, but was unable in the crisis of the war ever to take his seat. The deep sympathy of the Society will go out to his widow, a daughter of Sir John Gorst, and to his large family of young children. At the Requiem Mass sung in Westminster Cathedral

on March 26 the Council were represented by Sir Maurice de Bunsen and Colonel Sir Henry McMahon.