

A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Enter Here





Jerusalem

Sunday, January 2, 2008

PEACE in the Middle East!

In an amazing turn of events, all sides have finally agreed to an unprecedented peace plan. This one is for real. The wars are over. The time of rebuilding has come. Some have argued that the democratic changes we're seeing in the Middle East are destabilizing the region. This argument begin with. The reality is that the stability we thought we saw in the Middle East was a mirage. For decades, millions of men and women in the region have been trapped in oppression and hopelessness. And these conditions left a generation disillusioned, and made this region a

Hamas wants Arabs to broker Palestinian accord (Reuters)

In Partial Fulfillment of Fall 2007 Course Requirements for University of Michigan's RCSSCI 461.001
Maps, Timelines, the Internet: Stories of the Quest for Peace in the Middle East
taught by
Sandra L. Arlinghaus, Robert J. Haug, Ann Evans Larimore

Reuters - Palestinian group Hamas is open to Arab mediation in its dispute with rival Fatah faction of President Mahmoud Abbas, the Arab League chief said in remarks published on Sunday.

Israeli PM says Syria peace talks to remain secret (AFP)



AFP - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said on Sunday that indirect peace talks with Syria, a process that began more than a year ago, will be conducted in secrecy and seriously.

Top Israeli defence official to Egypt for truce talks (AFP)



AFP - A top Israeli defence official is expected in Cairo on Sunday for more talks with Egyptian mediators who are trying to hammer out a truce with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, officials said.

Palestinian PM pleads case for unity (AFP)



AFP - Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad insisted unified authority in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was "absolutely essential" to progress, in a BBC radio programme broadcast Saturday.

Abbas fears Olmert probe may hold up peace talks (Reuters)



Reuters - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said on Saturday he feared a criminal investigation of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and looming U.S. elections could hold up Middle East peace talks.

Israel, Hamas exchange fire; 4 Hamas gunmen hurt (AP)



AP - Israeli forces on Saturday attacked two groups of Palestinian militants firing mortar shells in the northern Gaza Strip, wounding four Hamas gunmen, Israeli and Palestinian officials said.



Hezbollah`s army survives under Lebanon peace deal (AP)



AP - Hezbollah fighters have pulled back since seizing parts of Lebanon`s capital, but their brazen display has made one thing clear: A private army blamed for terrorist attacks on Western interests and dedicated to the destruction of Israel will be a fixture in this weakened country for a long time.

Syria rejects linking Israel peace with cutting off Iran (AFP)



AFP - Syria will not accept preconditions over its resumed peace talks with Israel and will not compromise its relations with other states, the government daily Tishrin said on Saturday, referring to Iran.

Hamas: Israel PM too weak to talk peace with Syria (AP)



AP - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is too weak to take the necessary steps for peace with Syria, Hamas` exiled leader said Saturday during a visit to Iran, the militant group`s ally.

Sign of change? Israeli, Palestinian officers meet (AP)



AP - The military men don`t look like diplomats and the sun-baked checkpoint dividing the West Bank from Israel couldn`t have been farther from the Jerusalem hotels and ministerial residences where Israeli-Palestinian peace talks unfold.

Lebanese Political Deal Is a Win for Hezbollah (U.S. News & World Report)

U.S. News & World Report - The White House put on a brave face Wednesday in light of a political deal in Lebanon that gave increased political strength to the radical group Hezbollah at the expense of the U.S.-backed government. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called the accord, a major break in the country`s 18-month political stalemate, a "positive step toward resolving the current crisis."

Lebanon deal fails to tackle conflict`s causes: French FM (AFP)



AFP - French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner said in Jerusalem on Friday that the deal reached by Lebanon`s rival factions fails to tackle the roots of the crisis, though it was a first step.

Hezbollah welcomes Lebanon deal (AFP)




AFP - Hezbollah deputy secretary general Naim Qassem on Friday welcomed as an "important achievement" a breakthrough deal reached by rival Lebanese political factions to end the country`s crisis.

Palestinian PM: $1.4 billion in investments raised (AP)



AP - A business conference helped raise $1.4 billion in investments for projects aimed at bolstering Palestinians` battered economy, the Palestinian prime minister said Friday.

Police question Olmert again in corruption case (AP)



AP - Police questioned Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Friday for a second time in a corruption case that threatens his political survival and Israeli efforts to advance fragile peace moves with Syria and the Palestinians.

UN says Israel erected more West Bank roadblocks (AFP)



AFP - The number of roadblocks in the Israeli-occupied West Bank has increased by 41 since September despite Israeli pledges to reduce them, the United Nations reported on Friday.

Bush bid to isolate Mideast hardliners backfires: analysts (AFP)



AFP - The Bush administration`s campaign to isolate Iran and Syria has backfired as the two Middle East



hardliners ended up this week sidelining the United States, analysts said.

Israeli PM grilled again in graft probe (AFP)



AFP - Police grilled Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Friday for the second time in three weeks in the latest corruption probe against him, which has sparked calls for his resignation.

Five Palestinian fighters killed in Gaza: Hamas (AFP)



AFP - Five Palestinian fighters were killed and an Israeli soldier wounded on Friday as violence flared up again in the Gaza Strip despite Egyptian efforts to mediate a truce around the impoverished territory.

Israeli police quiz Olmert again in bribery case (Reuters)



Reuters - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was questioned by police for an hour on Friday, the second time this month that investigators have quizzed him over allegations he took bribes from an American businessman.



A(the) Case (s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by
Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Read Me First! (How to Navigate Through this Site)

A Timeline to Bring *You* to TODAY

From Testaments to The Great War

- 1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine
- 636 AD - The Jews of Palestine
- 1880 - Jewish Settlements

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire

- 1917 - Post WWI Border Changes
- 1919 - The Zionist Plan
- 1920 - The Jewish Majority
- 1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots
- 1931 - Jewish Settlements
- 1936 - The Arab Campaign
- 1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

The Fight For Survival (Israel)

- 1947 - The UN Partition Plan
- 1948 - The Israeli War of Independence
- 1949 - The Arab Refugees
- 1949 - Israel's New Frontiers
- 1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel
- 1956 - The Sinai Campaign

The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

- 1967 - The New West Bank
- 1972 - The Build Up to War
- 1973 - The Yom Kippur War
- 1978 - Camp David Accords
- 1982 - Sabra and Chatila
- 1983 - New Settlements in Judea
- 1983 - New Settlements in Samaria
- 1987 - The Intifada

The Cases for Peace

- 1991 - The Madrid Invitation
- 1993 - The Bailey Map
- 1994 - The Cairo Agreement
- 1994 - Peace with Jordan
- 1995 - Peace and Terror
- 1995 - Oslo
- 2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt
- 2000 - Security Fence Proposed
- 2002 - The Arab Initiative
- 2003 - Project "COPE"
- 2004 - The Peres Center For Peace



1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs

1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine



1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition



1967 - The Middle East Crisis

1967 - The Six Day War



1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies



2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

TODAY 5/25/2008

Timeline information partially provided by Sir Martin Gilbert and fellow classmates. For a more comprehensive timeline, click here.

Table of Contents

Today	Browse over ten categories of maps and data to enhance your knowledge!
The Arab Initiative	Analyze the 2002 Arab based initiative that lays the foundation for future peace talks!
The Heliyza Conference	Actually view the border changes suggested by this Israeli based proposal!
Annapolis	Is this the end?



The olive branch has been a symbol of peace ever since its origins in ancient Greece. An olive tree may take up to four years to bear ripe fruit, thus rendering it difficult to tend to and cultivate during times of war.

Title **Home** **Today** **The Arab Initiative** **The Herzliya Conference** **Annapolis**



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project
by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

If you are ever lost, just click on the olive branch above.

For Your Information

I. Introduction

The conflict between Israel and Palestine is one of the most ubiquitous and passionate trials of our era. The world is and has always been full of struggles, but none has evoked as much opinion and international coverage as this one. Those unfortunate ones who can be considered actors of this morbid play have lived through many potential final acts, however, to everyone's dismay, the next page never fails to yield the start of a new, painstaking chapter.

For the first time in over seven years, we are once again flirting with the idea that this coming year will be the final act. An air of optimism blew from the trail of the politicians as they left the conference in Annapolis. The hopeless romantic, whose heart has been broken uncountable times, treats every new encounter with the fervor of his first. We will treat *a case for peace* in the same way.

All peace proposals, as presented, are simple black and white textual documents consisting of citations to past documents and references to a geographical landscape. This site applies a few strokes of paint onto an otherwise mundane canvas. However, the intended purpose of this website is to serve not only as a tool to analyze several current peace proposals, but as a resource to explore future initiatives as well. The site as a whole can be divided into five chapters: Home, Today, The Arab Initiative, The Herzliya Conference, and Annapolis. What follows is a brief explanation of what to expect in each of

these chapters.

II. Home

The home page (where you just came from) consists of two things, a series of timelines and a table of contents. The timelines, along with their accompanying maps, serve as an abridged visual and chronological history of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Each of the five timelines corresponds to a chapter in this history with the present day being located in the bottom far right. Since this is only a selection of important events in the opinion of the author (me), the empty space represents time, to an appropriate scale, but not an absence of events. Many of the maps of this timeline are referred to in other pages; thus my selection was based largely on the events in the long history of the conflict that are referred to often in today's peace processes.

At the bottom of the page is a table of contents, the contents of which are explained next.

III. Today

This is your resource page. As you will come to learn, many pragmatic peace proposals focus on border demarcations with the intentions of a 1:1 ratio of land exchange. But are all plots of land equal? This being an impartial site, it is left to the user to determine the answer to this question. A plethora of maps and data, gathered from the best sources on the web and on print, are organized into 12 subsections in this page, namely: orientation, Jerusalem, mobility, population, the Wall, settlements, civic infrastructure, refugees, natural resources, water resources, archaeological sites, and peace. One does not need to go through every single map on this page. Familiarity will suffice, for the rest of this site will often refer back to this page and its key maps/data in order to make a staying point.

IV. The Arab Initiative

As briefly touched upon earlier, part of the intent of the creation of this site is to serve as a tool to impartially breakdown several peace proposals that are still on the table today. The format utilized to accomplish this is GEOMAT, a web architecture for space-time representation. The first one we are to tackle is the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. The actors of this play are nations of the League of Arab States, which are, in order of greatest GDP: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Kuwait, Morocco, Libya, Qatar, Oman, Tunisia, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan, Mauritania, and Comoros. The champion of the initiative was the then crown prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Other key actors, such as Ehud Olmert and Amr Moussa, can be found on this page with links to their most appropriate biography on the web.

The page as a whole is clearly divided into two parts, a calendrical timeline on the left and the actual Arab Initiative on the right. The timeline, which focuses on events closely related to the formation of The Arab Initiative (main event), places the most current event on top, and has an appropriate pixel to time ratio on its way down. Thus once again, empty space represents time, but in this instance it more specifically represents time lacking of key events. Clicking on the date of each event will give the user an opportunity to expand on their knowledge.

On the right is The Arab Initiative. However, it contains more than just the document itself. All key treaties, actors, events, documents, and referrals to maps are in a green font and linked to either a page on my site or elsewhere to provide further information on the highlighted words.

Thus, with the power of time, visual aids, and a library of information at your fingertips on one

page, the user can determine for him/herself the strengths and shortcomings of the Arab Initiative.

V. The Herzliya Conference

Without giving too much away, there is one apparent shortcoming of the Arab Initiative; there is no indication of the possibility of border demarcations to compromise for Israeli settlements barely within the Green Line and Palestinian villages just on the outside. The Herzliya Conference is an annually held Israeli event where Jewish scholars come together to present their ideas on such issues. Professor Gideon Biger of the geography department of Tel Aviv University and his team members have championed in 2006 what is to this date the first official Israeli framework on border demarcations. All 14 pages of the framework are analyzed on this section of the site.

The format of the page as a whole is similar to the previous. The scaled calendrical timeline on the left is centered on the key event, the framework publication, and on the right is the actual document. The bar over the document allows the user to choose which page to look at of the 14. Yellow marks within the document are simple highlights to show emphasis, while blue highlights are links to additional information. Page 8 begins the proposals for border demarcations, and by clicking on the links the user can arrive at a page comparing the status quo with the suggested border change, represented symbolically by the color green.

This is where the user has to use all that he/she has learned from the previous pages to determine if the demarcations are just. For instance, the user will come to see that Dr. Biger's framework relocates much of the land in Israel in the northern region of the West Bank to Palestine, while moving the southern border of the West Bank further north, allocating more land to Israel there as a compensation. The question the user should be pondering is not whether there is an equal transfer of acres, but more importantly, what is the difference between the qualities of the land in the north to that of the south? Would it be a fair trade? The Today page is the resource to refer back to in order to answer these questions.

VI. Annapolis

Finally, the afterthoughts of the conference in Annapolis will be briefly touched on. In the months to come, do not be surprised if discussions on future peace proposals cite The Arab Initiative and/or Dr. Biger's Framework. Both proposals discuss certain issues and leave out others. Their combination, along with input from many diverse sources, may be what it takes for this hopeless romantic to finally take a bow. After nearly seven years of exile, *the cases for peace* are once again on the table.

The site performs better on Internet Explorer.

Questions? Comments? Drop an email at shiraz@umich.edu



A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

From Testaments to The Great War

1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine




636 AD - The Jews of Palestine

1880 - Jewish Settlements

1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs

1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

From Testaments to The Great War

1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine


636 AD - The Jews of Palestine



[1880 - Jewish Settlements]

[1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs]

[1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

From Testaments to The Great War

1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine


636 AD - The Jews of Palestine



1880 - Jewish Settlements

[1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs]

[1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




[1936 - The Arab Campaign]

[1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan]

[1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition]

[1938 - British Plan for Partition]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




[1936 - The Arab Campaign]

[1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan]

[1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition]

[1938 - British Plan for Partition]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)


1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence

1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers


1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel



[1956 - The Sinai Campaign]

[1967 - The Middle East Crisis]

[1967 - The Six Day War]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)


1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence

1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers


1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel



[1956 - The Sinai Campaign]

[1967 - The Middle East Crisis]

[1967 - The Six Day War]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)

1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence

1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers


1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel

THE ARAB REFUGEES 1949-1967

In April 1949, at the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees within the framework of a general settlement. The Arab delegations rejected the offer. In 1950 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) proposed resettling Arab refugees in Sinai, Jordan and Syria, but the Arab Governments also rejected this proposal. In 1952 the UN Refugee Rehabilitation Fund offered the Arab States $200 million to find 'homes and jobs' for the refugees. The Arab States used some of the money for relief work, but did not even apply for the greater part of the fund

The refugees are the corner-stone in the Arab struggle against Israel. The refugees are the armaments of the Arabs and Arab nationalism.
RADIO CAIRO 19 JULY 1957


The refugees will not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when the flag of Palestine is hoisted over Arab Palestine



[1956 - The Sinai Campaign]

[1967 - The Middle East Crisis]

[1967 - The Six Day War]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)


1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence

1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers


1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel



[1956 - The Sinai Campaign]

[1967 - The Middle East Crisis]

[1967 - The Six Day War]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)

1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence

1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers

1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel


TERRORIST RAIDS INTO ISRAEL 1951 – 1956

Palestinian terrorist groups, or Fedayeen, began systematic raids into Israel from 1950. Towards the end of 1954, the Egyptian Government supervised the formal establishment of Palestinian terrorist groups in the Gaza strip and north-eastern Sinai. Throughout 1955 an increasing number of raids were launched into Israel. From 1951 to 1956, Israeli vehicles were ambushed, farms attacked, fields boobytrapped and roads mined. Fedayeen from Gaza also infiltrated into Jordan, and operated from there. Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon each gave the Fedayeen support and refuge. Local Jordanian-Palestinian Fedayeen were also active operating from the West Bank

ISRAELI DEATHS AS A RESULT OF FEDAYEEN ATTACKS

YEAR	FROM	ISRAELI DEAD
1951	JORDAN	111
	EGYPT	26
1952	JORDAN	114
	EGYPT	48
1953	JORDAN	124
	EGYPT	38
1954	JORDAN	117
	EGYPT	50
1955	JORDAN	37
	EGYPT	241
1951-55	SYRIA	55
	LEBANON	6


- Centres of anti-Israel activity
- Moral and material support for Fedayeen attacks
- Movement of Fedayeen groups
- Areas of Fedayeen activity against Israel. With Egyptian encouragement, the Fedayeen also incited demonstrations inside Jordan against the Jordanian regime



1956 - The Sinai Campaign

1967 - The Middle East Crisis

1967 - The Six Day War





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)


1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence


1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers

1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel



1956 - The Sinai Campaign



1967 - The Middle East Crisis

1967 - The Six Day War



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War


1978 - Camp David Accords

THE WEST BANK UNDER ISRAELI MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 1967-

The Israeli conquest of the West Bank in June 1967 brought 600,000 Arabs under Israeli military administration. The Israelis encouraged and financed economic development, and by the end of 1970 Arab unemployment had dropped from 12% to 3% By 1972 over 60,000 Arabs crossed the 'Green Line' every morning to work in Israel. At the same time, over 100,000 Arabs visited other Arab states for work, education and business. By 1973 over 14,500 West Bank Arabs were working in local administration in the West Bank

Sixteen Israeli settlements were founded in the West Bank between 1967 and 1973, with a total civilian population of 1,150. One of these settlements was near Hebron, where Jews had lived for more than two thousand years, before being driven out by the Arabs in 1929. Another group of settlements, the Etzion Bloc, was established on the site of settlements destroyed by the Arabs in 1949. At the same time, 44,000 Arabs who had fled from the West Bank in 1967, returned by 1972

During 1970 an 'Open Bridges' policy enabled West Bank Arabs to cross freely into Jordan. At the height of the tourist season in 1970, some 750 buses a day crossed from Jordan to Hebron, and by the end of August 50,000 Arabs had visited the West Bank from Jordan



ARABS VISITING THE WEST BANK FROM OTHER ARAB AREAS	
1968	16, 000
1969	23, 000
1970	52, 000

1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



[1982 - Sabra and Chatila]


[1983 - New Settlements in Judea]

[1983 - New Settlements in Samaria]

[1987 - The Intifada]

[1989 - More Palestinian Refugees]

[1992 - The Intifada Intensifies]





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



[1982 - Sabra and Chatila]


[1983 - New Settlements in Judea]

[1983 - New Settlements in Samaria]

[1987 - The Intifada]

[1989 - More Palestinian Refugees]

[1992 - The Intifada Intensifies]





BubbleShare: Share photos - Print Christmas Coloring Pages.

The Camp David Accords- A Framework for Peace in the Middle East

September, 17, 1978

Maps

The Ground Layout of the Camp David Presidential Retreat

Timeline

Camp David

The Accords

The Players

Carter

Sadat

Begin

Video from Signing Ceremony



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies



14 September: Bashir Gemayel, President Elect of Lebanon, killed in a bomb explosion

15 September: Israeli forces occupy West Beirut 'in order to protect the Muslims from the vengeance of the Phalangists' **(Israeli PM, Menachem Begin)**

16 September: 'Christian Phalangist forces begin sweeping camps in West Beirut. A massacre of men, women and children took place in the Sabra and Chatila refugee camps'. **(The Times, 3 January 1983)**

23 September: Amin Gemayel elected President

28 September: Israeli forces leave West Beirut

An Israeli judicial enquiry, the Kahan Report, concluded: 'No intention existed on the part of any Israeli element to harm the non-combatant population in the camps'. But the Director of Israeli Military Intelligence was criticized for 'closing his eyes and blocking his ears'; the Israeli Minister of Defence (Ariel Sharon) because humanitarian obligations 'did not concern him in the least'; and the Israeli Prime Minister (Menachem Begin) for unjustifiable 'indifference', and 'for not having evinced during or after the Cabinet session any interest in the Phalangists' actions in the camps'. **(Kahan Report, 7 February 1983)**

© Martin Gilbert 1984



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies



Syria~Israel~Palestine~Lebanon~Jordan

SCROLL ALL THE WAY DOWN THE PAGE FOR YOUR COMPLETE **WELCOME** TO THIS GEOMAT SITE

اَلسَّلَامُ عَلَيكُم وَرَحمَةُ اللهِ وَبَرَكَاتُه

~Peace Be With You All~

The United States, the Soviet Union, and the
University of Michigan
Invite you to attend the

Middle East Peace Conference

in Madrid, Spain at the Royal Palace
on October 31-November 3, 1991

MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE - LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Wednesday, October 30, 1991-THOSE PRESENT

Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain
President Bush of the United States
President Gorbachev of the U.S.S.R.
EC Delegation
Egyptian Delegation

Thursday, October 31, 1991-THOSE PRESENT

Israeli Delegation
Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation - Jordanians
Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation - Palestinians
Lebanese Delegation
Syrian Delegation

Friday, November 1, 1991-THOSE PRESENT

Israeli Delegation
Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation - Jordanians
Jordanian/Palestinian Delegation - Palestinians
Lebanese Delegation
Syrian Delegation
Egyptian Delegation
Foreign Minister Pankin of the U.S.S.R.
Secretary of State Baker of the United States
Foreign Minister van den Broek of the Netherlands, for the E.C.

Below is a double-faced image of the diplomatic leaders in the SALON DE LAS COLUMNAS
See both the inside and outside of the Royal Palace

The question of Peace in the Middle East

Visit the links below

Read-->Why the Peace Conference in Madrid was such a success

An *In-Depth* look at the Middle East with Maps

Visit the source of the Invitation
See the timeline of the Travels of Secretary of State, James Baker
Accompany James Baker, architect of the Peace Conference, on his travels by flying back in time with Google Earth!

The Atmosphere before the Conference-Doubtful Thoughts

Breaking News-U.S. Embassy in Lebanon Hit day before Madrid
Tensions Rise at the Madrid Conference

View the Conference Center in 3-D images, as a JPG
View the Conference Center and additional photos, as a KMZ file
Understand the background of the conference
Meet the Actors of the Peace Process in the Middle East
Learn your way around the Middle East and the Delegate countries
- Syria
- Israel
- Palestine
- Lebanon
- Jordan

***Info taken from the U.S. State Dept, Background Notes on Countries of the World**

Understand the significance of Madrid, Spain
Familiarize yourself with the Madrid Framework
See a Middle East Peace Chronology dating back to 1978

Bilateral Negotiations
- Israel-Jordan
- Israel-Palestine
- Israel-Syria
- Israel-Lebanon

Understand the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
- Differing Viewpoints
- The Key Terms
- Phases of the Road Map

Multilateral Negotiations

Environment
Arms Control and Regional Security
Refugees
Water -The Water Crisis in the Middle East
Economic Development

Quick VIDEO History Lesson-check it out!

Discover the different components/atmospheres of the Middle East
- Political
- Economic
- Geographic-Location/Climactic
- Religious
- Cultural
- Invention/Progress

Read the Opening and Closing Speeches at the Conference

Declaration by the UN on the 10th Anniversary of the Conference

Calendrical Timeline-The Quest for Peace over the years
1991 Let's Agree to Disagree
1992 Where was Palestine in the Moscow Peace Talks

4th row from left:unknown, unknown, Amre Moussa
3rd row from left: unknown, James Baker III, unknown, Dr.Kamel Abu Jaber , Hans Van Den Broek
2nd row from left:unknown, unknown, Yitzhak Shamir, unknown
1st row from left:Boris Pankin,Mikhail Gorbachev , George H.W. Bush

1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles
1994 American Aid in the Peace Process
1995 Have Arab Governments loss confidence in the Peace Process
1996 Will Israel strike
1997 The Israel-Palestine Conflict-in need of America's help
1998 The Trust is missing in negotiations
1999 Meeting of Clinton & Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel
2000 What Gorbachev thinks
2001 Why we should revive the Madrid Spirit
2002 The U.N. involvement in the Peace Process
2003 The Debate over Oslo
2004 The Peace Process without Arafat
2005 The Progress we've made-or haven't made
2006 The Israel-Lebanon Crisis
2007 What George W. Bush can learn from Madrid today

CONTINUE TO NAVIGATE YOUR WAY AROUND THIS GEOMAT PROJECT! THE TABLES ON THE RIGHT ARE YOUR GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING ALL ASPECTS OF THE MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE. THE GRAY BOX CONTAINS ALL THE INFORMATION SURROUNDING THE CONFERENCE, MAKE SURE TO VISIT ALL THE LINKS AND BE CURIOUS WHEN YOU GET TO THOSE PAGES, FOR THERE ARE MORE LINKS THAT GET IN GREATER DEPTH.

BELOW THE GRAY TABLE IS THE OFFICAL INVITATION TO THE CONFERENCE, I AM GLAD YOU HAVE CONFIRMED YOUR ATTENDANCE!



Below: Current Map of the Middle East Region, the countries and their borders are labeled; capitals and major cities are also shown

Understanding the Geography of the Middle East through Maps

LETTER OF INVITATION TO MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE
October 30, 1991

The breakup of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War reshaped the basic political order of the Middle East. In an attempt to take advantage of this change, US Secre ry of State James Baker made eight trips to the region in the eight months following the Gulf War. The Madrid Invitation, inviting Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians to an opening conference represents the result of this shuttle diplomacy. The invitation, an outcome of compromises by all sides, details the structure of the Madrid process:

- *An opening conference having no power to impose solutions*
- *Bilateral talks with the Arab states bordering Israel,*
- *Talks with the Palestinians on 5-year interim self-rule, to be followed by talks on the permanent status*
- *Multilateral talks on key regional issues, like refugees.*

The following is the complete text of the invitation to the Madrid Peace Conference on October 30, 1991, jointly issued by the U.S. and the Soviet Union:

TEXT:

After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.

Toward that end, the president of the U.S. and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991.

President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6 P.M. Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.

Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues of water, refugee issues, environment, economic development, and other subjects of mutual interest.





www.mapsofworld.com



The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its secretary- general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general.

The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues of results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties.

With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self- government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years; beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend.

The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve.

This GeoMat Study was designed by Angelina Sulaka,
with contribution by the following people and works



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



[2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt]

[2000 - Security Fence Proposed]


[2003 - Project "COPE"]

[2004 - The Peres Center For Peace]

[2004 - The Death of Arafat]

[2005 - Hamas uprising]

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



[2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt]

[2000 - Security Fence Proposed]


[2003 - Project "COPE"]

[2004 - The Peres Center For Peace]

[2004 - The Death of Arafat]

[2005 - Hamas uprising]

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



[2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt]

[2000 - Security Fence Proposed]


[2003 - Project "COPE"]

[2004 - The Peres Center For Peace]

[2004 - The Death of Arafat]

[2005 - Hamas uprising]

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt

2000 - Security Fence Proposed


2003 - Project "COPE"

2004 - The Peres Center For Peace

2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



[2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt]

[2000 - Security Fence Proposed]


[2003 - Project "COPE"]

[2004 - The Peres Center For Peace]

[2004 - The Death of Arafat]

[2005 - Hamas uprising]

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt

2000 - Security Fence Proposed


2003 - Project "COPE"

2004 - The Peres Center For Peace

2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

TODAY 5/25/2008



A Landmark Event: Shaping the Border along the West Bank

A Security Fence or a Wall?

Actors	Natural Resources & Climate	Documents

Debates Concerning the Security Fence





http://www.mapsofworld.com/flags

A Timeline of the Major Events Building Towards Israel's Decision to Build the Security Fence

MAPS click to see enlarged map			Major Events Follow the links for further detail, images, and timelines.
	1880		Zionism- Started by European Jews
	1890		Zionists build colonies in Palestine
	1900		
	1910		WWI Britain gained control of Palestine- supported by Arthur J Balfour's proposal for a "national home" for the Jews
	1920		Britain establishes Jewish homeland- first riots Jews and Arabs commit terrorist attacks
	1930		
The UN Partition Plan- 1947 **The Independence War- 1948-49** **Arab Refugees 1948**	1940		In response to Nazism, Jewish immigration increases from 5,000 to 65,000. WWII Jewish refuegees sweep into Palestine- Arab League forms UN voted for separate Arab and Jewish states, the Jewish one to be 55% of the land west of the Jordan River
Arab Refugees 1949-1967			**David Ben-Gurion** declared Israel a State- Independence War
	1950		Followed by the creation of the 1949 Armistice Line, or Green Line
Israeli Response to Terror 1951-1966			
	1960		Sinai War
			Six-Day War
Camp David, West Bank and Gaza Strip	1970		Arafat creates the Palestine Liberation Organizaiton (PLO) Jordan expelled PLO- PLO arrived in Lebanon Black September killed Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games
Palestinian Refugees 1989			**Timeline: Yom Kippur War**- started by Egypt and Syria
Intifada 1992	1980		Camp David Accords (Carter, Begin, and Sadat)
Enclaves for Peace 1993			War in Lebanon- Israel attacked Lebanon
	1990		**Intifada**- Palestinian uprisings against Israel
Security Fence			

	2000		Oslo Accords, Arafat, Rabin, and Clinton **West Bank** town Hebron returned to Palestinian control **Security Fence- LANDMARK EVENT**
	2010		**Annapolis Peace Conference** **2000s** **current crises**



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Arab Peace Initiative







The Calendrical History of The Arab Initiative

January 1, 2008

July 12, 2007 - Jordan and Egypt met with Israeli PM Ehud Olmert to discuss the Initiative

March 28, 2007 - Initiative renewed at Riyadh Summit

March 11, 2007 - Ehud Olmert praises many aspects of the Initiative

March 7, 2007 - King Abdullah II of Jordan meets with the US Congress to gain support for the Initiative

Official translation of the full text of a Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut, 2002.

The Arab Peace Initiative

The Council of Arab States at the Summit Level at its 14th Ordinary Session,

Reaffirming the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-Ordinary Arab Summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government,

Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in which his highness presented his initiative calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land-for-peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an

February 25, 2007 - Pakistan publicly supports the Initiative

January 1, 2007

March 30, 2006 - Arab League reiterates commitment to the Initiative (Khartoum)

January 1, 2006

March 23, 2005 - Arab League reiterates commitment to the Initiative (Algiers)

January 1, 2005

May 23, 2004 - Arab League reiterates commitment to the Initiative (Tunis)

January 1, 2004

March 1, 2003 - Arab League reiterates commitment to the Initiative (Sharm el-Sheikh)

January 1, 2003

March 29 2002 - Operation Defensive Shield

March 28, 2002 - Israeli FM Shimon Peres welcomes the Initiative

independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel,

Emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace or provide security for the parties, the council:

1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.

2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:

I- Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights, to the June 4, 1967 lines as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.

II- Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.

III- The acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:

I- Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.

II- Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.

4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.

5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighbourliness and provide future generations with security, stability and prosperity.

6. Invites the international community and all countries and organisations to support this initiative.

7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the Security Council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim states and the European Union.



March 28, 2002 - *The Arab Initiative is released by The Arab League in Beruit*

March 27 2002 - The Passover Massacre

March 25, 2002 - A draft of the Initiative circulated amongst foreign ministers

February 17, 2002 - Reporter Thomas Friedman hints that the Saudis are forming a peace initiative



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt

2000 - Security Fence Proposed


2003 - Project "COPE"

2004 - The Peres Center For Peace

2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt

2000 - Security Fence Proposed


2003 - Project "COPE"

2004 - The Peres Center For Peace

2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

TODAY 5/25/2008





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

From Testaments to The Great War

1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine


636 AD - The Jews of Palestine



1880 - Jewish Settlements

1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs

1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Dissolution of The Ottoman Empire


1917 - Post WWI Border Changes

1919 - The Zionist Plan

1920 - The Jewish Majority

1929 - The Anti-Jewish Riots

1931 - Jewish Settlements




1936 - The Arab Campaign

1937 - The Peel Commission Partition Plan

1938 - Jewish Proposal For Partition

1938 - British Plan for Partition





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Fight For Survival (Israel)


1947 - The UN Partition Plan

1948 - The Israeli War of Independence


1949 - The Arab Refugees

1949 - Israel's New Frontiers

1951 - Terrorist Raids into Israel



1956 - The Sinai Campaign



1967 - The Middle East Crisis

1967 - The Six Day War

Six Days In June



A Geomat Study of the Buildup To the Six Day War and the Capture of East Jerusalem

A Case Study by Justin Adams
University of Michigan



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies



JORDAN	10 camps
In camps	208,716
Not in camps	636,826
Total	**845,542**

Number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza:	818,983
Number of Palestinians in countries bordering on Israel:	1,382,140
Total:	**2,201,113**

The continued reluctance of Arab States to absorb the Palestinian refugees in their midst, and the political desire of many Palestinians to retain their identity and status as a dispossessed people, led to the perpetuation of the refugee camps set up in 1948 and 1967. These camps received funding from the United Nations, and also from individual Arab States, but were essentially areas of poverty and deprivation. Inceasingly, however, Palestinians left the camps, specially in Jordan and on the West Bank, and entered Palestinian Arab society. The 27 camps inside Israel became centres of the uprising that began in December 1987 (the Intifada)

The figures on this map were compiled by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) as at 30 June 1989



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


The Fight for Survival (Palestine)

1967 - The New West Bank

1972 - The Build Up to War

1973 - The Yom Kippur War

1978 - Camp David Accords



1982 - Sabra and Chatila


1983 - New Settlements in Judea

1983 - New Settlements in Samaria

1987 - The Intifada

1989 - More Palestinian Refugees

1992 - The Intifada Intensifies





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Cases for Peace

1991 - The Madrid Invitation


1993 - The Bailey Map

1994 - The Cairo Agreement

1994 - Peace with Jordan

1995 - Peace and Terror

1995 - Oslo



2000 - Clinton's Final Attempt

2000 - Security Fence Proposed


2003 - Project "COPE"

2004 - The Peres Center For Peace

2004 - The Death of Arafat

2005 - Hamas uprising

TODAY 5/25/2008



The Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip



1949- Egypt gains control of the Gaza Strip following armistice agreement with Israel. Israeli settlements are evacuated.
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964- The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded by the Arab League
1965
1966
1967- Israel gains control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem following the Six Day War
1968
1969
1970-72- The Israeli re-settlement of the Gaza Strip begins with Kfar Darom which grew to become Gush Katif
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979- Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty defined the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Egypt rejected claim of the Gaza Strip
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987- Formation of Hamas by Sheikh



Ahmed Yassin
1988
1990
1991- Madrid Peace Summit
1992
1993- The Oslo Accords

1994- The Palestinian Authority is established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Yasser Arafat wins Nobel Peace Prize

1995- Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin assinated at peace rally in Tel Aviv

1996- Yasser Arafat becomes Palestinian Authority President
1997
1998
1999
2000- The Second Intifada begins following the Camp David Summit

2001- Ariel Sharon becomes the Israeli Prime MInister

2002- Israel begins construction of security barrier around the West Bank

2003- The US publishes the "Road Map" for the peace process

2004- Prime Minister Sharon announces disengagement plan. Yasser Arafat dies.

2005- Israeli Disengagment from the Gaza Strip 2005

2006- Palestinian Parliamentary Elections

2007- Seige of Fatah's headquarters in the Gaza Strip

Key People to Know

Basic Information on the Gaza Strip



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

[Home page of the Herzliya Conference]

[Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences]







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

IDC HERZLIYA
Institute for Policy and Strategy

HERZLIYA CONFERENCE
Institute for Policy and Strategy | IDC Herzliya

The Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy
Institute for Policy and Strategy

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

January 21-24, 2006 - *The Framework is submitted*

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

Working Paper

Submitted for the Herzliya Conference,
January 21-24, 2006

Team Members

David Newman, Gideon Biger –Team Leaders

Shaul Arieli
Moshe Brawer
Elisha Efrat
Amiram Gonen
Rassem Khamaisi
Nurit Kliot
Amiram Oren
Rafi Regev
David Schattner
Yossef Shilhav
Oren Yiftachel

This paper reflects the opinions of its authors only

MILESTONES IN PALESTINIAN HISTORY

1903 1st Palestinian women's organization founded, in Acre; wave of Zionist immigration.
1905 7th Zionist Congress rejects the East Africa scheme (Uganda as alternative to Palestine).
1908 Najib Nassar founds *Al-Carmel*; 'Young Turks' Revolt begins.
1909 Tel Aviv founded as first all-Jewish city.
1911 Al-Isa brothers found *Filastin* newspaper in Jaffa; *Al-Fatat* secret society founded to work towards Arab independence from Ottoman rule.
1913 1st Arab Nationalist Congress in Paris calls for provincial Arab autonomy from the Ottomans.
1914 The Ottoman Empire enters WW I on the side of Germany.
1915 Hussein-McMahon correspondence begins.
1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement signed; Sharif Hussein launches the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans.
1917 Balfour Declaration; Ottoman forces surrender to the British.
1918 Armistice effectively ends the Ottoman Empire.
1919 King-Crane Commission; 1st Palestinian National Congress in Jerusalem demands independence.
1920 San Remo Conference; British civil administration begins; Nabi Musa riots; Haycraft Commission
1922 League of Nations approve British Mandate of Palestine; 'Churchill' White Paper reaffirms the Balfour Declaration.
1923 British Mandate comes into effect.
1928 British Gov't White Paper confirms the status of the Wailing/Western Wall as Muslim property.
1929 Al-Buraq riots; Shaw Commission; Hope-Simpson Commission.
1930 British Gov't 'Passfield' White Paper.
1933 General strike in Palestine to protest Jewish immigration.
1936 Great Rebellion begins; Arab Higher Committee established.
1937 Peel Commission.
1938 Woodhead Commission.
1939 London Conference at St. James's Palace; British Gov't 'MacDonald' White Paper restricts Jewish immigration and land purchases.
1942 Zionist Conference at Biltmore Hotel formulates idea of 'Jewish Commonwealth' in Palestine.
1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Jewish immigration; Morrison-Grady Plan.
1947 UN Special Committee on Palestine formed; UN Res. 181 (Partition Plan).
1948 First Arab-Israeli War; An-Naqba; Deir Yassin massacre; Birth of the State of Israel; All-Palestine Government; Palestinian Declaration of Independence; UNGA Res. 194.
1949 UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine established; UNRWA founded; UNGA Res. 303; Fourth Geneva Convention.
1950 Israeli 'Law of Return' and 'Absentee Property Law'; Jordan 'unifies' the East and West Bank.
1951 Assassination of King Abdallah in Jerusalem.
1955 Israeli army attack and massacre in Gaza.
1956 Israeli massacres of Qalqilya, Kufr Qassem, and Khan Younis; tripartite invasion (UK, France, Israel) of Egypt (Suez Crisis).
1957 Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza.
1959 Fateh founded.
1963 PLO Draft Constitution issued at the Arab Summit in Cairo.
1964 PLO founded.
1965 Israel diverts the Jordan River; first military operation of Fateh in Palestine
1966 Israeli massacre in As-Samu' village.
1967 June or Six-Day War; occupation of Palestine; UNSC Res. 242; Arab League summit in Khartoum.
1968 PFLP founded; Battle of Karameh; Palestinian National Charter amended.
1969 DFLP founded; arson attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque; Arafat becomes PLO chairman.
1970 Black September in Jordan.
1972 King Hussein's United Arab Kingdom Plan.
1973 October or Yom Kippur War; UN Res. 338; Geneva Conference; Palestinian National Salvation Front created.
1974 Rejectionist Front formed; UN and Arab League recognize PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, Arafat addresses the UN.
1975 PLO granted access to the UNSC; UNGA Res. 3379 (Zionism as a form of racism).
1976 Land Day; West Bank municipal election.
1977 Begin's autonomy peace plan.
1978 National Guidance Committee formed; Israeli invasion of South Lebanon; Camp David Accords.
1979 Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty; International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People declared; UN Res. 446, 452 condemn Israeli settlement policy.
1980 EC's Venice Declaration; Israel's Basic Law on Jerusalem.
1981 King Fahd Plan.
1982 Fez Plan; Reagan Plan; Brezhnev Plan; Israeli invasion of Lebanon; Sabra and Shatila massacre; Palestinian Communist Party founded
1983 Geneva International Conference.
1986 'War of the Camps' (Lebanon).
1987 Intifada.
1988 Jordan's disengagement; Hamas emerges; Shultz Peace Plan; Palestinian Declaration of Independence.
1990 Rishon LeZion (Iyun Qarah), Al-Aqsa massacres.
1991 Gulf War; Madrid Conference.
1992 Multilateral talks; Labor wins Israeli elections.
1993 Closure policy begins; Declaration of Principles.
1994 Hebron massacre; Oslo I; PA established; Early Empowerment Agreement.
1995 Oslo II; Rabin assassinated.
1996 Palestinian elections; PLC; Netanyahu/Likud.
1997 Hebron Agreement; Sheikh Ahmad Yassin released.
1998 Wye River Memorandum.
1999 Sharm El-Sheikh Agreement.
2000 Camp David II Summit; *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.
2001 Taba Talks fail; Sharon defeats Barak, marking the end to Palestinian-Israeli talks.
2002 Israeli re-invasion/re-occupation of most of the West Bank; Saudi peace initiative; US "road map".
2003 Road map officially publicized; amendment of the PA Basic Law to provide for the post of PM (first Mahmoud Abbas, then Ahmed Qrei'a); Geneva Accord.
2004 Yasser Arafat dies.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

TODAY 5/25/2008

An In Depth View into the Current Situation of the Israeli/ Palestinian Conflict




Ashqelon
Gaza Strip*
1950 Armistice Line
1949 Armistice Line
Dead Sea
Beersheba
Dimona
NEGEV
JORDAN
EGYPT
Elat
Gulf of Aqaba
*Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement -- permanent status to be determined through further negotiation.
Image © 2007 TerraMetrics
Image NASA
© 2007 Cnes/Spot Image
Image © 2007 DigitalGlobe
©2007 Google™
Pointer 31°11'41.79" N 35°00'48.54" E
Streaming 100%
Eye alt 308.53 mi



A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh



November 27, 2007

THE ANNAPOLIS CONFERENCE



Map of participating delegations at Annapolis	
The main venue:	U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Md.

The players:

· The United States, host, to be represented by President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
· Israel, to be represented by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni.
· Palestinians, to be represented by Palestinian Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and senior officials.

Members of the international diplomatic quartet on the Middle East other than the United States:
· The United Nations, to be represented by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon.
· European Union presidency, to be represented by Portuguese Foreign Minister Luis Amado.
· European Union Commission, to be represented by EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner.
· European Union High Representative for foreign affairs Javier Solana.
· Russia, expected to be represented by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
· Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, the quartet special representative to the Middle East.

Members of the Arab League committee tasked with pursuing a Saudi initiative for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal. Of these, only Egypt and Jordan have full diplomatic with Israel:
· Arab League, to be represented by Secretary-General Amr Moussa.
· Algeria
· Bahrain
· Egypt
· Jordan
· Lebanon
· Morocco
· Qatar
· Saudi Arabia
· Sudan
· Syria
· Tunisia
· Yemen

Other members of the Arab League:
· Iraq
· Mauritania
· Oman
· United Arab Emirates

Permanent members of the UN Security Council not included in above categories:
· Britain
· China
· France

Members of the Group of Eight industrialized countries not included in above categories:
· Canada
· Germany
· Italy
· Japan

Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference not included in above categories:
· Indonesia
· Malaysia
· Pakistan
· Senegal
· Turkey

Other nations:
· Brazil
· Greece
· India

	· Norway · Poland · Slovenia · South Africa · Spain · Sweden **Financial institutions invited as observers:** · International Monetary Fund · World Bank **Key Actors Not Invited:** • Iran • Hamas Information courtesy of Haaretz Daily Newspaper Israel
Calendrical Timeline (all dates 2007)	 November 28 - President Bush's Remarks November 28 - Secretary Rice's Interviews: ABC | CBS | NBC November 27 - Secretary Rice's Opening and Closing Remarks November 27 - Joint Statement Read by President Bush November 27 - President Bush's Remarks November 27 - Prime Minister Olmert's Remarks November 27 - President Abbas' Remarks November 26 - President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert November 26 - President Bush meets President Abbas November 26 - President Bush's Statement November 25 - Teleconference Briefing November 24 - November 23 - November 22 - November 21 - Secretary Rice's Interviews: Radio, TV, and Wires | Print Journalists November 20 - Special Briefing: Text | Video November 20 - Announcement
What is Fateh?	Fateh-Palestinian National Liberation Movement
The released schedule:	•Monday, November 26, 2007: **President Bush** meets individually with **Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert** and **Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas** at the White House. **Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice** hosts the conference attendees at a State Department dinner. •Tuesday November 27, 2007: Bush has a joint meeting with Olmert and Abbas in Annapolis, then addresses the conference. Attendees meet all day. •Wednesday November 28, 2007: Bush meets individually with Olmert and Abbas.

Key Links:	The Annapolis Joint Declartion, singned by both Abbas and Olmert Conference Site Media: Israel's Response and Sentiments ; Palestinian Response ; Gulf media's mixed response to Annapolis Two Palestinian views: A Letdown Even to Skeptics , A Complete Failure Two Israeli views: Questions , The Settlers will Survive Annapolis Peacenow.org page on the Annapolis Peace Conference (full of great links)
So, what does Israel think of President Bush?	"If the day comes when the two-state solution collapses and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting rights ... then, as soon as that happens, the state of Israel is finished" -Olmert



A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

From Testaments to The Great War

1000 BC -The Jews of Palestine


636 AD - The Jews of Palestine



1880 - Jewish Settlements

1915 - Britain's Promise to the Arabs

1916 - Allied Plan For Palestine



The Camp David Accords

The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in

assuring security.

- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

- **West Bank and Gaza**
  Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

  1. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

  2. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be

exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

3. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

    i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
    ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
    iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
    iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
    v. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the

security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

vi. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

vii. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

- **Egypt-Israel**
  1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

  2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

- **Associated Principles**
  1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

  2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

     a. full recognition;
     b. abolishing economic boycotts;
     c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt:

Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:

Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:


Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America

Top | The Camp David Accords

Please send comments or questions to carter.library@nara.gov

Last modified: July 21, 2001.

Maps of Israel





Notice that the second map shows the division lines for the areas of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. The Camp David Accords dealt mostly with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It also dealt with troop withdrawl from the Sinai Peninsula as described below.

The Camp David Accords included two separate agreements. The first, between Egypt and Israel, states that the Isreali's must withdraw from the Sinai in return for Egypt's signing of a Peace Treaty with Israel. This was to include ambassador exchange and travel across borders. Also, Israeli troops would withdraw from the Sinai and be replaced by

multinational troops in an effort to keep the peace.

The second agreement set up a three-stage framework that called for elections to be held in the West Bank and Gaza. This was to be followed by a five-year transitional autonomy phase. The problem with the second agreement was that it did not set a timetable. In other words, things could stay the same indefinitley without a violation of the agreement. This is why, as of 1992 little had been done in the direction of this second stage of the agreement.

The peace treaty has been massively criticized for its separate nature. Despite all the criticism, the first part of the agreement showed signs of progress. The Accords stayed in effect even through the assassination of Sadat and the Israel invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Criticism came from both sides. The Israeli's thought their government gave up too much for an uneasy peace with Egypt. On the other hand, many in Egypt thought that Sadat conceded too much in the agreement for ambassador exchange and travel across borders.

(Source:www.ciaonet.org/casestudy/tes01/tes01c.html)

This file is available on a **Cryptome DVD** offered by Cryptome. Donate $25 for a DVD of the Cryptome 10-year archives of 35,000 files from June 1996 to June 2006 (~3.5 GB). Click Paypal or mail check/MO made out to John Young, 251 West 89th Street, New York, NY 10024. Archives include all files of cryptome.org, cryptome2.org, jya.com, cartome.org, eyeball-series.org and iraq-kill-maim.org. Cryptome offers with the Cryptome DVD an INSCOM DVD of about 18,000 pages of counter-intelligence dossiers declassified by the US Army Information and Security Command, dating from 1945 to 1985. No additional contribution required -- $25 for both. The DVDs will be sent anywhere worldwide without extra cost.

---

16 October 2006. A writes:

> One small point of interest in your new Camp David Eyeball pictures. If you look at the picture taken facing SW - there is another clearing in the forest at the top center of the photograph. This isn't part of Camp David, it is called Camp Greentop - a campground built by the Civilian Conservation Corps in the 1930s. This campground is owned by the National Park Service and operated by a nonprofit group called the League for People with Disabilities. They offer summer camps for children with disabilities - and it is a fantastic program.
>
> http://www.leagueforpeople.org/camping_ther_web/camping_ther_prg.htm
>
> Camp Greentop is not inside the perimeter of Camp David, but evidently is within its security zone. There are occasions when Secret Service block the entrance gate when dignitaries are using the National Park Service road. Every President has dropped by to visit the campers at least once during their term. The visits are kept very low key, and are not publically announced - with no press or family. Dubya dropped by two summers ago and spent a couple of hours with the kids.

14 October 2006

These photos are relatively new. Heretofore, most satellite photos of Camp David were monochromes dated from the 1990s.

See also:

> Camp David Kill and Maim Zone: http://cryptome.org/david-kill/david-kill01.htm
>
> Camp David: http://eyeball-series.org/david-eyeball.htm


Site R is the hardened US military Alternate Joint Communications Center (AJCC) located beneath Raven Rock mountain.

Eyeballing

Camp David by Google Earth

Coordinates for Google Earth at the bottom left of the photos.



SITE R
CAMP
DAVID
THURMONT
© 2006 Europa Technologies
Image © 2006 TerraMetrics
Image © 2006 DigitalGlobe
© 2006 Google
Pointer 39°40'58.12" N 77°25'34.61" W elev 1562 ft
Streaming 100%
Eye alt 13.16 mi


N
©2006 Google™
© 2006 Europa Technologies
Pointer 39°38'55.11" N 77°27'33.82" W elev 1703 ft
Streaming 100%
Eye alt 5465 ft


Camp David in the 1990s. Compare to the photo above: buildings have been added at the helipad, bottom left, and removed from the center of the site and from the main compound, top, with the parking area replaced by structures.




Looking North



Looking East



Looking South



Looking Southwest



Event Horizon: Timeline of peace negotiations involving Egypt and Israel

1977	**Begin invites Sadat to Israel to discuss options for peace**
1978	**The Camp David Accords**: After 12 days of closed negotiations between the Israelis and Egyptians at Camp David, the two delegations sign the Camp David Accords. This is made up of two sections: the first creates a framework for autonomous rule by the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the second deals with the future of peace between Israel and Egypt, calling for a peace treaty to be agreed upon within three months that will include a full Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
1979	
1980	
1981	**Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty**: Calls for the demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula by both sides and for Egypt to "normalize" relation with Israel.
1982	
1983	
1984	
1985	
1986	
1987	
1988	
1989	
1990	
1991	**Israel's Peace Initiative:** A plan for peace announced by Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin (based on the Camp David Accords).
1992	
1993	
1994	**Madrid Peace Conference:** bilateral and multilateral talks occurred between Israel, its neighbors, and the U. S. and Russia (ultimately no agreements were reached).
1995	
1996	
1997	**Oslo Accords:** Called for the transfer of power to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
1998	Click here for nested time line
1999	**Oslo II:** Dealt with many aspects of the transition to Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank And the Gaza Strip
2000	
	Camp David Summit: An effort to achieve peace once and for all. No agreement reached after Arafat's rejection.

Camp David




President Carter's Quarters



PM Begin's Quarters



President Sadat's Quarters




President Jimmy Carter



James Earl "Jimmy" Carter Jr. served as the 39th President of the United States from 1977 - 1981. Carter was present for the signing of the Camp David Accords. He hosted Begin and Sadat for twelve days of negotiations in September, 1978.

Anwar Al Sadat



Born December 25, 1918 - Died October 6, 1981

Anwar Sadat was President of Egypt during the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. He was a key player because, along with Menachem Begin of Israel, agreement was reached on the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the Sinai Peninsula and its return to Egypt in 1978.

Menachem Begin



Born August 16, 1913 - Died March 9, 1992

Menachem Begin was Prime Minister of Israel and a key player in the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1978. He, along with Anwar Sadat, agreed on the full withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the Sinai Peninsula and its return to Egypt in 1978.

Syrian Arab Republic

Geography

Area: 185,170 sq. km. (71,504 sq. mi.), including 1,295 sq. km. of Israeli-occupied territory; about the size of North Dakota.
Cities: *Capital* -- Damascus (pop. 4 million).
Other cities --Aleppo (4.2 million), Homs (1.6 million), Hama (1.4 million), Idleb (1.3 million), al-Hasakeh (1.2 million), Dayr al-Zur (1.1), Latakia (0.9 million), Dar'a (0.9), al-Raqqa (0.8), and Tartous (0.7).
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain with a double mountain belt in the west; large, semiarid and desert plateau to the east.
Climate: Mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (June to August) and mild, rainy winters (December to February) along coast.



People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective* --Syrian (s).
Population (2005 est.)*: 18.6 million.
Growth rate (2005 est.): 2.45%.
Major ethnic groups: Arabs (90%), Kurds (9%), Armenians, Circassians, Turkomans.
Religions: Sunni Muslims (74%), Alawis

(12%), Christians (10%), Druze (3%), and small numbers of other Muslim sects, Jews, and Yazidis.
Languages: Arabic (official), English (widely understood in major cities only), Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian.
Education (2005 est.):
Years compulsory -- primary, 6 yrs.
Attendance -- 97.9%. *Literacy* -- 92.5%; 87.9% male, 73.9% female.
Health (2004): *Infant mortality rate* --17.1/1,000.
Life expectancy -- 68.47 yrs. male, 71.02 yrs. female.
Work force (6.1 million, 2004 est.): Services (including government); agriculture; industry and commerce.

Government

Type: Republic, under Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party regimes since March 1963.
Independence: April 17, 1946.
Constitution: March 13, 1973.
Branches:
Executive -- president, two vice presidents, prime minister, Council of Ministers (cabinet).
Legislative -- unicameral People's Council.
Judicial --Supreme Constitutional Court, High Judicial Council, Court of Cassation, State Security Courts.
Administrative subdivisions: 13 provinces and city of Damascus (administered as a separate unit).
Political parties: Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba'ath) Party, Syrian Arab Socialist Party, Arab Socialist Union,



POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Officially, Syria is a republic. In reality, however, it is an authoritarian regime that exhibits only the forms of a democratic system. Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and members of Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The late President Hafiz Al-Asad was confirmed by unopposed referenda five times. His son, Bashar Al-Asad, also was confirmed by an unopposed referendum in July 2000. The President and his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security services, ultimately make most basic decisions in political and economic life, with a very limited degree of public accountability. Political opposition to the President is not tolerated. Syria has been under a state of emergency since 1963. Syrian governments have justified martial law by the state of war, which continues to exist with Israel and by continuing threats posed by terrorist groups.

The Asad regime (little has changed since Bashar Al-Asad succeeded his father) has held power longer than any other Syrian government since independence; its survival is due partly to a strong desire for stability and the regime's success in giving groups such as religious minorities and peasant farmers a stake in society. The expansion of the government bureaucracy has also created a large class loyal to the regime. The President's continuing strength is due also to the army's continued loyalty and the effectiveness of Syria's large internal security apparatus. The leadership of both is comprised largely of members of Asad's own Alawi sect. The several main branches of the security services operate independently of each other and outside of the legal system. Each continues to be responsible for human rights violations.

All three branches of government are guided by the views of the Ba'ath Party, whose primacy in state institutions is assured by the constitution. The Ba'ath platform is proclaimed succinctly in the party's slogan: "Unity, freedom, and socialism." The party has traditionally been considered both socialist, advocating state ownership of the means of industrial production and the redistribution of agricultural land, and revolutionary, dedicated to carrying a socialist revolution to every part of the Arab world. Founded by Michel 'Aflaq, a Syrian Christian and Salah al-Din Al-Bitar, a Syrian Sunni, the Ba'ath Party embraces

Syrian Communist Party, Arab Socialist Unionist Movement, Democratic Socialist Union Party, and some 15 very small quasi-tolerated political parties, generally considered opposition-oriented but enfeebled and reluctant to challenge the government.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy

2005 estimate+++
GDP (2005 nominal)*: $27.3 billion.
Real growth rate*: 2.9%.
Per capita GDP*: $1464.
Natural resources: Crude oil and natural gas, phosphates, asphalt, rock salt, marble, gypsum, iron ore, chrome, and manganese ores.
Agriculture: *Products* --cotton, wheat, barley, sugar beets, fruits and vegetables. *Arable land* --32%.
Industry: *Types* --mining, manufacturing (textiles, food processing), construction, petroleum.
Trade: *Exports* --$10.2 billion: petroleum, textiles, phosphates, antiquities, fruits and vegetables, cotton. *Major markets* --EU, Arab countries, United States, New Independent States, Eastern Europe. *Imports* --$10.8 billion: foodstuffs, metal and metal products, machinery, textiles, petroleum. *Major suppliers* --Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, China, U.S., Japan.
*according to IMF statistics

PEOPLE

secularism and has attracted supporters of all faiths in many Arab countries, especially Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon. Since August 1990, however, the party has tended to de-emphasize socialism and to stress both pan-Arab unity and the need for gradual reform of the Syrian economy.

Nine smaller political parties are permitted to exist and, along with the Ba'ath Party, make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties that represents the sole framework of legal political party participation for citizens. While created ostensibly to give the appearance of a multi-party system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba'ath Party and does not change the essentially one-party character of the political system. Non-Ba'ath parties included in the NPF represent small political groupings of a few hundred members each and conform strictly to Ba'ath Party and government policies. There were reports in 2005, in the wake of the June Ba'ath Party Congress, that the government was considering legislation to permit the formation of new political parties and the legalization of parties previously banned. These changes have not taken place. In addition, some 15 small independent parties outside the NPF operate without government sanction.

The Ba'ath Party dominates the parliament, which is known as the People's Council. With members elected every 4 years, the Council has no independent authority. The executive branch retains ultimate control over the legislative process, although parliamentarians may criticize policies and modify draft laws; according to the constitution and its bylaws, a group of 10 parliamentarians can propose legislation. During 2001, two independent members of parliament, Ma'mun al-Humsy and Riad Seif, who had advocated political reforms, were stripped of their parliamentary immunity and tried and convicted of charges of "attempting to illegally change the constitution." Seif was released from prison in early 2006, but remains under strict surveillance by the security services. The government has allowed independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats in the 250-member People's Council. Following the April 22-23, 2007 parliamentary elections, the NPF strengthened its hold on parliament, with the number of non-NPF deputies shrinking from 83 to 80, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'ath Party-dominated NPF.

There was a surge of interest in political reform after Bashar al-Asad assumed power in 2000. Human rights activists and other civil society advocates, as well as some parliamentarians, became more outspoken during a period referred to as "Damascus Spring" (July 2000-February 2001). Asad also made a series of appointments of reform-minded advisors to formal and less formal positions, and included a number of similarly oriented individuals in his cabinet. The 2001 arrest and long-term detention of the two reformist parliamentarians and the apparent marginalizing of some of the reformist advisors in the past five years, indicate that the pace of any political reform in Syria is likely to be much slower than the short-lived Damascus Spring promised. A crackdown on civil society in 2005, in the wake of Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, and again in the late winter and spring of 2006, reinforced the perception that any steps toward political form were likely to be halting and piecemeal at best.

ECONOMY

Syria is a middle-income, developing country with an economy based on agriculture, oil, industry, and tourism. However, Syria's economy faces serious challenges and impediments to growth, including: a large and poorly performing public sector; declining rates of oil production; widening non-oil deficit; wide scale

Ethnic Syrians are of Semitic stock. Syria's population is 90% Muslim--74% Sunni, and 16% other Muslim groups, including the Alawi, Shi'a, and Druze--and 10% Christian. There also is a tiny Syrian Jewish community.

Arabic is the official, and most widely spoken, language. Arabs, including some 500,000 Palestinian and up to 1.3 million Iraqi refugees, make up 90% of the population. Many educated Syrians also speak English or French, but English is the more widely understood. The Kurds, many of whom speak the banned Kurdish language, make up 9% of the population and live mostly in the northeast corner of Syria, though sizable Kurdish communities live in most major Syrian cities as well. Armenian and Turkic are spoken among the small Armenian and Turkoman populations.

Most people live in the Euphrates River valley and along the coastal plain, a fertile strip between the coastal mountains and the desert. Overall population density is about 140 per sq. mi. Education is free and compulsory from ages 6 to 11. Schooling consists of 6 years of primary education followed by a 3-year general or vocational training period and a 3-year academic or vocational program. The second 3-year period of academic training is required for university admission. Total enrollment at post-secondary schools is over 150,000. The literacy rate of Syrians aged 15 and older is 88% for males and 74%for females.

Ancient Syria's cultural and artistic achievements and contributions are

corruption; weak financial and capital markets; and high rates of unemployment tied to a high population growth rate. In addition, Syria currently is the subject of U.S. economic sanctions under the Syria Accountability Act, which prohibits the export and re-export of most U.S. products to Syria.

As a result of an inefficient and corrupt centrally planned economy, Syria has low rates of investment, and low levels of industrial and agricultural productivity. Its GDP growth rate was approximately 2.9% in 2005, according to IMF statistics. The two main pillars of the Syrian economy have been agriculture and oil. Agriculture, for instance, accounts for 25% of GDP and employs 42% of the total labor force. The government hopes to attract new investment in the tourism, natural gas, and service sectors to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil and agriculture. The government has begun to institute economic reforms aimed at liberalizing most markets, but reform thus far has been slow and ad hoc. For ideological reasons, privatization of government enterprises is explicitly rejected. Therefore major sectors of the economy including refining, ports operation, air transportation, power generation, and water distribution, remain firmly controlled by the government.

The Bashar al-Asad government started its reform efforts by changing the regulatory environment in the financial sector. In 2001, Syria legalized private banking and the sector, while still nascent, has been growing quickly in the last four years. Controls on foreign exchange continue to be one of the biggest impediments to the growth of the banking sector, although Syria has taken gradual steps to loosen those controls. In 2003, the government canceled a law that criminalized private sector use of foreign currencies, and in 2005 it issued legislation that allows licensed private banks to sell specific amounts of foreign currency to Syrian citizens under certain circumstances and to the private sector to finance imports. Syria's exchange rate is fixed, and the government maintains two official rates -- one rate on which the budget and the value of imports, customs, and other official transactions are based, and a second set by the Central Bank on a daily basis that covers all other financial transactions. There is, however, still an active black market for foreign currency.

Given the policies adopted from the 1960s through the late 1980s, which included nationalization of companies and private assets, Syria failed to join an increasingly interconnected global economy. Syria withdrew from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1951 because of Israel's accession. It is not a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), although it submitted a request to begin the accession process in 2001. Syria is developing regional free trade agreements. As of January 1, 2005, the Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) came into effect and customs duties were eliminated between Syria and all other members of GAFTA. In addition, Syria has signed a free trade agreement with Turkey, which came into force in January 2007, and initialed an Association Agreement with the EU, which has yet to be signed. Although Syria claims a recent boom in non-oil exports, its trade numbers are notoriously inaccurate and out-of-date. Syria's main exports include crude oil, refined products, raw cotton, clothing, fruits, and grains. The bulk of Syrian imports are raw materials essential for industry, vehicles, agricultural equipment, and heavy machinery. Earnings from oil exports as well as remittances from Syrian workers are the government's most important sources of foreign exchange.

Syria has produced heavy-grade oil from fields located in the northeast since the late 1960s. In the early 1980s, light-grade, low-sulphur oil was discovered near Dayr al-Zur in eastern Syria. Syria's rate of oil production has been decreasing steadily, from a peak close to 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995 down

many. Archaeologists have discovered extensive writings and evidence of a brilliant culture rivaling those of Mesopotamia and Egypt in and around the ancient city of Ebla. Later Syrian scholars and artists contributed to Hellenistic and Roman thought and culture. Zeno of Sidon founded the Epicurean school; Cicero was a pupil of Antiochus of Ascalon at Athens; and the writings of Posidonius of Apamea influenced Livy and Plutarch. Syrians have contributed to Arabic literature and music and have a proud tradition of oral and written poetry. Although declining, the world-famous handicraft industry still employs thousands.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Ensuring national security, increasing influence among its Arab neighbors, and achieving a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement, which includes the return of the Golan Heights, are the primary goals of President Asad's foreign policy.

Relations with Other Arab Countries
Syria reestablished full diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1989. In the 1990-91 Gulf War, Syria joined other Arab states in the U.S.-led multinational coalition against Iraq. In 1998, Syria began a slow rapprochement with Iraq, driven primarily by economic needs. Syria continues to play an active pan-Arab role, although in the wake of the Hariri assassination, Syria became more isolated diplomatically, both in the region and beyond.

Though it voted in favor of UNSCR 1441

to approximately 425,000 bpd in 2005. Experts generally agree that Syria will become a net importer of petroleum not later than 2012. Syria exported roughly 200,000 bpd in 2005, and oil still accounts for a majority of the country's export income. Syria also produces 22 million cubic meters of gas per day, with estimated reserves around 8.5 trillion cubic feet. While the government has begun to work with international energy companies in the hopes of eventually becoming a gas exporter, all gas currently produced is consumed domestically.

Some basic commodities, such as diesel, continue to be heavily subsidized, and social services are provided for nominal charges. The subsidies are becoming harder to sustain as the gap between consumption and production continues to increase. Syria has a population of approximately 19 million people, and Syrian Government figures place the population growth rate at 2.45%, with 75% of the population under the age of 35 and more than 40% under the age of 15. Approximately 200,000 people enter the labor market every year. According to Syrian Government statistics, the unemployment rate is 7.5%, however, more accurate independent sources place it closer to 20%. Government and public sector employees constitute over one quarter of the total labor force and are paid very low salaries and wages. Government officials acknowledge that the economy is not growing at a pace sufficient to create enough new jobs annually to match population growth. The UNDP announced in 2005 that 30% of the Syrian population lives in poverty and 11.4% live below the subsistence level.

Syria has made progress in easing its heavy foreign debt burden through bilateral rescheduling deals with its key creditors in Europe, most importantly Russia, Germany, and France. Syria has also settled its debt with Iran and the World Bank. In December 2004, Syria and Poland reached an agreement by which Syria would pay $27 million out of the total $261.7 million debt. In January 2005, Russia forgave 80% of Syria's $13 billion long-outstanding debt, and later that year Syria reached an agreement with Slovakia, and the Czech Republic to settle debt estimated at $1.6 billion. Again Syria was forgiven the bulk of its debt, in exchange for a one time payment of $150 million.

U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS

U.S.-Syrian relations, severed in 1967, were resumed in June 1974, following the achievement of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreement. In 1990-91, Syria cooperated with the United States as a member of the multinational coalition of forces in the Gulf War. The U.S. and Syria also consulted closely on the Taif Accord, ending the civil war in Lebanon. In 1991, President Asad made a historic decision to accept then President Bush's invitation to attend a Middle East peace conference and to engage in subsequent bilateral negotiations with Israel. Syria's efforts to secure the release of Western hostages held in Lebanon and its lifting of restrictions on travel by Syrian Jews helped to further improve relations between Syria and the United States. There were several presidential summits; the last one occurred when then-President Clinton met the late President Hafiz al-Asad in Geneva in March 2000. In the aftermath of September 11th the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with U.S. in the war against terror.

Syria has been on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism since the list's inception in 1979. Because of its continuing support and safe haven for terrorist organizations, Syria is subject to legislatively mandated penalties, including export sanctions and ineligibility to receive most forms of U.S. aid or to purchase U.S.

in 2002, Syria was against coalition military action in Iraq in 2003. However, the Syrian Government accepted UNSCR 1483 (after being absent for the actual vote), which lifted sanctions on Iraq and established a framework to assist the Iraqi people in determining their political future and rebuilding their economy. Syria also voted for UNSCR 1511, which called for greater international involvement in Iraq and addressed the transfer of sovereignty from the U.S.-led coalition. Since the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq on June 28, 2004, Syria extended qualified support to the Iraqi Government and pledged to cooperate in the areas of border security, repatriation of Iraqi assets, and eventual restoration of formal diplomatic relations. While Syria has taken some steps to tighten controls along the Syria-Iraq border, Syria remains one of the primary transit points for foreign fighters entering Iraq. Consequently, relations between Syria and the Iraqi Government remained strained. However, following a series of visits between high-level officials from both governments--including Foreign Minister Mu'allim's November 2006 visit to Baghdad and Iraqi President Talabani's subsequent visit to Damascus--formal diplomatic relations were finally established in December 2006. That same month, the Ministers of Interior from both countries signed a Memorandum of Security Understanding aimed at improving border security and combating terrorism and crime. Iraq continues to call for more action on the part of Syria to control its border and to prevent Iraqi and Arab elements residing in--or transiting--Syria from contributing financially, politically, or militarily to the insurgency in Iraq.

military equipment. In 1986, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador and imposed additional administrative sanctions on Syria in response to evidence of direct Syrian involvement in an attempt to blow up an Israeli airplane. A U.S. ambassador returned to Damascus in 1987, partially in response to positive Syrian actions against terrorism such as expelling the Abu Nidal Organization from Syria and helping free an American hostage earlier that year.

However, relations since the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri have considerably deteriorated. Issues of U.S. concern include the Syrian Government's failure to prevent Syria from becoming a major transit point for foreign fighters entering Iraq, its refusal to deport from Syria former Saddam regime elements who are supporting the insurgency in Iraq, its ongoing interference in Lebanese affairs, its protection of the leadership of Palestinian rejectionist groups in Damascus, its deplorable human rights record, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. In May 2004, the Bush administration, pursuant to the provisions of the Syrian Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, imposed sanctions on Syria which banned nearly all exports to Syria except food and medicine. In February 2005, in the wake of the Hariri assassination, the U.S. recalled its Ambassador to Washington.

On September 12, 2006 the U.S. Embassy was attacked by four armed assailants with guns, grenades and a car bomb (which failed to detonate). Syrian Security Forces successfully countered the attack, killing all four attackers. Two other Syrians killed during the attack were a government security guard and a passerby. The Syrian Government publicly stated that terrorists had carried out the attack. The U.S. Government has not received an official Syrian Government assessment of the motives or organization behind the attack, but security was upgraded at U.S. facilities. Both the Syrian ambassador to the U.S., Imad Mushtapha, and President Bashar Asad, however, blamed U.S. foreign policy in the region as contributing to the incident.

Principal U.S. Officials
Ambassador--vacant
Charge d'Affaires--Michael Corbin
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission--William Roebuck
Head of the Economic/Political Section--Todd Holmstrom
Head of the Consular Section--Patricia Fietz
Management Counselor--John Finnegan
Public Affairs Officer--Chris Eccel
Defense Attaché--Col. Norman Larson

GOVERNMENT

The Syrian constitution vests the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party with leadership functions in the state and society and provides broad powers to the president. The president, approved by referendum for a 7-year term, is also Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party and leader of the National Progressive Front, which is a coalition of 10 political parties authorized by the regime. The president has the right to appoint ministers, to

Involvement in Lebanon

Syria has played an important role in Lebanon by virtue of its history, size, power, and economy. Lebanon was part of post-Ottoman Syria until 1926. The presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon dated to 1976, when President Hafiz al-Asad intervened in the Lebanese civil war on behalf of Maronite Christians. Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Syrian and Israeli forces clashed in eastern Lebanon. However, Syrian opposition blocked implementation of the May 17, 1983, Lebanese-Israeli accord on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon.

In 1989, Syria endorsed the Charter of National Reconciliation, or "Taif Accord," a comprehensive plan for ending the Lebanese conflict negotiated under the auspices of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco. In May 1991, Lebanon and Syria signed the treaty of brotherhood, cooperation, and coordination called for in the Taif Accord.

According to the U.S. interpretation of the Taif Accord, Syria and Lebanon were to have decided on the redeployment of Syrian forces from Beirut and other coastal areas of Lebanon by September 1992. Israeli occupation of Lebanon until May 2000, the breakdown of peace negotiations between Syria and Israel that same year, and intensifying Arab/Israeli tensions since the start of the second Palestinian uprising in September 2000 helped delay full implementation of the Taif Accords. The United Nations declared that Israel's withdrawal from southern Lebanon fulfilled the

declare war and states of emergency, to issue laws (which, except in the case of emergency, require ratification by the People's Council), to declare amnesty, to amend the constitution, and to appoint civil servants and military personnel. The Emergency Law, which effectively suspends most constitutional protections for Syrians, has been in effect since 1963.

The National Progressive Front also acts as a forum in which economic policies are debated and the country's political orientation is determined. However, because of Ba'ath Party dominance, the National Progressive Front has traditionally exercised little independent power.

The Syrian constitution of 1973 requires that the president be Muslim but does not make Islam the state religion. Islamic jurisprudence, however, is required to be a main source of legislation. The judicial system in Syria is an amalgam of Ottoman, French, and Islamic laws, with three levels of courts: courts of first instance, courts of appeals, and the constitutional court, the highest tribunal. In addition, religious courts handle questions of personal and family law.

The Ba'ath Party emphasizes socialism and secular Arabism. Although Ba'ath Party doctrine seeks to build pan-Arab rather than ethnic identity, ethnic, religious, and regional allegiances remain important in Syria.

Members of President Asad's own minority sect, the Alawis, hold most of the important military and security positions, while Sunnis (in 2006) controlled ten of 14 positions on the powerful Ba'ath Party Regional Command. In recent years there has been a gradual decline in the party's preeminence. The party also is heavily influenced by the security services and the military, the latter of which consumes a large share of Syria's economic resources.

Syria is divided administratively into 14 provinces, one of which is Damascus. A governor for each province is appointed by the President. The governor is assisted by an elected provincial council.

Principal Government Officials

President--Bashar Al-Asad
Vice President--Farouk al-Shar'a
Vice President--Najah al-Attar
Prime Minister--Muhammad Naji al-Utri
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Walid al-Mouallem
Ambassador to the United States--Ambassador Imad Moustapha
Ambassador to the United Nations--Ambassador Dr. Bashar al-Ja'fari

NATIONAL SECURITY

President Bashar Al-Asad is commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces, comprised of some 400,000 troops upon mobilization. The military is a conscripted force; males serve 24 months in the military upon reaching the age of 18. Some 17,000 Syrian soldiers formerly deployed in Lebanon have been withdrawn to Syria in response to UNSCR 1559, which was passed in the fall of 2004. Demands that Syria comply with

requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 425. However, Syria and Lebanon claimed that UNSCR 425 had not been fully implemented because Israel did not withdraw from an area of the Golan Heights called Sheba Farms, which had been occupied by Israel in 1967, and which Syria now claimed was part of Lebanon. The United Nations does not recognize this claim. However, Lebanese resistance groups such as Hezbollah use it to justify attacks against Israeli forces in that region. The danger of Hezbollah's tactics was highlighted when Hezbollah's attacks on and hostage-taking of Israeli soldiers on July 12, 2006 sparked a 34-day conflict in Lebanon. After the conflict, the passing of UNSCR 1701 authorized the enhancement of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Before the conflict, UNIFIL authorized a presence of 2,000 troops in southern Lebanon; post-conflict, this ceiling is to be raised to 15,000. As of September 2006, 5,000 troops had deployed to southern Lebanon. UNIFIL is tasked with ensuring peace and security along the frontier and overseeing the eventual return of effective Lebanese government and military authority throughout the border region.

Until its withdrawal in April 2005, Syria maintained approximately 17,000 troops in Lebanon. A September 2004 vote by Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution to extend Lebanese President Lahoud's term in office by three years amplified the question of Lebanese sovereignty and the continuing Syrian presence. The vote was clearly taken under Syrian pressure, exercised in part through Syria's military intelligence service, whose chief in Lebanon had acted as a virtual proconsul

1559 intensified after the February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.

Syria's military remains one of the largest in the region, although the breakup of the Soviet Union--long the principal source of training, material, and credit for the Syrian forces--slowed Syria's ability to acquire modern military equipment. Syria received significant financial aid from Gulf Arab states in the 1990s as a result of its participation in the first Gulf War, with a sizable portion of these funds earmarked for military spending. Besides sustaining its conventional forces, Syria seeks to develop its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability.

HISTORY

Archaeologists have demonstrated that Syria was the center of one of the most ancient civilizations on earth. Around the excavated city of Ebla in northern Syria, discovered in 1975, a great Semitic empire spread from the Red Sea north to Turkey and east to Mesopotamia from 2500 to 2400 B.C. The city of Ebla alone during that time had a population estimated at 260,000. Scholars believe the language of Ebla to be the oldest Semitic language.

Syria was occupied successively by Canaanites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arameans, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Nabataeans, Byzantines, and, in part, Crusaders before finally coming under the control of the Ottoman Turks. Syria is significant in the history of Christianity; Paul was converted on the road to Damascus and established the first organized Christian Church at Antioch in ancient Syria, from which he left on many of his missionary journeys.

Damascus, settled about 2500 B.C., is one of the oldest continuously inhabited cities in the world. It came under Muslim rule in A.D. 636. Immediately thereafter, the city's power and prestige reached its peak, and it became the capital of the Omayyad Empire, which extended from Spain to India from A.D. 661 to A.D. 750, when the Abbasid caliphate was established at Baghdad, Iraq.

Damascus became a provincial capital of the Mameluke Empire around 1260. It was largely destroyed in 1400 by Tamerlane, the Mongol conqueror, who removed many of its craftsmen to Samarkand. Rebuilt, it continued to serve as a capital until 1516. In 1517, it fell under Ottoman rule. The Ottomans remained for the next 400 years, except for a brief occupation by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from 1832 to 1840.

French Occupation

In 1920, an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria was established under King Faysal of the Hashemite family, who later became King of Iraq. However, his rule over Syria ended after only a few months, following the clash between his Syrian Arab forces and regular French forces at the battle of Maysalun. French troops occupied Syria later that year after the League of Nations put Syria under French mandate. With the fall of France in 1940, Syria came under the control of the Vichy Government until the British and Free French occupied the country in July 1941. Continuing pressure from Syrian nationalist groups forced the French to evacuate their troops in April 1946, leaving the country in the hands of a republican government that had been formed during the mandate.

for many years. The UN Security Council expressed its concern over the situation by passing Resolution 1559, which called for the withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout the country, and a free and fair electoral process in the presidential election.

Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 19 others were assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on February 14, 2005. The assassination spurred massive protests in Beirut and international pressure that led to the withdrawal of the remaining Syrian military troops from Lebanon on April 26, 2005. Rafiq Hariri's assassination was just one of a number of attacks that continue to target high-profile Lebanese critics of Syria. The UN International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) headed by Serge Brammertz is investigating Hariri's assassination and is expected to report its findings to the Security Council by June 2007.

The United States supports a sovereign, independent Lebanon, free of all foreign forces, and believes that the best interests of both Lebanon and Syria are served by a positive and constructive relationship based upon principles of mutual respect and non-intervention between two neighboring sovereign and independent states. The United States calls for Syrian non-interference in Lebanon, consistent with UNSCR 1559 and 1701.

Arab-Israeli Relations

Syria was an active belligerent in the

Independence to 1970

Although rapid economic development followed the declaration of independence of April 17, 1946, Syrian politics from independence through the late 1960s were marked by upheaval. A series of military coups, begun in 1949, undermined civilian rule and led to army colonel Adib Shishakli's seizure of power in 1951. After the overthrow of President Shishakli in a 1954 coup, continued political maneuvering supported by competing factions in the military eventually brought Arab nationalist and socialist elements to power.

Syria's political instability during the years after the 1954 coup, the parallelism of Syrian and Egyptian policies, and the appeal of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's leadership in the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis created support in Syria for union with Egypt. On February 1, 1958, the two countries merged to create the United Arab Republic, and all Syrian political parties ceased overt activities.

The union was not a success, however. Following a military coup on September 28, 1961, Syria seceded, reestablishing itself as the Syrian Arab Republic. Instability characterized the next 18 months, with various coups culminating on March 8, 1963, in the installation by leftist Syrian Army officers of the National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a group of military and civilian officials who assumed control of all executive and legislative authority. The takeover was engineered by members of the Arab Socialist Resurrection Party (Ba'ath Party), which had been active in Syria and other Arab countries since the late 1940s. The new cabinet was dominated by Ba'ath members.

The Ba'ath takeover in Syria followed a Ba'ath coup in Iraq the previous month. The new Syrian Government explored the possibility of federation with Egypt and Ba'ath--controlled Iraq. An agreement was concluded in Cairo on April 17, 1963, for a referendum on unity to be held in September 1963. However, serious disagreements among the parties soon developed, and the tripartite federation failed to materialize. Thereafter, the Ba'ath regimes in Syria and Iraq began to work for bilateral unity. These plans foundered in November 1963, when the Ba'ath regime in Iraq was overthrown. In May 1964, President Amin Hafiz of the NCRC promulgated a provisional constitution providing for a National Council of the Revolution (NCR), an appointed legislature composed of representatives of mass organizations--labor, peasant, and professional unions--a presidential council, in which executive power was vested, and a cabinet. On February 23, 1966, a group of army officers carried out a successful, intra-party coup, imprisoned President Hafiz, dissolved the cabinet and the NCR, abrogated the provisional constitution, and designated a regionalist, civilian Ba'ath government. The coup leaders described it as a "rectification" of Ba'ath Party principles. The defeat of the Syrians and Egyptians in the June 1967 war with Israel weakened the radical socialist regime established by the 1966 coup. Conflict developed between a moderate military wing and a more extremist civilian wing of the Ba'ath Party. The 1970 retreat of Syrian forces sent to aid the PLO during the "Black September" hostilities with Jordan reflected this political disagreement within the ruling Ba'ath leadership. On November 13, 1970, Minister of Defense Hafiz al-Asad affected a bloodless military coup, ousting the civilian party leadership and assuming the role of prime minister.

1970 to 2000

Upon assuming power, Hafiz al-Asad moved quickly to create an organizational infrastructure for his government and to consolidate control. The Provisional Regional Command of Asad's Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party nominated a 173-member legislature, the People's Council, in which the Ba'ath Party took 87 seats. The remaining seats were divided among "popular organizations" and other minor parties. In March 1971,

1967 Arab-Israeli War, which resulted in Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra. Following the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, which left Israel in occupation of additional Syrian territory, Syria accepted UN Security Council Resolution 338, which signaled an implicit acceptance of Resolution 242. Resolution 242, which became the basis for the peace process negotiations begun in Madrid in 1981, calls for a just and lasting Middle East peace to include withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in 1967; termination of the state of belligerency; and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all regional states and of their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

As a result of the mediation efforts of then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Syria and Israel concluded a disengagement agreement in May 1974, enabling Syria to recover territory lost in the October war and part of the Golan Heights occupied by Israel since 1967, including Quneitra. The two sides have effectively implemented the agreement, which is monitored by UN forces.

In December 1981, the Israeli Knesset voted to extend Israeli law to the part of the Golan Heights over which Israel retained control. The UN Security Council subsequently passed a resolution calling on Israel to rescind this measure. Syria participated in the Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991. Negotiations were conducted intermittently through the 1990s, and came very close to succeeding. However,

the party held its regional congress and elected a new 21-member Regional Command headed by Asad. In the same month, a national referendum was held to confirm Asad as President for a 7-year term. In March 1972, to broaden the base of his government, Asad formed the National Progressive Front, a coalition of parties led by the Ba'ath Party, and elections were held to establish local councils in each of Syria's 14 governorates. In March 1973, a new Syrian constitution went into effect followed shortly thereafter by parliamentary elections for the People's Council, the first such elections since 1962.

The authoritarian regime was not without its critics, though most were quickly dealt with. A serious challenge arose in the late 1970s, however, from fundamentalist Sunni Muslims, who reject the basic values of the secular Ba'ath program and object to rule by the Alawis, whom they consider heretical. From 1976 until its suppression in 1982, the archconservative Muslim Brotherhood led an armed insurgency against the regime. In response to an attempted uprising by the brotherhood in February 1982, the government crushed the fundamentalist opposition centered in the city of Hama, leveling parts of the city with artillery fire and causing many thousands of dead and wounded. Since then, public manifestations of anti-regime activity have been very limited.

Syria's 1990 participation in the U.S.-led multinational coalition aligned against Saddam Hussein marked a dramatic watershed in Syria's relations both with other Arab states and with the West. Syria participated in the multilateral Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in October 1991, and during the 1990s engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with Israel. These negotiations failed, and there have been no further Syrian-Israeli talks since President Hafiz Al-Asad's meeting with then President Bill Clinton in Geneva in March 2000.

Hafiz Al-Asad died on June 10, 2000, after 30 years in power. Immediately following Al-Asad's death, the Parliament amended the constitution, reducing the mandatory minimum age of the President from 40 to 34 years old, which allowed his son, Bashar Al-Asad legally to be eligible for nomination by the ruling Ba'ath party. On July 10, 2000, Bashar Al-Asad was elected President by referendum in which he ran unopposed, garnering 97.29% of the vote, according to Syrian Government statistics. He was inaugurated into office on July 17, 2000 for a 7-year term.

2000 to 2007


In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 the Syrian Government began limited cooperation with United States in the global war against terrorism. However, Syria opposed the Iraq war in March 2003, and bilateral relations with the United States swiftly deteriorated. In December 2003, President Bush signed into law the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, which provided for the imposition of a series of sanctions against Syria if Syria did not end its support for Palestinian terrorist groups, end its military and security interference in Lebanon, cease its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and meet its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. In May 2004, the President determined that Syria had not met these conditions and implemented sanctions that prohibit the export to Syria of U.S. products except for food and medicine, and the taking off from or landing in the United States of Syrian Government-owned aircraft. At the same time, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced its intention to order U.S. financial institutions to sever correspondent accounts with the Commercial Bank of Syria based on money-laundering concerns, pursuant to Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Acting under the International

the parties were unable to come to an agreement over Syria's nonnegotiable demand that Israel withdraw to the positions it held on June 4, 1967. The peace process collapsed following the outbreak of the second Palestinian (Intifada) uprising in September 2000, though Syria continues to call for a comprehensive settlement based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the land-for-peace formula adopted at the 1991 Madrid conference.

Tensions between Israel and Syria increased as the second Intifada dragged on, primarily as a result of Syria's unwillingness to stop giving sanctuary to Palestinian terrorist groups conducting operations against Israel. In October 2003, following a suicide bombing carried out by a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Haifa that killed 20 Israeli citizens, Israeli Defense Forces attacked a suspected Palestinian terrorist training camp 15 kilometers north of Damascus. This was the first such Israeli attack deep inside Syrian territory since the 1973 war. During the summer of 2006 tensions again heightened due to Israeli fighter jets buzzing President Asad's summer castle in response to Syria's support for the Palestinian group Hamas, Syria's support of Hezbollah during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon, and the possible rearming of Hezbollah in potential violation of UN Resolution 1701. Rumors of "back-channel" negotiations in 2006-2007 between the Israeli and Syrian Governments were discounted by both Israel and Syria, with spokespersons for both countries indicating that any such talks were not officially sanctioned.

Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the President also authorized the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to freeze assets belonging to certain Syrian individuals and entities.

Tensions between Syria and the United States intensified from late 2004 to 2007, primarily over issues relating to Iraq and Lebanon. The U.S. Government recalled its Ambassador to Syria in February 2005, after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri. Sensing its international isolation, the Syrians shored up their relations with Iran and radical Palestinians groups based in Damascus, and cracked down on any signs of internal dissent. There has been little movement on political reform, with more public focus on limited economic liberalizations. The Syrian Government has provided some cooperation to the UN Independent International Investigation Commission, headed by Serge Brammertz, which is investigating the killing of Hariri. Since the 34-day conflict in Lebanon in July and August 2006, evidence of Syrian compliance with its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 not to rearm the Lebanese group Hezbollah is unpersuasive. On April 17, 2007, the United Nations Security Council welcomed the Secretary General's intention to evaluate the situation along the entire Syria-Lebanon border and invited the Secretary General to dispatch an independent mission to fully assess the monitoring of the border, and to report back on its findings and recommendations.




Membership in International Organizations

Syria is a member of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab League, Arab Monetary Fund, Council of Arab Economic Unity, Customs Cooperation Council, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Food and Agricultural Organization, Group of 24, Group of 77, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Chamber of Commerce, International Development Association, Islamic Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural Development, International Finance Corporation, International Labor Organization, International Monetary Fund, International Maritime Organization, INTERPOL, International Olympic Committee, International Organization for Standardization, International Telecommunication Union, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Organization of the Islamic Conference, United Nations, UN Conference on Trade and Development, UN Industrial Development Organization, UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Universal Postal Union, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Health Organization, World Meteorological Organization, and World Tourism Organization.

Syria's 2-year term as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council ended in December 2003





Israel's Historical
Timeline

The State of Israel

Geography

Area: 20,330 sq. km.[1] (7,850 sq. mi.); about the size of New Jersey.
Cities: *Capital* --Jerusalem.[2] *Other cities* --Tel Aviv, Haifa.
Terrain: Plains, mountains, desert, and coast.
Climate: Temperate, except in desert areas.

People

Population (2007 est.): 6.43 million.
Annual population growth rate (2007 est.): 1.2%.
Ethnic groups: Jews 76.2%; Arabs 19.5%; other 4.3%.
Religions: Judaism, Islam, Christianity, Druze.
Languages: Hebrew (official), Arabic (official), English, Russian.
Education: *Years compulsory*--11. *Literacy*--96.9% (female 95.6%; male 98.3%).
Health: *Infant mortality rate* (2005 est.)--7.03/1,000 births. *Life expectancy at birth* --79.32 years; female 81.55 years, male 77.21 years.
Work force (2.68 million; Central Bureau for Statistics, 2004): *Agriculture*--2.1%; *manufacturing* --16.2%; *electricity and water supply* --0.8%; *construction* --5.4%; *trade and*



repair of motor vehicles --3.6%; *accommodation services and restaurants* --4.3%; *transport, storage, and communication* --6.5%; *banking, insurance, and finance* --3.3%; *business activities* --13.4%; *public administration* --4.7%; *education* --12.7%; *health, welfare, and social services* --10.7%; *community, social, and personal services* --4.6%; *services for households by domestic personnel* --1.6%.

Government

Type: Parliamentary democracy.
Independence: May 14, 1948.
Constitution: None; however, the Declaration of Establishment (1948), the Basic Laws of the parliament (the Knesset), and the Israeli citizenship law fill many of the functions of a constitution.
Branches: *Executive* --president (chief of state); prime minister (head of government). *Legislative* --unicameral Knesset. *Judicial* --Supreme Court.
Political parties: Labor, Likud, Kadima, and various other secular and religious parties, including some wholly or predominantly supported by Israel's Arab citizens. A total of 12 parties are represented in the 17th Knesset, elected March 2006.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.




Economy

GDP (2006 est.): $170.3 billion.
Annual growth rate (2006): 4.8%.
Per capita GDP (2006): $26,800.
Currency: Shekel (4.13 shekels = 1 U.S. dollar; 2007 est.).
Natural resources: Copper, phosphate, bromide, potash, clay, sand, sulfur, bitumen, manganese.
Agriculture: *Products* --citrus and other fruits, vegetables, beef, dairy, and poultry products.
Industry: *Types* --high-technology projects (including aviation, communications, computer-aided design and manufactures, medical electronics, fiber optics), wood and paper products, potash and phosphates, food, beverages, tobacco, caustic soda, cement, construction, plastics, chemical products, diamond cutting and polishing, metal products, textiles, and footwear.
Trade: *Exports* (2006 est.)--$42.86 billion. Exports include polished diamonds, electronic communication, medical and scientific equipment, chemicals and chemical products, electronic components and computers, machinery and equipment, transport equipment, rubber, plastics, and textiles. *Imports* (excluding defense imports, 2006 est.)--$47.8 billion: raw materials, diamonds, energy ships and airplanes, machinery, equipment, land transportation equipment for investment, and consumer goods.
Major partners --U.S., U.K., Germany; *exports* --U.S., Belgium, Hong Kong; *imports* --U.S., Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, U.K.

[1]Including Jerusalem
[2]Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital in 1950. The United States, like nearly all other countries, maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.

PEOPLE

Of the approximately 6.43 million Israelis in 2007, about 76% were counted as Jewish, though some of those are not considered Jewish under Orthodox Jewish law. Since 1989, nearly a million immigrants from the former Soviet Union have arrived in Israel,



POLITICAL CONDITIONS

From the founding of Israel in 1948 until the election of May 1977, Israel was ruled by successive coalition governments led by the Labor alignment or its constituent parties. From 1967-70, the coalition government included all of Israel's parties except the communist party. After the 1977 election, the Likud bloc, then composed of Herut, the Liberals, and the smaller La'am Party, came to power forming a coalition with the National Religious Party, Agudat Israel, and others. As head of Likud, Menachem Begin became Prime Minister. The Likud retained power in the succeeding election in June 1981, and Begin remained Prime Minister. In the summer of 1983, Begin resigned and was succeeded by his Foreign Minister, Yitzhak Shamir.

After Prime Minister Shamir lost a Knesset vote of confidence early in 1984, new elections in July provided no clear winner, with both Labor and Likud considerably short of a Knesset majority and unable to form even narrow coalitions. After several weeks of difficult negotiations, they agreed on a government of national unity, including the rotation of the office of Prime Minister and the combined office of Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister midway through the government's 50-month term.

During the first 25 months of unity government rule, Labor's Shimon Peres served as Prime Minister, while Likud's Shamir held the posts of Vice Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, until they switched positions in October 1986. In November 1988 elections, Likud edged Labor out by one seat but was unable to form a coalition, producing another national unity government in January 1989. Yitzhak Shamir became Prime Minister, and Shimon Peres became Vice Prime Minister and Finance Minister. This government fell in March 1990, however, in a vote of no confidence precipitated by disagreement over the government's response to U.S. Secretary of State Baker's initiative in the peace process. Labor Party leader Peres was unable to attract sufficient support among the religious parties to form a government. Yitzhak Shamir then formed a Likud-led coalition government, including members from religious and right-wing parties.

Shamir's government took office in June 1990, and held power for 2 years. In the June 1992 national elections, the Labor Party reversed its electoral fortunes, taking 44 seats. Labor Party leader Yitzhak Rabin formed a coalition with Meretz (a group of three leftist parties) and Shas (an ultra-Orthodox religious party). The coalition included the support of two Arab-majority parties. Rabin became Prime Minister in July 1992, presiding over the signing of the Oslo accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization. However, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Jewish radical on November 4, 1995. Peres, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, once again became Prime Minister and immediately proceeded to carry forward the peace policies of the Rabin government and to implement Israel's Oslo commitments, including military redeployment in the West Bank and the holding of historic Palestinian elections on January 20, 1996.

Enjoying broad public support and anxious to secure his own mandate, Peres called for early elections after just 3 months in office. (They would have otherwise been held by the end of October 1996.) In late February and early March, a series of suicide bombing attacks by Palestinian terrorists took some 60 Israeli lives, seriously

making this the largest wave of immigration since independence. In addition, an estimated 105,000 members of the Ethiopian Jewish community have immigrated to Israel, 14,000 of them during the dramatic May 1991 Operation Solomon airlift. 32.9% of Israelis were born outside of Israel.

The three broad Jewish groupings are the Ashkenazim, or Jews who trace their ancestry to western, central, and eastern Europe; the Sephardim, who trace their origin to Spain, Portugal, southern Europe, and North Africa; and Eastern or Oriental Jews, who descend from ancient communities in Islamic lands. Of the non-Jewish population, about 68% are Muslims, about 9% are Christian, and about 7% are Druze.

Education is compulsory from age 6 to 16 and is free up to age 18. The school system is organized into kindergartens, 6-year primary schools, 3-year junior secondary schools, and 3-year senior secondary schools, after which a comprehensive examination is offered for university admissions. There are seven university-level institutions in Israel, a number of regional colleges, and an Open University program.

With a population drawn from more than 100 countries on 5 continents, Israeli society is rich in cultural diversity and artistic creativity. The arts are actively encouraged and supported by the government. The Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra performs throughout the country and frequently tours abroad. The Jerusalem Symphony and the New Israel Opera also tour frequently, as do other musical ensembles. Almost every municipality has a chamber orchestra or ensemble, many boasting the talents of gifted performers from the countries of the former Soviet Union.

Israel has several professional ballet and modern dance companies, and folk dancing, which draws upon the cultural heritage of many immigrant groups, continues to be very popular. There is great public interest in the theater; the repertoire covers the entire range of classical and contemporary drama in translation as well as plays by Israeli authors. Of the three major repertory companies, the most famous, Habimah, was founded in 1917.

eroding public support for Peres and raising concerns about the peace process. Increased fighting in southern Lebanon, which also brought Katyusha rocket attacks against northern Israel, also raised tensions and weakened the government politically a month before the May 29 elections.

In those elections--the first direct election of a Prime Minister in Israeli history--Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu won by a narrow margin, having sharply criticized the government's peace policies for failing to protect Israeli security. Netanyahu subsequently formed a right-wing coalition government publicly committed to pursuing the peace process, but with an emphasis on security and reciprocity. In 1999, with a shrunken coalition and facing increasing difficulty passing legislation and defeating no-confidence motions, Netanyahu dissolved parliament and called for new elections. This time, the Labor candidate--Ehud Barak--was victorious. Barak formed a mixed coalition government of secular and religious parties, with Likud in the opposition. In May 2000, Barak fulfilled one of his major campaign promises by withdrawing Israeli forces from Southern Lebanon. However, by mid-autumn, with the breakdown of the Camp David talks and the worsening security situation caused by the new intifada, Barak's coalition was in jeopardy. In December, he resigned as Prime Minister, precipitating a new prime ministerial election.

In a special election on February 6, 2001, after a campaign stressing security and the maintenance of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem, Likud leader Ariel Sharon defeated Barak by over 20 percentage points. As he had promised in his campaign, Sharon formed a broad unity government that included the Labor and Likud parties, the far-right parties, some smaller secular parties, and several religious parties. The unity government collapsed in late 2002, and new elections were held in January 2003. Sharon again won, and formed a new government consisting of his own Likud party, the right-wing National Religious Party and National Union party, and centrist Shinui.

The summer of 2004 saw renewed instability in the government, as disagreement over the Gaza disengagement plan resulted in Sharon's firing two ministers of the National Union Party and accepting the resignation of a third from the National Religious Party in order to secure cabinet approval of the plan (it was endorsed on June 6, 2004). Continuing divisions within the Likud on next steps then prompted Ariel Sharon to leave the party in November 2005 to form the Kadima ("Forward") party and call new elections for March 2006. However, Sharon was unexpectedly incapacitated in January 2006 due to a severe stroke and leadership of Kadima shifted to Acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who on March 28 led the party to 29 seats in the Knesset. Labor came in second with 19 seats, and Shas and Likud tied with 12. After intensive coalition negotiations, a new, Kadima-led government, with Labor as "senior partner", was sworn in on May 4, 2006.

ECONOMY

Israel has a diversified, technologically advanced economy with substantial but decreasing government ownership and a strong high-tech sector. The major industrial sectors include high-technology electronic and biomedical equipment, metal products, processed foods, chemicals, and transport equipment. Israel possesses a substantial service sector and is one of the world's centers for diamond cutting and polishing. It also is a world leader in software development and, prior to the violence that began in September 2000, was a major tourist destination.

Israel's strong commitment to economic development and its talented work force led to economic growth rates during the nation's first two decades that frequently exceeded 10% annually. The years after the 1973 Yom Kippur War were a lost decade economically, as growth stalled and inflation reached triple-digit levels. The successful economic stabilization plan implemented in 1985 and the subsequent introduction of market-oriented structural reforms reinvigorated the economy and paved the way for rapid growth in the 1990s.

Active artist colonies thrive in Safed, Jaffa, and Ein Hod, and Israeli painters and sculptors exhibit works worldwide. Israel boasts more than 120 museums, including the Israel Museum in Jerusalem, which houses the Dead Sea Scrolls along with an extensive collection of regional archaeological artifacts, art, and Jewish religious and folk exhibits. Israelis are avid newspaper readers, with more than 90% of Israeli adults reading a newspaper at least once a week. Major daily papers are in Hebrew; others are in Arabic, English, French, Polish, Yiddish, Russian, Hungarian, and German.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In addition to seeking an end to hostilities with Arab forces, against which it has fought five wars since 1948, Israel has given high priority to gaining wide acceptance as a sovereign state with an important international role.

Before 1967, Israel had established diplomatic relations with a majority of the world's nations, except for the Arab states and most other Muslim countries. UN Security Council resolutions provided the basis for cease-fire and disengagement agreements concerning the Sinai and the Golan Heights between Israel, Egypt, and Syria and for promoting the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The Soviet Union and the communist states of Eastern Europe (except Romania) broke diplomatic relations with Israel during the 1967 war, but those relations were restored by 1991.

The landmark October 1991 Madrid conference recognized the importance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in resolving regional disputes, and brought together for the first time Israel, the Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab countries, launching a series of direct bilateral and multilateral negotiations. These talks were designed to finally resolve outstanding security, border, and other issues between the parties while providing a basis for mutual cooperation on issues of general concern, including the status of refugees, arms control and regional security, water and environmental concerns, and economic development.

Today, Israel has diplomatic relations with 161 states.

A wave of Jewish immigration beginning in 1989, predominantly from the countries of the former U.S.S.R., brought nearly a million new citizens to Israel. These new immigrants, many of them highly educated, now constitute some 13% of Israel's 6.7 million inhabitants. Their successful absorption into Israeli society and its labor force forms a remarkable chapter in Israeli history. The skills brought by the new immigrants and their added demand as consumers gave the Israeli economy a strong upward push and in the 1990s, they played a key role in the ongoing development of Israel's high-tech sector.

During the 1990s, progress in the Middle East peace process, beginning with the Madrid Conference of 1991, helped to reduce Israel's economic isolation from its neighbors and opened up new markets to Israeli exporters farther afield. The peace process stimulated an unprecedented inflow of foreign investment in Israel, and provided a substantial boost to economic growth in the region over the last decade. The onset of the intifada beginning at the end of September of 2000, the downturn in the high-tech sector and Nasdaq crisis, and the slowdown of the global economy have all significantly affected the Israeli economy. However, despite the recent conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon, the Israeli economy grew during 2006.

Israeli companies, particularly in the high-tech area, have in the past enjoyed considerable success raising money on Wall Street and other world financial markets; Israel ranks second to Canada among foreign countries in the number of its companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges. Israel's tech market is very developed, and in spite of the pause in the industry's growth, the high-tech sector is likely to be the major driver of the Israeli economy. Almost half of Israel's exports are high tech. Most leading players, including Intel, IBM, and Cisco have a presence in Israel.

Growth was an exceptional 6.2% in 2000, due in part to a number of one-time high tech acquisitions and investments. This exceptional year was followed by two years of negative growth of -0.9% and -1%, respectively, in 2001 and 2002. As a result of the security situation and the associated downturn in the economy, there was a significant rise in unemployment and wage erosion. This led to a decline in private consumption in 2002, the first time that there had been negative private consumption since the early 1980s. However, following growth rates of 1.7% in 2003 and 4.4% in 2004, the Israeli economy entered into a period of stabilization and recovery after the deep recession of 2001 and 2002. Since then, the Israeli economy seems to have returned to a trend of consistent growth. The Israeli economy grew by 5.2% in 2005 and GDP per capita (U.S. $17,800) increased by 3.3%. The Israeli economy grew by an estimated 4.8% in 2006.

Exports of goods and services in Israel grew by 7% in 2005. Service and agricultural exports each increased by more than 10% in 2005, whereas exports increased by 5.6% and imports rose to 4.4%. Tourism revenues increased by 22.7% as a result of the dramatic increase following the intifada's subsidence.

Israel's private consumption increased by 4% in 2005. The largest growth in private consumption was in the purchase of clothing, footwear, and personal effects, which increased by 10.2%, following an increase of 5.4% in 2004. Consumption of consumer durables grew much more slowly than in 2004, with an increase of only 3.4%, compared with 14.3% the previous year.

In the Israeli business sector, business GDP grew by 6.6% in 2005. According to CBS statistics, the transportation, storage, and communications industries grew by 9.2%, following growth of 6.6% in 2004. The GDP of the wholesale, retail, restaurant, and hotel sector increased by 8.1%, up from 6.1% in 2004. The GDP of the finance and business services sector in 2005 increased by 6.4%, up from the previous year's 6.1% growth rate.

The general consensus among economists is that Israel's economy is very strong and that its growth potential is

Following the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, Israel established or renewed diplomatic relations with 36 countries. Israel has full diplomatic relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Mauritania. In addition, on October 1, 1994, the Gulf States publicly announced their support for a review of the Arab boycott, in effect abolishing the secondary and tertiary boycotts against Israel.

Israel has diplomatic relations with nine non-Arab Muslim states and with 32 of the 43 Sub-Saharan states that are not members of the Arab League. Israel established relations with China and India in 1992 and with the Holy See in 1993.

DEFENSE

Israel's ground, air, and naval forces, known as the Israel Defense Force (IDF), fall under the command of a single general staff. Conscription is universal for Jewish men and women over the age of 18, although exemptions may be made on religious grounds. Druze, members of a small Islamic offshoot living in Israel's mountains, also serve in the IDF. Israeli Arabs, with the exception of some Bedouins, do not serve. During 1950-66, Israel spent an average of 9% of GDP on defense. Real defense expenditures increased dramatically after both the 1967 and 1973 wars. Military spending in 2005 totaled $9.45 billion, which is equivalent to 7.7% of GDP, and represents 16.3% of government expenditures. The United States provides approximately $2.4 billion per year in security assistance.

In 1983, the United States and Israel established the Joint Political Military Group, which meets twice a year. Both the U.S. and Israel participate in joint military planning and combined exercises, and have collaborated on military research and weapons development.

GOVERNMENT

Israel is a parliamentary democracy. Its governmental system is based on several basic laws enacted by its unicameral parliament, the Knesset. The president (chief of state) is elected by the Knesset for a 5-year term.

The prime minister (head of government) exercises

in the 4% to 5% range.

The United States is Israel's largest trading partner. In 2005, two-way trade totaled some $26.6 billion, up 12% from 2004. The U.S. trade deficit with Israel was $7.1 billion in 2005, up 33% from 2004, due largely to rising Israeli exports to the U.S. U.S. exports to Israel rose 6.1% in 2005 to $9.7 billion, making Israel our 19th largest export market for goods. The principal goods exported from the U.S. include civilian aircraft parts, telecommunications equipment, semiconductors, civilian aircraft, electrical apparatus, and computer accessories. Israel's chief exports to the U.S. include diamonds, pharmaceutical preparations, telecommunications equipment, medicinal equipment, electrical apparatus, and cotton apparel. The two countries signed a free trade agreement (FTA) in 1985 that progressively eliminated tariffs on most goods traded between the two countries over the following 10 years. An agricultural trade accord signed in November 1996 addressed the remaining goods not covered in the FTA but has not entirely erased barriers to trade in the agricultural sector. Israel also has trade and cooperation agreements in place with the European Union, Canada, Mexico, and other countries.

Best prospect industry sectors in Israel for U.S. exporters are electricity and gas equipment, defense equipment, medical instruments and disposable products, industrial chemicals, telecommunication equipment, electronic components, building materials/construction industries (DIY and infrastructure), safety and security equipment and services, non-prescription drugs, travel and tourism services, and computer software.

HISTORY

The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 was preceded by more than 50 years of efforts to establish a sovereign nation as a homeland for Jews. These efforts were initiated by Theodore Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, and were given added impetus by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which asserted the British Government's support for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

In the years following World War I, Palestine became a Mandate and Jewish immigration steadily i ncreased, as did violence between Palestin'e Jewish and Arab communities. Mounting British efforts to restrict this immigration were countered by international support for Jewish national aspirations following the near-extermination of European Jewry by the Nazis during World War II. This support led to the 1947 UN partition plan, which would have divided Palestine into seperate Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem under UN administration.

On May 14, 1948, soon after the British quit Palestine, the State of Israel was proclaimed and was immediately invaded by armies from neighboring Arab states, which rejected the UN partition plan. This conflict, Israel's War of Independence, was condcluded by armistice agreements between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1949 and resulted in 50% increase in Israeli territory.

In 1956, French, British, and Israeli forces engaged Egypt in response to its nationalization of the Suez Canal and blockade of the Straits of Tiran. Israeli forces withdrew in March 1957, after the United Nations established the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Gaza Strip and Sinai. This war resulted in no territorial shifts and was followed by several years of terrorist incidents and retaliatory acts across Israel's borders.

In June 1967, Israeli forces struck targets in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in response to Egyptian President Nasser's ordered withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula and the buildup of Arab armies along Israel's borders. After 6 days, all parties agreed to a cease-fire, under which Israel retained control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, the formerly Jordanian-controlled West Bank of the Jordan River, and East Jerusalem. On November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted Resolution 242, the "land for peace" formula, which called for the establishment of a just and lasting peace based on Israeli withdrawal from

executive power and has in the past been selected by the president as the party leader most able to form a government. Between May 1996 and March 2001, Israelis voted for the prime minister directly. (The legislation, which required the direct election of the prime minister, was rescinded by the Knesset in March 2001.) The members of the cabinet must be collectively approved by the Knesset.

The Knesset's 120 members are elected by secret ballot to 4-year terms, although the prime minister may decide to call for new elections before the end of the 4-year term. Voting is for party lists rather than for individual candidates, and the total number of seats assigned each party reflects that party's percentage of the vote. Successful Knesset candidates are drawn from the lists in order of party-assigned rank. Under the present electoral system, all members of the Knesset are elected at large.

The independent judicial system includes secular and religious courts. The courts' right of judicial review of the Knesset's legislation is limited. Judicial interpretation is restricted to problems of execution of laws and validity of subsidiary legislation. The highest court in Israel is the Supreme Court, whose judges are approved by the President.

Israel is divided into six districts, administration of which is coordinated by the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for the administration of the occupied territories.

US-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Commitment to Israel's security and well being has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel's founding in 1948, in which the United States played a key supporting role. Israel and the United States are bound closely by historic and cultural ties as well as by mutual interests. Continuing U.S. economic and security assistance to Israel acknowledges these ties and signals U.S. commitment. The broad issues of Arab-Israeli peace have been a major focus in the U.S.-Israeli relationship. U.S. efforts to reach a Middle East peace settlement are based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and have been based on the premise that as Israel takes calculated risks for peace the United States will help minimize those risks.

territories occupied in 1967 in return for the end of all states of belligerency, respect for the sovereignty of all states in the area, and the right to live in peace within secure, recognized boundaries.

The following years were marked by continuing violence across the Suez Canal, punctuated by the 1969-70 war of attrition. On October 6, 1973--Yom Kippur (the Jewish Day of Atonement), the armies of Syria and Egypt launched an attack against Israel. Although the Egyptians and Syrians initially made significant advances, Israel was able to push the invading armies back beyond the 1967 cease-fire lines by the time the United States and the Soviet Union helped bring an end to the fighting. In the UN Security Council, the United States supported Resolution 338, which reaffirmed Resolution 242 as the framework for peace and called for peace negotiations between the parties.

In the years that followed, sporadic clashes continued along the cease-fire lines but guided by the U.S., Egypt, and Israel continued negotiations. In November 1977, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat made a historic visit to Jerusalem, which opened the door for the 1978 Israeli-Egyptian peace summit convened at Camp David by President Carter. These negotiations led to a 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, pursuant to which Israel withdrew from the Sinai in 1982, signed by President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel.


In the years following the 1948 war, Israel's border with Lebanon was quiet relative to its borders with other neighbors. After the expulsion of Palestinian fighters from Jordan in 1970 and their influx into southern Lebanon, however, hostilities along Israel's northern border increased and Israeli forces crossed into Lebanon. After passage of Security Council Resolution 425, calling for Israeli withdrawal and the creation of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping force (UNIFIL), Israel withdrew its troops.

In June 1982, following a series of cross-border terrorist attacks and the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to the U.K., Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the forces of Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO withdrew its forces from Lebanon in August 1982. Israel, having failed to finalize an agreement with Lebanon, withdrew most of its troops in June 1985 save for a residual force which remained in southern Lebanon to act as a buffer against attacks on northern Israel. These remaining forces were completely withdrawn in May 2000 behind a UN-brokered delineation of the Israel-Lebanon border (the Blue Line). Hezbollah forces in Southern Lebanon continued to attack Israeli positions south of the Blue Line in the Sheba Farms/Har Dov area of the Golan Heights.

The victory of the U.S.-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 opened new possibilities for regional peace. In October 1991, the United States and the Soviet Union convened the Madrid Conference, in which Israeli, Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian, and Palestinian leaders laid the foundations for ongoing negotiations designed to bring peace and economic development to the region. Within this framework, Israel and the PLO signed a Declaration of Principles on September 13, 1993, which established an ambitious set of objectives relating to a transfer of authority from Israel to an interim Palestinian authority. Israel and the PLO subsequently signed the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994, and the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities on August 29, 1994, which began the process of transferring authority from Israel to the Palestinians.

On October 26, 1994, Israel and Jordan signed a historic peace treaty, witnessed by President Clinton. This was followed by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and PLO Chairman Arafat's signing of the historic Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on September 28, 1995. This accord, which incorporated and superseded previous agreements, broadened Palestinian self-government and provided for cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians in several areas.

On a bilateral level, relations between the United States and Israel are continually strengthening in every field. In addition to the Joint Political-Military Group described above, there are: bilateral science and technology efforts (including the Binational Science Foundation and the Binational Agricultural Research and Development Foundation); the U.S.-Israeli Education Foundation, which sponsors educational and cultural programs; the Joint Economic Development Group, which maintains a high-level dialogue on economic issues; the Joint Counterterrorism Group, designed to enhance cooperation in fighting terrorism; and a high-level Strategic Dialogue that meets biannually.



Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995, by a right-wing Jewish radical, bringing the increasingly bitter national debate over the peace process to a climax. Subsequent Israeli governments continued to negotiate with the PLO resulting in additional agreements, including the Wye River and the Sharm el-Sheikh memoranda. However, a summit hosted by President Clinton at Camp David in July 2000 to address permanent status issues--including the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, final security arrangements, borders, and relations and cooperation with neighboring states--failed to produce an agreement.

Following the failed talks, widespread violence broke out in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza in September 2000. In April 2001 the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact Finding Committee, commissioned by the October 2000 Middle East Peace Summit and chaired by former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, submitted its report, which recommended an immediate end to the violence followed by confidence-building measures and a resumption of security cooperation and peace negotiations. Building on the Mitchell report, In April 2003, the Quartet (the U.S., UN, European Union (EU), and the Russian Federation) announced the "roadmap," a performance-based plan to bring about two states, Israel and a democratic, viable Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

Despite the promising developments of spring 2003, violence continued and in September 2003 the first Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), resigned after failing to win true authority to restore law and order, fight terror, and reform Palestinian institutions. In response to the deadlock, in the winter of 2003-2004 Prime Minister Sharon put forward his Gaza disengagement initiative, proposing the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from Gaza as well as parts of the northern West Bank. President Bush endorsed this initiative in an exchange of letters with Prime Minister Sharon on April 14, 2004, viewing Gaza disengagement as an opportunity to move towards implementation of the two-state vision and begin the development of Palestinian institutions. In a meeting in May 2004 the Quartet endorsed the initiative, which was approved by the Knesset in October 2004.

The run-up to disengagement saw a flurry of diplomatic activity, including the February 2005 announcement of Lieutenant General William Ward as U.S. Security Coordinator; the March 2005 Sharon-Abbas summit in Sharm el-Sheikh; the return of Egyptian and Jordanian ambassadors to Israel; and the May 2005 appointment of former World Bank president James D. Wolfensohn as Special Envoy for Gaza Disengagement to work for a revitalization of the Palestinian economy after disengagement. Wolfensohn's direct involvement spurred Israeli-Palestinian agreement on the Gaza 'crossings" at Karni and Erez, on the demolition of settler homes, water, electricity, and communications infrastructure issues, as well as other issues related to the Palestinian economy.

On August 15, 2005, Israel began implementing its disengagement from the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli Defense Forces completed their withdrawal, including the dismantling of 17 settlements, on September 12. After broad recognition for Prime Minister Sharon's accomplishment at that fall's UN General Assembly, international attention quickly turned to efforts to strengthen Palestinian governance and the economy in Gaza. The United States brokered a landmark Agreement on Movement and Access between the parties in November 2005 to facilitate further progress on Palestinian economic issues. However, the terrorist organization Hamas--building on popular support for its "resistance" to Israeli occupation and a commitment to clean up the notorious corruption of the Palestinian Authority (PA)--took a majority in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, with Hamas leader Ismail Haniya as Prime Minister. The Israeli leadership pledged not to work with a Palestinian government in which Hamas had a role.

Shortly following Hamas' PLC victory, the Quartet--comprised of the United States, European Union, United Nations. and Russia--outlined three basic principles the Hamas-led PA must meet in order for the U.S. and the international community to reengage with the PA: renounce violence and terror, recognize Israel, and respect

previous agreements, including the roadmap. The Hamas-led PA government rejected these principles, resulting in a Quartet statement of "grave concern" on March 30, 2006 and the suspension of U.S. assistance to the PA, complete prohibition on U.S. Government contacts with the PA, and prohibition of unlicensed transactions with the PA government. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) under the leadership of PLO Chairman and PA President Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), by contrast, remained consistently committed to the Quartet principles.

Despite several negotiated cease-fires between Hamas and Fatah, violent clashes in the Gaza Strip--and to a lesser extent in the West Bank--were commonplace between December 2006 and February 2007 and resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries. In an attempt to end the intra-Palestinian violence, the King of Saudi Arabia invited Palestinian rivals to Mecca, and on February 9, 2007, Abbas and Hamas leader Haniya agreed to the formation of a Palestinian national unity government and a cessation of violence. Hamas' rejectionist policies and violent behavior continued despite the formation of the national unity government.

In June 2007, Hamas effectively orchestrated a violent coup in Gaza. Hamas also launched scores of Qassam rockets into southern Israel in an attempt to involve Israel in the Hamas-Fatah conflict. On June 14, Palestinian Authority President Mahoud Abbas exercised his lawful authority by declaring a state of emergency, dissolving the national unity government, and replacing it with a new government with Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister.

The new Palestinian Authority government under President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad has no elements controlled by Hamas or any other terrorist group. The new government is dedicated to peace and the Quartet principles and has been embraced politically and financially by the international community, including Israel.

Palestine

***In the map below, the West Bank is the land known as Palestine

Click below to read The Palestinian Charter

HISTORY

Ottoman rule (1516 - 1917 CE)

Territory of the Ottoman Empire in 1890

After the Ottoman conquest, the name "Palestine" disappeared as the official name of an administrative unit, as the Turks often called their (sub) provinces after the capital. Since its 1516 incorporation in the Ottoman Empire, it was part of the *vilayet* (province) of Damascus-Syria until 1660, next of the *vilayet* of Saida (Sidon), briefly interrupted by the 7 March 1799 - July 1799 French occupation of

Jaffa, Haifa, and Caesarea. During the siege of Acre in 1799, Napoleon prepared a proclamation declaring a Jewish state in Palestine. On 10 May 1832 it was one of the Turkish provinces annexed by Muhammad Ali's shortly imperialistic Egypt (nominally still Ottoman), but in November 1840 direct Ottoman rule was restored.

Still the old name remained in popular and semi-official use. Many examples of its usage in the 16th and 17th centuries have survived.[95] During the 19th century, the "Ottoman Government employed the term *Arz-i Filistin* (the 'Land of Palestine') in official correspondence, meaning for all intents and purposes the area to the west of the River Jordan which became 'Palestine' under the British in 1922".[96] Amongst the educated Arab public, *Filastin* was a common concept,

Palestine Map

referring either to the whole of Palestine or to the Jerusalem *sanjaq* alone[97] or just to the area around Ramle.[98]

Ottoman rule over the region lasted until the Great War (World War I) when the Ottomans sided with Germany and the Central Powers. During World War I, the Ottomans were driven from much of the area by the United Kingdom during the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

The 20th century

In European usage up to World War I, "Palestine" was used informally for a region that extended in the north-south direction typically from Raphia (south-east of Gaza) to the Litani River (now in Lebanon). The western boundary was the sea, and the eastern boundary was the poorly-defined place where the Syrian desert began. In various European sources, the

CURRENT STATUS

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the 1949 Armistice Agreements between Israel and neighboring Arab states eliminated Palestine as a distinct territory. With the establishment of Israel, the remaining lands were divided amongst Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

In addition to the UN-partitioned area it was allotted, Israel captured 26% of the Mandate territory west of the Jordan river. Jordan captured and annexed about 21% of the Mandate territory, known today as the West Bank. Jerusalem was divided, with Jordan taking the eastern parts, including the Old City, and Israel taking the western parts. The Gaza Strip was captured by Egypt.

For a description of the massive population movements, Arab and Jewish, at the time of the 1948 war and over the following decades, see Palestinian exodus and Jewish exodus from Arab lands.

From the 1960s onward, the term "Palestine" was regularly used in political contexts. Various declarations, such as the 15 November 1988 proclamation of a State of Palestine by the PLO referred to a country called Palestine, defining its borders based on the U.N. Resolution 242 and 383 and the principle of land for peace. The Green Line was the 1967 border established by many UN resolutions including those mentioned above.

In the course of the Six Day War in June 1967, Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan and Gaza from Egypt.

According to the CIA World Factbook,[108] of the ten million people living between Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea, about five million (49%) identify as Palestinian, Arab, Bedouin and/or Druze. One million of those are citizens of Israel. The other four million are residents of the West Bank and Gaza, which are under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian National Authority.

In the West Bank, 360,000 Israeli settlers live in a hundred scattered settlements with connecting corridors. The 2.5 million West Bank Palestinians live in four blocs centered in Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, and Jericho. In 2005, all the Israeli settlers were evacuated from the

eastern boundary was placed anywhere from the Jordan River to slightly east of Amman. The Negev Desert was not included.[99]

Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, it was envisioned that most of Palestine, when freed from Ottoman control, would become an international zone not under direct French or British colonial control. Shortly thereafter, British foreign minister Arthur Balfour issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which laid plans for a Jewish homeland to be established in Palestine eventually.

The British-led Egyptian Expeditionary Force, commanded by Edmund Allenby, captured Jerusalem on 9 December, 1917 and occupied the whole of the Levant following the defeat of Turkish forces in Palestine at the Battle of Megiddo in September 1918 and the capitulation of Turkey

Gaza Strip in keeping with Ariel Sharon's plan for unilateral disengagement, and control over the area was transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

The Greek toponym *Palaistinê* (Παλαιστίνη), with which the Arabic *Filastin* (فلسطين) is cognate, first occurs in the work of the Ionian historian Herodotus, active in the middle of the 5th century BCE, where it denotes generally[6] all of the coastal land, including Phoenicia, down to Egypt. In expressions where he employs it as an ethnonym, as when he speaks of the 'Syrians of Palestine'[7] it refers to a population distinct from the Phoenicians, and thus probably Philistines, though it may also cover several other tribes and ethnic groups present in the area, including the Jews.[8]. The word bears comparison to a congeries of ethnonyms in Semitic languages, Egyptian *Prst*, Assyrian *Palastu*, and the Hebraic *Plishtim*, the latter term used in the Bible to signify the Philistines.

The Arabic word *Filastin* has been used to refer to the region since the earliest medieval Arab geographers adopted the Greek name. *Filastini* (فلسطيني), also derived from the Latinized Greek term *Palaestina* (Παλαιστίνη), appears to have been used as an Arabic adjectival noun in the region since as early as the 7th century CE.[9]

During the British Mandate of Palestine, the term "Palestinian" was used to refer to all people residing there, regardless of religion or ethnicity, and those granted citizenship by the Mandatory authorities were granted "Palestinian citizenship".[10]

Following the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel as the national homeland of the Jewish people, the use and application of the terms "Palestine" and "Palestinian" by and to Palestinian Jews largely dropped from use. The English-language newspaper *The Palestine Post* for example — which, since 1932, primarily served the Jewish community in the British Mandate of Palestine — changed its name in 1950 to *The Jerusalem Post*. Jews in Israel and the West Bank today generally identify as Israelis. Arab citizens of Israel identify themselves as Israeli and/or Palestinian and/or Arab.[11]

The Palestinian National Charter, as amended by the PLO's Palestine National Council in July

on 31 October.[100]

British Mandate (1920–1948)

Palestine and Transjordan were incorporated (under different legal and administrative arrangements) into the Mandate for Palestine issued by the League of Nations to Great Britain on 29 September 1923

The British Mandate enacted English, Hebrew and Arabic as its three official languages. The land designated by the mandate was called Palestine in English, Falastin (فلسطين) in Arabic, and in Hebrew *Palestina or Eretz Yisrael* (**הניתשלפ (י"א)**).

In April 1920 the Allied Supreme Council (the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan) met at Sanremo and formal decisions were taken on the allocation of mandate territories. The United Kingdom accepted a mandate for Palestine, but the

1968, defined "Palestinians" as: "those Arab nationals who, until 1947, normally resided in Palestine regardless of whether they were evicted from it or stayed there. Anyone born, after that date, of a Palestinian father — whether in Palestine or outside it — is also a Palestinian."[12] This definition also extends to, "The Jews who had normally resided in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion." The Charter also states that "Palestine with the boundaries it had during the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit."[13][12]

Palestinian perceptions of identity

In his 1997 book, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness,* historian Rashid Khalidi notes that the archaeological strata that denote the history of Palestine —encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods—form part of the identity of the modern-day Palestinian people, as they have come to understand it over the last century.[14] Khalidi stresses that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" continuing to play an important role.[15]

Echoing this view, Walid Khalidi writes that Palestinians in Ottoman times were "[a]cutely aware of the distinctiveness of Palestinian history ..." and that "[a]lthough proud of their Arab heritage and ancestry, the Palestinians considered themselves to be descended not only from Arab conquerors of the seventh century but also from indigenous peoples who had lived in the country since time immemorial, including the ancient Hebrews and the Canaanites before them."[16].

Ali Qleibo, a Palestinian anthropologist, explains how identity is "a discursive narrative that validates the present by selecting events, characters, and moments in time as formative beginnings."[17] Qleibo critiques Muslim historiography for assigning the beginning of Palestinian cultural identity to the advent of Islam in the seventh century.[17] In describing the effect of such a historiography, he writes: "Pagan origins are disavowed. As such the peoples that populated Palestine throughout history have discursively rescinded their own history and religion as they adopted the religion, language, and culture of Islam."[17]

According to Salim Tamari, the 'nativist' ethnographies produced by Tawfiq Canaan and other Palestinian writers and published in *The Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society* (1920-1948), were driven by the concern that the "native culture of Palestine", and in particular

boundaries of the mandate and the conditions under which it was to be held were not decided. The Zionist Organization's representative at Sanremo, Chaim Weizmann, subsequently reported to his colleagues in London:

> "There are still important details outstanding, such as the actual terms of the mandate and the question of the boundaries in Palestine. There is the delimitation of the boundary between French Syria and Palestine, which will constitute the northern frontier and the eastern line of demarcation, adjoining Arab Syria. The latter is not likely to be fixed until the Emir Feisal attends the Peace Conference, probably in Paris."[101]

peasant society, was being undermined by the forces of modernity.[18] Tamari continues: "Implicit in their scholarship (and made explicit by Canaan himself) was another theme, namely that the peasants of Palestine represent—through their folk norms ... the living heritage of all the accumulated ancient cultures that had appeared in Palestine (principally the Canaanite, Philistine, Hebraic, Nabatean, Syrio-Aramaic and Arab)."[18]

The folklorist revival among Palestinian intellectuals such as Nimr Sirhan, Musa Allush, Salim Mubayyid, and the Palestinian Folklore Society of the 1970s, highlighted pre-Islamic (and pre-Hebraic) cultural roots, re-constructing Palestinian identity with a focus on Canaanite and Jebusite cultures.[18] These efforts seems to have borne fruit as evidenced in the organization of celebrations like the Qabatiya Canaanite festival and the annual Music Festival of Yabus by the Palestinian Ministry of Culture.[18] Nonetheless, some Palestinians, like Zakariyya Muhammad, have criticized the "Canaanite ideology" as an "intellectual fad, divorced from the concerns of ordinary people."[18]

Emergent nationalism(s)

The timing and causes behind the emergence of a distinctively Palestinian national consciousness among the Arabs of Palestine are matters of scholarly disagreement. Rashid Khalidi argues that the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of the Ottoman empire in the late 19th century, and which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the Middle East after World War I.[15] Khalidi also states that although the challenge posed by Zionism played a role in shaping this identity, that "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism."[15]

In contrast, historian James L. Gelvin argues that Palestinian nationalism was a direct reaction to Zionism. In his book *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War* he states that “Palestinian nationalism emerged during the interwar period in response to Zionist immigration and settlement.”[19] Gelvin argues that this fact does not make the Palestinian identity any less legitimate:

Whatever the causal mechanism, by the early 20th century strong opposition to Zionism and evidence of a burgeoning nationalistic Palestinian identity is found in the content of Arabic-

In July 1920, the French drove Faisal bin Husayn from Damascus ending his already negligible control over the region of Transjordan, where local chiefs traditionally resisted any central authority. The sheikhs, who had earlier pledged their loyalty to the Sharif of Mecca, asked the British to undertake the region's administration. Herbert Samuel asked for the extension of the Palestine government's authority to Transjordan, but at meetings in Cairo and Jerusalem between Winston Churchill and Emir Abdullah in March 1921 it was agreed that Abdullah would administer the territory (initially for six months only) on behalf of the Palestine administration. In the summer of 1921 Transjordan was included within the Mandate, but excluded from the provisions for a Jewish National Home.[102] On 24 July, 1922 the League of Nations

language newspapers in Palestine, such as *Al-Karmil* (est. 1908) and *Filasteen* (est. 1911).[20] *Filasteen*, published in Jaffa by Issa and Yusef al-Issa, addressed its readers as "Palestinians",[21] first focusing its critique of Zionism around the failure of the Ottoman administration to control Jewish immigration and the large influx of foreigners, later exploring the impact of Zionist land-purchases on Palestinian peasants ((Arabic: فلاحين, *fellahin*), expressing growing concern over land dispossession and its implications for the society at large.[20]

The historical record also reveals an interplay between "Arab" and "Palestinian" identities and nationalisms. The idea of a unique Palestinian state separated out from its Arab neighbors was at first rejected by some Palestinian representatives. The First Congress of Muslim-Christian Associations (in Jerusalem, February 1919), which met for the purpose of selecting a Palestinian Arab representative for the Paris Peace Conference, adopted the following resolution: "We consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria, as it has never been separated from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, natural, economic and geographical bonds."[22] After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the French conquest of Syria, however, the notion took on greater appeal. In 1920, for instance, the formerly pan-Syrianist mayor of Jerusalem, Musa Qasim Pasha al-Husayni, said "Now, after the recent events in Damascus, we have to effect a complete change in our plans here. Southern Syria no longer exists. We must defend Palestine".[*citation needed*]

In 1922, the British authorities over Mandate Palestine proposed a draft constitution which would have granted the Palestinian Arabs representation in a Legislative Council. The Palestine Arab delegation rejected the proposal as "wholly unsatisfactory," noting that "the People of Palestine" could not accept the inclusion of the Balfour Declaration in the constitution's preamble, as the basis for discussions, and further taking issue with the designation of Palestine as a British "colony of the lowest order."[23] The Arabs tried to get the British to offer an Arab legal establishment again roughly ten years later, but to no avail.[24]

Conflict between Palestinian nationalists and various types of pan-Arabists continued during the British Mandate, but the latter became increasingly marginalized. Two prominent leaders of the Palestinian nationalists were Mohammad Amin al-Husayni, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,appointed by the British, and Izz ad-Din al-Qassam.[25] Followers of Sheikh Izz ad-Din al-Qassam, who was killed by the British in 1935, initiated the 1936–1939 Arab revolt in Palestine which began with a

approved the terms of the British Mandate over Palestine and Transjordan. On 16 September the League formally approved a memorandum from Lord Balfour confirming the exemption of Transjordan from the clauses of the mandate concerning the creation of a Jewish national home and from the mandate's responsibility to *facilitate* Jewish immigration and land settlement.[103] With Transjordan coming under the administration of the British Mandate, the mandate's collective territory became constituted of 23% Palestine and 77% Transjordan. Transjordan was a very sparsely populated region (specially in comparison with Palestine proper) due to its relatively limited resources and largely desert environment.

The award of the mandates was delayed as a result of the United States' suspicions regarding Britain's

general strike and attacks on Jewish and British installations in Nablus.[25] The call for a general strike, non-payment of taxes, and the closure of municipal governments was met and by the end of 1936, the movement had become a national revolt, often credited as marking the birth of the "Arab Palestinian identity".[25]

The "lost years" (1948 - 1967)

After the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and the accompanying Palestinian exodus, known to Palestinians as Al Nakba (the "catastrophe"), there was a hiatus in Palestinian political activity which Khalidi partially attributes to "the fact that Palestinian society had been devastated between November 1947 and mid-May 1948 as a result of a series of overwhelming military defeats of the disorganized Palestinians by the armed forces of the Zionist movement."[26] Those parts of British Mandate Palestine which did not become part of the newly declared Israeli state were occupied by Egypt and Jordan. During what Khalidi terms the "lost years" that followed, Palestinians lacked a center of gravity, divided as they were between these countries and others such as Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.[27]

In the 1950s, a new generation of Palestinian nationalist groups and movements began to organize clandestinely, stepping out onto the public stage in the 1960s.[28] The traditional Palestinian elite who had dominated negotiations with the British and the Zionists in the Mandate, and who were largely held responsible for the loss of Palestine, were replaced by these new movements whose recruits generally came from poor to middle class backgrounds and were often students or recent graduates of universities in Cairo, Beirut and Damascus.[28] The potency of the pan-Arabist ideology put forward by Gamel Abdel Nasser—popular among Palestinian for whom Arabism was already an important component of their identity[29]—tended to obscure

Recent developments in Palestinian identity (1967 - present)

Since 1967, pan-Arabism has diminished as an aspect of Palestinian identity. The Israeli capture of the Gaza Strip and West Bank in the 1967 Six-Day War prompted fractured Palestinian political and militant groups to give up any remaining hope they had placed in pan-Arabism. Instead, they rallied around the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its nationalistic orientation.[31] Mainstream secular Palestinian nationalism was grouped together under the umbrella of the PLO whose constituent organizations include Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation

colonial ambitions and similar reservations held by Italy about France's intentions. France in turn refused to reach a settlement over Palestine until its own mandate in Syria became final. According to Louis,

> Together with the American protests against the issuance of mandates these triangular quarrels between the Italians, French, and British explain why the A mandates did not come into force until nearly four years after the signing of the Peace Treaty.... The British documents clearly reveal that Balfour's patient and skillful diplomacy contributed greatly to the final issuance of the A mandates for Syria and Palestine on September 29, 1923.[104]

of Palestine, among others.[32] These groups have also given voice to a tradition that emerged in 1960s that argues Palestinian nationalism has deep historical roots, with extreme advocates reading a Palestinian nationalist consciousness and identity back into the history of Palestine over the past few centuries, and even millennia, when such a consciousness is in fact relatively modern.[33]

The Battle of Karameh and the events of Black September in Jordan contributed to growing Palestinian support for these groups. In 1974, the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by the Arab states and was granted observer status as a national liberation movement by the United Nations that same year.[5][34] Israel rejected the resolution, calling it "shameful".[35] In a speech to the Knesset, Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Allon outlined the government's view that: 'No one can expect us to recognize the terrorist organization called the PLO as representing the Palestinians—because it does not. No one can expect us to negotiate with the heads of terror-gangs, who through their ideology and actions, endeavour to liquidate the State of Israel.'[35]

The identity of Palestinians has been a point of contestation with Israel. Golda Meir expounded the early position in her famous remark that:

'It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. **They did not exist**.'[36]

. The British historian Eric Hobsbawn allows that an element of justness can be discerned in sceptical outsider views that dismiss the propriety of using the term 'nation' to peoples like the Palestinians: such language arises often as the rhetoric of an evolved minority out of touch with the larger community that lacks this modern sense of national belonging. But at the same time, he argues, this outsider perspective has tended to

'overlook the rise of mass national identification when it did occur, as Zionist and Israeli Jews notably did in the case of the Palestinian Arabs.'[37]

. From 1948 through until the 1980's, according to Eli Podeh, professor at Hebrew University, the textbooks used in Israeli schools tried to disavow a unique Palestinian identity, referring to 'the Arabs of the land of Israel' instead of 'Palestinians.' Israeli textbooks now widely use the term 'Palestinians.' Podeh believes that Palestinian textbooks of today resemble those from the early years of the Israeli state.[38]

Even before the Mandate came into legal effect in 1923 (text), British terminology sometimes used "'Palestine" for the part west of the Jordan River and "Trans-Jordan" (or *Transjordania*) for the part east of the Jordan River.[105][106]

In the years following World War II, Britain's control over Palestine became increasingly tenuous. This was caused by a combination of factors, including:


- Rapid deterioration due to the attacks by the Irgun and Lehi on British officials, armed forces, and strategic installations. This caused severe damage to British morale and prestige, as well as increasing opposition to the

Various declarations, such as the PLO's 1988 proclamation of a State of Palestine, have further served to reinforce the Palestinian national identity.[*citation needed*] Today, most Palestinian organizations conceive of their struggle as either Palestinian-nationalist or Islamic in nature, and these themes predominate even more today. Within Israel itself, there are political movements, such as Abnaa el-Balad that assert their Palestinian identity, to the exclusion of their Israeli one.



mandate in Britain itself, public opinion demanding to "bring the boys home". [107]

- World public opinion turned against Britain as a result of the British policy of preventing Holocaust survivors from reaching Palestine, sending them instead to Cyprus internment camps, or even back to Germany, as in the case of Exodus 1947.
- The costs of maintaining an army of over 100,000 men in Palestine weighed heavily on a British economy suffering from post-war depression, and was another cause for British public opinion to demand an end to the Mandate.
- US Congress was




delaying a loan necessary to prevent British bankruptcy. The delays were in response to the British refusal to fulfill a promise given to Truman that 100,000 Holocaust survivors would be allowed to migrate to Palestine.


Finally in early 1947 the British Government announced their desire to terminate the Mandate, and passed the responsibility over Palestine to the United Nations.

UN Partition Plan

On 29 November 1947, the United Nations General Assembly, with a two-thirds majority international vote, passed the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine (United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181), a plan to resolve




the Arab-Jewish conflict by partitioning the territory into separate Jewish and Arab states, with the Greater Jerusalem area (encompassing Bethlehem) coming under international control. Jewish leaders (including the Jewish Agency), accepted the plan, while Palestinian Arab leaders rejected it and refused to negotiate. Neighboring Arab and Muslim states also rejected the partition plan. The Arab community reacted violently after the Arab Higher Committee declared a strike and burned many buildings and shops. As armed skirmishes between Arab and Jewish paramilitary forces in Palestine continued, the British mandate ended on May 15, 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel having been proclaimed the day before (see Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel). The neighboring Arab states and armies (Lebanon,




Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Transjordan, Holy War Army, Arab Liberation Army, and local Arabs) immediately attacked Israel following its declaration of independence, and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War ensued. Consequently, the partition plan was never implemented.

Refugees

There are 4,255,120 Palestinians registered as refugees with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). This number includes the descendants of regugees from the 1948 war, but excludes those who have emigrated to areas outside of UNRWA's remit. Based on these figures, almost half of all Palestinians are registered refugees. The 993,818 Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip and 705,207 Palestinian refugees in the West Bank who hail from towns and villages that are now located in Israel are included in these UNRWA figures.




UNRWA figures do not include some 274,000 people, or 1 in 4 of all Arab citizens of Israel, who are internally displaced Palestinian refugees.

Lebanese Republic

Geography:

Area: 10,400 sq. km. (4,015 sq. km.) about 0.7 times the size of Connecticut.
Cities: *Capital* --Beirut (pop. 1.5 million). *Other cities* --Tripoli/ *Trablus* (210,000), Zahle (60,000), Sidon/*Sayda* (50,000), Tyre/ *Sur* (20,000), Byblos/ *Jbail* (10,000).
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain; El Beqaa (Bekaa Valley) separates Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains.
Climate: Mediterranean; mild to cool, wet winters with hot, dry summers; Lebanon mountains experience heavy winter snows.

People:

Nationality: *noun and adjective* --Lebanese (singular and plural).
Population (2006 est.): 3,874,050.
Growth rate (2006 est.): 1.23%.
Major ethnic groups: Arab 95%, Armenian 4%, other 1% (*note:* many Christian Lebanese do not identify themselves as Arab but rather as descendents of the ancient Canaanites and prefer to be called Phoenicians).
Religions: Muslim 60% (Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ili, Alawite or Nusayri), Christian 39% (Maronite Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Melkite Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Syrian Catholic, Armenian Catholic, Syrian



Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Chaldean, Assyrian, Copt, Protestant), other 1%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English, French, Armenian.
Education: *Years compulsory* --8. *Attendance* --99%. *Literacy* (2005 est.)--87.4%; 93.1% male, 82.2% female.
Health (2006 est.): *Infant mortality rate* --23.7/1,000. *Life expectancy*--70.41 male, 75.48 female.
Work force (2001 est.): 2.6 million.

Government:

Type: Republic.
Independence: November 22, 1943.
Constitution: May 23, 1926.
Branches: *Executive* --president (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), deputy prime minister, cabinet. *Legislative* --unicameral national assembly. *Judicial* --four Courts of Cassation, Constitutional Council, Supreme Council.
Administrative subdivisions: 8 governorates.
Political parties: Amal Movement, Ba'ath Party, Democratic Left, Democratic Renewal Movement, Free Patriotic Movement, Future Movement, Hezbollah, Kataeb Party, Kataeb Reform Movement, Lebanese Forces, National Bloc, Marada Movement, Nasserite Popular Movement, National Liberal Party, Popular Bloc, Progressive Socialist Party, Qornet Shehwan Gathering, Syrian Social National Party, Tachnaq Party.
A principal divide in current Lebanese politics is between pro-and anti-Syrian forces, often referred to, respectively, as March 8 and March 14, after major demonstrations they



HISTORY

Lebanon is the historic home of the Phoenicians, Semitic traders whose maritime culture flourished there for more than 2,000 years (c.2700-450 B.C.). In later centuries, Lebanon's mountains were a refuge for Christians, and Crusaders established several strongholds there. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the League of Nations mandated the five provinces that comprise present-day Lebanon to France. Modern Lebanon's constitution, drawn up in 1926, specified a balance of political power among the various religious groups. The country gained independence in 1943, and French troops withdrew in 1946. Lebanon participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and signed an armistice with Israel on March 23, 1949.

Lebanon's history since independence has been marked by periods of political turmoil interspersed with prosperity built on Beirut's position as a regional center for finance and trade. In 1958, during the last months of President Camille Chamoun's term, an insurrection broke out, and U.S. forces were briefly dispatched to Lebanon in response to an appeal by the government. During the 1960s, Lebanon enjoyed a period of relative calm and Beirut-focused tourism and banking sector-driven prosperity. Other areas of the country, however, notably the South, North, and Bekaa Valley, remained poor in comparison.

In the early 1970's, difficulties arose over the presence of Palestinian refugees, many of whom arrived after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the secret 1969 Cairo Agreement permitting the establishment of Palestinian camps in Lebanon, and 1970 "Black September" hostilities in Jordan. Among the 1970 arrivals were Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Coupled with the Palestinian problem, Muslim and Christian differences grew more intense.

Beginning of the Civil War--1975-81

Full-scale civil war broke out in April 1975. After shots were fired at a church, gunmen in Christian East Beirut ambushed a busload of Palestinians. Palestinian forces joined predominantly leftist-Muslim factions as the fighting persisted, eventually spreading to most parts of the country and precipitating the Lebanese President's call for support from Syrian troops in June 1976. In fall of 1976, Arab summits in Riyadh and Cairo set out a plan to end the war. The resulting Arab Deterrent Force, which included Syrian troops already present, moved in to help separate the combatants. As an uneasy quiet settled over Beirut, security conditions in the south began to deteriorate.

organized in 2005. "March 8" consists principally of the Shi'ite Amal and Hezbollah, now allied with the Free Patriotic Movement (Christian), while March 14 includes the Future Movement (Sunni), Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), and Lebanese Forces and Qornet Shehwan Gathering (both Christian).
Suffrage: 21; compulsory for all males; authorized for women at 21 with elementary education.

Economy:

GDP (2006 est.): $21.5 billion.
GDP growth rate (2006 est.): (-5%).
Per capita GDP (2006 est.): $5,500.
Natural resources: limestone, iron ore, salt.
Agriculture: *Products* --citrus, grapes, tomatoes, apples, vegetables, potatoes, olives, tobacco; sheep, goats. *Arable land* --18%.
Industry: *Types* --banking, tourism, food processing, jewelry, cement, textiles, mineral and chemical products, wood and furniture products, oil refining, metal fabricating.
Trade: *Exports* --$1.88 billion (2005 est., f.o.b.): authentic jewelry, inorganic chemicals, miscellaneous consumer goods, fruit, tobacco, construction minerals, electric power machinery and switchgear, textile fibers, paper. *Major markets* --Syria, U.A.E., Switzerland, Turkey, Saudi Arabia. *Imports* --$9.34 billion (2005 est., f.o.b.): petroleum products, cars, medicinal products, clothing, meat and live animals, consumer goods, paper, textile fabrics, tobacco. *Major suppliers* --Italy, Syria, France, Germany, China, U.S., U.K., Saudi Arabia.

PEOPLE

The population of Lebanon comprises

After a PLO attack on a bus in northern Israel and Israeli retaliation that caused heavy casualties, Israel invaded Lebanon in March 1978, occupying most of the area south of the Litani River. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 425 calling for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and creating the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), charged with maintaining peace. Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978, turning over positions inside Lebanon along the border to their Lebanese ally, the South Lebanon Army (SLA) under the leadership of Maj. Sa'ad Haddad, thus informally setting up a 12-mile wide "security zone" to protect Israeli territory from cross border attack.

U.S. Intervention--1982-84

An interim cease-fire brokered by the U.S. in 1981 among Syria, the PLO, and Israel was respected for almost a year. Several incidents, including PLO rocket attacks on northern Israel, as well as an assassination attempt on the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom, led to the June 6, 1982 Israeli ground attack into Lebanon to remove PLO forces. Operation "Peace for Galilee" aimed at establishing a deeper security zone and pushing Syrian troops out of Lebanon, with a view toward paving the way for an Israeli-Lebanese peace agreement. With these aims in mind, Israeli forces drove 25 miles into Lebanon, moving into East Beirut with the support of Maronite Christian leaders and militia.

In August 1982, U.S. mediation resulted in the evacuation of Syrian troops and PLO fighters from Beirut. The agreement also provided for the deployment of a multinational force composed of U.S. Marines along with French and Italian units. A new President, Bashir Gemayel, was elected with acknowledged Israeli backing. On September 14, however, he was assassinated. The next day, Israeli troops crossed into West Beirut to secure Muslim militia strongholds and stood aside as Lebanese Christian militias massacred almost 800 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Israel's then-Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon was held indirectly responsible for the massacre by the Kahane Commission and later resigned. With U.S. backing, Amin Gemayel, chosen by the Lebanese parliament to succeed his brother as President, focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. The multinational force returned.

On May 17, 1983, Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops. Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops, effectively stalemating further progress. In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Shuf (southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting. By September, the Druze had gained control over most of the Shuf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone, where they remained until May 2000. The virtual collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984, following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias, was a major blow to the government. With the U.S. Marines looking ready to withdraw, Syria and Muslim groups stepped up pressure on Gemayal. On March 5, 1984 the Lebanese Government canceled the May 17 agreement; the Marines departed a few weeks later.

This period of chaos witnessed the beginning of terrorist attacks launched against U.S. and Western interests. These included the April 18, 1983 suicide attack at the U.S. Embassy in West Beirut (63 dead), the bombing of the headquarters of U.S. and French forces on October 23, 1983 (298 dead), the assassination of American University of Beirut President Malcolm Kerr on January 18, 1984, and the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in East Beirut on September 20, 1984 (9 dead).

It also saw the rise of radicalism among a small number of Lebanese Muslim factions who believed that the successive Israeli and U.S. interventions in Lebanon were serving primarily Christian interests. It was from these

various Christian and Muslim sects as well as Druze. No official census has been taken since 1932, reflecting the political sensitivity in Lebanon over confessional (religious) balance. While there is no consensus over the confessional breakdown of the population for this reason, it is safe to say that the Muslim sects as a whole make up a majority, and that Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Maronites are the three largest groups.

About 400,000 Palestinian refugees, some in Lebanon since 1948, are registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). They are not accorded the legal rights enjoyed by the rest of the population.

With no official figures available, it is estimated that 600,000-900,000 persons fled the country during the initial years of civil war (1975-76). Although some returned, continuing conflict through 1990 as well as after the 2006 war sparked further waves of emigration, casting even more doubt on population figures. As much as 7% of the population was killed during the civil war between 1975 and 1990. Approximately 17,000-20,000 people are still "missing" or unaccounted for from the civil war period.

Many Lebanese still derive their living from agriculture. The urban population, concentrated mainly in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, is noted for its commercial enterprise. A century and a half of migration and return have produced Lebanese commercial networks around the globe--from North and South America to Europe, the Gulf, and Africa. Lebanon has a high proportion of skilled labor compared with many other Arab countries.

GOVERNMENT

Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy in which the people constitutionally have the right to change their government. However,

factions that Hezbollah emerged from a loose coalition of Shi'a groups. Hezbollah employed terrorist tactics and was supported by Syria and Iran.

Worsening Conflict and Political Crisis--1985-89

Between 1985 and 1989, factional conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. Heavy fighting took place in the "War of the Camps" in 1985 and 1986 as the Shi'a Muslim Amal militia sought to rout the Palestinians from Lebanese strongholds. The Amal movement had been organized in mid-1975, at the beginning of the civil war, to confront what were seen as Israeli plans to displace the Lebanese population with Palestinians. (Its charismatic founder Imam Musa Sadr disappeared in Libya three years later. Its current leader, Nabih Berri, is the Speaker of the National Assembly.) The combat returned to Beirut in 1987, with Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, on the political front, Prime Minister Rashid Karami, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. President Gemayel's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces Commanding General Michel Aoun, as acting Prime Minister, contravening Lebanon's unwritten "National Pact," which required the prime minister to be Sunni Muslim. Muslim groups rejected the move and pledged support to Salim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karami. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian government in East Beirut and a Muslim government in West Beirut, with no president.

In February 1989 Aoun attacked the rival Lebanese Forces militia. By March he turned his attention to other militias, launching what he termed a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their Lebanese militia allies. In the months that followed, Aoun rejected both the agreement that ultimately ended the civil war and the election of another Christian leader as president. A Lebanese-Syrian military operation in October 1990 forced him to take refuge in the French Embassy in Beirut and later to go into a 15-year exile in Paris. After Syrian troop withdrawal, Aoun returned to Lebanon on May 7, 2005 and won a seat in the 2005 parliamentary elections. His Free Patriotic Movement became a principal element of the pro-Syrian opposition bloc.

End of the Civil War--1989-91

The Ta'if Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the war. In January of that year, a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, had begun to formulate solutions to the conflict, leading to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia, where they agreed to the national reconciliation accord in October. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Moawad as President the following day. Moawad was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut on November 22 as his motorcade returned from Lebanese Independence Day ceremonies. Elias Hrawi, who remained in office until 1998, succeeded him.

In August 1990, parliament and the new President agreed on constitutional amendments embodying some of the political reforms envisioned at Ta'if. The National Assembly expanded to 128 seats and was divided equally between Christians and Muslims (with Druze counted as Muslims). In March 1991, parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. The amnesty was not extended to crimes perpetrated against foreign diplomats or certain crimes referred by the cabinet to the Higher Judicial Council. In May 1991, the militias (with the important exception of Hezbollah and Palestinian militias) were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild itself as Lebanon's only major nonsectarian institution.

from the mid-1970s until the parliamentary elections in 1992, civil war precluded the effective exercise of political rights. According to the constitution, direct elections must be held for the parliament every 4 years. Parliament, in turn, is tasked to elect a new president every 6 years. A presidential election scheduled for the autumn of 2004 was pre-empted by a parliamentary vote to extend the sitting President's term in office by 3 years. The president and parliament choose the prime minister. Political parties may be formed. However, the political parties that do exist are weak and mostly based on sectarian interests.

Since the emergence of the post-1943 state, national policy has been determined largely by a relatively restricted group of traditional regional and sectarian leaders. The 1943 national pact, an unwritten agreement that established the political foundations of modern Lebanon, allocated political power on an essentially confessional system based on the 1932 census. Until 1990, seats in parliament were divided on a 6-to-5 ratio of Christians to Muslims (with Druze counted as Muslims). With the Ta'if Agreement, the ratio changed to half and half. Positions in the government bureaucracy are allocated on a similar basis. Indeed, gaining political office is virtually impossible without the firm backing of a particular religious or confessional group. The pact also allocated public offices along religious lines, with the top three positions in the ruling "troika" distributed as follows:

- The presidency is reserved for a Maronite Christian;
- The prime minister, a Sunni Muslim, and
- The speaker of parliament, a Shi'a Muslim.

Efforts to alter or abolish the confessional system of allocating power have been at the

In all, it is estimated that more than 100,000 were killed, and another 100,000 left handicapped, during Lebanon's 16-year civil war. Up to one-fifth of the pre-war resident population, or about 900,000 people, were displaced from their homes, of which perhaps a quarter of a million emigrated permanently. The last of the Western hostages taken during the mid-1980s were released in May 1992.

Postwar Reconstruction--1992 to 2005

Postwar social and political instability, fueled by economic uncertainty and the collapse of the Lebanese currency, led to the resignation of Prime Minister Omar Karami in May 1992, after less than 2 years in office. Former Prime Minister Rashid al Sulh, who was widely viewed as a caretaker to oversee Lebanon's first parliamentary elections in 20 years, replaced him.

By early November 1992, a new parliament had been elected, and Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri had formed a cabinet, retaining for himself the finance portfolio. The formation of a government headed by a successful billionaire businessman was widely seen as a sign that Lebanon would make a priority of rebuilding the country and reviving the economy. Solidere, a private real estate company set up to rebuild downtown Beirut, was a symbol of Hariri's strategy to link economic recovery to private sector investment. After the election of then-commander of the Lebanese Armed Forces Emile Lahoud in 1998, following Hrawi's extended term as President, Salim al-Hoss again served as Prime Minister. Hariri returned to office as Prime Minister in November 2000. Although problems with basic infrastructure and government services persist, and Lebanon is now highly indebted, much of the civil war damage was repaired throughout the country, and many foreign investors and tourists returned.

In early April 1996, Israel conducted a military operation dubbed "Grapes of Wrath" in response to Hezbollah's continued launching of rockets at villages in northern Israel. The 16-day operation caused hundreds of thousands of civilians in south Lebanon to flee their homes. On April 18, Hezbollah fired mortars at an Israeli military unit from a position near the UN compound at Qana, and the Israeli Army responded with artillery fire. Several Israeli shells struck the compound, killing 102 civilians sheltered there. In the "April Understanding" concluded on April 26, Israel and Hezbollah committed themselves to avoid targeting civilians and using populated areas to launch attacks. The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG), co-chaired by France and the United States, with Syria, Lebanon, and Israel all represented, was set up to implement the Understanding and assess reports of violations. ILMG ceased operations following the May 2000 Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon.

On May 23, 2000, the Israeli military carried out a total withdrawal of Israeli troops from the south and the Bekaa Valley, effectively ending 22 years of occupation. The SLA collapsed and about 6,000 SLA members and their families fled the country, although more than 3,000 had returned by November 2003. The military court tried all of the SLA operatives who remained in the country and the average sentence handed down was 1-year imprisonment.

On June 16, 2000, the UN Security Council adopted the report of the Secretary General verifying Israeli compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 425 (1978) and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to their side of the demarcated Lebanese-Israeli line of separation (the "Blue Line") mapped out by UN cartographers. (The international border between Lebanon and Israel is still to be determined in the framework of a peace agreement.) In August 2000, the Government of Lebanon deployed over 1,000 police and soldiers to the former security zone, but Hezbollah also maintained observation posts and conducted patrols along the Blue Line. While Lebanon and Syria initially agreed to respect the Blue Line, both since have registered objections and continue

center of Lebanese politics for decades. Those religious groups most favored by the 1943 formula sought to preserve it, while those who saw themselves at a disadvantage sought either to revise it after updating key demographic data or to abolish it entirely. Nonetheless, many of the provisions of the national pact were codified in the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, perpetuating sectarianism as a key element of Lebanese political life.

Although moderated somewhat under Ta'if, constitutionally, the president has a strong and influential position. The president has the authority to promulgate laws passed by the Chamber of Deputies, to issue supplementary regulations to ensure the execution of laws, and to negotiate and ratify treaties.

The Chamber of Deputies is elected by adult suffrage (majority age is 21) based on a system of proportional representation for the various confessional groups. Political blocs are usually based on confessional and local interests or on personal/family allegiance rather than on left/right policy orientations.

The parliament traditionally has played a significant role in financial affairs, since it has the responsibility for levying taxes and passing the budget. It also exercises political control over the cabinet through formal questioning of ministers on policy issues and by requesting a confidence debate.

Lebanon's judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. Juries are not used in trials. The Lebanese court system has three levels--courts of first instance, courts of appeal, and the court of cassation. There also is a system of religious courts having jurisdiction over personal status matters within particular religious communities, e.g., rules on such matters as marriage, divorce,

to argue that Israel has not fully withdrawn from Lebanese soil. As regional tension escalated with the Palestinian *intifada* in September 2000, Hezbollah cited Blue Line discrepancies when it reengaged Israel on October 7, taking three Israeli soldiers captive in an area known as Sheba'a Farms. (In 2001, the Israeli Government declared the three soldiers were believed to be dead.) Sheba'a Farms, a largely unpopulated area just south of the Blue Line opposite the Lebanese town of Sheba'a, was captured by Israel when it occupied Syria's Golan Heights in 1967. The Lebanese Government has repeatedly laid claim to the area since shortly before Israel's general withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Syrian Government has verbally stated that the Sheba'a Farms tract is Lebanese, but, as with the rest of the Lebanon-Syria border, has been unwilling to commit to a formal border demarcation in the area. As a result of secret mediation by the German Government, Israel released a number of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in early 2004 in exchange for Elhanan Tannenbaum, an Israeli reservist abducted by Hezbollah in late 2000.

In January 2000 the government took action against Sunni Muslim extremists in the north who had attacked its soldiers, and it continues to act against groups such as Asbat al-Ansar, which has been linked to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaida network, and other extremists. On January 24, 2002, Elie Hobeika, a former Lebanese Forces figure associated with the Sabra and Shatila massacres and who later served in three cabinets and the parliament, was assassinated in a car bombing in Beirut.

A September 2004 vote by the Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution to extend President Lahoud's term in office by 3 years amplified the question of Lebanese sovereignty and the continuing Syrian presence. The vote was clearly taken under Syrian pressure, exercised in part through Syria's military intelligence service, whose chief in Lebanon had acted as a virtual proconsul for many years. Syria, which views Lebanon as part of its own territory, has not signed a boundary agreement with Lebanon and does not have normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon. The UN Security Council expressed its concern over the situation by passing Resolution 1559, also in September 2004, which called for withdrawal of all remaining foreign forces from Lebanon, disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout the country, and a free and fair electoral process in the presidential election.

Syrian Withdrawal--2005

Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, who had resisted Syria's effort to secure Lahoud's extension, and 19 others were assassinated in Beirut by a car bomb on February 14, 2005. The assassination spurred massive protests in Beirut and international pressure that led to the withdrawal of the remaining Syrian military troops from Lebanon on April 26. In the months that followed Hariri's assassination, journalist Samir Qassir, Lebanese politician George Hawi, and journalist Gebran Tueni were murdered by car bombs, and Defense Minister Elias Murr and journalist May Chidiac narrowly avoided a similar fate when they were targeted with car bombs. The UN International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC) headed by Detlev Mehlis began an investigation of Hariri's assassination and related crimes, beginning with the October 2004 attempt to assassinate Communications Minister Marwan Hamadeh. Serge Brammertz took over the investigation at the beginning of 2006. In December 2006, the Lebanese Cabinet approved an agreement with the UN Security Council to create a Special Tribunal of international character which will be responsible for trying those who may be indicted as a result of the investigation. President Lahoud, Parliament Speaker Berri, and the Shia ministers who resigned from Lebanon's cabinet in November 2006 do not recognize the cabinet's decision on this matter, however.

Parliamentary elections were held May 29-June 19, 2005 and the anti-Syrian opposition led by Sa'ad Hariri, Rafiq Hariri's son, won a majority of 72 seats (out of 128). Hariri ally and former Finance Minister Fouad Siniora was named Prime Minister and Nabih Berri was reelected as Speaker of Parliament. Parliament approved the first "made-in-Lebanon" cabinet in almost 30 years on July 30. The ministerial statement of the new cabinet (which

and inheritance.

US-LEBANESE RELATIONS

The United States seeks to maintain its traditionally close ties with Lebanon, and to help preserve its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. The United States, along with the international community, supports full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, including the disarming of all militias and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces throughout Lebanon. The United States believes that a peaceful, prosperous, and stable Lebanon can make an important contribution to comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

One measure of U.S. concern and involvement has been a program of relief, rehabilitation, and recovery that from 1975 through 2005 totaled more than $400 million in aid to Lebanon. For relief, recovery, rebuilding, and security in the wake of the 2006 war, the U.S. Government substantially stepped up this program, pledging well over $1 billion in additional assistance for the 2006 and 2007 fiscal years. This support reflects not only humanitarian concerns and historical ties but also the importance the United States attaches to sustainable development and the restoration of an independent, sovereign, unified Lebanon. Some of current funding is used to support the activities of U.S. and Lebanese private voluntary organizations engaged in rural and municipal development programs nationwide, improve the economic climate for global trade and investment, and enhance security and resettlement in south Lebanon. The U.S. also supports humanitarian demining and victims' assistance programs.

Over the years, the United States also has assisted the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the Lebanese American University

included two Hezbollah ministers), a summary of the new government's agenda and priorities, focused on political and economic reform, but also endorsed Hezbollah's right to possess military weapons to carry out a "national resistance" against the perceived Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory.

Hezbollah forces continued to launch sporadic military strikes on Israeli forces, drawing responses that produced casualties on both sides and, on two occasions in 2001, Israeli air strikes on Syrian radar sites in Lebanon. Israel continues to violate Lebanese sovereignty by conducting overflights of Lebanese territory north of the Blue Line. UNIFIL has recorded numerous violations of the Blue Line by both sides since the Israeli withdrawal. In general, however, the level of violence along the Israeli-Lebanon front decreased dramatically from May 2000 until mid-2006.

War with Israel--2006

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah guerillas crossed into Israel, killed three Israeli soldiers, and kidnapped two others, precipitating a war with Israel. Israeli air strikes hit Hezbollah positions in the south and strategic targets throughout Lebanon, and Israeli ground forces ground forces moved against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah resisted the ground attack and fired thousands of rockets at civilian targets in Israel. By the time the war ended, on Aug. 14, an estimated 1200 Lebanese civilians and hundreds of Hezbollah fighters had died, along with 119 Israeli military and 43 Israeli civilians. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the war, provided for a ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal and lifting of blockades, disarming of Hezbollah and other militias, and a ban on unauthorized weapons transfers into Lebanon. UNSCR 1701 also significantly strengthened UNIFIL's mandate and authorized its enlargement from about 2,000 initially up to a maximum of 15,000. Bolstered by UNIFIL, which by the beginning of 2007 had more than 11,000 personnel, the Lebanese Armed Forces deployed to southern Lebanon and the border with Israel for the first time in almost four decades.

The war temporarily or permanently displaced roughly one-fourth of Lebanon's population, and caused enormous damage to homes, businesses, and infrastructure. The country, which was already seriously indebted, suffered roughly $5 billion in damages and financial losses. The international community provided massive humanitarian relief, plus substantial aid for economic reconstruction and reform, with $940 million in aid pledged at an August 31, 2006 donors conference in Stockholm and $7.6 billion in pledges announced at a Paris conference January 25, 2007. Aid pledged in Paris was to be coordinated with the Lebanese Government's program for fiscal and economic reform.

Although Syria withdrew its military forces from Lebanon, intelligence assets remained, and Syria continues to have a strong influence in Lebanese politics. In November 2006, as Siniora's cabinet neared approval of the Hariri tribunal, pro-Syrian ministers, including all the Shi'ite ministers, withdrew from the cabinet. Led by Hezbollah, pro-Syrian forces began months of massive demonstrations, sit-ins, and occasional violence with the aim of either paralyzing or bringing down the cabinet. Minister of Industry Pierre Gemayel, son of ex-president Amin Gemayel, was assassinated November 21.

POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Lebanese political institutions often play a secondary role to highly confessionalized personality-based politics. Powerful families also still play an independent role in mobilizing votes for both local and parliamentary elections. Nonetheless, a lively panoply of domestic political parties, some even predating independence, still exists. The largest are all confessional based. The Phalange, National Bloc, National Liberal Party, Lebanese Forces and Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) are overwhelmingly Christian parties. Amal and Hezbollah are the

(LAU) with budget support and student scholarships. Assistance also has been provided to the Lebanese-American Community School (ACS) and the International College (IC).

1993, the U.S. resumed the International Military Education and Training program in Lebanon to help bolster the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)--the country's only nonsectarian national institution--and reinforce the importance of civilian control of the military. Sales of excess defense articles (EDA) resumed in 1991 and have allowed the LAF to enhance both its transportation and communications capabilities, which were severely degraded during the civil war. Security assistance to both the LAF and the Internal Security Forces (ISF) increased significantly after the 2006 war, in order to support the democratically elected Government of Lebanon as it carries out the requirements of UNSCR 1701 and asserts its sovereignty over the whole of Lebanese territory.

Principal Government Officials
President--Emile Lahoud
Prime Minister--Fouad Siniora
Speaker of Parliament--Nabih Berri
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Fawzi Salloukh (resigned--resignation not accepted)
Finance Minister--Jihad Azour
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister--Elias Murr
Ambassador to the U.S.--Antoine Chedid
Ambassadorto the UN--Nawaf Salam



main rivals for the organized Shi'a vote, and the PSP (Progressive Socialist Party) is the leading Druze party. In the recent parliamentary elections, an anti-Syrian opposition coalition ("March 14") emerged, led by Sa'ad Hariri's predominantly Sunni Future Movement and allied with Druze leader Jumblatt, the Qornet Shehwan coalition of center-right Christian politicians, Samir Geagea's mostly Maronite Lebanese Forces, and Elias Attallah's Democratic Left secular movement. In addition to domestic parties, there are branches of pan-Arab secular parties (Ba'ath, socialist and communist parties) that were active in the 1960s and throughout the period of civil war.

There are differences both between and among Muslim and Christian parties regarding the role of religion in state affairs. There is a very high degree of political activism among religious leaders across the sectarian spectrum. The interplay for position and power among the religious, political, and party leaders and groups produces a political tapestry of extraordinary complexity.

In the past, the system worked to produce a viable democracy. The civil war resulted in greater segregation across the confessional spectrum. Whether in political parties, places of residence, schools, media outlets, even workplaces, there is a lack of regular interaction across sectarian lines to facilitate the exchange of views and promote understanding.

Some Christians favor political and administrative decentralization of the government, with separate Muslim and Christian sectors operating within the framework of a confederation. Muslims, for the most part, prefer a unified, central government with an enhanced share of power commensurate with their larger share of the population. The trajectory of the Ta'if Agreement points towards a non-confessional system, but there has been no real movement in this direction in the decade and a half since Ta'if.

Palestinian refugees, predominantly Sunni Muslims, who numbered 405,525 in 2006 according to UNWRA, are not active on the domestic political scene. Nonetheless, they constitute an important minority whose naturalization/settlement in Lebanon is vigorously opposed by most Lebanese, who see them as a threat to Lebanon's delicate confessional balance. During 2002, parliament enacted legislation banning Palestinians from owning property in Lebanon. The Labor Ministry opened up professions previously closed to Palestinians in June 2005. The number of recent Iraqi refugees numbers in the tens of thousands and is believed to be growing.

ECONOMY

Lebanon has a free-market economy and a strong laissez-faire commercial tradition. The Lebanese economy is service-oriented; main growth sectors include banking and tourism. According to the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade, Lebanon posted 5% real growth in 2004, with inflation running at 3%. There are no restrictions on foreign exchange or capital movement, and bank secrecy is strictly enforced. Lebanon has adopted a law to combat money laundering. There are practically no restrictions on foreign investment; however, the investment climate suffers from red tape, corruption, arbitrary licensing decisions, high taxes, tariffs, and fees, archaic legislation, and a lack of adequate protection of intellectual property. There are no country-specific U.S. trade sanctions against Lebanon.

Lebanon embarked on a massive reconstruction program in 1992 to rebuild the country's physical and social infrastructure devastated by both the long civil war (1975-90) and the Israeli occupation of the south (1978-2000). In addition, the delicate social balance and the near-dissolution of central government institutions during the civil war handicapped the state as it sought to capture revenues to fund the recovery effort. Monetary stabilization coupled with high interest rate policies aggravated the debt service burden, leading to a substantial



rise in budget deficits. Thus, the government accumulated significant debt, which by 2005 had reached $36 billion, or 185% of GDP. Unemployment is estimated at 18% officially, but in the absence of reliable statistics, some estimate it could be as high as 20-25%.

The government also has maintained a firm commitment to the Lebanese pound, which has been pegged to the dollar since September 1999. The government passed an Investment Development Law as well as laws for the privatization of the telecom and the electricity sector, signed the Euro-Med Partnership Agreement with the European Union (EU) in March 2003, and is working toward accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). In order to increase revenues, the government introduced a 10% value added tax (VAT) that became applicable in February 2002 and a 5% tax that became applicable in February 2003.

Plagued by mounting indebtedness, Lebanon submitted a comprehensive program on its financing needs at the Paris II donors conference in November 2002 and succeeded in attracting pledges totaling $4.4 billion, including $3.1 billion to support fiscal adjustment and $1.2 billion to support economic development projects. Despite the substantial aid it had received, the government made little progress on its reform program, and by 2006, even before the war, the debt problem had grown worse. After the war, $940 million in relief and early reconstruction aid was pledged to Lebanon August 31, 2006 at a donors conference in Stockholm, and an additional $7.6 billion in assistance for reconstruction and economic stabilization was pledged January 25, 2007 at the International Conference for Support to Lebanon, "Paris III". Unlike the Paris II aid, much of the Paris III aid was to be contingent on Lebanon's meeting agreed benchmarks in implementing its proposed five-year economic and social reform program. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to initiate a Post-Conflict Program and to assign a team to Lebanon to provide technical assistance, to monitor the progress of reforms, and to advise donors on the timing of aid delivery.

The U.S. enjoys a strong exporter position with Lebanon, generally ranking as Lebanon's fifth-largest source of imported goods. More than 160 offices representing U.S. businesses currently operate in Lebanon. Since the lifting of the passport restriction in 1997 (see below), a number of large U.S. companies have opened branch or regional offices, including Microsoft, American Airlines, Coca-Cola, FedEx, UPS, General Electric, Parsons Brinkerhoff, Cisco, Eli Lilly, and Pepsi Cola.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The foreign policy of Lebanon reflects its geographic location, the composition of its population, and its reliance on commerce and trade. Lebanon's foreign policy has been heavily influenced by neighboring Syria, which has also long influenced Lebanon's internal policies as well. Reflecting lingering feelings in Syria that Lebanon was unjustly separated from Syria by European powers, Syria and Lebanon have never formally agreed on their mutual boundaries, and, rather than having normal diplomatic relations, the two countries are linked by a Higher Council for Bilateral Relations. Syria has no embassy or equivalent office in Beirut, while Lebanon has an "Interest Office" in Damascus. The framework for relations was first codified in May 1991, when Lebanon and Syria signed a treaty of mutual cooperation. This treaty came out of the Ta'if Agreement, which stipulated "Lebanon is linked to Syria by distinctive ties deriving strength from kinship, history, and common interests." The Lebanese-Syria treaty calls for "coordination and cooperation between the two countries" that would serve the "interests of the two countries within the framework of sovereignty and independence of each." Numerous agreements on political, economic, security, and judicial affairs have followed over the years. Syria maintained troops in Lebanon from 1976 until 2005; however, even after the withdrawal of Syria's military troops, it is believed to have maintained intelligence assets in Lebanon. In any case, Syrian influence in Lebanese politics remains strong.



Lebanon, like most Arab states, does not recognize Israel, with which it has been technically at war since Israel's establishment. Lebanon participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and despite the 1948 Lebanon-Israel armistice, Lebanon's lack of control over the border region resulted in repeated border hostilities, initiated mainly by Palestinian exile groups from 1968 to 1982 and later by Hezbollah. These attacks led to Israeli counterattacks, including a 1978 invasion, a 1982 invasion and occupation which ended in 2000, and the 2006 war. Lebanon did not participate in the 1967 or 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, nor in the 1991 Gulf War. The success of the latter created new opportunities for Middle East peacemaking. In October 1991, under the sponsorship of the United States and the then-Soviet Union, Middle East peace talks were held in Madrid, Spain, where Israel and a majority of its Arab neighbors conducted direct bilateral negotiations to seek a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (and 425 on Lebanon) and the concept of "land for peace." Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and representatives of the Palestinians continued negotiating until the Oslo interim peace accords were concluded between Israel and the Palestinians in September 1993 and Jordan and Israel signed an agreement in October 1994. In March 1996, Syria and Israel held another round of Madrid talks; the Lebanon track did not convene. Lebanon has repeatedly called for a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian problem as a prerequisite to peace with Israel.

Lebanon concluded negotiations on an association agreement with the European Union in late 2001, and both sides initialed the accord in January 2002. Lebanon also has bilateral trade agreements with several Arab states and is working toward accession to the World Trade Organization. Aside from Syria, Lebanon enjoys good relations with virtually all of the other Arab countries (despite historic tensions with Libya, the Palestinians, and Iraq), and hosted an Arab League Summit in March 2002 for the first time in more than 35 years. Lebanon also is a member of the Organization of Islamic Conference and maintains a close relationship with Iran, largely centered on Shi'a Muslim links. Lebanon is a member of the Francophone countries and hosted the Francophone Summit in October 2002.

Kingdom of Jordan

Geography
Area: 89,342 sq. km. (34,495 sq. mi.).
Cities: *Capital* -- Amman (pop. 1.9 million).
Other cities --Irbid (272,681), Az-Zarqa (472,830).


People
Nationality: *Noun and adjective* -- Jordanian(s).
Population (2006, per IMF): 5.63 million.
Religions (est.): Sunni Muslim 95%, Christian 4%, other 1%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English.
Education (2006, according to Jordan's Department of Statistics):
Literacy --90.9%.
Health (2003): *Infant mortality rate* --19/1,000.
Life expectancy --71 yrs.
Ethnic groups: Mostly Arab but small communities of Circassians, Armenians, and Kurds.
Work force (1.3 million, of which 260 thousand are registered guest workers): public sector 17%, services 36%, manufacturing 20%, education 12%, health and social services 10%, primary industries 5%.
Unemployment rate (2006): 13% of



economically active Jordanians.

Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy.
Independence: May 25, 1946.
Constitution: January 8, 1952.
Branches:
Executive --King (chief of state), Prime Minister (head of government), Council of Ministers (cabinet).
Legislative --bicameral National Assembly (appointed Senate, elected Chamber of Deputies).
Judicial --civil, religious, special courts.
Political parties: Wide spectrum of parties legalized in 1992.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.
Administrative subdivisions: Twelve governorates--Irbid, Jarash, Ajloun, al-'Aqaba, Madaba, al-Mafraq, al-Zarqa, Amman, al-Balqa, al-Karak, al-Tafilah, and Ma'an.

Economy
Nominal GDP (2006): $14.3 billion.
Annual real growth rate (2006): 6.4%.
Per capita GDP (2006): $2,533.
Natural resources: Phosphate, potash.
Agriculture:
Products --fruits, vegetables, wheat, olive oil, barley, olives. *Land* --10% arable; 5% cultivated.
Industry (26.5% of GDP in 2006):
Types --phosphate mining, manufacturing, electricity and water; cement and petroleum production, and construction.
Trade: *Exports* (2006)--$5.17 billion: phosphates, potash, garments, fertilizers, pharmaceutical products, agricultural products. *Major markets* --U.S., Iraq,



POLITICAL CONDITIONS
King Hussein ruled Jordan from 1953 to 1999, surviving a number of challenges to his rule, drawing on the loyalty of his military, and serving as a symbol of unity and stability for both the East Bank and Palestinian communities in Jordan. In 1989 and 1993, Jordan held free and fair parliamentary elections. Controversial changes in the election law led Islamist parties to boycott the 1997 elections. King Hussein ended martial law in 1991 and legalized political parties in 1992.

King Abdullah II succeeded his father Hussein following the latter's death in February 1999. Abdullah moved quickly to reaffirm Jordan's peace treaty with Israel and its relations with the U.S. Abdullah, during his first year in power, refocused the government's agenda on economic reform.

Jordan's continuing structural economic difficulties, burgeoning population, and more open political environment led to the emergence of a variety of political parties. Moving toward greater independence, Jordan's Parliament has investigated corruption charges against several regime figures and has become the major forum in which differing political views, including those of political Islamists, are expressed. In June 2001, the King dissolved Parliament. Parliamentary elections were held in June 2003, and municipal elections were held in July 2003. The King appointed the current Prime Minister, Marouf Bakhit, in December 2005. Bakhit and his cabinet have set as their goal the continued legislative implementation of a ten-year reform plan, known as the National Agenda, drafted by a royal commission in 2005. The King also charged the new cabinet with strengthening Jordan's security following the November 2005 suicide hotel bombings in Amman that killed 60.

ECONOMY
Jordan is a small country with limited natural resources. The country is currently exploring ways to expand its limited water supply and use its existing water resources more efficiently, including through regional cooperation. Jordan also depends on external sources for the majority of its energy requirements. During the 1990s, its crude petroleum needs were met through imports from neighboring Iraq. Since early 2003, oil has been provided by some Gulf Cooperation Council member countries. In addition, a natural gas pipeline from Egypt to Jordan through the southern port city of Aqaba is now operational. The pipeline has reached northern Jordan and construction to connect it to Syria and beyond is underway.

India, Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Syria, Israel, Kuwait. *Imports* (2006)--$11.46 billion: crude petroleum and derivatives, vehicles, machinery and equipment, cereals, fabrics and textiles. *Major suppliers* -- Saudi Arabia (mainly crude oil and derivatives), EU, China, U.S., Egypt, South Korea, Japan, Turkey.

Note: From 1949 to 1967, Jordan administered the West Bank. Since the 1967 war, when Israel took control of this territory, the United States has considered the West Bank to be territory occupied by Israel. The United States believes that the final status of the West Bank can be determined only through negotiations among the concerned parties based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

PEOPLE

Jordanians are Arabs, except for a few small communities of Circassians, Armenians, and Kurds who have adapted to Arab culture. The official language is Arabic, but English is used widely in commerce and government. About 70% of Jordan's population is urban; less than 6% of the rural population is nomadic or semi-nomadic. Most of the population lives where rainfall can support agriculture. Approximately 1.7 million registered Palestinian refugees and other displaced persons reside in Jordan, many as citizens.

HISTORY

The land that became Jordan is part of the richly historical Fertile Crescent region. Around 2000 B.C., Semitic Amorites settled around the Jordan River in the area called Canaan. Subsequent invaders and settlers included Hittites,

Under King Abdullah, Jordan has undertaken a program of economic reform. The government has taken the initiative to gradually eliminate fuel subsidies, pass legislation targeting corruption, and begin tax reform. It has also worked to liberalize trade, gaining access to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000, signing an Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) in 2001, and securing the first bilateral Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and an Arab country in 2001. Since 2000, exports of light manufactured products, principally textiles and garments manufactured in the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) that enter the United States tariff and quota free, have been driving economic growth. Jordan exported $6.9 million in goods to the U. S. in 1997, when two-way trade was $395 million; according to the U.S. International Trade Commission, it exported $1.42 billion in 2006, with two-way trade at $2.07 billion.

The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States that went into effect in December 2001 will phase out duties on nearly all goods and services by 2010. The agreement also provides for more open markets in communications, construction, finance, health, transportation, and services, as well as strict application of international standards for the protection of intellectual property. In 1996, Jordan and the United States signed a civil aviation agreement that provides for "open skies" between the two countries, and a U.S.-Jordan treaty for the protection and encouragement of bilateral investment entered into force in 2003. More information on the FTA is available on www.jordanusfta.com.

Such developments hold considerable promise for diversifying Jordan's economy away from its traditional reliance on exports of phosphates and potash, overseas remittances, and foreign aid. The government has emphasized the information technology (IT) and tourism sectors as other promising growth sectors. The low tax and low regulation Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) is considered a model of a government-provided framework for private sector-led economic growth.

Jordan is classified by the World Bank as a "lower middle income country." The per capita GDP, as reported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was $2,533 for 2006. According to Jordan's Department of Statistics, 13% of the economically active Jordanian population residing in Jordan was unemployed in 2006. Education and literacy rates and measures of social well-being are relatively high compared to other countries with similar incomes. Jordan's population growth rate has declined in recent years and is currently 2.3% as reported by the Jordanian government. One of the most important factors in the government's efforts to improve the well-being of its citizens is the macroeconomic stability that has been achieved since the 1990s. The rate of inflation in 2006 was 6.3%; the currency has been stable with an exchange rate fixed to the U.S. dollar since 1995 at JD 0.708-0.710 to the dollar. In 2006, Jordan significantly reduced its debt to GDP ratio to 73.2% of GDP.

While pursuing economic reform and increased trade, Jordan's economy will continue to be vulnerable to external shocks and regional unrest. Without calm in the region, economic growth seems destined to stay below its potential.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Jordan has consistently followed a pro-Western foreign policy and traditionally has had close relations with the United States. These relations were damaged by support in Jordan for Iraq during the first Gulf war. Although the Government of Jordan stated its opposition to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, popular support for Iraq was driven by Jordan's Palestinian community, which favored Saddam as a champion against Western supporters of Israel.

Egyptians, Israelites, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arab Muslims, Christian Crusaders, Mameluks, Ottoman Turks, and, finally, the British. At the end of World War I, the League of Nations awarded the territory now comprising Israel, Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem to the United Kingdom as the mandate for Palestine and Transjordan. In 1922, the British divided the mandate by establishing the semiautonomous Emirate of Transjordan, ruled by the Hashemite Prince Abdullah, while continuing the administration of Palestine under a British High Commissioner. The mandate over Transjordan ended on May 22, 1946; on May 25, the country became the independent Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan. It ended its special defense treaty relationship with the United Kingdom in 1957.

Transjordan was one of the Arab states which moved to assist Palestinian nationalists opposed to the creation of Israel in May 1948, and took part in the warfare between the Arab states and the newly founded State of Israel. The armistice agreements of April 3, 1949 left Jordan in control of the West Bank and provided that the armistice demarcation lines were without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines.

In 1950, the country was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to include those portions of Palestine annexed by King Abdullah I. While recognizing Jordanian administration over the West Bank, the United States maintained the position that ultimate sovereignty was subject to future agreement.

Jordan signed a mutual defense pact in May 1967 with Egypt, and it participated

Following the first Gulf war, Jordan largely restored its relations with Western countries through its participation in the Middle East peace process and enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq. Relations between Jordan and the Gulf countries improved substantially after King Hussein's death. Following the fall of the Iraqi regime, Jordan has played a pivotal role in supporting the restoration of stability and security to Iraq. The Government of Jordan has facilitated the training of over 50,000 Iraqi police cadets at a Jordanian facility near Amman.

Jordan signed a nonbelligerency agreement with Israel (the Washington Declaration) in Washington, DC, on July 25, 1994. Jordan and Israel signed a historic peace treaty on October 26, 1994, witnessed by President Clinton, accompanied by Secretary Christopher. The U.S. has participated with Jordan and Israel in trilateral development discussions in which key issues have been water-sharing and security; cooperation on Jordan Rift Valley development; infrastructure projects; and trade, finance, and banking issues. Jordan also participates in multilateral peace talks. Jordan belongs to the UN and several of its specialized and related agencies, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Meteorological Organization (IMO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and World Health Organization (WHO). Jordan also is a member of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Nonaligned Movement, and Arab League.

Since the outbreak of the Intifada in September 2000, Jordan has worked to maintain lines of communication between the Israelis and the Palestinians to counsel moderation and to return the parties to negotiations of outstanding permanent status issues.

During summer 2006, Jordan provided considerable relief supplies to Lebanon and has supported U.S. efforts to generate international security assistance for Lebanese national forces.

U.S.-JORDANIAN RELATIONS

Relations between the U.S. and Jordan have been close for over four decades. A primary objective of U.S. policy has been the achievement of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East.

U.S. policy seeks to reinforce Jordan's commitment to peace, stability, and moderation. The peace process and Jordan's opposition to terrorism parallel and indirectly assist wider U.S. interests. Accordingly, through economic and military assistance and through close political cooperation, the United States has helped Jordan maintain its stability and prosperity.

Since 1952, the United States has provided Jordan with economic assistance totaling more than $9 billion ($1.3 billion in loans and $7.7 billion in grants), including funds for development projects, health care, education, construction to increase water availability, support for microeconomic policy shifts toward a more completely free market system, and both grant and loan acquisition of U.S. agriculture commodities. These programs have been successful and have contributed to Jordanian stability while strengthening the bilateral relationship. U.S. military assistance--provision of material and training--is designed to meet Jordan's legitimate defense needs, including preservation of border integrity and regional stability. Jordan signed a Threshold Agreement with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in October 2006, and was subsequently deemed by the MCC to be eligible for a Compact Agreement in recognition of the country's progress on economic, social, and political reform indicators.

in the June 1967 war between Israel and the Arab states of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. During the war, Israel gained control of the West Bank and all of Jerusalem. In 1988, Jordan renounced all claims to the West Bank but retained an administrative role pending a final settlement, and its 1994 treaty with Israel allowed for a continuing Jordanian role in Muslim holy places in Jerusalem. The U.S. Government considers the West Bank to be territory occupied by Israel and believes that its final status should be determined through direct negotiations among the parties concerned on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The 1967 war led to a dramatic increase in the number of Palestinians living in Jordan. Its Palestinian refugee population--700,000 in 1966--grew by another 300,000 from the West Bank. The period following the 1967 war saw an upsurge in the power and importance of Palestinian resistance elements (fedayeen) in Jordan. The heavily armed fedayeen constituted a growing threat to the sovereignty and security of the Hashemite state, and open fighting erupted in June 1970.

No fighting occurred along the 1967 Jordan River cease-fire line during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, but Jordan sent a brigade to Syria to fight Israeli units on Syrian territory. Jordan did not participate in the Gulf war of 1990-91. In 1991, Jordan agreed, along with Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian representatives, to participate in direct peace negotiations with Israel sponsored by the U.S. and Russia. It negotiated an end to hostilities with Israel and signed a peace treaty in 1994. Jordan has since sought to remain at peace with all of its

GOVERNMENT

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on the constitution promulgated on January 8, 1952. Executive authority is vested in the King and his Council of Ministers. The King signs and executes all laws. His veto power may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the National Assembly. He appoints and may dismiss all judges by decree, approves amendments to the constitution, declares war, and commands the armed forces. Cabinet decisions, court judgments, and the national currency are issued in his name. The King, who may dismiss other cabinet members at the prime minister's request, appoints the council of ministers, led by a prime minister. The cabinet is responsible to the Chamber of Deputies on matters of general policy and can be forced to resign by a two-thirds vote of "no confidence" by that body.

Legislative power rests in the bicameral National Assembly. The number of deputies in the current Chamber of Deputies is 110, with a number of seats reserved for various religions, ethnicities, and women. The Chamber, elected by universal suffrage to a 4-year term, is subject to dissolution by the King. The King appoints the 55-member Senate for a 4-year term. Parliamentary elections are scheduled to be held in the fall of 2007.

The constitution provides for three categories of courts--civil, religious, and special. Administratively, Jordan is divided into 12 governorates, each headed by a governor appointed by the King. They are the sole authorities for all government departments and development projects in their respective areas.


Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador--David M. Hale
Deputy Chief of Mission--Daniel Rubinstein
Political Affairs--David Greene
Economic Affairs--Natalie Brown
Consular Affairs--Rena Bitter
Management Affairs--Perry Adair
Public Affairs--Phillip Frayne
Commercial Counselor--Sheryl Maas



neighbors.

Principal Government Officials
Chief of State--King Abdullah bin al-Hussein II
Prime Minister--Marouf Bakhit
Minister of Defense--Marouf Bakhit
Foreign Minister--Abdelelah al-Khatib
Ambassador to the U.S.--Prince Zeid bin Ra'ad
Ambassador to the UN--Charge d'affaires Bashir Zubi



Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

Back / Home / E-Mail

Jerusalem Letter / Viewpoints

No. 472 3 Adar 5762 / 15 February 2002

THE WAY TO PEACE EMERGED AT MADRID: A DECADE SINCE THE 1991 MADRID CONFERENCE

Eytan Bentsur

The Successes of Madrid / Preparing for Madrid / The Vision of a Comprehensive Peace / In the Aftermath of the Gulf War / The Principles of Madrid / A New Era of Normalization / Oslo Derails the Comprehensive Track / A Code of Conduct for Negotiations

The Successes of Madrid

The October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference represented a breakthrough in relations between the State of Israel and the Arab world. For the first time, Israel engaged in direct, face-to-face negotiations with all its immediate neighbors, and not just with Egypt, with whom Israel had signed a peace treaty in 1979. These talks were between the political leaders of the region, unlike the armistice discussions that Israel undertook in the late 1940s and 1950s. Madrid also launched a multilateral process that brought Israeli diplomats into contact with representatives of Arab states from North Africa and the Persian Gulf.

The Madrid process sought to take into account the aspirations of the parties, their security requirements, their readiness for mutual reconciliation, and, most of all, their reciprocal need to compromise. It

also institutionalized regular contact between Israel and the Arab states that created bridges for eventual understandings in the future.

More importantly, **it created the framework for direct negotiations and, thereby, launched the Middle East peace process.** Such regular lines of communication were the best guarantee for regional stability and the avoidance of miscalculation in the future. Unfortunately, for now the successes of Madrid have been swept away by the collapse of the Oslo process. But Madrid's careful approach should be recalled and even re-established in the future, taking into account the new conditions that have arisen in the Middle East.

Preparing for Madrid

The diplomatic arena was active before the convening of the Madrid Conference but yielded no concrete results. The main point of contention was over the composition of the Palestinian delegation that would negotiate with Israel, against the backdrop of the end of the first "intifada."

The diplomatic discussions before Madrid focused on the content of procedure and the procedure of content. Every procedural concession was viewed by both sides to imply a concession in substance. Israel demanded exclusion from the Palestinian delegation of PLO representatives, Arabs from east Jerusalem, and Palestinian exiles. Jerusalem, Washington, and Cairo dealt with this problem, and the argument extended to the Israeli government, resulting in the Labor party leaving the coalition.

The U.S., for its part -- particularly Secretary of State George Shultz by way of interlocutors -- acted to remove from the PLO its tiger's stripes and portray it as a body that no longer carried the weapon of terror to advance the peace process. Indeed, it was during the final days of the Reagan administration, in December 1988, that the U.S. formally opened a dialogue with the PLO after Yasser Arafat announced his renunciation of violence and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. This happened while opinion was growing in Israel that the PLO was losing its grip on the territories and a new local leadership was emerging that was not dependent on the PLO and would be free of its 1964 covenant calling for Israel's elimination.

This pre-Madrid diplomatic activity had trouble rising above the content of procedure. Moreover, by May 1990, the U.S. was compelled to cut off its dialogue with the PLO, after one of its constituent organizations, the Iraqi-based Palestinian Liberation Front, launched an attack on Israeli beaches from the sea.

The Vision of a Comprehensive Peace

All these efforts were missing a vision -- and moved further and further away from a vision -- of what might be beyond the procedural disputes: a comprehensive peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab states. In order to create momentum and break the procedural deadlocks of the pre-Madrid period, a more far-sighted approach was needed which had the full potential to bring the *entire* Middle East to a gradual resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the creation of a stable peace.

After the outbreak of the intifada in December 1987, it had become increasingly accepted to define the Arab-Israel conflict as an Israeli-Palestinian dispute alone. After all, most observers witnessed the drama of the Palestinian clash with Israel on their televisions; network camera crews enjoyed free access to Khan Yunis or Ramallah, but *not* to the pictures that defined the wider Arab-Israel conflict: Iraqi missile preparations, Syrian armored maneuvers, and Hizbullah training camps in Lebanon. Diplomatic initiatives naturally followed this Palestinian-centered definition of the Arab-Israeli conflict -- the wider issues that constituted the real threats to Israel have unfortunately been ignored.

A new initiative to correct this diplomatic myopia came from papers that I prepared in the Foreign Ministry during the period when David Levy served as its minister. At his initiative, the Foreign Ministry developed ideas for combining progress on the Palestinian track with recognition and normalization in relations between Israel and the Arab states.

The essence of this diplomatic approach was to develop a two-track peace process in which progress on the Palestinian front would correspond to progress in relations with the Arab states. The two-track process was supposed to be wrapped in a third track -- the multilateral track -- whose basis was a vision of regional development and finding solutions to major problems (arms control, ecology, water, etc.) that accompany the path to peace. The basic idea was to pursue a full

regional peace in order for Israel to avoid becoming bogged-down in the Palestinian track alone, with no change in its relations with the Arab world.

In the Aftermath of the Gulf War

The full diplomatic initiative was presented to Secretary of State James Baker and his people by Foreign Minister Levy and myself in a series of conversations that, in retrospect, became absorbed into American thinking. This occurred before the Americans launched their own initiative. At the end of the Gulf War, Baker skillfully used the momentum from the formation of an international coalition that included Arab states to start up the peace process on a new basis.

The status of the U.S. after the Gulf War, now as the sole superpower, with determined leadership in the person of Baker, brought a new opportunity to the Middle East. The new global and regional historic setting for a breakthrough was evident first and foremost in the decline and eventual fall of the Soviet Union. This signaled the collapse of support for radicalism in the region and rejectionism of the peace process. The exhaustion of the peoples of the region from war, coupled with loss of military and economic maneuvering room by the Arab states, brought recognition that it was time for the peace process to set out on its way. Baker requested from the beginning that the Gulf War coalition be transformed into a peace coalition -- of which the Madrid Conference was a natural product.

Baker advanced the initiative through an intensive burst of shuttle diplomacy, aggressive and systematic negotiations, grappling with doubts and resistance, marshalling the few who supported this path in Israel, and with a panoply of guarantees, formulations, and formulas. Slowly, the U.S. created conditions for the convening of a conference designed to help the sides reach a lasting peace through direct negotiations both between Israel and the Palestinians and between Israel and the Arab states. These tracks were based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and were in conjunction with multilateral negotiations designed to promote regional development and solve regional problems.

The Principles of Madrid

At the opening of the Madrid Conference on October 30, 1991, President George Bush set forth the principles to advance the Madrid process:

- Negotiations in the Madrid framework were directed toward peace agreements; diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties; and investment in development and tourism.
- Peace will only be achieved through direct negotiations based on give-and-take and territorial compromise.
- Peace cannot be imposed -- it can only come from within the region.
- The process will be two-tracked and the multilateral element will follow.
- The negotiations are supposed to allow the Palestinian people to control their lives and destiny, and, in parallel, ensure the security and recognition of Israel.
- Peace must be based on fairness toward Israel, giving Israel a chance to demonstrate its willingness to establish relations with its Palestinian neighbors on the basis of mutual respect and cooperation.
- President Bush noted that the U.S. would refrain from defining the meaning of a stable settlement in the Middle East or final borders -- but that these borders must promote security and fair diplomatic arrangements.

Prior to Madrid, Israel carefully negotiated a "letter of assurances" from the United States in order to protect its vital interests in any upcoming negotiations. This careful component of pre-Madrid diplomacy was not replicated by those who initiated the later Oslo path.

A New Era of Normalization

The Madrid Peace Conference and the peace process it initiated -- which was conducted with ups and downs until "Oslo" -- created a new reality in the Middle East. In reality, a new light shined on the Middle

East and for the first time the region came closer to the definition of a "New Middle East." "New" in this sense meant that the preoccupation with the details of the Palestinian dilemma was replaced by negotiations between Israel and Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Arab world generally in the widest sense.

The multilateral dimension created hope and a sense of achievable goals that could be reached through determined effort. The region was bursting with hope and ideas for giant projects for the benefit of all its peoples. The dialogue between Israel -- and Israelis -- with representatives of all Arab states accelerated and became commonplace.

The spirit of normalization reigned over everything -- despite difficulties, despite the tough diplomatic positions of our negotiating partners. Israelis were received as desired guests in most Arab capitals. In addition, Madrid strengthened Israel's international position beyond recognition. Diplomatic relations were established or restored between Israel and the Soviet Union, China, and India. Relations were established at different levels of intimacy and cooperation with many Arab countries. The vision of a comprehensive peace seemed to be approaching, even if the road to it was long, gradual, not without setbacks, and fraught with difficult negotiations.

Madrid's participants knew from the beginning that even if the journey down this road had begun, there were no shortcuts to peace. We knew that the Madrid Conference was the starting point of a long road that, on the horizon, would lead to the squaring of circles and the eventual bridging of presently polarized positions in order to forge a comprehensive peace.

Oslo Derails the Comprehensive Track

The Oslo agreement, to a great degree, returned the process to another track, one that placed the Palestinian aspect at the forefront at the expense of the general Arab-Israeli and multilateral tracks. With time, the momentum of normalization that accompanied the Madrid process weakened and then disappeared.

It was noteworthy that, as Israeli negotiators continued to implement Oslo with the September 1995 Interim Agreement, the 1997 Hebron

Protocol, and the 1998 Wye Agreement, the U.S. and Israel failed to generate new parallel breakthroughs between Israel and the Arab world. Israel did not open up new offices in the Gulf region, for example, beyond Qatar and Oman, in Kuwait, Bahrain, or in the UAE. Anti-Israel diplomatic activity continued at the United Nations and in international organizations. The multilateral initiatives begun at Madrid were undermined, withered, and reached a stalemate.

The architects of Oslo who led the negotiations at Camp David will no doubt be intellectually honest enough to note that it would have been better to insist on the spirit of normalization to create an atmosphere for making peace, such as was employed in the Helsinki Final Act and other well-known historic compromises.

A Code of Conduct for Negotiations

Today, as well, those who want peace and are ready for territorial compromise will work toward normalization, and economic, scientific, and medical cooperation. They will also push for joint projects that promote tolerance and mutual respect and that adopt an internationally supervised behavioral code prohibiting incitement, and advancing a peaceful settlement. They will also work to renew the multilateral track in the Madrid framework.

In retrospect, one of the shortcomings of the Oslo period was the absence of this sort of a "code of conduct" or set of rules governing the negotiating process. Clearly, it is unacceptable that violence be permitted to accompany *any* negotiation process, whether direct violence or violence by proxy, like Syria's use of Hizbullah. Moreover, it is unacceptable that Israel and its neighbors decide to resolve their differences *bilaterally*, while at the same time Arab states initiate resolutions in the UN General Assembly that prejudge the outcome of those very same negotiations. A code of conduct addressing these issues should be a part of any negotiating process in the future.

The slow train that started out from Madrid made sense. The peace process was carefully structured. It allowed the parties to stop along the way to verify whether its engine was operating correctly and to check the worthiness of the tracks down the line. This train was exchanged for the fast train of Oslo, that barreled ahead without sufficient attention to blockages and broken tracks along the way. In my view, the slow train

was preferable and would more reliably have reached the destination, while the fast train tended to careen off the tracks. At present, the Oslo train has reached a dead-end. When the negotiations continue, it behooves Israel to insist that many of the principles of Madrid be revived, and to work to restore the atmosphere of great hope that this process brought on its wings.

* * *


Eytan Bentsur is a former Director General of the Foreign Ministry and is the author of *Making Peace*. Today he is a special advisor to the American company Patco.

The *Jerusalem Letter*
and *Jerusalem Letter/*
Viewpoints are published by the
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 13 Tel-Hai St., Jerusalem, Israel; Tel. 972-2-5619281, Fax. 972-2-5619112, Internet: jcpa@netvision.net.il. In U.S.A.: Center for Jewish Community Studies, 1515 Locust St., Suite 703, Philadelphia, PA 19102; Tel. (215) 772-0564, Fax. (215) 772-0566. © Copyright. All rights reserved. ISSN: 0792-7304.


The opinions expressed by the authors of Viewpoints do not necessarily reflect those of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

LOOK AT THE MAPS BELOW TO SEE THE VARIOUS ANGLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Muslim Population of the World



3-D Raised Map of the Middle East Region






MIDDLE EAST
RUSSIA
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Aden
Arabian Sea
GEORGIA
Tbilisi
ARMENIA
Yerevan
AZERBAIJAN
Baku
TURKEY
Ankara
GREECE
Athens
BULGARIA
Sofia
CYPRUS
Nicosia
SYRIA
Damascus
Aleppo
LEBANON
Beirut
ISRAEL
Jerusalem
West Bank
Amman
JORDAN
IRAQ
Baghdad
IRAN
Tehran
Mashhad
Esfahan
Shiraz
Kerman
Abadan
Kuwait
KUWAIT
Basra
EGYPT
Cairo
Alexandria
Port Said
Suez
Aswan
Luxor
WESTERN DESERT
NUBIAN DESERT
SAUDI ARABIA
Riyadh
Medina
Mecca
Yanbu al Bahr
Buraydah
Hafar al Batin
QATAR
Doha
Manama
BAHRAIN
Dubai
Abu Dhabi
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
OMAN
Muscat
RUB AL KHALI
YEMEN
Sanaa
Aden
Al Mukalla
Al Ghaydah
Salalah
Hodeidah
Mocha
ERITREA
Asmara
Massawa
SUDAN
Khartoum
Omdurman
Port Sudan
Wad Madani
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
SOMALIA
Hargeysa
Berbera
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa
Scale 1:21,000,000
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection,
standard parallels 12°N and 38°N
500 Kilometers
500 Miles
Golan Heights is Israeli-occupied Syria.
West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement — permanent status to be determined through further negotiation.
Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital in 1950, but the U.N. the treaty of other countries, maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv.
Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.
803066AI (R02107) 3-04




Israel
Lebanon
Jordan







Oil Fields in the Middle East



Syria



Topographic Map of the Middle East



ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Search

Go

RSS MFA NEWS

MFA newsletter

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

Madrid Letter of Invitation

30 Oct 1991

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

LE ON TO MADRID PEACE
CO
Oc

The n and the Gulf War reshaped the basic political
orde attempt to take advantage of this change, US
Sec r made eight trips to the region in the eight
mon The Madrid Invitation, inviting Israel, Syria,
Leba stinians to an opening conference represents the
resu The invitation, an outcome of compromises by all
side e Madrid process:

having no power to impose solutions
rab states bordering Israel,
ans on 5-year interim self-rule, to be followed by
status
regional issues, like refugees.

The ext of the invitation to the Madrid Peace
Con 91, jointly issued by the U.S. and the Soviet Union:

TEXT:

After extensive consultations with Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians, the United States and the Soviet Union believe that an historic opportunity exists to advance the prospects for genuine peace throughout the region. The United States and the Soviet Union are prepared to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement, through direct negotiations along two tracks, between Israel and the Arab states, and between Israel and the Palestinians, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of this process is real peace.

Toward that end, the president of the U.S. and the president of the USSR invite you to a peace conference, which their countries will co-sponsor, followed immediately by direct negotiations. The conference will be convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991.

President Bush and President Gorbachev request your acceptance of this invitation no later than 6 P.M. Washington time, October 23, 1991, in order to ensure proper organization and preparation of the conference.

Direct bilateral negotiations will begin four days after the opening of the conference. Those parties who wish to attend multilateral negotiations will convene two weeks after the opening of the conference to organize those negotiations. The co-sponsors believe that those negotiations should focus on region-wide issues of water, refugee issues, environment, economic

development, and other subjects of mutual interest.

The co-sponsors will chair the conference which will be held at ministerial level. Governments to be invited include Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians will be invited and attend as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Egypt will be invited to the conference as a participant. The European Community will be a participant in the conference, alongside the United States and the Soviet Union and will be represented by its presidency. The Gulf Cooperation Council will be invited to send its secretary- general to the conference as an observer, and GCC member states will be invited to participate in organizing the negotiations on multilateral issues. The United Nations will be invited to send an observer, representing the secretary-general.

The conference will have no power to impose solutions on the parties or veto agreements reached by them. It will have no authority to make decisions for the parties and no ability to vote on issues of results. The conference can reconvene only with the consent of all the parties.

With respect to negotiations between Israel and Palestinians who are part of the joint Jordanian- Palestinian delegation, negotiations will be conducted in phases, beginning with talks on interim self- government arrangements. These talks will be conducted with the objective of reaching agreement within one year. Once agreed, the interim self-government arrangements will last for a period of five years; beginning the third year of the period of interim self-government arrangements, negotiations will take place on permanent status. These permanent status negotiations, and the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, will take place on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the co-sponsors are committed to making this process succeed. It is their intention to convene the conference and negotiations with those parties who agree to attend.

The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace. Thus, the co-sponsors hope that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences. Indeed, only through such a process can real peace and reconciliation among the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians be achieved. And only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve.

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

Under Secretary Hughes to Leave the Stat... | Daily Press Briefing | What's New

KEYWORD SEARCH GO

Subject Index

petitive Exam Deadline Approaches 2009 Diversity Visa Lottery Program Registration Press: Need To Book State Department Officials?

Home Issues & Press Travel & Business Countries Youth & Education Careers About State Video

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Office of the Historian > Presidents and Secretaries of State Foreign Travels > Secretaries Travel Abroad > List by Secretary

James A. Baker III

January 25, 1989-August 23, 1992

February 10, 1989
Canada
Ottawa
Accompanied President Bush on a working visit.

February 11, 1989
Iceland
Reykjavik
Met with Foreign Minister Hannibalsson.

February 11-12, 1989
United Kingdom
London
Met with Foreign Secretary Howe.

February 12- 14, 1989
Germany, Federal Republic of
Bonn
Discussed modernization of short-range NATO nuclear missiles with Foreign Minister Genscher.

February 13, 1989
Denmark
Copenhagen
Met with Foreign Minister Ellemann-Jensen.

February 13, 1989
Norway
Oslo
Met with Prime Minister Brundtland and Foreign Minister Stoltenberg.

February 14, 1989
Turkey
Ankara
Met with Prime Minister Ozal and Foreign Minister Yilmaz.

February 14, 1989
Greece
Athens
Met with Prime Minister Papandreou and Foreign Minister Papoulias.

February 14-15, 1989
Italy
Rome
Met with Foreign Minister Andreotti.

February 15, 1989
Spain
Madrid
Met with Foreign Minister Fernandez-Ordonez.

February 15, 1989
Portugal
Lisbon
Met with Prime Minister Cavaco Silva and Foreign Minister Pinheiro.

February 15-17, 1989
Belgium
Brussels
Met with Foreign Minister Tindemans and NATO officials.

February 16, 1989
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Met with Prime Minister Santer and Foreign Minister Poos.

February 16, 1989
Netherlands
The Hague
Met with Foreign Minister van den Broek.

February 17, 1989
France
Paris
Met with Prime Minister Rocard and Foreign Minister Dumas.

February 23-25, 1989
Japan
Tokyo
Accompanied President Bush to the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, and to meetings with other attending heads of state and government.

February 25-27,
China, People's Republic of
Beijing
Accompanied President Bush.

February 27, 1989
Korea
Seoul
Accompanied President Bush on an official visit.

March 4-7, 1989
Austria
Vienna
Attended CSCE Meetings on confidence- and security-building measures and conventional armed forces in Europe. Met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

May 9-10, 1989
Finland
Helsinki
Overnight stop en route to Moscow.

May 10-11, 1989
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with President Gorbachev, senior Soviet officials, and human rights activists.

May 11-12, 1989
Belgium
Brussels
Briefed NATO Foreign Ministers on his visit to Moscow.

May 26-28, 1989
Italy
Rome
Accompanied President Bush. Also met with South African Foreign Minister Botha.

May 27, 1989
Vatican City
Audience with Pope John Paul II.

May 28-30, 1989
Belgium
Brussels
Accompanied President Bush to NATO Summit Meeting.

May 30-31, 1989
Germany, Federal Republic of
Bonn
Accompanied President Bush.

May 31-June 2, 1989
United Kingdom
London
Accompanied President Bush.

July 4-5, 1989
Japan
Tokyo

Attended the Multilateral Assistance Initiative for the Philippines conference.

July 5-8, 1989
Brunei
Bandar Seri Begawan
Attended ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting.

July 8, 1989
Oman
Muscat
Stopped while traveling to Poland to join President Bush.

July 9-11, 1989
Poland
Warsaw, Gdansk
Accompanied President Bush.

July 11-13, 1989
Hungary
Budapest
Accompanied President Bush.

July 13-17, 1989
France
Paris
Accompanied President Bush to the Economic Summit Meeting.

July 17-18, 1989
The Netherlands
The Hague
Accompanied President Bush.

July 28-31, 1989
France
Paris
Attended the opening of the International Conference on Cambodia. Also met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

August 6-7, 1989
Mexico
Mexico, D.F.
Attended the 7th meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binati

October 27-28, 1989
Costa Rica
San Jose
Accompanied President Bush to Hemispheric Summit Meeting.

November 1-8, 1989
Australia
Sydney, Canberra
Attended U.S.-Australian Bilateral Ministerial Meeting and Conference on Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation.

December 1-3, 1989
Malta

Valletta, Marsaxlokk Bay
Accompanied President Bush to meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev.

December 3-4, 1989
Belgium
Brussels
Accompanied President Bush to meetings with NATO heads of state and government.

December 11, 1989
United Kingdom
London
Met with Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Hurd.

December 11-12, 1989
Germany
West Berlin
Met with West German Chancellor Kohl; delivered a public address.

December 12, 1989
German Democratic Republic
Potsdam
Met with East German Prime Minister Modrow and with religious leaders.

December 13-15, 1989
Belgium
Brussels
Discussed aid to Eastern Europe with representatives of the Group of 24; attended a NATO Foreign Ministers Meeting.

December 16, 1989
Netherlands (Antilles)
St. Maartin
Accompanied President Bush en route to meeting with French President Mitterrand.

December 16, 1989
France
St. Martin Island (West Indies)
Accompanied President Bush to an informal meeting with President Mitterrand.

February 6, 1990
Ireland
Shannon
Met with French Foreign Minister Dumas.

February 6, 1990
Czechoslovakia
Prague
Met with President Havel; delivered an address at Charles University.

February 7-10, 1990
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with Soviet leaders; addressed the International Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

February 10-11, 1990

Bulgaria
Sofia
Met with Bulgarian officials and opposition leaders.

February 11, 1990
Romania
Bucharest
Met with Romanian officials and opposition leaders.

February 11-13, 1990
Canada
Ottawa
Attended Open Skies Ministerial Conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers.

February 15, 1990
Colombia
Cartagena
Accompanied President Bush to Drug Summit Meeting with the Presidents of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru.

March 19-22, 1990
Namibia
Windhoek
Attended Namibian independence ceremonies. Met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

March 22-23, 1990
South Africa
Cape Town Johannesburg, Soweto
Met with President De Klerk, South African officials, and leaders of the African National Congress (ANC).

March 23-24, 1990
Zaire
Kinshasa
Met with President Mobutu and with UNITA leader Savimbi.

April 13-14, 1990
United Kingdom
Bermuda
Accompanied President Bush to an informal meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher.

May 3, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Met with NATO and European Community Foreign Ministers.

May 4-6, 1990
Germany, Federal Republic of
Bonn
Attended Two-Plus-Four Ministerial Meeting on German reunification.

May 6, 1990
Poland
Warsaw
Met with Polish officials and leaders of Solidarity.

May 15-19, 1990
U.S.S.R.
Moscow, Zagorsk, Radonezsh
Attended pre-summit and arms reduction negotiations with senior Soviet officials. Also met with Egyptian President Mubarak and Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene.

June 5-6, 1990
Denmark
Copenhagen
Attended CSCE Meeting and met with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

June 6-8, 1990
United Kingdom
Turnberry (Scotland)
Attended NATO Foreign Ministers meeting.

June 17-19, 1990
Guatemala
Guatemala City and Antigua Guatemala
Met with Presidents of the Central American Republics.

June 20-22, 1990
German Democratic Republic
East Berlin
Attended Two-Plus-Four Foreign Ministers Meeting.

June 23, 1990
Ireland
Shannon
Met with Foreign Minister Collins.

July 3-4, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Attended meeting of the Group of 24.

July 5-6, 1990
United Kingdom
London
Accompanied President Bush to NATO Summit Meeting.

July 16-18, 1990
France
Paris
Attended Two-Plus-Four Foreign Ministers Meeting.

July 26-29, 1990
Indonesia
Jakarta
Attended ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.

July 29-31, 1990
Singapore
Singapore

Attended Second Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting.

July 31-August 2, 1990
U.S.S.R.
Irkutsk
Met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

August 2-3, 1990
Mongolia
Ulaan Baatar
Met with President Ochirbat and Foreign Minister Gombosuren.

August 3, 1990
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze; issued a joint statement on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

August 8-9, 1990
Turkey
Ankara
Met with President Ozal and senior Turkish officials.

August 10, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Attended a special session of the North Atlantic Council.

September 6-7, 1990
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah, Taif
Met with King Fahd and with Emir al-Sabah of Kuwait; discussed financing of U.S. military presence. Visited U.S. military personnel.

September 7, 1990
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi
Met with Sheikh al-Nahyan.

September 7-8, 1990
Egypt
Cairo, Alexandria
Met with President Mubarak. Discussed increased Egyptian military commitment in the Persian Gulf.

September 8-10, 1990
Finland
Helsinki
Accompanied President Bush to summit meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev.

September 10, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Briefed NATO Foreign Ministers on the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting and the Persian Gulf crisis.

September 10-13, 1990
U.S.S.R.

Moscow
Met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Attended Two-Plus-Four Foreign Ministers Meeting. Signed Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany.

September 13-14, 1990
Syria
Damascus
Met with President Assad and Foreign Minister Sharaa.

September 15, 1990
Italy
Rome
Met with senior Italian officials.

September 15, 1990
Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn, Ludwigshafen
Met with Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher.

November 4-5, 1990
Bahrain
Manama
Met with Amir Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al-Khalifa.

November 4, 5-6, 1990
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah, Taif
Met with King Fahd, Foreign Minister Prince Saud, and the Emir of Kuwait. Addressed U.S. military personnel.

November 6-7, 1990
Egypt
Cairo
Met with President Mubarak and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian.

November 7, 1990
Turkey
Ankara
Met with President Ozal.

November 7-9, 1990
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with President Gorbachev.

November 9-10, 1990
United Kingdom
London
Met with Prime Minister Thatcher.

November 10, 1990
France
Paris
Met with President Mitterrand.

November 13, 1990
United Kingdom
Bermuda
Met with Canadian External Affairs Secretary Clark.

November 16-17, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Attended U.S.-European Community Meeting.

November 17, 1990
Switzerland
Geneva
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with the Foreign Ministers of Ethiopia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Zaire.

November 17-21, 1990
France
Paris
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with the Foreign Ministers of Romania, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.
Joined President Bush for meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev, CSCE Summit meeting, and signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty.

November 21-22, 1990
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah
Accompanied President Bush to meetings with King Fahd and the Amir of Kuwait.

November 22, 1990
Yemen
Sanaa
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Salih.

November 23, 1990
Egypt
Cairo
Accompanied President Bush to meeting with President Mubarak.

November 24, 1990
Colombia
Bogota
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Gaviria and Foreign Minister Jaramillo.

December 16-18, 1990
Belgium
Brussels
Attended NATO Ministerial Meeting.

January 6-8, 1991
United Kingdom
London
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Foreign Secretary Hurd, EC Chairman Poos, Spanish Foreign Minister Fernandez Ordonez, and NATO Secretary General Woerner.

January 8, 1991

France
Paris
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Dumas.

January 8, 1991
Germany
Bonn
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Chancellor Kohl.

January 8, 1991
Italy
Milan
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Foreign Minister DeMichelis.

January 8-10, 1991
Switzerland
Geneva
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz.

January 10-11, 1991
Saudi Arabia
Riyadh
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with King Fahd and Foreign Minister Prince Saud.

January 11, 1991
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi
Discussed the Persian Gulf Emirates crisis with Sheikh Zayed.

January 11, 1991
Saudi Arabia
Taif
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with the Amir of Kuwait. Addressed U.S. military personnel in eastern Saudi Arabia.

January 11-12, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Abdel-Meguid.

January 12, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Assad and Foreign Minister Sharaa.

January 12-13, 1991
Turkey
Incirlik, Ankara
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with President Ozal and Foreign Minister Alptemocin.

January 13, 1991
United Kingdom
Alconbury
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Prime Minister Major.

January 13-14, 1991
Canada
Ottawa
Discussed the Persian Gulf crisis with Prime Minister Mulroney.

March 8-10, 1991
Saudi Arabia
Taif, Riyadh
Met with the Amir of Kuwait and with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Syria, and the Gulf Cooperation Council.

March 10-11, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Met with President Mubarak.

March 11-13, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem, Karmeil
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Herzog, Prime Minister Shamir, Foreign Minister Levy, and Palestinian representatives.

March 13-14, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Assad and Foreign Minister Sharaa.

March 14-16, 1991
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Bessmertnkyh.

March 16, 1991
Turkey
Ankara
Met with President Ozal and senior Turkish officials.

April 7-8, 1991
Turkey
Ankara, Diyarbakir, Cukurca, Uzumlu
Discussed emergency aid to Kurdish refugees with President Ozal; visited refugee camps.

April 8-10, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Prime Minister Shamir, Israeli officials, and a Palestinian delegation.

April 10-11, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Mubarak, Foreign Minister Abdel-Meguid, and Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud.

April 11-12, 1991
Syria

Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Assad, Foreign Minister Sharaa, and Tunisian Foreign Minister Ben Yahya.

April 12, 1991
Switzerland
Geneva
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Jordanian Foreign Minister Masri. Also discussed aid to Kurdish refugees with heads of international relief agencies.

April 17-18, 1991
Luxembourg
Luxembourg
Discussed aid to Kurdish refugees and the Middle East peace process with European Community Foreign Ministers.

April 18-20, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed the Middle East peace process with senior Israeli officials and Palestinian representatives.

April 20, 1991
Jordan
Aqaba
Discussed the Middle East peace process with King Hussein.

April 20-21, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Abdel-Meguid.

April 21-22, 1991
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah
Discussed the Middle East peace process with King Fahd and Foreign Minister Prince Saud.

April 22, 1991
Kuwait
Kuwait City
Discussed postwar economic assistance with the Amir and Crown Prince.

April 22-24, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Foreign Minister Sharaa.

April 24-25, 1991
U.S.S.R.
Kislovodsk
Discussed the Middle East peace process and implementation of the CFE Treaty with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh.

April 25-26, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Prime Minister Shamir.

May 11-12, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Assad.

May 12-14, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed the Middle East peace process with President Mubarak and Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh.

May 14, 1991
Jordan
Amman
Discussed the Middle East peace process with King Hussein.

May 14-16, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Prime Minister Shamir and senior Israeli officials.

May 31-June 1, 1991
Portugal
Lisbon
Witnessed the signing of the Angola Peace Accords.

June 5-7, 1991
Denmark
Copenhagen
Attended NATO Ministerial Meeting.

June 7, 1991
Switzerland
Geneva
Met with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh.

June 17-21, 1991
Germany
Berlin, Halle
Attended CSCE Foreign Ministers' Meeting and discussed strategic arms reductions with Soviet Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh.

June 21-22, 1991
Yugoslavia
Belgrade
Met with Prime Minister Markovic and with the presidents of the 6 republics.

June 22, 1991
Albania
Tirane
Met with President Alia and senior officials; addressed the Albanian Parliament.

July 15-18, 1991
United Kingdom
London
Attended Economic Summit Meeting and accompanied President Bush to meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev.

July 18-19, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Assad.

July 19-20, 1991
Egypt
Cairo, Alexandria
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Mubarak.

July 20-21, 1991
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Fahd.

July 21, 1991
Jordan
Amman
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Hussein.

July 21-22, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with Prime Minister Shamir, senior Israeli officials, and Palestinian representatives.

July 23-25, 1991
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur
Attended meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers.

July 25-29, 1991
Mongolia
Ulaanbaatar
Met with senior Mongolian officials, addressed the Mongolian Parliament, and observed wildlife in the Gobi Desert.

July 29-August 1, 1991
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Attended U.S.-Soviet Summit Meeting.

August 1-2, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with senior Israeli officials and Palestinian representatives.

August 2-3, 1991
Jordan
Amman
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Hussein and Foreign Minister Masri.

August 3-4, 1991
Morocco
Rabat

Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Hassan II and Foreign Minister Filali.

August 4, 1991
Tunisia
Tunis
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Ben Ali and Foreign Minister Benyahia. Returned to Morocco afterwards.

August 5, 1991
Algeria
Algiers
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Benjedid and Foreign Minister Ghozali.

August 21-22, 1991
Belgium
Brussels
Met with NATO Foreign Ministers to discuss the coup in the Soviet Union.

September 8-9, 1991
Mexico
Mexico, D.F.
Attended meeting of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission.

September 10-16, 1991
U.S.S.R.
Moscow, St. Petersburg, Alma Ata
Met with senior officials of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic, and Kazakhstan. Attended the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension.

September 14, 1991
Estonia
Tallinn
Met with Chairman Ruutel and Prime Minister Savisaar.

September 14, 1991
Latvia
Riga
Met with President Gorbunovs and Prime Minister Godmanis.

September 14, 1991
Lithuania
Vilnius
Met with President Landsbergis and Prime Minister Vagnorius.

September 16-17, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with senior Israeli officials and Palestinian representatives.

September 17-18, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Amr Moussa.

September 18-19, 1991
Syria

Damascus
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Assad and Foreign Minister Sharaa.

September 19-20, 1991
Jordan
Amman
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Hussein.

September 20, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Assad.

October 13-14, 1991
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Mubarak.

October 14-15, 1991
Jordan
Amman
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with King Hussein.

October 15-16, 1991
Syria
Damascus
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with President Assad.

October 16-19, 1991
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed a Middle East peace conference with senior Israeli officials and Palestinian representatives. Also met with Soviet Foreign Minister Pankin and announced a Middle East Peace Conference.

October 19, 1991
Spain
Madrid
Discussed arrangements for a Middle East Peace Conference with senior Spanish officials.

October 22-23, 1991
France
Paris
Attended the signing of the Cambodian Comprehensive Peace Accords and discussed normalization of relations with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Ngueyn.

October 29- November 3, 1991
Spain
Madrid
Accompanied President Bush to a meeting with Soviet President Gorbachev and to the opening session of the Middle East Peace Conference.

November 6-8, 1991
Italy
Rome
Accompanied President Bush to a NATO Summit Meeting.

November 8-9, 1991
Netherlands
The Hague
Accompanied President Bush to an European Community Summit Meeting.

November 10-12, 1991
Japan
Tokyo
Met with Prime Minister Miyazawa and Foreign Minister Watanabe.

November 12-15, 1991
South Korea
Seoul
Attended Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference.

November 15-17, 1991
China, People's Republic of
Beijing
Met with President Yang and senior Chinese officials.

December 15-17, 1991
U.S.S.R.
Moscow
Met with senior Soviet and Russian officials.

December 17, 1991
Kirghizia
Bishkek
Met with President Akyev.

December 17, 1991
Kazakhstan
Alma Ata
Met with President Nazarbayev.

December 18, 1991
Byelorussia
Minsk
Soviet Chairman Shuskevich and Foreign Minister Kravchenko.

December 18-19, 1991
Ukraine
Kiev
Met with President Kravchuk.

December 19-21, 1991
Belgium
Brussels
Attended NATO Ministerial Meeting and met with Foreign Ministers of the European Community.

January 16, 1992
Mexico
Mexico, D.F.

Attended the signing of the Salvadoran Peace Treaty.

January 16-17, 1992
El Salvador
San Salvador
Addressed the Salvadoran National Assembly.

January 17, 1992
Nicaragua
Managua
Met with President Chamorro.

January 27-29, 1992
Russia
Moscow
Attended Middle East peace conference.

January 30, 1992
Czechoslovakia
Prague
Attended CSCE Council of Ministers Meeting.

February 9-10, 1992
Germany
Frankfurt
Attended ceremonies inaugurating emergency aid to the former Soviet republics.

February 11, 1992
Moldova
Kishenev
Met with President Snegur.

February 11-12, 1992
Armenia
Yerevan
Met with President Ter-Petrossian.

February 12, 1992
Azerbaijan
Baku
Met with President Mutalibov and discussed possible establishment of diplomatic relations.

February 12, 1992
Tajikistan
Dushanbe
Met with President Nabiyev and discussed possible establishment of diplomatic relations.

February 12-13, 1992
Turkmenistan
Ashkhabad
Met with President Niyazov.

February 14-15, 1992
Russia

Yekaterinburg Chelyabinsk-70
Met with former Soviet nuclear scientists.

February 15-16, 1992
Uzbekistan
Tashkent, Samarkand
Met with President Karimov and Uzbek political leaders.

February 16-18, 1992
Russia
Moscow
Discussed strategic arms reductions with President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

March 9-11, 1992
Belgium
Brussels
Attended NATO Ministerial Meeting and met with North Atlantic Cooperation Council Foreign Ministers. Discussed peace-keeping efforts in Yugoslavia with European Community Foreign Ministers, and strategic arms reductions with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

May 22-23, 1992
United Kingdom
London
Met with Prime Minister Major.

May 23-24, 1992
Portugal
Lisbon
Attended Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States. Signed protocol making Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine parties to the START Treaty.

May 25-26, 1992
Georgia
Tblisi
Met with State Council Chairman Shevardnadze and Prime Minister Sigua.

June 11-12, 1992
United Kingdom
London
Discussed strategic arms reductions with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

July 5, 1992
Poland
Warsaw
Accompanied President Bush on a visit.

July 5-8, 1992
Germany
Munich
Accompanied President Bush to the Economic Summit Meeting and to meetings with Russian President Yeltsin.

July 8-10, 1992
Finland
Helsinki
Accompanied President Bush to the CSCE Summit Meeting.

July 19-21, 1992
Israel
Jerusalem
Discussed the Middle East peace process with Prime Minister Rabin, Israeli officials, and Palestinian representatives.

July 21, 1992
Jordan
Amman
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis with King Hussein.

July 21-22, 1992
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis with President Assad.

July 22, 1992
Egypt
Cairo
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis with President Mubarak.

July 22-23, 1992
Syria
Damascus
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis with President Assad.

July 23, 1992
Lebanon
Zahle
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Taif Accord with President Hrawi.

July 23-24, 1992
Saudi Arabia
Jeddah
Discussed the Middle East peace process and the Iraq crisis with King Fahd and Foreign Minister Prince Saud.

July 24, 1992
Maldives
Male
Met with President Gayoom en route to the Philippines.

July 25-26, 1992
Philippines
Manila
Attended ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference.

Updates | **Frequent Questions** | **Contact Us** | **Email this Page** | **Subject Index** | **Search**
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov | **Privacy Notice** | **FOIA** | **Copyright Information** | **Other U.S. Government Information**

Home Page . My Times . Today's Paper . Video . Most Popular . Times Topics

Log InRegister Now

Archives The New York Times

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World . U.S. . N.Y. / Region . Business . Technology . Science . Health . Sports . Opinion . Arts . Style . Travel . Jobs . Real Estate . Autos

A Missing Olive Branch

Print

Single-Page

Save

Share

By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
Published: October 20, 1991

With an Arab-Israeli peace conference now virtually certain to take place, what are the prospects that it will actually produce something?

American, Arab and Israeli diplomats are not hiding the fact that they really have no answer to that question. Their attention has been so focused on the exhausting effort to organize the conference that little original or in-depth thought has been given to what can realistically be achieved once the parties get to the table.

Few diplomats doubt that when the conference opens here on Oct. 30, it will appear at first blush to be a breakthrough to a dead end. Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians and Lebanon are expected to demand territory occupied by Israel. Israel will decline. The Arabs will call for American pressure on Israel. Israel will say this is not what the conference was supposed to be about, and the whole enterprise will explode in a cacophony of conflicting demands and finger-pointing. A One-Act Play?

So Act One is already written. The question, American officials say, is whether there can be an Act Two.

"One should not predict the demise of this conference too quickly," said Stephen P. Cohen of the Montreal-based Center for Middle East Peace. "The same combination of international pressures which forced the parties to the table in the first place will apply to keeping them there after it starts. It is not going to be easy for anybody to just walk away."

In seeking to organize the conference, the United States was initially driven by President Bush's desire to prove that the Persian Gulf war could produce something beyond the destruction of half of the Iraqi Army and the restoration of the Kuwaiti monarchy, American officials say.

The peace conference, which Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d discussed with Spanish officials today on a stop here on his way home from the Middle East, has been arranged totally at the initiative of Washington, and not through the efforts of the Middle East parties themselves.

After nearly eight months, the United States appears to have succeeded in persuading Arabs and Israelis to come to the table by manipulating pressures on the participants that grew out of the end of the cold war and the end of the gulf war.

The splintering of the Soviet Union left Syria an orphan, desperately interested in a new relationship with Washington and ready to pay for it by agreeing to direct talks with Israel. Pressures on Israel

An influx of Soviet Jewish emigres left Israel so strapped for cash to take care of them that it could not afford to spurn the Bush Administration's demand for a peace conference. The Iraqi missile attacks on Israeli cities during the gulf war drove home to Israelis as never before the need to end the regional conflict.

Jordan and the Palestinians were left economically impoverished and diplomatically isolated by their support for Iraq in the gulf war. When the Bush Administration offered them a parole on the condition that they attend the conference on the United States' terms, they seized the opportunity.

Adding to the pressures were the end of the cold war and the new relationship between President Bush and President Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union, who are expected to meet in Madrid before the conference convenes. The new cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the gulf war also gave Mr. Baker unparalleled tools for diplomatic maneuvering in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union, for instance, was ready to squeeze the Syrians and Palestinians on Washington's behalf and to restore relations with Israel to promote the conference. The Saudis, who were beholden to Washington for the American role in the gulf war, used their influence with Damascus.

Such tools can build a conference. Can they build peace agreements?

Neither Lebanon nor Syria, nor Jordan or the Palestinians, is approaching the talks with the philosophy that inspired President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to make peace with Israel in the late 1970's. That philosophy was based first on a gesture of complete reconciliation -- which in Mr. Sadat's case meant coming to Jerusalem -- and then an offer of full security guarantees in return for an Israeli withdrawal from all lands occupied in the 1967 war. The Least Contact Possible

1 2 3 Next Page >

Ads by Google what's this?

The Next Oil Boom
See who's pumping cash by making oil for $13.21. And selling for $90
www.InvestmentU.com

Israeli/Palestinian Peace
Show support for two-state solution Lapel pins, buttons, banners & more
www.SupportSanity.org

An alternative for Iraq
Read our response to Iraq Study Group Report. There is alternative!
www.europeancourier.org

MOST POPULAR

- E-Mailed
- Blogged
- Searched

1. Mind: Unhappy? Self-Critical? Maybe You're Just a Perfectionist
2. Well: Asperger's Syndrome Gets a Very Public Face
3. Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream
4. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
5. A Lurid Aftermath to a Hedge Fund Manager's Life
6. Simulations of Ailing Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights on Style
7. David Brooks: The Dictatorship of Talent
8. Op-Ed Contributor: Now and Forever
9. American Exception : Serving Life for Providing Car to Killers
10. Editorial: Evolution and Texas

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads

What are Related Ads?

» Israel 1967

» Six Day War

» War Israel

» Arab Israeli Conflict

» War in the Middle East

Inside NYTimes.com

Arts » **Opinion »** **Science »** **Opinion »** **N.Y. / Region »** **World »**

Politically Charged Prints Cause Stir at Library



Religion and the Law

Is religious belief so special that the devout practitioner gets a pass when it comes to the law? Readers respond to Stanley Fish.

Simulations of Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights



Op-Ed: Cholera, a Microscopic Insurgent



Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream



In British Villages, Truck Drivers Run Into the Limits of G.P.S.

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS; Rocket Hits Embassy in Lebanon

Print
Save
Share

Published: October 30, 1991

A rocket fired from a hillside blasted the wall of the United States Embassy compound in East Beirut today, on the eve of the Arab-Israeli peace conference in Madrid.

The explosion caused no casualties or serious damage to the embassy building, which is in the Christian suburb of Aukur, said a Lebanese guard who answered the telephone at the embassy.

There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack. But Iranian and Arab extremists have promised to attack targets of the United States, which is a sponsor of the conference, and others taking part in it. Extremists oppose the meeting because it could lead to Arab recognition for Israel.

Minutes after the blast, Lebanese army troops and police officers set up a cordon around the embassy and turned away reporters and photographers. No embassy officials were available for comment. The Ambassador to Lebanon, Ryan Crocker, was in Madrid with the American delegation to the conference.

All embassy functions were moved to east Beirut site after the American compound in Muslim west Beirut was destroyed by two truck bombs in 1983 and 1984. The suicide attacks by the Islamic Holy War organization left 74 people dead, including 21 Americans, and 196 wounded.

Islamic Holy War is one of the Shiite Muslim factions holding kidnapped Western hostages in

<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N1942.nytimes.comSD6440/B2473033.2;abr=!ie;sz=336x280;ord=2007.12.05.04.00.19?"> </SCRIPT> <NOSCRIPT> <A HREF="http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N1942.nytimes.comSD6440/B2473033.2;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=336x280;ord=2007.12.05.04.00.19?"> <IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N1942.nytimes.comSD6440/B2473033.2;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=336x280;ord=2007.12.05.04.00.19?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=336 HEIGHT=280 ALT="Click Here"></A> </NOSCRIPT>

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed | Blogged | Searched

1. Mind: Unhappy? Self-Critical? Maybe You're Just a Perfectionist
2. Well: Asperger's Syndrome Gets a Very Public Face
3. Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream
4. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
5. A Lurid Aftermath to a Hedge Fund Manager's Life
6. Simulations of Ailing Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights on Style
7. David Brooks: The Dictatorship of Talent
8. Op-Ed Contributor: Now and Forever
9. American Exception : Serving Life for Providing Car to Killers
10. Editorial: Evolution and Texas

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business

Lebanon. The groups are believed to be under the loose control of the Party of God.

Sheik Abbas Musawi, secretary general of the Party of God, proclaimed a day of mourning for Wednesday to mark the opening of the peace talks, which he denounced as an effort by Israel to buy time to "bring in more Jewish immigrants and create more settlements in occupied territories."

Ads by Google what's this?

The Syrian Ambassador
Imad Moustapha on the Peace Process free streaming video
www.fora.tv

Big Oil's Nightmare
Is suddenly an investor's dream. Get the full story.
www.investmentu.com

Pimp Your Profile Free
Free Backgrounds & Layouts for Your Profile. 100% Free. Download Now!
MySpace.MyFreeLayout.us



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Mac Emulation
» SSH Linux
» SSH Chroot
» SSH Protocol
» Mac OS X

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Learn Arabic Lessons
» Learn Hebrew com
» I Want to Learn Arabic
» Hebrew Lessons
» Learn Hebrew with a CD

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Learn Arabic Lessons
» Learn Hebrew com
» I Want to Learn Arabic
» Hebrew Lessons
» Learn Hebrew with a CD

Inside NYTimes.com

Arts »	Opinion »	Science »	Opinion »	N.Y. / Region »	World »
	**Religion and the Law** Is religious belief so special that the devout practitioner gets a pass when it comes to the law? Readers respond to Stanley Fish.				**In British Villages, Truck Drivers Run Into the Limits of G.P.S.**
Politically Charged Prints Cause Stir at Library		Simulations of Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights	Op-Ed: Cholera, a Microscopic Insurgent	Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream	

Home World U.S. N.Y. / Region Business Technology Science Health Sports Opinion Arts Style Travel Jobs Real Estate Autos Back to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company Privacy Policy Search Corrections RSS First Look Help Contact Us Work for Us Media Kit Site Map

Home Page | My Times | Today's Paper | Video | Most Popular | Times Topics
Log In Register Now
Archives
The New York Times
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Search
World | U.S. | N.Y. / Region | Business | Technology | Science | Health | Sports | Opinion | Arts | Style | Travel | Jobs | Real Estate | Autos

<script type="text/javascript" language="JavaScript"> document.write(''); </script><noscript><img src="http://portal.mxlogic.com/images/transparent.gif" border="0"></noscript>

THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS; MIDEAST FOES LIST DEMANDS AND TRADE ANGRY CHARGES ACROSS CONFERENCE TABLE

Print
Single-Page
Save
Share

By R. W. APPLE JR.,
Published: November 1, 1991

In salvos of intransigent oratory, Israel and its Arab neighbors said today that they all hoped to end the bloodshed in their region, but disagreed about almost everything else -- who was at fault, what to do about it, even where further peace talks should be held.

On a day when the Palestinians at last found their place at a major Middle East peace conference, the Arabs demanded that Israel stop creating settlements in occupied territories and give up territory it had taken from Arabs in 1967. The Israelis in turn demanded that the Arabs recognize Israel's right to exist.

Each accused the other of deception, brutality, treachery and aggression, exactly as they have done for most of the 43 years that they have been at each other's throats. Both Sides Listen

But for the first time, representatives of much of the Arab world listened across the same table to an Israeli leader denouncing them, remaining in their chairs throughout, and the Israeli leader, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, listened to their replies. He stayed put even though the Palestinian delegates identified themselves in so many words with the Palestine Liberation Organization, something the Israelis had said could prompt them to walk out.

In one especially heated passage, Farouk al-Sharaa, the Syrian Foreign Minister, accused Mr. Shamir of "faking facts and history." [Excerpts from speeches, pages A10 and A11.]

In reply, at a later news conference, Benjamin Netanyahu, an Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, accused the Arabs of complicity with Hitler, Himmler, Ribbentrop and Eichmann in planning the Holocaust, and said Syria had spoken in terms of "vituperation, slander and condescension." Less Rigidity Expected

"These are just their opening statements, maximalist bargaining positions," a senior American official said. "A lot of it is for television and the political audiences back home. People will start to soften their ideological rigidity once face-to-face negotiations get under

Inside NYTimes.com

Arts »



Politically Charged Prints Cause Stir at Library

Opinion »

Religion and the Law
Is religious belief so special that the devout practitioner gets a pass when it comes to the law? Readers respond to Stanley Fish.

Science »



Simulations of Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights

Opinion »



Op-Ed: Cholera, a Microscopic Insurgent

N.Y. / Region »



Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream

World »

In British Villages, Truck Drivers Run Into the Limits of G.P.S.

MOST POPULAR
E-Mailed
Blogged
Searched

1. Are You Self-Critical? Maybe You're Just a Perfectionist
2. Well: Asperger's Syndrome Gets a Very Public Face
3. Brazilians Giving Up Their American Dream
4. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
5. A Lurid Aftermath to a Hedge Fund Manager's Life
6. Simulations of Ailing Artists' Eyes Yield New Insights on Style
7. David Brooks: The Dictatorship of Talent
8. Op-Ed Contributor: Now and Forever
9. American Exception : Serving Life for Providing Car to Killers
10. Editorial: Evolution and Texas

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"
Also in Business:
- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads — What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel
» Shanghai China
» Chaoyang China Vacation

way."

But other top-level Americans who have worked for months to bring Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians together in Madrid expressed disappointment at what one called the "truculent tone" of today's speeches. None could point to any overt sign that the participants were ready to yield ground in the private, direct talks scheduled to start Sunday.

Indeed, it was unclear when, where and even whether those talks would begin. The Israelis and the Arabs remained deadlocked tonight, despite mediation efforts by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, over Mr. Shamir's demand that they be held in the Middle East, with a first round in Israel. The Arabs insisted that the plan had always been to negotiate in Madrid and argued that they would be recognizing Israel, in effect, by going there.

There was even some doubt expressed that the single organizational session that everyone had agreed to for Sunday at the Royal Palace in Madrid would go forward as planned.

The Palestinians said explicitly for the first time that they would accept limited self-rule in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an interim stop on the way to statehood. In accepting the terms of invitation to the conference, they had implictly said the same thing, but some saw an incremental step forward.

Israel accepts the idea of limited autonomy, which it had agreed to in the 1978 Camp David agreement with Egypt and the United States, but rejects the idea of Palestinian sovereignty. Nonetheless, there has been very tentative talk among the Palestinian delegates and others here in the last 48 hours of some form of eventual confederation, possibly economic, possibly economic and political, involving Jordan, Israel and some sort of Palestinian entity. Jordan Faults Radicals

There was also a small conciliatory note from Jordan. Its delegate urged both sides to work for "the dawn of a new era" and pointedly called on Arab radicals to shed their rigid ideologies.

So the initial two days of the conference here, the first of which was dominated by speeches by Presidents Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, have developed into a microcosm of the Middle East, marked by hopeful words from the great powers, hateful words from the countries of the region and fragile theorizing about what might be. So far, Madrid has been spared the physical violence that has long disfigured the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

1**2**3 **Next Page >**

» Hotels in Beijing China

» China Hotel Hong Kong

Ads by Google what's this?

Luxury Senior Tours
Our Tours - 12-24 Guests Per Group Free Odysseys Tours Catalog
www.offeredby.net

Day 2: Forbidden City
Roof of the World River Cruise 16-Day China Tour from $4,099.
VikingRiverCruises.com/China

Private China Tours
Wanna more flexibilities and Cares? Try privately-guided tour from $848
www.china-tour.cn

HomeWorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutosBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

Madrid, Spain- Climate and Weather Information

Below is the weather from Oct. 31, 1996- the closest year I could find to that of the conference.

Spring and fall are ideal times to visit nearly all of Spain, with the possible exception of the Atlantic coast, which experiences heavy rains in October and November. May and October are the best months, in terms of both weather and crowds.

In summer it's hot, hot, and hotter still, with the cities in Castile (Madrid) and Andalusia (Seville and Córdoba) heating up the most. Madrid has dry heat; the average temperature can hover around 84°F (29°C) in July and 75°F (24°C) in September. Seville has the dubious reputation of being about the hottest part of Spain in July and August, often baking under average temperatures of 93°F (34°C).

Barcelona, cooler in temperature, is often quite humid. Midsummer temperatures in Majorca often reach 91°F (33°C). The overcrowded Costa Brava has temperatures around 81°F (27°C) in July and August. The Costa del Sol has an average of 77°F (25°C) in summer. The coolest spot in Spain is the Atlantic coast from San Sebastián to La Coruña, with temperatures in the 70s in July and August.

August remains the major vacation month in Europe. The traffic from France, the Netherlands, and Germany to Spain becomes a veritable migration, and low-cost hotels along the coastal areas are virtually impossible to find. To compound the problem, many restaurants and shops also decide it's time for a vacation, thereby limiting the visitors' selections for both dining and shopping.

In winter, the coast from Algeciras to Málaga is the most popular, with temperatures reaching a warm 60°F to 63° F (16°C-17°C). Madrid gets cold, as low as 34°F (1°C). Majorca is warmer, usually in the 50s, but it often dips into the 40s. Some mountain resorts can experience extreme cold.

Below is a photo taken of the beach in San Sebastian, Spain

October 31 1996 Go »

Daily Weekly Monthly Custom

	Actual:	Average :	Record :
Temperature:			
Mean Temperature	**50** °F / **10** °C	-	
Max Temperature	**68** °F / **20** °C	-	- ()
Min Temperature	**32** °F / **0** °C	-	- ()
Degree Days:			
Heating Degree Days	15		
Moisture:			
Dew Point	**34** °F / **1** °C		
Average Humidity	64		
Maximum Humidity	100		
Minimum Humidity	33		
Precipitation:			
Precipitation	**0.00** in / **0.0** cm	-	- ()
Sea Level Pressure:			
Sea Level Pressure	**30.42** in / **1030** hPa		
Wind:			
Wind Speed	**1** mph / **2** km/h ()		
Max Wind Speed	**7** mph / **11** km/h		



Max Gust Speed -	
T = Trace of Precipitation, MM = Missing Value	Source: Averaged Metar Reports


Best Western Premier Hotel Santo Domingo
Tryp Ambassador
Palacio Real (Royal Palace)
Royal Palace
Image © 2007 DigitalGlobe
© 2007 Europa Technologies
© 2007 Tele Atlas
© 2007 Google
Pointer 40°25'04.04" N 3°42'50.12" W elev 2113 ft
Streaming 100%
Eye alt 4996 ft

The Actors of the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference

United States of America
George H.W. Bush, President
James A. Baker III, Secretary of State

Israel
Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister

Syria
Farouk Al-Shara, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Lebanon
Fares Boueiz, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Egypt
Amre Moussa, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Palestine
Yasser Arafat, President
Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi, Head of Delegation


Jordan
Dr.Kamel Abu Jaber, Foreign Minister

Soviet Union
Mikhail Gorbachev, President
Boris D. Pankin, Minister of Foreign Affiars

The Netherlands
Hans Van Den Broek, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Spain
Felipe Gonzalez





Background Notes

Background Notes
These publications include facts about the land, people, history, government, political conditions, economy, and foreign relations of independent states, some dependencies, and areas of special sovereignty. The Background Notes are updated/revised by the Office of Electronic Information and Publications of the Bureau of Public Affairs as they are received from the Department's regional bureaus and are added to the list below.

Country Pages
Within each Background Note is a link under "OFFICIAL NAME" that goes to the respective "country page" containing additional information. For a specific country, click on its Background Note link in the list below, or, for a list of the countries in a region of the world (with links to respective country pages) go to the Countries and Other Areas section in each of these regions: Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, South and Central Asia, and the Western Hemisphere.

You can subscribe to an email list to receive Background Notes as they are updated.

Background Notes Archive
Earlier versions of Background Notes are available in our Previous Editions of Background Notes section.



-- Afghanistan (05/07)
-- Albania (09/07)
-- Algeria (10/07)
-- Andorra (11/07)
-- Angola (10/07)
-- Antigua and Barbuda (11/07)
-- Argentina (07/07)
-- Armenia (06/07)
-- Aruba (05/07)
-- Australia (07/07)
-- Austria (09/07)
-- Azerbaijan (07/07)
-- Bahamas, The (06/07)
-- Bahrain (10/07)
-- Bangladesh (05/07)
-- Barbados (11/07)
-- Belarus (08/07)
-- Belgium (10/07)
-- Belize (07/07)
-- Benin (09/07)
-- Bermuda (10/07)
-- Bhutan (07/07)
-- Bolivia (10/07)
-- Bosnia and Herzegovina (10/07)
-- Botswana (10/07)
-- Brazil (11/07)
-- Brunei (11/07)
-- Bulgaria (09/07)
-- Burkina Faso (11/07)
-- Burma (06/07)
-- Burundi (07/07)
-- Cambodia (06/07)
-- Cameroon (06/07)
-- Canada (09/07)
-- Cape Verde (09/07)
-- Cayman Islands (06/07)
-- Central African Republic (06/07)
-- Chad (06/07)
-- Chile (04/07)
-- China (10/07)
-- Colombia (09/07)
-- Comoros (11/07)
-- Congo (Brazzaville) (06/07)
-- Congo (Kinshasa) (06/07)
-- Costa Rica (10/07)
-- Cote d'Ivoire (11/07)
-- Croatia (05/07)
-- Cuba (11/07)
-- Cyprus (08/07)
-- Czech Republic (09/07)
-- Denmark (10/07)
-- Djibouti (11/07)
-- Dominica (06/07)
-- Dominican Republic (11/07)
-- Ecuador (09/07)
-- Egypt (03/07)
-- El Salvador (09/07)
-- Equatorial Guinea (06/07)
-- Eritrea (11/07)
-- Estonia (10/07)
-- Ethiopia (11/07)
-- Fiji (10/07)
-- Finland (10/07)
-- France (08/07)
-- Gabon (06/07)
-- Gambia, The (09/07)
-- Georgia (08/07)
-- Germany (08/07)
-- Ghana (10/07)
-- Greece (11/07)
-- Grenada (06/07)
-- Guatemala (08/07)
-- Guinea (10/07)
-- Guinea-Bissau (10/07)
-- Guyana (05/07)
-- Haiti (08/07)
-- Holy See (05/07)
-- Honduras (06/07)
-- Hong Kong (07/07)
-- Hungary (08/07)
-- Iceland (07/07)
-- India (10/07)
-- Indonesia (08/07)
-- Iran (06/07)
-- Iraq (06/07)
-- Ireland (10/07)
-- Israel (10/07)
-- Italy (08/07)
-- Jamaica (10/07)

-- Japan (10/07)
-- Jordan (05/07)
-- Kazakhstan (02/07)
-- Kenya (10/07)
-- Kiribati (10/07)
-- Kuwait (06/07)
-- Kyrgyzstan (04/07)
-- Laos (10/07)
-- Latvia (08/07)
-- Lebanon (11/07)
-- Lesotho (10/07)
-- Liberia (05/07)
-- Libya (10/07)
-- Liechtenstein (10/07)
-- Lithuania (08/07)
-- Luxembourg (04/07)
-- Macau (09/07)
-- Macedonia (10/07)
-- Madagascar (11/07)
-- Malawi (10/07)
-- Malaysia (10/07)
-- Maldives (07/07)
-- Mali (10/07)
-- Malta (11/07)
-- Marshall Islands (06/07)
-- Mauritania (05/07)
-- Mauritius (11/07)
-- Mexico (02/07)
-- Micronesia (06/07)
-- Moldova (10/07)
-- Monaco (06/07)
-- Mongolia (07/07)
-- Montenegro (08/07)
-- Morocco (10/07)
-- Mozambique (10/07)
-- Namibia (10/07)
-- Nauru (10/07)
-- Nepal (11/07)
-- Netherlands (09/07)
-- Netherlands Antilles (05/07)
-- New Zealand (11/07)
-- Nicaragua (08/07)
-- Niger (11/07)
-- Nigeria (10/07)
-- North Korea (09/07)
-- Norway (10/07)
-- Oman (06/07)
-- Pakistan (05/07)
-- Palau (06/07)
-- Panama (11/07)
-- Papua New Guinea (10/07)
-- Paraguay (11/07)
-- Peru (07/07)
-- Philippines (10/07)
-- Poland (11/07)
-- Portugal (06/07)
-- Qatar (07/07)
-- Romania (10/07)
-- Russia (09/07)
-- Rwanda (06/07)
-- Saint Kitts and Nevis (06/07)
-- Saint Lucia (11/07)
-- Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (06/07)
-- Samoa (10/07)
-- San Marino (10/07)
-- Sao Tome and Principe (06/07)
-- Saudi Arabia (06/07)
-- Senegal (10/07)
-- Serbia (07/07)
-- Seychelles (11/07)
-- Sierra Leone (10/07)
-- Singapore (10/07)
-- Slovakia (08/07)
-- Slovenia (10/07)
-- Solomon Islands (10/07)
-- Somalia (11/07)
-- South Africa (10/07)
-- South Korea (09/07)
-- Spain (07/07)
-- Sri Lanka (11/07)
-- Sudan (10/07)
-- Suriname (06/07)
-- Swaziland (10/07)
-- Sweden (08/07)
-- Switzerland (10/07)
-- Syria (05/07)
-- Taiwan (10/07)
-- Tajikistan (04/07)
-- Tanzania (10/07)
-- Thailand (10/07)
-- Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) (08/07)
-- Togo (09/07)
-- Tonga (10/07)
-- Trinidad and Tobago (11/07)
-- Tunisia (06/07)
-- Turkey (09/07)
-- Turkmenistan (09/07)
-- Tuvalu (10/07)
-- Uganda (11/07)
-- Ukraine (03/07)
-- United Arab Emirates (06/07)
-- United Kingdom (08/07)
-- Uruguay (06/07)
-- Uzbekistan (03/07)
-- Vanuatu (10/07)
-- Venezuela (10/07)
-- Vietnam (06/07)
-- Yemen (02/07)
-- Zambia (10/07)
-- Zimbabwe (10/07)

What's New | **Frequent Questions** | **Contact Us** | **Email this Page** | **Subject Index** | **Search**
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov | **Privacy Notice** | **FOIA** | **Copyright Information** | **Other U.S. Government Information**

The Madrid Peace Talks: A Place of History-Past and Present

The date was Oct. 30, 1991 and the venue was Madrid, Spain. American New World Order diplomacy eventually succeeded in bringing Muslim Arab countries to their knees. They were forced to negotiate a peace agreement with the Jewish occupied state of Israel. now LET'S GO 500 YEARS BACK IN HISTORY▪ It was on Nov. 25, 1491, in the same land of Spain, where a similar "Peace Agreement" was brokered at Gharnata, which is situated 200 miles South of Madrid. Here too, a Muslim Arab leader, Abu Abdullah Muhammad, ruler of the last Spanish Muslim state, succumbed to pressure because of constant siege, fear of hunger and starvation. The Muslim Arab ruler affixing his signature on an agreement to bring peace, agreed to lay down arms before armies of Ferdinand and Isabella, then rulers of Christian Spain. By virtue of this agreement, Abu Abdullah promised to hand over Gharnata, the castle of Al-Hamra and all weapons to Christians within 60 days.

Interestingly, all talks that took place between Abu Abdullah and his advisers regarding the peace agreement were kept secret as was done in the recent Madrid talks.

On seeing the conquering armies enter Gharnata, Abu Abdullah

got down from his horse, held its reins in his hands and most humbly handed over the keys of the city to the Christians, saying, "these keys are the last symbols of Muslim power in Spain. Take them because according to God's pre-determination, our lives, our country and our possessions are all yours. I hope you will deal with us in the manner you promised." Ferdinand assured Abu Abdullah that "He will fulfill all promises made to the Muslims"

(Ehsan-ul-Haq in *Muslim Europe*, pp. 293)

A silver cross was displayed on the highest point of Al-Hamra and a gradual but discreet process was initiated to remove vestiges of 781-year-old Muslim rule over Spain. The peace agreement had guaranteed Muslims:

- **Protection of person and property;**
- **Their right to practice their religion;**
- **To wear their local costume;**
- **To speak their own language;**
- **To adopt their own rites and celebrate their festivals;**
- **To decide their matters according to the Shari'ah;**
- **Their custody shall remain over Mosques and Auqaf; and**
- **No tax will be deducted from Muslims for Urce years and even after that no new tax will be imposed**

The Christian rulers never intended to fulfill promises they had made to one as loyal and faithful as Abu Abdullah. He had been promised rule over the area of Al-Basharat, but instead was banished to Morocco. Muslims were given options either to embrace Christianity or face extermination, as cruelty towards them had become order of the day. In 1499, Muslims who refused to change faith were ordered to leave Spain. In 1502, all

rogue Muslims were ordered to be executed. This way, all Muslims, excepting those who adopted Christianity, were either burnt alive, murdered, or expelled from Spain. In short span of a few years following the 1491 Peace Agreement, not a soul in Spain professed faith in Allah and the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). The agreement had thus annihilated remains of Muslims from territory where they had magnanimously ruled for over 781 years.

The Madrid Conference of 1991-Time to Reconcile?

Why was the 1991 Middle East Peace Conference held in Spain? A definite answer to this question is difficult. There may be many factors behind the choice of this venue. However, it would not be mere wishful thinking that those who fixed the venue had Spain's 500th anniversary in their mind commemorating the time when Muslims were wiped off Spain. It would not be gainsaying, keeping human psychology in view, that there was mockery in selecting this site as a venue for peace talks between pro-Israeli Western powers and the Muslim Arabs. It becomes all the more crystallized when one considers how meticulously birthdays are celebrated in Western culture. In this background, was it a message adapted from history which the West wanted to convey to the Muslim Arab participants to the peace talks? Or, was it the intention of vested interests to put psychological pressure on them? Were the peace talks, harbinger of

vengeance, an example of which was the fall of Gharnata?

We will find no difference if we compare the situation that prevailed in 1491 and the Muslims' circumstances in 1991. Arabs are against Turks, Iraq against Kuwait, Egyptians against Yemenis, Punjabis against Bengalis – they are all Muslims up in arms against their brethren. The deplorable Muslim condition centuries before is what we find even today. Western secular Christian powers have always been instrumental in keeping Muslims polarized with a view to keep them under their dominance. The Madrid Conference started in the aftermath of the Gulf War. What actually happened there? Arabs fought Arabs, or precisely Muslims killed their Muslim brethren. The Western countries first jointly armed Iraq. When it became a power to reckon with, it was destroyed. In Jordan, Palestinians were killed en-masse in *Black September*, an offensive was launched by Syria in Lebanon, Palestinians were murdered in Beirut's refugee camps, while a large number of Palestinians were arrested by Jordanians in the Gaza Strip. Who were the perpetrators of these onslaughts and who were the victims. Were they all not Muslims? Why should the Palestinians not adopt similar policies if Egypt can go to Camp David with out them and if Saudi Arabia and Kuwait openly announce they are ready for peace with Israel, whether Palestinians come to the talks table or not.

Information taken from: *Islam and the West: Middle East Peace Talks* **by Khurram Murad**

© 2007 AICE

JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY
A Division of The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise

The Madrid Framework

Today's Middle East peace negotiations are being carried out within the structure of the Madrid Framework. This framework, described in the Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Conference, is the product of intensive diplomatic efforts carried out in the region immediately following the Gulf War.

The framework consists of three basic elements:

1. The Opening Conference

The Madrid invitation called for the convening of an opening conference, in order to inaugurate two separate yet parallel negotiating tracks -- the bilateral track and the multilateral track. The conference was designed to serve as a opening forum for all the participants, having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. The Madrid Conference, hosted by the Government of Spain and co-sponsored by the U.S. and Russia (then the USSR), opened on October 30, 1991 and lasted for three days.

The opening addresses by hosts, co-sponsors and participating delegations reflect the aspirations of each. This conference may only be reconvened with the agreement of all participants.

2. The Bilateral Track

The bilateral negotiations are meant to resolve the conflicts of the past. The first_ever direct talks between Israel and her immediate

Arab neighbors opened in Madrid on November 3, 1991, immediately following the Madrid Conference. Over a dozen formal rounds of bilateral talks were subsequently hosted by the US Department of State in Washington.

These talks are, in fact, four separate sets of bilateral negotiations. While the talks with the three Arab states are aimed at achieving peace treaties, the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians are based on a two-stage formula: 5-year interim self-government arrangements, to be followed by negotiations on the permanent status issues.

- Israel-Jordan
- Israel-Palestinians
- Israel-Syria
- Israel-Lebanon

3. The Multilateral Track

The multilateral negotiations are meant to build the Middle East of the future, while building confidence among the regional parties. These talks, which opened in Moscow in January 1992, include five separate forums attended by delegations from countries in the region as well as representatives of the international community. The negotiations focus on key issues that concern the entire Middle East -- water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development. The talks have taken place in working groups which meet periodically in venues throughout the world, including the Middle East.

The Madrid Framework

Inaugurated at the
MADRID CONFERENCE
October 30 - November 1, 1991
October 30 - November 1, 1991

BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

Israel-Palestinians	Israel-Jordan	Israel-Syria	Israel-Lebanon
Interim Self-Government Arrangements for 5 years			
Permanent Status	Peace Treaty Signed: Oct 26, 1994	Peace Treaty	Peace Treaty

- The purpose of the bilateral negotiations is to resolve the conflicts of the past.
- The goal of the talks with the Arab states is to conclude bilateral peace treaties.
- The talks with the Palestinians are aimed at achieving a settlement in two stages, over five years.

MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS				
Steering Committee				
Working Groups				
Economic Cooperation & Development	Environment	Water	Refugees	Arms Control & Regional Security

- The purpose of the multilateral talks is to build the Middle East of the future.
- Issues of regional concern are discussed in a forum which fosters cooperation and builds confidence between the parties.

Source: [Israeli Foreign Ministry]

Copyright 2007 The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise

MIDDLE EAST PEACE CHRONOLOGY

FROM 1978-PRESENT



2002-2007

November 20, 2007
The United States invites 49 nations, organizations and individuals to attend the **November 26-28 Middle East Peace Conference** at the U.S. Naval Academy campus in Annapolis, Maryland, about 80.5 kilometers outside Washington.

July 16, 2007
President Bush calls for a **Middle East Peace Conference** in the fall to be led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and to include Palestinians, Israelis and regional neighbors who support creation of a Palestinian state, as well as new aid measures to support the West Bank-based government of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

June 27, 2007
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair becomes the first special representative for the Quartet. He will represent the diplomatic grouping and support Palestinian state-building efforts.

September 20, 2006
President Bush meets with the Palestinian president on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, reiterating U.S. support for a two-state solution.

March 1, 2005
Members of the Quartet — the United Nations, Russia, the European Union and the United States — convene in London for the Meeting on Supporting the Palestinian Authority. The Quartet calls for continued financial support from the international community and encourages preparations for a future pledging conference.

February 8, 2005
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas — also known as Abu Mazen — agree to a ceasefire at the summit at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The summit, which was hosted by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah II, is the first high-level meeting between Palestinian and Israeli leaders in over four years.

January 9, 2005
Mahmoud Abbas wins the Palestinian presidential elections with 62.3 percent of the votes cast.

November 11, 2004
Palestinian Authority President Yasser Arafat dies at age 75.

April 14, 2004
President Bush **sends a letter** to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon welcoming Israel's plan to withdraw settlements from Gaza and parts of the West Bank and reaffirming the United States' commitment to the road map.

June 3 - 4, 2003
Red Sea Summit held in Aqaba, Jordan.

May 10 - 13, 2003
Secretary Powell travels to the Middle East to discuss implementing President Bush's road map for peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

May 1, 2003
Mahmoud Abbas is confirmed as the first Palestinian Prime Minister.

April 30, 2003
The **road map** to a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is released. The road map sets forth a sequence of steps toward the goals outlined by President Bush during his **June 24, 2002, speech**.

1997-2002

October 1, 2002
President Bush signs the Foreign Affairs Authorization Act for fiscal year 2003 and maintains that the status of Jerusalem must be negotiated by the Israelis and Palestinians.

September 12, 2002
President Bush, addressing the United Nations General Assembly, underscored his commitment to the establishment of an independent and democratic Palestinian state "living side by side with Israel in peace and security."

August 8, 2002
Secretary of State Powell met in Washington with a Palestinian delegation including Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat, Interior Minister Abdel Razak Yehiyeh and Economic and Trade Minister Maher Masri.

August 1, 2002
President Bush meets with Jordan's King Abdullah in Washington. Bush also met briefly with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who was at the White House for discussion with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

June 24, 2002
President Bush, speaking from the White House, **calls for new Palestinian leadership** and pledges that, "when the Palestinian people have new leaders, new institutions, and new security arrangements with their neighbors, the United States of America will support the creation of a Palestinian state whose borders and certain aspects of its sovereignty will be provisional until resolved as part of a final settlement in the Middle East." Bush also calls for an end to terrorism, increased humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people, and the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab World.

May 2, 2002
The United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia announce plans to arrange for the distribution of humanitarian aid and establish more effective security arrangements in the region.

April 4, 2002
President Bush, speaking from the White House, outlines his vision for a resolution of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict and announces Secretary of State Powell will travel to the region, seeking an end to terrorism and violence.

March 27, 2002
The Arab League, meeting in Beirut, adopts the proposal of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah endorsing a peaceful two-state settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

March 12, 2002
The United Nations Security Council adopts Resolution 1397, endorsing a "vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders." The resolution, introduced by the United States, is the first Security Council resolution to refer to Palestinian statehood.

February 18, 2002
President Bush supports a Saudi proposal to normalize Arab relations with Israel in exchange for withdrawal to its 1967 borders. The proposal first appeared February 17, 2002, in "The New York Times".

November 19, 2001
Secretary Powell, in a speech delivered at University of Louisville, Kentucky, outlines U.S. policy to help achieve peace between Arabs and Israelis. He underscores U.S. support for a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders.

November 10, 2001
Speaking before the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush states the U.S. will work "toward a day when two states, Israel and Palestine, live peacefully together within secure and recognize borders as called for by the Security Council resolutions."

September 26, 2001
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Palestinian Chairman Arafat agree to a ceasefire and promise to resume joint security initiatives.

July 19, 2001
The Group of Eight (G-8) foreign ministers, meeting in Genoa, issue a statement calling for the implementation of the Mitchell Report recommendations.

June 26, 2001
President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon meet in Washington to discuss implementation of the Mitchell Report.

April 30, 2001
The Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, chaired by former U.S. Senator George J. Mitchell, issues its **final report** on how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict might be solved. The report calls for an immediate cease-fire, a renunciation of terrorism and a resumption of peace

talks, as well as a freeze on construction of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza.

February 25, 2001
Secretary of State Powell meets with Prime Minister Sharon in Jerusalem and Chairman Arafat in Ramallah.

November 7, 2000
Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell is asked by President Clinton to chair a fact-finding commission to look into the causes of recent violence between Israelis and Palestinians.

October 17, 2000
Arafat and Barak attend meeting in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt arranged by president Clinton and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to discuss a cease-fire and pullback of Israeli forces.

October 4, 2000
Israeli PM Barak and Palestinian leader Arafat meet with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and French President Jacques Chirac in Paris.

July 11-25, 2000
President Clinton hosts meeting between Israeli and Palestinian leadership to address the most difficult of final status issues, including Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees.

March 21, 2000
Palestinian-Israeli talks commence at Bolling Air Force Base near Washington, DC and last one week. The U.S. facilitates discussion of permanent status issues in an effort to help the parties reach a comprehensive agreement by September 13, 2000.

January 3, 2000
Delegations from Israel and Syria, again led by PM Barak and Foreign Minister Al-Shara, gather in Shepherdstown, West Virginia for a further week of talks. Differences remain, and Secretary Albright announces the postponement of a third round of talks.

Back to Top

December 15, 1999
President Clinton welcomes Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq Al-Shara to the White House prior to the resumption of direct negotiations suspended in 1996. The parties hold two days of talks and agree to a second round in January.

September 24, 1999
Representatives of regional and international parties, led by Secretary of State Albright, gather in New York as Partners in Peace to demonstrate their strong and unwavering support for the Middle East Peace Process.

July 14 - 20, 1999
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak visits the U.S. for the first time since taking office July 6. He and President Clinton pledge to make peace a top priority. PM Barak also meets in Washington with Secretary of State Albright, Secretary of Defense Cohen and other U.S.

May 17, 1999
Ehud Barak is elected Prime Minister of Israel, defeating Benyamin Netanyahu 56% to 44% in direct voting.

May 17 - 20, 1999
King Abdullah II of Jordan makes his first visit to the United States since succeeding his father, the late King Hussein.

February 7, 1999
King Hussein of Jordan dies of cancer in Amman. His son, King Abdullah II, succeeds him. President Clinton issues a proclamation honoring the legacy of King Hussein, and joins world leaders at the late king's funeral in Amman February 8.

December 12 - 15, 1998
President Clinton visits the Palestinian Authority and Israel. Following an historic address to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) in Gaza, the President witnesses a PLC vote "fully and forever" rejecting conflict with Israel and revoking articles of the Palestinian Charter calling for the destruction of Israel.

November 30, 1998
President Clinton hosts a Middle East Donors Conference in Washington at which some 40 nations pledge over $3 billion in economic assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The President will seek Congress' approval for an additional U.S. contribution of $400 million over the next five years.

October 15 - 23, 1998
President Clinton, Secretary Albright and other U.S. officials broker intensive negotiations

between Israel and the Palestinian Authority at the Wye River Conference Center on Maryland's Eastern Shore. A final, all-night session results in agreement upon the Wye River Memorandum, which is signed at the White House on October 23.

September 28, 1998
Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat meet at the White House with President Clinton, who announces that Secretary Albright will return to the region for a further push to get direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations back on track.

January 20 - 22, 1998
President Clinton meets separately with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat in Washington in an attempt to re-energize the peace process.

Back to Top

1991-1997

May 31, 1996
Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu becomes prime minister of Israel, having defeated Labor's Shimon Peres in early elections called after the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin.

April 30, 1996
President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres sign a U.S.-Israeli Counterterrorism Accord at the White House.

March 13, 1996
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hosts a "Summit of the Peacemakers" in Sharm El-Sheikh to call for a halt to extremism and violence.

November 4, 1995
Israeli Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin is assassinated following a peace rally in Tel Aviv by an Israeli university student, Yigal Amir.

September 28, 1995
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is signed in Washington, DC. The agreement contains 31 articles and seven annexes (redeployment and security, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, cooperation programs, and prisoner release). Following the signing, President Clinton hosts a summit attended by King Hussein, President Mubarak, Prime Minister Rabin, and Chairman Arafat. The leaders review progress toward a comprehensive peace and ways to reinforce and accelerate that progress.

May 24, 1995
Secretary of State Christopher announces that Israel and Syria have reached a set of understandings on security arrangements.

October 26, 1994
The Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, which had been initialed on October 17 by Israeli Prime Minister Rabin and Jordanian Prime Minister Majali, is signed at the White House. President Clinton's participation in the signing ceremony underscores the U.S. commitment to the peace process.

August 29, 1994
The Agreement on the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities is signed at Erez, a checkpoint between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The expansion of Palestinian self-rule in the West Bank over education, taxation, social welfare, tourism, and health was completed by December 1994.

July 25, 1994
The Washington Declaration, embracing the underlying principles of the Israel-Jordan Common Agenda, is signed in Washington, DC.

May 4, 1994
At a ceremony in Cairo, Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat sign the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. The new agreement sets out terms for implementation of the Declaration of Principles and includes annexes on withdrawal of Israeli military forces and security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations.

Back to Top

September 14, 1993
The Israel-Jordan Common Agenda is agreed in Washington, DC, marking the end of the state of war between the two nations and paving the way for talks leading to a formal peace treaty.

September 13, 1993
A new page in the history of the Middle East is turned at the White House, as Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat meet and watch Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres PLO Executive Council Member Abou Abbas sign the agreement. President Bill Clinton, former presidents George Bush and Jimmy Carter, and 3,000 dignitaries witness the signing — on the same desk used in the signing of the Camp David accords 15 years earlier.

September 10, 1993
• Arafat letter is hand-carried to Israel by Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Joergen Holst, whose country brokered the PLO-Israel pact.
• Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin signs a document recognizing the PLO, and opens the way to a signing ceremony August 13 in Washington.
• President Clinton calls the Oslo agreement "a bold breakthrough." "Today marks a shining moment of hope for the people of the Middle East; indeed, of the entire world," he says, pledging continued direct engagement of the United States in the peace process.
• European leaders, including French president Francois Mitterrand and British Prime Minister John Major give strong endorsements to the Israel-PLO mutual recognition accord, but caution that much remains to be done.
• Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes, representing the European Community's (EC) current presidency, says he will immediately start consultations with his EC counterparts and the executive European Commission to intensify the Community's contribution to the Middle East peace process. The EC is already the largest donor of aid to the Palestinians.

September 9, 1993
• Israel and the PLO agree to recognize each other after 45 years of conflict, building on a pact already initialed on Palestinian self-rule in the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and in Jericho.
• PLO leader Yasser Arafat signs a letter recognizing Israel and renouncing violence.

August 31, 1993
Eleventh round opens with the Israelis announcement on secret talks with PLO in Oslo and an initialed accord on self-rule for Palestinians in Gaza Strip and Jericho.

August 29, 1993
Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres tells his cabinet that he has reached an agreement with the PLO on Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho.

August 26, 1993

PLO says it has reached provisional agreement in secret talks with Israel on partial autonomy in occupied territories.

January 28 - 29, 1992
The organizational meeting for multilateral talks on regional issues such as arms control, refugees and the environment is held in Moscow. Rounds one, two and three convene in 1992 in Lisbon and London.

January 7 - 16, 1992
The United States hails as another "step forward" when Israeli and Jordanian/Palestinian delegates resolve procedural differences that allow the third round of talks to resume. Israeli representatives meet separately with Lebanese, Syrian and Jordanian/Palestinian delegations.

Back to Top

1988-1991

December 11, 1991
Direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and separate delegations from Syria and Lebanon proceed; Israeli and Lebanese delegations characterize two sessions of talks as "substantive"; but negotiations have not begun between Israel and a joint Palestinian delegation.

December 4, 1991
Palestinian, Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian delegations arrive on time at the three designated sites to resume direct Middle East negotiations in Washington. The Israeli delegates are absent.

November 29, 1991
Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians agree to a joint U.S.-Soviet proposal to resume bilateral talks in Washington on December 4, but Israel says it will not be ready to resume bilateral talks until December 9.

November 1, 1991
Secretary of State Baker in remarks closing the Madrid conference says a breakthrough was achieved with the start of "direct bilateral negotiations." Baker and conference co-sponsor Soviet Foreign Minister Pankin call for direct bilateral negotiations to start immediately.

October 31, 1991
Palestinians, in a joint delegation with Jordan, attend the Madrid talks between Jordan, Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Direct bilateral talks begin among Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and participants from the occupied territories. Multilateral negotiations begin on arms control,

security, water, refugees, the environment and economic development.

October 30, 1991
Opening the Madrid conference, President Bush says the objective is "to achieve "real peace... security, diplomatic relations, economic relations, trade, investment, cultural exchange, even tourism. We seek a Middle East, where vast resources are no longer devoted to armaments." Outsiders can assist, he says, "but in the end, it is up to the peoples and the governments of the Middle East to shape the future of the Middle East."

October 18, 1991
Secretary of State Baker, at a news conference in Jerusalem, says President Bush and Soviet President Gorbachev are inviting Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians to attend a Middle East peace conference to be held beginning October 30 in Madrid. Baker says the conference is to be followed by "direct negotiations to achieve real peace."

March, 1991
President Bush says that Gulf War victory opens "window of opportunity" for resolution of Arab-Israeli conflict. Secretary of State Baker travels to Middle East on first of eight peace missions.

August 2, 1990
Iraq invades and occupies Kuwait. Yasser Arafat's support for Saddam Hussein leads Persian Gulf states to cut off funds to the PLO. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are forced out of the Gulf states.

Back to Top

1978-1988

December 1988
Palestine National Council accepts original U.N. partition plan (U.N. General Assembly Resolution 181), Israel's right to exist, and U.N. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and renounces terrorism. The U.S. opens dialogue with the PLO, the first formal contacts with the PLO in 13 years. The PLO charter is not revised, however. The dialogue lasts two years.

July 30, 1988
King Hussein surrenders Jordan's claim to the West Bank, cuts legal and administrative ties.

February - April 1988
Secretary of State Shultz, in a letter to Prime Minister Shamir, launches shuttle mediation effort, sets a timetable for talks on transitional arrangements and a permanent solution in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The proposal calls for bilateral Arab-Israeli talks following an international conference. It fails to gain support from all parties.

December 9, 1987
Palestinian uprising -- the intifada -- erupts in Gaza, spreads to West Bank.

September 1986
Yitzhak Shamir replaces Shimon Peres as prime minister of Israel.

February 19, 1986
Frustrated by Yasser Arafat's refusal to accept U.N. resolutions as a basis for peace talks, Jordan's King Hussein severs links with the PLO.

September 1985
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres launches peace initiative centered on Jordan which includes proposal for an international conference; the United States encourages Israeli, Egyptian, and Jordanian diplomatic efforts; Yitzhak Shamir and Likud party oppose conference.

June 1985
Israel completes withdrawal from most of Lebanon, retaining effective control over 12-mile-wide "security zone" in southern Lebanon.

March 5, 1984
Lebanon abrogates Lebanese-Israeli agreement.

February 21, 1984
U.S. forces in Beirut withdraw from Lebanon.

October 1983
U.S. Marine headquarters in Beirut destroyed by terrorist bomb.

May 17, 1983
Israel-Lebanon peace and withdrawal agreement signed, mediated by Secretary of State Shultz and Ambassador Philip Habib.

April 18, 1983
U.S. embassy in Beirut destroyed by terrorist bomb.

September 16, 1982
Lebanese President Bachir Gemayel assassinated; Israeli forces occupy West Beirut; Christian Phalange militia massacre civilian Palestinians near Beirut.

September 9, 1982
The 12th Arab League Summit meeting in Fez, Morocco, calls for Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 1967 including Arab Jerusalem, the removal of Israeli settlements in Arab territories, and confirms the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO.

September 1, 1982
President Reagan announces U.S. initiative to settle Arab-Israeli conflict, based on earlier Camp David Accords and **UN Resolution 42**

June - August 1982
Lebanon War: Israel attacks Syrian and PLO forces threatening its northern border in Lebanon. Yasser Arafat and PLO followers are forced to evacuate Beirut strongholds. Philip Habib mediates PLO withdrawal agreement. U.S., French, and Italian forces deployed in Beirut to facilitate PLO evacuation.

April 1982
Israel completes withdrawal of forces and civilians from Sinai.

December 14, 1981
Government of Israel extends its law, jurisdiction, and administration to the Golan Heights.

October 6, 1981
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat is assassinated.

March - June 1981
U.S. mediator Philip Habib attempts to defuse Israeli-Syrian confrontation over Syrian SAM missiles in Lebanon; clashes between Israel and PLO elements in Lebanon.

March 1979

Israel and Egypt sign a bilateral peace treaty in Washington under which Israel agrees to hand back Sinai to Egypt. It keeps the Gaza Strip. Arab states impose boycott on Egypt.

September 17, 1978
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with the help of President Jimmy Carter, agree at **Camp David** to a framework for peace in the Middle East which offers limited autonomy to Palestinians in occupied territories and sets the framework for an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The Israel-Jordan Negotiations

Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, U.S. President Bill Clinton,and Jordan's King Hussein.





The bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan, initiated at the Madrid Conference, continued for almost two years in Washington until the signing of the Israeli-Jordanian Common Agenda on September 14, 1993. The Common Agenda constituted the blueprint for the peace treaty, comprising the following components: security, water, refugees and displaced persons, borders and territorial matters.

The first public meeting between King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin took place in Washington, on July 25, 1994. Out of this meeting emerged The Washington Declaration, signed by Prime Minister Rabin and King Hussein, with President Clinton serving as a witness.

The major achievements of the Washington Declaration were a series of agreements and concrete steps symbolizing the new era:





- The state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel was terminated.
- Both states agreed to seek a just, lasting and comprehensive peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Israel will respect the special role of the Hashemite Kingdom over Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem.

Concrete steps included the establishment of direct telephone links, joint electricity grids, new border crossings, free access to third country tourists, and cooperation between the police forces in combating crime, with special emphasis on drug smuggling. It was also decided to continue negotiations on bilateral economic cooperation and abolishing economic boycotts, as well as on the opening of an international air corridor between the two countries.

The first meeting in the region of the Israeli and Jordanian bilateral delegations took place on July 18-19, 1994 at Ein Avrona, located in the boundary area north of Aqaba and Eilat. The parties agreed to hold talks on a continuous basis, alternately on the Israeli and Jordanian sides of the border. These talks culminated in the signing of a Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan on October 26, 1994.

With the ratification of the peace treaty full diplomatic relations were established between Israel and Jordan on November 27, 1994. Since that time, relations between Israel and Jordan have been steadily progressing. The Jordanian parliament's action in August 1995 to rescind its adherence to the Arab boycott on Israel, as well as the regional economic conference in Amman in November 1995, served as significant positive indicators for the future.

The open border crossings between the two countries have facilitated the normalization of relations. Joint business ventures are being consistently initiated and the free movement of businessmen, by both land and air, has created an atmosphere of cooperation and open communication. Tourism between the two countries has been on the rise.

The basis for the implementation of the peace treaty with Jordan was set with the 15 bilateral agreements which have since been signed and ratified. These agreements cover the following areas: Environmental Protection, Commerce and Trade, Transportation, Air Transport, Water, Agriculture, Combating Crime and Illicit Drugs, Communications and Mail, Science and Culture, Education, Health, Borders, The Eilat-Aqaba Region, Tourism and Energy. These treaties are to serve as the foundation of the peaceful, normal relationship between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom.

These are some of the recent highlights of activity:

Commerce and Trade: Since trade began between Jordan and Israel in July 1996, the figures indicate a steady growth in Jordanian-Israeli commerce. In 1996 Israel exported some 9 million dollars' worth of goods to Jordan, while importing products valued at 5 million dollars. In 1997 the value of exports rose to about 20 million dollars, and imports from Jordan amounted to 12.5 million. Estimates for the period January-September 1998 alone show exports and imports at more than 29 million dollars.

Economic Cooperation: An important part of the economic cooperation between Jordan and Israel is taking place in the Hassan Industrial Park in Irbid — the first area to be granted the status of duty-free export to the USA (QIZ). Cooperation in this region is mainly in the areas of textiles and the manufacture of jewelry and electronic equipment. Thousands of Jordanians are employed in these industries, as well as in other industrial areas throughout the country. The success of the joint industrial park in Irbid has given rise to a decision reached by the Ministers of Industry and Trade of the two countries with regard to the expansion of this move to additional industrial parks in the border area between Jordan and Israel subject to approval by the United States.

International Cooperation and Agriculture: In October 1995 an agreement on cooperation in these areas was signed between Jordan and Israel. Under the terms of this agreement, the Israel Foreign Ministry's Center for International Cooperation (MASHAV) works together with several government ministries in Jordan and with a number of non-governmental organizations for the promotion of economic and social development for the benefit of both peoples. The two countries have established a joint enterprise for the marketing of agricultural produce, with a view to developing new markets for the agricultural produce being grown in the eastern Jordan River Valley with the help of Israeli technologies.

Air Transport: A "pilot project" has been activated involving the use of Aqaba Airport for flights from Europe bringing tourists to Eilat. With the completion of the new terminal on the Israeli side, all international flights currently landing at Ovda and Eilat Airports will be transferred to the Aqaba-Eilat Peace Airport. Moreover, the number of flights between Amman and Ben-Gurion Airport have been stepped up this year to 14, and a new line has been put in, linking Amman with Haifa twice a week.

Tourism: In 1996, and again in 1997, some 125,000 Israeli tourists visited Jordan. The number of Jordanian tourists visiting Israel came to about 50,000 annually (not counting family visits). There has been an increase in the level of cooperation between the tourist agencies of the two countries in the matter of marketing package tours for Israel and Jordan. There is agreement, too, between the two countries concerning cooperation with the approach of the year 2000 and the expected stream of tourists to the Holy Land from all over the world.

Water: Under the terms of the peace treaty, Israel today provides Jordan with nearly 75 million cubic meters of water per year. Work is to begin soon on the erection of a dam deigned to divert water from the Yarmouk River: another aspect of the cooperation between Jordan and Israel in this domain.

Trilateral Israel-Jordan-U.S. Economic Committee:

A Trilateral Israel-Jordan-U.S. Economic Committee was established at the October 1993 White House meeting between President Clinton, Crown Prince Hassan and Foreign Minister Peres to discuss economic cooperation and development. This forum first convened in Washington D.C. on November 30, 1993, and then periodically in the region. Sub-groups were established to discuss specific issues, such as: trade, finance and banking; Jordan Valley cooperative projects; and civil aviation. The outcome of these talks have

been incorporated in the Peace Treaty between Israel and Jordan.

The convening of the fifth meeting of the Trilateral Economic Committee at the Dead Sea Spa Hotel in Jordan on July 20-21, 1994 was the occasion for the first public meeting of Israeli and Jordanian leaders in the region — Jordanian Prime Minister Majali and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres.

Common Agenda
Washington, D.C. - September 14, 1993

Trilateral US-Jordan-Israel Economic Committee Washington, D.C. October 1, 1993 Established by Pres. Clinton-Crown Prince Hassan-FM Peres	**Washington Declaration** Washington, D.C. July 25, 1994

Treaty of Peace
Arava - October 26, 1994

- Full diplomatic relations.
- Agreed international boundary with minor modifications.
- End to belligerency; cooperation in prevention of terrorism.
- Agreement on allocations of water and the development of new water resources.
- Freedom of access to religious sites; recognition of special role of Hashemite Kingdom over Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem.
- Freedom of passage by land, sea and air.
- Cooperation in such areas as the economy, transportation, telecommunications, tourism, environment, energy, health, agriculture, war against crime and drugs.
- The problem of refugees and displaced persons will be resolved in agreed-upon negotiating frameworks.







Israel-Palestinian Negotiations

Background - Israel-PLO Recognition

Recent years have witnessed a series of landmarks in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Following intense behind-the-scenes contacts between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Oslo, an agreement was achieved between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. On *September 9, 1993* , Chairman Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin, in which he stated unequivocally that the PLO:

- Recognizes the right of Israel to exist in peace and security;
- Accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
- Commits itself to a peaceful resolution of the conflict;
- Renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence;
- Assumes responsibility over all PLO elements o ensure their compliance, prevent violations, and discipline violators;
- Affirms that those articles of the PLO Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist are now inoperative and no longer valid;
- Undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes to the Covenant.

In reply, Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the peace negotiations.

On *September 13, 1993* , a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP), based on the agreement worked out in Oslo, was signed by the two parties in Washington, outlining the proposed interim self-government arrangements, as envisioned and agreed by both sides. The arrangements contained in the DOP include immediate Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho, early empowerment for the Palestinians in West Bank, and an agreement on self-government and the election of a Palestinian council. Additionally, extensive economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians plays an important role in the DOP.

The Interim Agreement

Shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, negotiations commenced between Israeli and PLO delegations on the implementation of the interim agreement, which was accomplished in three stages:

1. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo on *May 4, 1994* , and applies to the Gaza Strip and to a defined area of about 65 square kilometers including Jericho and its environs. While the Declaration of Principles is a short document, consisting of approximately 20 pages, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement is a document containing almost 300 pages (the agreement itself and four annexes) with six maps attached. The Gaza-Jericho agreement addresses four main issues -- security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations. The document includes agreement to a withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza and Jericho, a transfer of authority from the Israeli Civil Administration to a Palestinian Authority, the structure and composition of the Palestinian Authority, its jurisdiction and legislative powers, a Palestinian police force, and relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

2. On *August 29, 1994* , the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities was signed by Israel and the Palestinians. The Agreement puts into effect the next phase (early empowerment) of the Declaration of Principles.
In accordance with the DOP, the Agreement provides for the transfer of powers to the Palestinian Authority within five specified spheres:

a. Education & Culture (carried out on August 29, 1994);
b. Social Welfare;
c. Tourism (both carried out on November 13-14, 1994);
d. Health;
e. Taxation (both carried out on December 1, 1994).

On *August 27, 1995,* an protocol was signed transferring additional spheres to the Palestinian Authority: labor, trade and industry, gas and gasoline, insurance, postal services, statistics, agriculture, and local government.

3. On *September 28, 1995,* the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was signed in Washington, D.C. This agreement, which marks the conclusion of the first stage in negotiations between Israel and the PLO, incorporates and supersedes the Gaza-Jericho and Early Empowerment agreements.

The main object of the Interim Agreement is to broaden Palestinian self-government in the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority -- the Palestinian Council -- for an interim period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (i.e. no later than May 1999). This will allow the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a new era of cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual respect. At the same time it protects Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security interests, both with regard to

external security as well as the personal security of its citizens in the West Bank.

The Interim Agreement sets forth the future relations between Israel and the Palestinians. To the main body of the agreement are appended seven annexes dealing with: security arrangements, elections, civil affairs (transfer of powers), legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-Palestinian cooperation, and the release of Palestinian prisoners.

Milestones in the Implementation of the Interim Agreement

On *January 20, 1996* , following completion of the first stage of IDF redeployment (with the exception of Hebron), elections were held to the Palestinian Council and for the Head of the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat was elected Ra'ees (head) of the Authority.

On *April 24, 1996* , the Palestinian National Council, convening in Gaza, voted 504 to 54, with 14 abstentions, as follows:

1. "The Palestinian National Charter is hereby amended by canceling the articles that are contrary to the letters exchanged between the P.L.O. and the Government of Israel 9-10 September 1993.
2. Assigns its legal committee with the task of redrafting the Palestinian National Charter in order to present it to the first session of the Palestinian central council." (24/04/96)

On *December 14, 1998* , the Palestinian National Council, in accordance with the Wye River Memorandum, convened in Gaza in the presence of U.S. President Clinton and voted to reaffirm this decision.

An agreement on a Temporary International Presence in Hebron was signed on *May 9, 1996* .

The Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed on *January 17, 1997* . The Protocol was accompanied by a Note for the Record prepared by the US Special Middle East Coordinator, confirming a series of agreements between the sides on non-Hebron issues and reaffirming their commitment to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity.

On *October 23, 1998* , The Wye River Memorandum was signed at the White House, Washington D.C., between Israel and the PLO, following a nine-day summit hosted by U. S. President Mr. Bill Clinton in Wye Plantation, Maryland.

On *September 4, 1999* , the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed by representatives of Israel and the PLO. Restating the commitment of the two sides to full implementation of all agreements reached since September 1993, the Memorandum sets out to resolve the outstanding issues of the present interim status, in particular those set out in the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998.

The sides also restated their commitment to the Interim Agreement's prohibition regarding initiating or taking any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to the conclusion of the permanent status agreement.

Stages of Sharm el-Sheikh implementation:

Release of prisoners: *Sep 9, 1999; Oct 15, 1999* .
Additional prisoners released for Ramadan: *Dec 1999; Jan 2000* .
Further redeployments: *Sep 10, 1999 (7%); Jan 5-7, 2000 (5%); Mar 21, 2000 (6.1%)*
Safe passage: southern route - *Oct 25, 1999*
Shuhada Street opened: *Oct 31, 1999*
Displaced persons committee convenes: *February 6, 2000*

Permanent Status Negotiations

The negotiations on the permanent status arrangements commenced in Taba on *May 5, 1996* . These negotiations will deal with the remaining issues to be resolved, including Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with neighboring countries.

In a joint communique issued on May 6 at the close of the first session of talks, the two sides reaffirmed the principles guiding these negotiations.

In the Wye Memorandum of October 23, 1998 both sides agreed to immediately resume permanent status negotiations on an accelerated basis and to make a determined effort to reach agreement by May 4, 1999. A first meeting between Foreign Minister Sharon and Abu Mazen took place on November 18, 1998.

Following the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the permanent status negotiations were formally resumed on *September 13, 1999* , at the Erez checkpoint. Foreign Minister David Levy was appointed to head the Israeli negotiating team with the Palestinians, and Abu-Mazen heads the Palestinian team.

In his speech at the opening of the talks, Foreign Minister Levy summarized the basic principles by which Israel will be guided up in negotiating a permanent status agreement: we will not return to the 1967 lines; united Jerusalem will remain the capital of Israel; settlement blocs in the territories will remain under Israeli sovereignty; there will be no foreign army west of the Jordan River.

Talks between Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams, headed by Oded Eran and Yasser Abed Rabbo, were resumed at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington D.C. on March 21, 2000.







Israel-Syria Negotiations

Following the Madrid Conference, talks between Israeli and Syrian delegations commenced in Washington under the framework of the Madrid formula. During 1994, negotiations were held on the ambassadorial level in Washington. These talks led to focused discussions on security arrangements and the convening of two meetings between the Israeli and Syrian chiefs-of-staff in December 1994 and June 1995.

These negotiations were supported by the involvement of high-ranking U.S. officials, including two meetings between President Clinton and President Assad and a number of visits by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the region.

The Israeli negotiators have stated to the Syrians that Israel accepts the principle of withdrawal on the Golan Heights, in the context of a peace settlement which simultaneously addresses four key issues:

Key Issues:

- the depth of the withdrawal;
- the schedule and duration for withdrawal;
- the stages of the withdrawal and the linkage between them and normalization;
  here, as with Egypt, we insist that there be a protracted phase of normalization -- open borders and embassies

-- before we complete our withdrawal to a yet undetermined line, and;

- agreement over security arrangement.

Topics of Discussion:

Israel feels that direct and public high-level meetings between Israeli and Syrian leaders will promote the negotiations and bolster public confidence in Syria's desire for peace.

The late Prime Minister Rabin stated that should a peace treaty including a significant withdrawal on the Golan Heights be negotiated with Syria, the proposed treaty will be put to a national referendum before it is signed.

In December 1995, Syria agreed to resume the negotiations without preconditions and with elements of flexibility in the form of those negotiations. The Syrians decided not to raise the level of negotiators to a political level, but to empower and increase the authority of Ambassador Mualem and give him and his colleagues a larger mandate, both in terms of substance and in terms of atmosphere. The Syrians agreed now to deal with those elements that make up the notion of full peace: quality of peace, normalization, water. Two rounds of Syrian-Israeli peace talks were conducted under U.S. auspices at the Aspen Institute's Wye River Conference Center in December 1995 and January 1996, focusing on both security and other issues. The discussions were highly detailed and comprehensive in scope.

The discussion of security arrangements identified important areas of conceptual agreement and convergence. Not unexpectedly, it also revealed differences of substance or perspective. Ideas for dealing with some of the differences were referred to leaderships in Israel and Syria for consideration.

All participants in this session agreed that it had significantly advanced the discussion of key issues in a future peace treaty, and clarified each side's views and needs. They agreed that the talks laid a solid basis for further discussions.

Although there have been no direct talks since January 1996, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu repeatedly called upon Syria to return to the negotiating table, without preconditions.

The guidelines of the government established by Prime Minister Ehud Barak in July 1999 reiterate:
"The Government will resume the negotiations with Syria with a view toward concluding a peace treaty therewith -- full peace that bolsters the security of Israel, grounded in UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and on the existence of a normal relationship between two neighboring states, living side by side in peace. The peace treaty with Syria will be submitted for approval in a referendum."

On December 8, 1999, President Clinton announced that Prime Minister Barak and President Assad agreed that the Israel-Syrian peace negotiations would be resumed from the point that they were halted since January 1996. The talks were launched at a summit meeting with President Clinton in Washington on December 15, with Prime Minister Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara, followed by a round of talks held in Shepherdstown, West Virginia from January 3-11, 2000







Israel-Lebanon Negotiations

The Israel-Lebanon Negotiations

From the beginning of the peace process, negotiations with Lebanon have been overshadowed by Syrian control over Lebanon's policies and decision-making process. Over a dozen rounds of bilateral talks were held between Israel and Lebanon in the framework of the Washington talks. These negotiations have been stalled since February 1994, and there is currently no contact between the two sides.

Israel has clarified to the Lebanese that it makes no claims to Lebanese land or resources, and that its primary concern is for security on its northern border. Israel has suggested a settlement based on the following principles:

The Principles:

- The Lebanese Army will be deployed north of the security zone and, for a period of six months, will prevent any terror activities against the security zone and Israel. Three months following that initial period, Israel will be prepared to sign a peace agreement with Lebanon.
- Prior to any change in its redeployment on the Lebanese front, Israel must be convinced that the military organs of all terrorist groups currently operating out of Lebanon will be irreversibly disbanded.
- The government of Israel must receive practical and valid guarantees that no harm will be inflicted upon Lebanese citizens and Southern Lebanese Army personnel currently residing in the security zone and that they will be absorbed in the governmental and societal fabric of Lebanon.

In April 1996, following months of provocations by Iranian-backed Hizbullah terrorists based in Lebanon,

Israel initiated "Operation Grapes of Wrath" directed against these terrorist elements.

On April 26, 1996, through U.S. mediation, a document of understanding was achieved in consultation with Syria, Lebanon and Israel. In addition to establishing what it is hoped will be a lasting end to hostilities, the document recognizes that a comprehensive peace can be achieved only on the basis of negotiations:

> "It is recognized that the understanding to bring the current crisis between Lebanon and Israel to an end cannot substitute for a permanent solution. The United States understands the importance of achieving a comprehensive peace in the region.
>
> Toward this end, the United States proposes the resumption of negotiations between Syria and Israel and between Lebanon and Israel at a time to be agreed upon, with the objective of reaching comprehensive peace.
>
> The United states understands that it is desirable that these negotiations be conducted in a climate of stability and tranquility."

On April 1, 1998, the Israeli government adopted a decision "accepting UN Security Council Resolution 425, so that the IDF will leave Lebanon with appropriate security arrangements, and so that the Lebanese government can restore its effective control over Southern Lebanon and assume responsibility for guaranteeing that its territory will not be used as a base for terrorist activity against Israel." In addition, the government "calls on the Lebanese government to begin negotiations, on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 425 to restore its effective control over territories currently under IDF control, and to prevent terrorist activities from its territory against Israel's northern border."

The guidelines of the government established by Prime Minister Barak in July 1999 reiterate: "The Government will act toward bringing the IDF out of Lebanon, while guaranteeing the welfare and security of residents of the north, and aspiring to conclude a peace treaty with Lebanon."

On March 5, 2000, the Israeli government passed a resolution to redeploy the IDF forces on the border with Lebanon by July 2000, preferably in the framework of an agreement.

On May 24, 2000, Israel completed the unilateral withdrawal of all IDF forces from southern Lebanon, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 425, and the Israel government decisions of April 1, 1998 and March 5, 2000, ending an 18-year presence there.

On June 18, 2000, the UN Security Council endorsed the Secretary-General's conclusion that, as of 16 June, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425.

The viewpoints of Israel and Palestine

Information taken from *The Road to Peace,* csmonitor.com



Statehood:

Though neighbors have challenged its right to exist, Israel seems assured of its sovereignty. The more pressing question of statehood refers to the Palestinian homeland. Three million Palestinians currently live in "autonomous regions" within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, areas which Israel occupied in 1967. Agreements between Israel and the Palestinians created a Palestinian Authority which has varying degrees of control over these areas, but not full self–determination. The agreements left Palestinian



statehood to "final status" negotiations, which have never begun.

Israeli position:

For most of its history, Israel perceived the creation of a Palestinian state as a direct threat to its security. (Arabs have declared war on Israel three times since its founding in 1947.) Though former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak made an unprecedented offer to support a state of Palestine, current leader Ariel Sharon remains opposed to the idea. Pressure from the Bush administration – which has now started to advocate a two-state solution to the Mideast conflict – might compel Israel to recognize Palestine. But borders are important. Israel will insist on a map that preserves its security, its settlements, its control of Jerusalem, and its access to water – much of which comes from the West Bank.

Palestinian position:

The Arabs rejected the original UN plan for Palestinian statehood, and the Palestinians never made much progress towards their goal until Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat signed peace agreements with the Israelis. The 1964 Palestine Liberation Organization charter called for Israel's destruction, and replacement with a



Palestinian state. Now disavowing this claim, Palestinian leaders insist that their state should include only the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in the 1967 war – Gaza and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. But Palestinians themselves are divided over their aims and methods. And so long as militants mount their campaign of terror, Israel will be more inclined to wipe out Palestinian infrastructure rather than support statehood.

Refugees:

In the Holy Land, exodus follows genesis. Israel was founded by refugees returning to an ancestral home. In the process, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled, or were ousted, from the new state. Today, millions of Palestinians living outside Israel (often in refugee camps in neighboring Arab countries) claim land or property inside the pre-1948 borders of the Jewish state. A United Nations resolution resolution recognizes this right-of-return, but Israeli law does not. The question of how to resolve this claim remains a chief obstacle to Mideast peace.

Israeli position:

Aside from being a logistical nightmare, granting right-of-return would dilute the Jewish population and threaten

Israel's identity as a Jewish state. Though saying their refusal is "nonnegotiable," Israeli leaders have floated the idea of repatriating a symbolic number of refugees, and compensating the rest. Israelis also point out that after 1948, Arab states expelled their Jewish populations, and Israel resettled the refugees instead of putting them in camps.

Palestinian position:

Many Palestinians have maintained old deeds to property as family heirlooms, passing down the dream of returning from generation to generation. The issue goes deeper than individual property claims for the Palestinians, who feel a collective right to their ancestral homeland and a deep anger at those who drove them from it.

Jerusalem:

Jerusalem is sacred ground for three major religions – Christianity, Judaism, and Islam – making discussion about control over the city particularly testy. The United Nations originally called for Jerusalem to be an international city shared by Israelis and Palestinians. Arabs and Israelis fought bitterly over the city in 1948, and the Jordanian army conquered East Jerusalem (and the city's holiest areas) and expelled its Jewish

population, while the Israeli army held on to West Jerusalem. In 1967, the Israelis conquered East Jerusalem and later annexed it to Israel proper. At the 2000 Camp David talks, there were for the first time direct negotiations over the fate of the city, but each side is adamant that the city must be its capital.

Israeli position:

Jerusalem is far and away the holiest city for Jews. Israelis consider the whole of Jerusalem to be the symbolic heart of their state. Israel claims Jerusalem as its capital, though most countries instead recognize Tel Aviv as the seat of government. For most Israelis, the option of partitioning the city again is totally unacceptable.

Palestinian position:

Jerusalem is Islam's third-holiest city and the idealized future capital of the Palestinian state. Palestinian historical and religious claims on parts of the city are deeply rooted. But Yasser Arafat has recently suggested that East Jerusalem could serve as the compromise capital.

Settlements:

Close to 400,000 Israelis live in Gaza, the West Bank, and Arab East Jerusalem. These illegal outposts developed after Israel seized Arab land in the 1967 war. Originally seen as a bargaining chip for

peace and a security buffer for Israel, they've become an aggravating factor in the Palestinian intifada, and often the scene of violence. A US commission led by former US Sen. George Mitchell recommended in 2001 that Israel freeze all settlement activity. Neither side is willing to consider Jewish settlers living under Palestinian rule.

Israeli position:

For Israelis, settlements have helped both absorb Jewish refugees (from the Soviet Union, for example) and provided a first line of defense against the Palestinians. Israel has retained authority over 60 percent of West Bank territory. Many Israelis consider the settlements perfectly legal: they say no one has the right to stop Jews from living within Israel's biblical borders.

Palestinian position:

Settlements are a sore point. These Jewish oases in the middle of Arab territory, developed illegally and tacitly condoned by the United States, are seen an instrument of ongoing occupation and threat to the Palestinians. The settlement question becomes even more crucial within the framework of a proposed Palestinian state, as it will either have to exclude the settlements, or include provisions for the Israelis to leave their new

homes.

Key Terms : The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

See a descriptive map of the disputed territory

Information taken from *The Road to Peace,* csmonitor.com



The Road Map:

A plan developed by the US, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia that calls for the establishment of a permanent Palestinian state and a full settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005. The seven-page plan, discussed in broad strokes throughout 2002, was delivered to both Israeli and Palestinian officials after the Palestinian Authority appointed Mahmoud Abbas as its first prime minister on April 29, 2003. By the end of May,



both sides had endorsed it – though the Israelis listed 14 concerns.

Right-of-return:

When Israel was created in 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians fled or were evicted from the new state. Many wound up in refugee camps in neighboring Arab states. They passed down to new generations their dreams of returning, and in some cases even the actual deeds to property. Palestinian leaders have insisted that the "dispossessed" have a right to return to their former homes, while Israel has steadfastly refused to consider the issue. Such an influx of Palestinians would dilute the Jewish population within Israel, and challenge its identity as a Jewish state. One suggested compromise: allowing a token number to return and compensating the rest.

Jewish settlements:

In the 1967 war, Israel defeated a second Arab invasion and retained control of the Palestinian territories remaining after the 1948 war. Israel encouraged Jewish settlers to build on this newly occupied land. Many of the settlers were immigrants pouring in from the former Soviet Union after its collapse. Settlements became an expedient way of integrating the poor arrivals into the Israeli economy. However, the



Palestinians have never accepted the post-1967 borders, and see the 400,000 settlers as encroaching on their land. The settlements have become extremely disruptive to the peace process, not only as frequent scenes of violence, but as sticking points in any potential border negotiations.

Intifada:

Literally meaning "uprising," intifada is the name given to two widespread Palestinian resistance movements. The first intifada started in 1987 and mostly involved Palestinian youth throwing rocks at Israeli troops, who sometimes shot back with deadly force. Badly outgunned, many more Palestinians were killed than Israelis. The second intifada began in 2000 as a hopeful phase in the peace process began to lose momentum and Israeli politician Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit to the al-Aqsa Mosque. This time, suicide bombers are the weapon of choice, resulting in a much bloodier conflict for the Israelis.

Palestinian Authority:

The Oslo Accords created a limited Palestinian self-government with Yasser Arafat at its head. The PA has jurisdiction in much of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While the PA is not an

internationally recognized sovereign state able to conduct foreign policy, it does have substantial domestic powers including its own armed police force. The PA headquarters are in the West Bank city of Ramallah.

The Oslo Accords:

In 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat arrived at this landmark agreement. Known as "land for peace," Israel agreed to withdraw troops from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, where Palestinians would be given self-rule. In exchange, the Palestinian Liberation Organization agreed to recognize Israel and renounce terrorism. The Accords left the Jewish settlements and all highways in Israeli control, and did not resolve the issue of Jerusalem. However, they became the foundation for the peace process. Arafat gained leadership over the new Palestinian Authority government and new status as a peace partner in the eyes of Israel and the US. Rabin was later assassinated by a Jewish militant.

The Wye River Accord:

The 1993 Oslo Accords set a five-year timetable for the implementation of many key issues only agreed upon in principle. In order to hash out the details before that deadline, Israeli Prime

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat met in Maryland in 1998. The perennial obstacles of Jewish settlements and Palestinian terror attacks hampered the talks. However a final deal was reached. The Palestinians agreed to revoke anti-Israeli provisions in the PLO charter and to arrest alleged terrorists; the Israelis agreed to an additional 13 percent pullback from the West Bank and to free hundreds of Palestinian prisoners.

The Taba talks:


Named for a town in Egypt, the Taba talks were a failed last-ditch effort by President Bill Clinton to broker an historic peace agreement between Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Iraeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. Months earlier at a Camp David summit, the two sides came extremely close to a final peace settlement between the two parties. Barak was more flexible than past Israeli leaders to put "non-negotiable" topics on the table, but his all-or-nothing approach is said to have spooked Arafat. The failure to reach agreement left deep bitterness on both sides. The Israelis claim that Barak offered Arafat the moon and he still wasn't satisfied, insisting on an unrealistic right-of-return. The Palestinians say momentum

for a deal with Barak was lost when he allowed Ariel Sharon to visit the Al Aqsa mosque.	

A closer look: The Road Map

Explore the long history of Peace Efforts

Information taken from *The Road to Peace,* csmonitor.com



The Road Map:

Sponsored by the US, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia (known as the "quartet"), the road map is meant to achieve a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005. The plan is divided into 3 phases. To build momentum, road map planners shifted the most difficult decisions to the last phase. However, each phase requires moves by both sides that have frustrated negotiators for decades.

Phase 1: End of violence

Palestinian leaders implement an unconditional official cease-fire and acknowledge Israel's right to exist in peace. The Palestinian Authority (PA) security force reorganizes and confronts those who violently attack Israelis. It also reestablishes cooperation with the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The PA takes steps to establish a strong parliamentary democracy



with separation of powers.

Israel states a commitment to a viable sovereign Palestinian state and calls for the end of violence against Palestinians. Israel takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians, or house demolitions. Israel must dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001 and freeze further settlement activity. IDF withdraws from areas occupied since Sept. 28, 2000. Restrictions on Palestinian movement are eased.

Road bumps: The Palestinian Authority will have difficulty curbing the militant organizations like Hamas and Islamic Jihad which do not support the peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, meanwhile, will face tough opposition from right-wing Israelis who equate giving up land – even small outposts – with giving up security.

Phase 2: Transition to separate states

The next phase begins after "free, open, and fair"



Palestinian elections and ends with the possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders. A democratic state would be based on a new constitution finalized and approved by Palestinian institutions.

Road bumps: Actual free and fair elections will require Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat to loosen his grip on power. And what if Hamas and Islamic Jihad put forth political candidates? Expect sharp disagreement from the Palestinians with any provisional borders that take into account larger Israeli settlements and other "facts on the ground."

Phase 3: Permanent status agreement

Talks convened by the quartet lead to a permanent-status resolution in 2005 to end the Israel-Palestinian conflict. The toughest disputes, back-loaded to jumpstart the peace process, now need to be resolved. Final decisions are required on borders, Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements. The quartet

nudges Israel, Lebanon, and Syria to arrive at a settlement as well. Arab states accept full normal relations with Israel. Road bumps: While there are many thorny issues, Jerusalem may be the trickiest. The religious claims to the city by both the Jewish and Muslim communities make a Solomonic division extremely controversial. Jewish settlements ringing around East Jerusalem further complicate the situation.	

The Multilateral Negotiations

2 Feb 2000

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | MULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

See also
multilateral talks diagram
multilateral track renewed at moscow meeting
moscow multilateral steering group ministerial joint declaration
press briefing by mfa senior deputy director general biran on the resumption of the multilateral talks
the multilateral talks - documents and background

Also available in
Spanish

Intr

The was born at the Madrid Conference in October 199 bilateral negotiations. While the bilateral track is mea he past, the multilateral track focuses on the futu , addressing problems on a regional level in a vari d boundaries, so as to promote long-term regi urity.

The nework is twofold -- to find solutions for key regi g as a confidence building measure (CBM) to pro rmalized relations among the nations of the Mid concern are discussed in a forum which can fost nfidence between the parties. Shared infra s and water pipelines, shared development brin n and trade, and cooperation in preserving the qual l environment are among the realities envisioned for t d economic partnership will bring about pros roduce a peace that constitutes more than merely an end to war.

The multilateral negotiations commenced on January 28-29, 1992 at the Moscow Multilateral Middle-East Conference. Opening presentations were made by the co-sponsors and the participants -- thirty-six parties in all -- with former Foreign Minister David Levy representing Israel.

The Steering Committee, comprised of representatives of the key delegations, coordinates the multilateral talks and sets dates and venues for the various working groups. The committee hears reports of the working groups, confirms their decisions and sets priorities for the allocation of resources. The Steering Committee also discusses such broader issues as the overall vision of the future of the Middle East, integrating the work of the individual working groups.

The five working groups deal with different areas of common regional concern:

- environment,
- arms control and regional security,
- refugees,
- water, and
- economic development.

Formal talks in the multilateral track, frozen for several years, resumed on January 31, 2000 with a meeting of the Steering Committee in Moscow, to be followed in the coming months by meetings of the working groups.

Feedback | Map | Hebrew

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

Environment Working Group

28 Jan 1999

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | ULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

Th rking Group

The up endeavors to enhance the ability of the regi ritime pollution, wastewater treatment, envi d desertification. The seventh meeting met in Amr , 1995, in conjunction with the Water Working Gro s participated and continued discussion on the follo evious meetings:

l Spill Contingency Project: Significant progress ementing the project on fighting pollution in the he framework of this project, three stations have Eilat and Nuweiba, to be linked by a joint k. The project is being financed by the European e government. Joint teams from Israel, Egypt and y for intensive training.

rld Bank is overseeing a project to address natural resource degradation of arid lands in the Middle East, which was discussed and launched at the working group meeting in Cairo. This project includes the establishment of grazing lands, wildlife, forestation and planting of orchards, introducing varieties of vegetation appropriate for arid climates, and the purification of brackish water, to be implemented through five regional centers, each dealing with a specific aspect.

- *Environmental Management:* At the informal consultation meeting held in Oman in June 1996, it was agreed to establish a regional training center on environmental management in Amman, Jordan. In November 1998 the regional parties convened there to establish an agreed-upon work plan for the center, which included the formulation of a cooperative training program to meet regional human resource requirements. The parties have called upon the international donor community to support the implementation of the training program in the framework of the regional training center.

- *Effective Use of Pesticides Project:* The object of this project is to reduce the hazards to the population as a result of the use of pesticides. The projects deals with monitoring levels of pesticides being used in identified areas and checking the effects on the health of the communities in the vicinity. In addition, it aims at improving techniques for administering pesticides by reducing the quantity of pesticides used, supplementing them with environmentally friendly methods. The project is led by the U.S.D.A. with the participation of Jordan, Israel, and the PA.

The Bahrain Environmental Code of Conduct for the Middle East:

This document was endorsed by the Middle East Peace Process Environmental Working Group on October 25th, 1994 in Bahrain. In the Bahrain Code of Conduct, the following principles were agreed upon by all the regional parties:

- Natural resources of region must be preserved and all activities that would have an adverse effect must be avoided.
- A comprehensive peace in the region and environment protection are interdependent, and the regional parties will cooperate on environmental issues.
- The parties will facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by training and education
- The regional parties will join forces for environmental protection and conservation and begin working in the following fields: water, marine and coastal environment, air, waste management, and desertification.

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Search

Go

RSS MFA NEWS

MFA newsletter

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

Also available in
Spanish

Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group

28 Jan 1999

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | MULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

Th d Regional Security Working Gr

This nal and conceptual issues pertaining to conf ng measures, as well as regional security and arm lenary meeting was held in Tunis on December 13-1 ts, 15 of them from the region.

Sinc the working group has held three intersessional mee nd conceptual issues, in preparation for the next plen

al issues held in Antalya, Turkey on April 4-6, owing CBM's:

p Communications Network:

The temporary communications network began operation in the Hague in March 1995. A discussion was held on the elements of the permanent center to be established in Egypt. In order to expand the data base and subsequently the use of the network, a list of topics was distributed (administrative issues, working group papers, CBM's and general information on arms control). It was agreed to continue the discussion at the next plenary meeting.

b. Maritime CBM's:

- The drafting of the agreement on the prevention of incidents at sea (INCSEA) has been completed.
- A series of activities within the agreement in principle to cooperate in search and rescue (SAR) were discussed.
- An agenda was agreed upon for a meeting of senior naval officers from the region.
- Tunisia reiterated its consent to conduct a naval exercise.

c. Information Exchange and Prenotification of Military Exercises:

Agreement was reached on several issues and activities whose implementation can begin within one month after the next plenary session:

- prenotification of certain military exercises;
- Exchange of curriculum vitae of senior military officers;
- Exchange of unclassified military publications, and

military training and education; and
- Voluntary invitations to visit defense installations.

2. Conceptual issues were discussed in Helsinki on May 29-June 1, 1995, with the participation of delegations from all the states in the region participating in the working group, the gavel holders, the host country Finland, as well as experts from Australia, India, France and the United Nations.

   During the meeting, the following issues were discussed:

   - A statement on arms control and regional security.
   - The definition of long-term goals in arms control and regional security.
   - The delineation of the Middle East region for purposes of regional security and arms control.
   - Elements needed to begin negotiations on arms control.

   It was decided to hold a seminar on military doctrines, to be organized by the French, to take place in Amman at the end of December 1995.

3. An experts meeting was held in Amman on September 20-21, 1995 to discuss the establishment of a Regional Security Center (RSC). The discussion followed the decision taken at the plenary meeting in Tunis to establish a Regional Security Center in Jordan, with secondary centers in Qatar and Tunisia.

   It was agreed that the primary objective of the RSC will be to enhance security and stability in the Middle East. The centers will engaged in a range of activities, including:

   - the organization of seminars on arms control and regional security;
   - the encouragement of education and training on issues related to the peace process;
   - the support of issues relating to arms control and regional security arrangements; and
   - the functioning of the three centers as an integral part of the regional communications network which began operation in March 1995.

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Search

Go

RSS MFA NEWS

MFA newsletter

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

Refugee Working Group

1 May 2000

External links

- the refugee working group (fafo)
- Rights of Jews from Arab Lands

Also available in

Spanish

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | ULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

Th Group

This the sensitive issue of Middle East refugees.
Fam d job creation, public health, child welfare and
soci ure are among the subjects addressed by this
foru of this group is to improve the living conditions
for r ation. The members of the refugee working
grou tanding on the appropriate frameworks for
disc he Palestinian refugee problem, in accordance
with D Declaration of Principles and the Israel-Jordan
Com ptember 1993, as follows:

8 refugees will be discussed within the
anent status negotiations between Israel and the

ssion of persons displaced from the West Bank
e decided by an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian-Egyptian committee.

- The re-admission of former Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza who had overstayed their permits abroad will be discussed in the bilateral negotiations with Jordan.

The above understanding, achieved in Tunis at the fourth round of talks, enabled the working group to focus on the humanitarian aspects of the refugee issue -- family reunification and improving living conditions. In this context, Israel agreed to approve 2,000 family reunification requests annually, thus according permanent resident status to an additional 6,000 persons who had entered the territories as visitors. In a further humanitarian act, Israel has permitted a number of individuals deported in the early 1970's due to prior terrorist activities, to return to the territories, together with their families.

In the round of talks which took place in Cairo (May 1994), more concrete plans were developed to ensure a real and positive impact on the lives of the refugees. A substantial portion of the World Bank's emergency assistance program will be directed toward this effort. The following activities were agreed upon:

- *Human Resources and Development:* Several countries including Israel, the US, the Netherlands, Germany, Turkey and China will be conducting courses for the refugees as follows: paramedic training, a drylands agricultural seminar, a public sector management training course, an animal health workshop, 'employment guaranteed' skills training program (to develop small and medium scale enterprises in Gaza and the West

Bank), agricultural training, public health, community planning and education.

- *Child Welfare:* Sweden has agreed to make available $2 million for child welfare programs. A conference on assistance to Palestinian children in the West Bank, Gaza and neighboring countries will also be convened.
- *Social and Economic Infrastructure:* The U.S. is providing aid to develop housing facilities and rehabilitation for refugees in Syria and Lebanon.
- *Public Health:* A regional laboratory is to be established in one of the West Bank cities in order to compliment a Medical center already in place.

Feedback | **Map** | **Hebrew**

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

Water Resources Working Group

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

20 Oct 2002

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI | EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | MULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

Th Working Group

The Resources (WGWR), for which the United States serv an and the European Union serve as co-orga owing four broad agenda items to address some of th

- data availability
- actices, including conservation
- supply
- ater management and cooperation

Taki he water resources of the region are already fully expl r is rising rapidly, the issue of water has become one ts importance to sustaining the quality of life and futu emphasis is being placed on enhancing existing resc , additional resources, including desalination and sew

Since its inception, the WGWR has been implementing a variety of projects under its four agenda items. Each project enjoys the support, both technical and financial, of one or more of the WGWR's extra-regional donor delegations. The multilateral framework has been a successful mechanism for addressing regional problems. The WGWR in particular has been successful in developing a cadre of high-level water decision-makers that now can effectively work together on regional water issues.

Following are several projects carried out to date:

The *Regional Water Data Banks Project* is organized to improve the availability and applicability of water data information. The project goal is to enable the exchange of consistent, compatible, and reliable water data and information to support decision making at both local and regional scales. As a result of continuous collaborative work since January 1995, the Regional Water Data Banks Project has achieved some remarkable successes. Water data collection, storage, and retrieval capabilities have been established within the Palestinian Water Authority and those of the Israeli Hydrological Service and the Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation were improved and enhanced. Among the donor countries taking part in the initiative are Canada, France, the Netherlands, and Australia. The Water Data Banks Project has a web site located at: http://www.exact-me.org.

The *Middle East Desalination Research Center* (MEDRC) - The Center, established in Oman in December 1996, coordinates and sponsors basic and applied research in the area of desalination. The U.S., Israel, Japan, Oman, the

See also
- middle east multilateral working group on water resources: second world water forum
- from contention to cooperation: a case study of the middle east multilateral working group on water resources

External links
- executive action team (exact) water data banks project
- middle east desalination research center

Also available in
Spanish

E.U. and Korea are the founding members of this first regional center, and comprise its board of directors. A number of training courses have been held for regional participants.

The objectives of MEDRC are:

- Discovering, developing, and improving methods of desalination through basic and applied research;
- Initiating training programs in the field of desalination to develop expertise as well as technical and scientific skills;
- Promoting electronic networking communications to improve the dissemination of technical information on desalination;
- Establishing regional cooperation and work to foster progress in the development, improvement, and use of water desalination and related technical areas.

The *Public Awareness and Water Conservation Project*, established in 1996, is managed by the United States. The first activity completed by the regional participants was the design and preparation of a video aimed at youth that highlights the importance of water issues from a regional perspective. The second major activity underway, WaterCare, is the preparation of a Student Resource Book, Teacher's Guide, and complimentary Web Page focused on regional water conservation issues that are regional. The materials are being prepared jointly by educational writers from each of the regional participants and are being written for students between 12 and 15 years old. The major topics addressed by the materials include water resources, water use, water pollution and life/health, water management for conservation, and water care for the future, all from a regional perspective. The materials are scheduled for implementation in schools throughout the region in January 2001.

The *Middle East Regional Study on Water Supply and Demand Development* - The German Government undertook a study of the long-term strategic development of water resources in the region. The objectives of the study were to elaborate specific proposals for the provision of additional water resources on the basis of a comprehensive demand forecast, and develop a concept for coordinated future management of all regional water resources. The study was completed in 1998.

The data show a significant gap between water supply and demand throughout the region, even when using conservative estimates of future population growth and water use. In addition, deteriorating water quality already is a serious issue in some parts of the region, and increasing pollution and salinization threaten to make more and more regional water resources nonutilizable in the future. The five activities considered to be the highest priority are:

- Joint development of prototype desalination plant(s) at the Mediterranean and/or the Red Sea;
- Prefeasibility study of large-scale coastal desalination plants;
- Comparative study of intersea schemes (Med-Dead; Red-Dead);
- Prefeasibility study of intraregional conveyance systems;
- Study on regional institutional setups.

Comparative Survey of regulatory and legal frameworks of water laws, pricing and management - A comparative study outlining these issues has been conducted by the Norwegian government through CESAR. In June 1996, the Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian (Core Party) participants adopted a Declaration of Principles for Cooperation on Water-Related Matters and New and Additional Water Resources identifying principles for regional cooperation.

The first result of this survey was the establishment of the *Waternet project*, designed to develop a computerized information system for water related issues to serve as a tool for researchers in the region and to enhance regional cooperation. The project has three main parts: Waternet-Local assists the Core Parties to develop a computerized water information system to display relevant local water information. Waternet-Regional assists the participating parties to link local nodes to form a shared regional computer information network. The third part is the establishment of a Regional Waternet and Research Center in Amman, Jordan, to begin operation in 2000.

Optimization of Intensive Agriculture under Varying Water Quality Conditions - This project, established in 1996, is managed by the Government of Luxembourg. The primary focus of the project is to demonstrate how brackish and saline water can be used to support sustainable farming. A demonstration farm, established in Gaza at Beit-Hanoun, is used to support technology transfer in the field of water use. Project implementation is led by Al-Azhar University of Gaza.

Water Sector Training Program - The importance of the water issues in the region led the Working Group on Water Resources in April 1994 to accept a joint United States/European Union proposal for a Regional Training Program in the water sector. The program consisted of 14 courses, although some were offered twice so 20 sessions were presented. The topics covered included water related aspects of planning, management, administration, technical, legal, financial, and institutional subjects. A total of 275 people participated in the program, including: Palestinians (91), Jordanians (70), Egyptians (47), Israelis (38), Omanis (14), Yemenis (8), Tunisians (4), Moroccans (2), and Saudi Arabians (1). Participants ranged from scientists, planners, and managers, to policy level decision makers.

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water?

Copyright © 1990 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Online at csmonitor.com

MIDDLE EAST WATER. TIME RUNNING OUT.
A 4-part series

Middle East's Cup Runneth Dry
Part 1, March 8, 1990

George D. Moffett III, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Dateline: Jerusalem

ALREADY troubled by economic woes and sectarian conflict, the Middle East is facing an imminent new danger that could plunge the region into famine and war.

Water resources, historically in short supply, are on the verge of being overwhelmed by run-away population growth, placing a huge strain on fragile political and ecological systems.

Experts and government officials in half a dozen Middle East countries say that, together with the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons, over-taxed rivers and falling water tables are creating the most worrisome long-term trend in the region.

"Sometime around the beginning of the century, the problem of water scarcity will break out into an acute crisis," says Meir Ben Meir, a former water commissioner of Israel.

"The Middle East is living on a time bomb," adds Elias Salameh, director of the University of Jordan's Water Research and Study Center. "It could explode at any time."

The effects of a prolongued water shortage, experts say, could include a deterioration in water quality, a dramatic reduction in living standards, the loss of food security, huge food import bills leading to crushing foreign debts, and political instability.

"This issue could decide the fate of the region," says Usama al-Baz, a senior advisor to Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak. "If the water problem is not solved you will have famine. And this will destabilize big countries and instability will move to neighboring countries."

Experts attribute the gathering crisis primarily to the pressures of population growth, which

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

have stretched available resources to the breaking point in the region's three main river basins - the Nile, the Jordan, and the Tigris-Euphrates. Unless population growth rates, now averaging 3 percent in the Middle East, are curbed, excess population will wipe out all projected gains in water development and conservation within 30 years. If conservation efforts falter, the crisis could come much sooner.

Worsening water shortages are also a function of climatic changes which have intensified drought cycles, and of inefficient water management. In Saudi Arabia, for example, irrigation for growing wheat, which the country could import far more inexpensively, could deplete underground aquifers – the source of 90 percent of the kingdom's water - within 20 years.

Regional politics also contributes to the growing water problem, as the nations that share the region's main river systems have been unable to rise above historic rivalries to cooperate in the development and allocation of precious water supplies.

Experts warn that in the foreseeable future there will be no panacea in dealing with the impending water shortage. Desalinating seawater for mass irrigation will remain prohibitively expensive until the technology is advanced and energy costs are lowered by breakthroughs in solar energy or nuclear fusion.

Impressive recent advances in biotechnology, which have produced more water-efficient crops, are not keeping pace with growing food demands.

As a result, unless population growth rates are curbed, irrigated agriculture restricted, and conservation efforts dramatically expanded, the supply and demand lines on the Middle East water graph could soon cross, with potentially disastrous consequences.

The growing likelihood that water disputes could fuel regional tensions stems from three factors:

*Fifteen nations now compete for the dwindling resources of the Euphrates, Jordan, and Nile each controlled by a non-Arab state (Turkey, Israel, and Ethiopia).

*Because of existing political tensions, none of the three basins is governed by a comprehensive water-sharing agreement.

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

*International law, which is contradictory, has not provided a clear basis for such agreements.

Throughout the region, water is replacing oil as the most prized and contested commodity.

Since the days of the pharoahs, life along the Nile has conformed to the inexorable cycles that ensured an eventual flood after every drought. But for reasons that remain unclear, the amount of water in the Nile has decreased over the past century, according to a study by Princeton University expert John Waterbury. If the trend continues as the country's population soars, Egypt will fall further behind in food production.

"Whatever the explanation, we'd do better to plan on decreasing discharges," says Dr. Waterbury of the Nile's yield. "It would be foolish for planners to assume they are going to increase."

Elsewhere in the Middle East, Turkey's plans to tap into the Euphrates for its massive southeastern Anatolia development project have sounded alarm bells in Syria and Iraq, which both rely on the river for agriculture and power generation. Competition over the Euphrates could exacerbate existing tensions created by raids on Turkish territory by Kurdish guerrillas operating from Syria and Iraq.

The biggest problem lies in the smallest river basin, the Jordan, where competition for water resources between Israel, Jordan, and Syria has already led to bloodshed and now threatens to put peace between Israelis and Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip beyond reach.

Experts say the incipient water crisis could serve as a catalyst for political cooperation, spurring the fractious nations of the region to find ways to develop and share common water resources.

But if water is the best way to peace, it could also prove the shortest route to conflict in a region already beset by old feuds and now armed to the hilt with sophisticated weapons.

"The politics of the Middle East after 2000 will be a struggle over water," says former Egyptian diplomat Tahsin Bashir.

Adds a Syrian official: "No region on earth is as vulnerable to war because of conflicts over water between neighboring states."

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Copyright © 1990 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Online at csmonitor.com

MIDDLE EAST WATER. TIME RUNNING OUT.
A 4-part series

Downstream Fears Feed Tensions
Part 2, March 13, 1990

George D. Moffett III, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Dateline: By the Ataturk Dam, Turkey

STRETCHED across the fog-enshrouded Euphrates River, the massive stone mountain that will soon be the world's ninth-largest dam stands in defiance of nature - and of protests downstream.

Now nearing completion, Turkey's Ataturk Dam will be the crown jewel in an ambitious project to harness the Euphrates to produce electric power and irrigate 46,000 acres of arid land in the country's southeastern provinces.

But for Syria and Iraq, which share the waters of the Euphrates with Turkey, the implications of the $21 billion Southeastern Anatolia Project seem ominous. If the three nations fail to negotiate a water-sharing agreement by the time the Anatolia project is fully developed, Syria could lose 40 percent of its Euphrates water and Iraq up to 90 percent, according to Thomas Naff of the University of Pennsylvania, director of Associates for Middle East Research (AMER).

Such catastrophic reductions are not inevitable, says AMER, a group of international water experts. Even so, one year before its giant turbines begin spinning out electricity, the Ataturk Dam has emerged as the most disquieting symbol of the potentially dangerous competition for water that most experts believe will soon dominate the politics of the Middle East.

"The Ataturk Dam makes an implicit problem explicit," says Elias Salameh, director of the Water Research and Study Center at the University of Jordan. "This is the beginning of water conflict in the Middle East."

Under the terms of two international conventions, the Helsinki Rules of 1966 and a United

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Nations' convention of 1972, water rights are to be shared according to population and need, with historical allocation taken into account.

But international law also acknowledges the absolute sovereignty of nations over the resources they control.

Thus, upstream countries like Turkey insist that they are under no more obligation to give away their water than, say, Saudi Arabia is to give away its oil.

"We have no international obligations," says Turkey's State Minister Kamran Inan, who points instead to a 1987 "gentlemen's agreement" with Syria and Iraq "to do our best not to harm our neighbors."

Despite pressure from Syria and Iraq, Turkey has been unwilling to commit itself to a basin-wide water-sharing agreement.

The case of the Euphrates also illustrates the complex synergism found elsewhere in the Middle East over water issues and other regional conflicts.

Tensions generated by the infiltration of Kurdish guerrillas into Turkey from Iraq and Syrian-controlled east Lebanon have been a major obstacle to a basinwide water sharing agreement, and have provoked fears downstream that Turkey might choke off the river in retaliation.

"We give them water, they give us terrorists," grumbles an official in Ankara who, nevertheless, insists that Turkey will never exploit its control of the Euphrates for political purposes.

On the other hand, reaching an agreement on water rights could pave the way for cooperation on such political issues as Kurdish terrorism and provide a catalyst to regional peace.

"Water can unite or divide the region," says Professor Naff. "It can be a catalyst for cooperation and peace or for conflict."

CONCERN over water rights in the region reached critical mass when Turkey closed off the Euphrates for one month in January to begin filling the huge reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam. It is one of 21 dams that will help irrigate an area of southeastern Turkey the size of East Germany.

Turkey compensated by increasing the flow downstream for 50 days starting late last year to

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

blunt the effect of the closure. Meanwhile Turkish officials, members of a tripartite technical committee, have sought to allay concerns in Syria and Iraq, which will have to endure months more of such closures over the next five years before the reservoir is topped off.

But Damascus and Baghdad worry that the dam and the Anatolia project could pose big long-term problems in a region that is just coming out of the worst drought in 15 years, and that is heavily dependent on the Euphrates for irrigation to cut food import bills that in Syria alone last year claimed 6 percent of the national budget.

To meet the food needs of a population expected to swell from 13 to 22 million in 20 years, Syria plans to irrigate 100,000 acres of new land along the Euphrates. One official in Damascus calculates that because of extra demands on the river upstream, plus the rapid depletion of groundwater in Syria, the 15 million cubic meters of water needed for Syria to avoid severe food shortages by the year 2000 may be unavailable.

"It is a problem of 'to be or not to be' for Syria," says the Syrian official of the consequences of excess demand on the Euphrates. "You are dealing with a very hot problem."

Matters are even worse for Iraq, which is at the end of the Euphrates water line.

Iraqi officials say that while the Ataturk reservoir is being filled, the country's electric power generation on the Euphrates could be cut by 40 percent, while water supplies to 5 million users in northwestern Iraq will be disrupted. Wheat and rice production could also suffer.

Without some form of trilateral sharing agreement, construction of the Ataturk Dam "will have severe repercussions on the amount of water and the quality of water that reaches Iraq," warns Nizar Hamdoon , Iraq's deputy foreign minister.

Adding to Iraq's troubles is the prospect that Syria will trap most of the remaining Euphrates flow behind its Tabaqah Dam, reducing the downstream flow to a trickle.

The two countries nearly went to war 15 years ago when the filling of new Turkish and Syrian dams temporarily cut the Euphrates to a third of its normal volume at the Iraqi border. If Turkey and Syria implement additional development plans, led by the Anatolia project, relations could be strained to the limit.

"We're heading towards a war, unless there is intervention by the United Nations," grimly predicts a Western diplomat in Damascus. "It must be done now."

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Copyright © 1990 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Online at csmonitor.com

MIDDLE EAST WATER. TIME RUNNING OUT.
A 4-part series

If Jordan Valley Wells Run Dry...
Part 3, March 14, 1990

George D. Moffett III, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Dateline: Jerusalem

IN the politically volatile Jordan Valley, competition for water, not land, is becoming the biggest obstacle to peace. For 6 million Israelis and Palestinians, the future will be dominated by the question of how to allocate the region's most precious resource.

Israel, whose water-efficient farmers made the desert bloom, is now living beyond its means. With all of its renewable water supplies already being over-exploited by 15 percent a year and with no new sources to turn to, the country is on the verge of one of its most severe crises.

With water already being shifted away from agriculture to meet urban needs and with a 30 percent water deficit looming within a decade, Israel's security is at risk.

``Israel is on the threshold of a catastrophe,'' warns Arnon Soffer, a Haifa University geographer who, in a recent unpublished report to Israel's Foreign Ministry, cautioned that the combination of arid lands and exploding populations was a ``formula for disaster'' throughout the Middle East.

For Palestinians living under Israeli military occupation, water shortages are not so much a function of nature as of politics. Although the West Bank is the source of 600-700 million cubic meters (mcm) of water annually, Israel has limited West Bank residents to one-fifth of that amount, stunting agriculture and retarding development.

In Gaza, meanwhile, overpopulation has produced the most acute water shortages in the Middle East. At stake for Palestinians: the political and economic viability of a state now demanded by West Bank and Gaza Arabs. ``For Palestinians under occupation, time has ceased since 1967,'' says Palestinian economist Ibrahim Matar. ``Palestinians have been pre-

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

vented from expanding their own water supplies since the occupation began."

In Israel, the issue of water has become a potent tool in the hands of conservatives opposed to relinquishing the territories. In a recent advertisement, under a menacing photo of Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat, the right-wing Israeli Tsomet Party warned that ``Israeli withdrawal from Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) means that this man will have the power to determine the quality and quantity of water you and your children drink."

Palestinians, meanwhile, have their own worst-case scenario: the influx of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union. Whether the 'emigr'es settle in the occupied territories or not, they will strain available resources and leave less water for Palestinian farmers.

Of combined water resources available in Israel and the territories, Israel consumes 86 percent, including more than 80 percent of the West Bank water table.

Meanwhile, competition for the dwindling resources of the Jordan Valley is joined by two other thirsty countries, Jordan and Syria. Despite United States mediation efforts, an agreement to share the Yarmuk River, one of the Jordan's main tributaries, has proved elusive, leaving officials on both sides increasingly concerned.

Competition over the Jordan River and its tributaries has already prompted the region to take up arms. Syria protested to the United Nations when Israel began construction of a pipeline during the 1950s which now diverts Jordan River water to its southern Negev Desert. (With water in the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) at the northern end of the pipeline at the lowest level ever recorded at this time of year, its continued use is now in jeopardy).

A 1964 Arab League decision to attempt to divert the Jordan's headwaters produced border skirmishes and later contributed to the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. After seizing the Golan Heights from Syria, Israel gained effective control of the Jordan.

Pressure for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip now raises new questions. Palestinians say they have a right to control their own water supplies. They argue that like any two states, ``Palestine" and Israel can negotiate an equitable sharing of water resources.

Israel says if it loses control of West Bank waters, its coastal cities and farmland in northern and central Israel will be at risk. Whatever the case, unrestrained competition between two

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

sovereign states in the region could prove lethal.

``If there's competition, that means drilling deeper and that means causing an ecological disaster with our mutual resource," says Meir Ben Meir, a former Israeli water commissioner. ``Nobody can win this war."

In the future, Israel plans to use more reclaimed wastewater for irrigation, freeing fresh water for domestic use.

But such news is small solace for Palestinians, whose water now accounts for one-third of Israel's annual consumption. After the occupation began, Israel quickly took control of West Bank water resources. Under military order, Palestinians were prohibited from digging all but a handful of new wells for drinking and irrigation, while limits were placed on the amount of water that could be pumped from existing wells.

Access to the Jordan River, once the source of 200 mcm of water for irrigation, was completely cut off. Meanwhile, Israel began drilling the first of more than 40 deep-bore wells with powerful motors that now pull up to 40 percent more water from West Bank aquifers than the 300 shallower pre-1967 sinkholes used by Palestinians.

Some of the new Israeli wells, used to provide water for Jewish settlements in the West Bank, were placed close to local Palestinian springs, causing the wells of many Palestinian farmers to run dry.

With no restrictions on pumping and with big subsidies from the World Zionist Organization, the settlers were soon using an average of four times more water per capita than Palestinians.

Responding to international pressure, Israel has agreed to compensate Palestinians for water shortages by providing, and in some cases charging for, limited supplies from some of its deep wells. But the arrangement has deprived local Arabs of their water independence and, in the opinion of many legal experts, violated international law governing military occupations.

``Palestinian farmers are now completely dependent on the Israelis for their water needs," says Mr. Matar. ``Their status has been changed from owners to renters of their own water resources."

The situation is worse in the Gaza Strip, where population growth has overtaxed water sup-

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

plies at an alarming rate. Underground aquifers in Gaza are capable of providing up to 60 mcm of renewable water each year for Gaza's 650,000 inhabitants. But 150 mcm are now being pumped annually, lowering the water table and causing seepage of salty sea water into the aquifer.

To allow the water table to replenish, usage will have to be dramatically cut even as Gaza's population dramatically increases. Palestinian and Israeli experts agree that if the present overpumping continues, agriculture and living standards will deteriorate catastrophically.

Copyright © 1990 The Christian Science Monitor. All rights reserved.
Online at csmonitor.com

MIDDLE EAST WATER. TIME RUNNING OUT.
A 4-part series

Pouring Oil on Troubled Middle East Water
Part 4, March 16, 1990

George D. Moffett III, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
Dateline: Aleppo, Syria

DEFYING the chill winds of a bleak winter day, the small green shoots of a chickpea plant venture out of the black Syrian soil.

Highly sensitive to cold and humidity, these protein-rich legumes - one of the staple food items in the the Middle East - have usually been planted in spring, too late to avoid the wilting, crop-stunting heat of summer.

But with a little genetic toughening, the plants on this experimental farm near Aleppo have learned to cope with winter, taking full advantage of limited seasonal rains, and thus prospering on the kind of semi-arid land prevalent in the region.

The new strain of chickpea, developed by agronomists at the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), is one way the Middle East is preparing for a future in which there will be less water to go around. For a region that relies heavily on irrigation to grow food, coaxing bigger harvests out of rain-fed land has become a top priority.

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Greater farm output and more-aggressive water-conservation efforts may not rescue the region from a drier future. Indeed, the Middle East is merely borrowing against the day, not far distant in the opinion of many experts, when spiraling population growth creates food demands that will be impossible to meet with available water resources.

But in a region that was largely excluded because of its dry soil from the benefits of the "Green Revolution" of the 1960s, the prospect of doubling output on some rain-fed lands has generated considerable enthusiasm among farmers and government officials alike.

"In these marginal lands you can make fantastic contributions," says Aart Van Schoonhoven, ICARDA's research director. "By doubling the efficiency of water use, you have the equivalent of two times as much rain."

One obvious way to control consumption of what is fast becoming the Middle East's most valuable resource is to charge more for water to effect rationing by price.

But few governments in the region are eager to risk the violence that has greeted price hikes in another basic commodity, bread. As a result, millions of gallons of valuable water continue to be squandered each year watering golf courses and washing cars.

In countries like Jordan, where up to a quarter of the water used for domestic and industrial needs is illegally siphoned off before reaching the meter, the effect of price increases would be blunted in any case.

"Because it's (practically) free, it's freely used," says ICARDA director Nasrat Fadda.

Instead, Middle East states have chosen less drastic means of improving water management and conservation in an effort some experts worry may be too little, too late.

In Israel, a growing network of treatment plants purifies waste water for agricultural use, making more fresh water available for domestic use.

In Egypt, where rain-fed agriculture is virtually nonexistent, an inefficient 20,000-mile network of public canals used to irrigate crop lands bordering the Nile is being upgraded. Some canals are being lined to minimize seepage, while 300,000 acres of new lands east and west of the Nile Delta are being fitted with more efficient "drip" irrigation systems, according to Egyptian government sources. Plans are also under way to capture more than 2 million cubic meters of irrigation runoff a year in Egypt's northern lakes before it drains into the

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Mediterranean Sea.

In Syria, farmers are being taught how to manage rain-fed crops more efficiently to maximize harvests and decrease reliance on irrigation. One technique: "harvesting" sparse rainwater by concentrating it in limited growing areas.

ICARDA agronomists are also teaching farmers how to use fertilizers more effectively, how to till croplands to minimize runoff, and how to rotate crops to intensify production.

Meanwhile, scientists around the world are seizing the last brief respite before the water crisis hits to develop and implement new technologies to make available water supplies stretch further.

By developing food crops with greater resistance to salt and viruses, an incipient revolution in biotechnology is opening the door to more water-efficient agriculture.

The ultimate technological challenge is finding a practical way to desalinate sea water.

"Desalination is the foremost challenge to the human race," says Meir Ben Meir, a former Israeli water commissioner. "The sea will be our main salvation in the future."

Less promising in the context of the Middle East have been schemes for regional cooperation in using water.

One technically feasible proposal is a canal that would link the Yarmuk River, which forms the border between Syria and Jordan and between Jordan and Israel, with the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret) in Israel. During the winter months, the canal would funnel rains, that would otherwise be lost, downstream into the sea. Some of this water could then be used to replenish underground aquifers in Israel and the occupied West Bank. During the dry summer months, water could be pumped back through the Yarmuk into the 42-mile long Ghor Canal that irrigates the Jordanian side of the Jordan River.

"It is the most attractive water-resources development scheme in the region, both in terms of cost and the quantities of water involved," says Israeli water engineer Elisha Kally.

Another proposal, first put forward by former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat at the time of the Camp David negotiations in 1978, is to divert Nile waters across the Sinai Peninsula into the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, and perhaps even into southern Jordan and Israel's Negev

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Lesson 2: Got Water? (cont'd.)

Desert. But these and other propositions have run afoul of the hard realities of Middle East politics.

The absence of relations between Israel and Jordan precludes even technical cooperation. Meanwhile, the kind of water-basin transfers that have proved so successful in the United States are considered unworkable between states that are real or potential adversaries. Israel is unwilling to place its water security in the hands of an Arab country. At the same time, Egyptian officials have long since pronounced Sadat's proposal a dead letter.

"We have no intention now or in the future of transferring water outside Egyptian territory," says a well-placed government source in Cairo flatly. "It will never happen."

In the end, the biggest obstacle to water self-sufficiency is not politics but population growth. Few experts say a solution to that problem is anywhere in sight.

Until inroads are made on birth rates, even the most ambitious conservation plans are bound to be inadequate in the long run.

"We're merely delaying the crisis," says Mr. Fadda about ICARDA's success in improving dry-land productivity. "We're buying time to make the adjustment either until population growth is brought down or until technological advances are made."

"This will postpone for a time the onset of the crisis," adds the Damascus-based director of a Western development agency, referring to water-saving measures now being instituted throughout the Middle East. "But it may not prevent the crisis from happening."

This is the last in a four-part series. The first three parts ran March 8, 13, and 14. Editor of series: Susan Llewelyn Leach.

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

Regional Economic Development Working Group

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

See also

remarks by fm dir gen uri savir: regional economic development

Also available in

Spanish

19 Jun 2000

THE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

ENVIRONMEI EFUGEES | WATER | ECONOMIC
CONTENTS | MULTILATERAL | FRUITS | FUTURE

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

Re evelopment Working Group

This s of infrastructure, trade, finance and tourism
deve uding the West Bank and Gaza. In November
199 ed the Copenhagen Action Plan, comprising 35
proj unications, transportation, energy, tourism,
agri nd investment, trade, training, regional networks
and

The at in June 1994 centered around two major
subj entation of the Copenhagen Action Plan; and
esta mittee as a tool to formulate a regional agenda
and g group.

The mmittee were defined as follows

- ntation of the Copenhagen Action Plan;
- etings and subcommittees, as required, in the various fields of regional economic cooperation
- To identify and promote priority projects to be presented to the working group.

It was agreed that the Monitoring Committee would strive:

- to encourage the free movement of people, goods, services, capital and information among the partners in the region;
- to stimulate economic development and to reduce regional economic disparities;
- to promote the region's integration in global markets
- to fully exploit respective advantages by promoting regional trade, facilitating investment and developing infrastructure.

The Monitoring Committee represents a qualitative leap in the institutionalization of the regional dialogue. With the establishment of this committee, the principle of regional cooperation has been anchored in specific subcommittees in the different fields of economic activity.

The working group heard progress reports on specific projects in the areas of transportation (highway infrastructure, railways and ports, motor transportation and civil aviation); energy (linking the electricity grids of Israel, the autonomy, Egypt and Jordan, and the alternatives of a Mediterranean-Dead Sea or Red Sea-Dead Sea hydroelectric project); tourism (regional consultation, cooperation and priorities); agriculture (veterinary services and plant protection); finance (financial markets and stock exchanges, training of banking personnel in the autonomy); regional trade; and training programs.

The Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourist Association (MEMTTA) was initialed in Casablanca in September 1995.

Parallel with these developments, the World Bank is considering holding a regional workshop to study ways to integrate the private sector in infrastructure projects.

First Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit - Casablanca
Oct 30 - Nov 1, 1994



At the invitation of King Hassan II of Morocco and with the support and endorsement of Presidents Bill Clinton of the United States and Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, the representatives of 61 countries and 1,114 business leaders from all regions of the world gathered for a Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca from October 30 to November 1, 1994. Among the accomplishments of the conference were:

1. the endorsement of the decision by the Council for Cooperation of the Gulf States to ignore the secondary and tertiary aspects of the Arab boycott;
2. the move towards ending the primary boycott;
3. an agreement to establish four regional centers:

    a. a Middle East and North Africa Development Bank,
    b. a Tourist Board to facilitate tourism,
    c. a regional Chamber of Commerce and Business Council to facilitate intra-regional trade relations, and
    d. a Steering Committee charged with following up all issues raised at the conference.

Second Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit - Amman
October 29-31, 1995

On October 29-31, 1995, the second Middle East/ North Africa Economic Summit was held in Amman.

The goals of the Summit were to facilitate the expansion of private sector investment in the region, to cement a public-private partnership which will ensure that end, and to work to enhance regional cooperation and development.

In this spirit, business leaders were able to conclude a number of significant commercial and business transactions at the Summit that will help augment the productive capacity of the region and contribute to its broad-based economic development. These ventures involved projects in the fields of tourism, telecommunications, and transportation. Reflecting this public-private partnership, a number of these ventures will benefit from government guarantees, technical assistance, and other support from the international community.

As a result of negotiations over the past year on institutional arrangements called for in the Casablanca Declaration which would help underpin the peace process, the following agreements have been reached:

- A Bank for Economic Cooperation and Development in the Middle East and North Africa to be established in Cairo, to promote development of the private sector, support regional infrastructure projects, and provide a Forum to promote regional economic cooperation.

- The establishment of a Regional Tourism Board, the Middle East-Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association (MEMTTA), to facilitate tourism and promote the region as a unique and attractive tourist destination.

- The establishment of a Regional Business Council to promote cooperation and trade among the private sectors of the countries of the region.

- The formal inauguration of the Economic Summit Executive Secretariat, located in Rabat, which is working to advance the public-private partnership, promote contacts, share data, and foster private sector investment in the region.

As a complement to the regional institutions called for at Casablanca, the Steering Group of the Multilateral Peace Negotiations has decided to establish the REDWG Monitoring Committee Secretariat as a permanent regional economic institution to be based in Amman, to promote and strengthen regional economic cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa.

The participants at the Summit expressed their intention to meet again next year for a third annual Middle East/ North Africa Economic Summit in Cairo.

Third Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit - Cairo
November 12-14, 1996

As in the previous two conferences, the Cairo MENA summit presented businessmen from the Arab countries, Israel, Western Europe, North America and other parts of the world with an excellent opportunity to meet, form professional and personal connections, establish business contacts and launch specific ventures.

Fourth Middle East/North Africa Economic Summit - Doha
November 16-18, 1997

The fourth MENA Conference was held in Doha, Qatar, with the participation of businessmen, state officials and journalists.


One of the concrete results of this conference was the signing of an agreement between Israel and Jordan on the establishment of the Irbid Qualifying Industrial Zone.


The MENA conferences are an integral part of the peace process. Even if no progress occurs in other aspects of the process, there is no justification for failing to advance in its non-political spheres. Like all regional activities, participation in this conference reflects joint interests, rather than private ones, and addresses the economic interests of all participants. This is made evident by the businesslike atmosphere of the conferences and by the numerous multi-national corporations and leading international businessmen who chose to take part in them.

In a process of transition from conflict to reconciliation, it is of great importance that normal ties be established between countries and peoples in a variety of areas (economic, social, "People-to-People" projects and others).

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

con2







Amr Mussa (front), secretary general of the Arab League, attends the opening of a meeting of Middle Eastern foreign ministers in Beirut, March 25, 2002.
© AFP/CORBIS

E-mail a Friend

Politics: From Royalty to Democracy

Politics in the Middle East, far from being solely an issue of Islamic resurgence as is often presented by Western media, actually reflects a complex mixture of issues that include nationalism, religion, social and economic concerns, anti-colonialist sentiments, tribal loyalties, and ethnic identities.

Political regimes in the Middle East have different forms of government. There are

- parliamentary republics in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen, and post-Taliban Afghanistan;
- traditional monarchies in Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia;
- constitutional monarchies in Jordan and Morocco.

There are also several unique governing structures, including

- Libya's *jamahiriya*, where local councils are supposed to govern (although Libya is in fact a military dictatorship);
- the United Arab Emirates, where several traditionally chosen rulers collaborate in a federation;
- the Islamic Republic of Iran, where religious scholars oversee an elected parliament and president.

Related Video

Terror and Tehran
Video Excerpt (6:11)
Watch

All political bodies are a compromise between an individual and a group. How that compromise is negotiated, and by whom, varies a great deal. Some institutions that reflect greater personal liberty are freedom of the press; free, fair and inclusive elections; multiple political parties; and the fair treatment of minority groups, whether ethnic or religious.

The role of religion in politics

Jump To:

The role of religion in politics

Pressures for and against democracy in the Middle East

The cult of personality

Identifying enemies as domestic policy

Effect of U.S. policies on public opinion

Also

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to politics in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Mapping the Middle East

A Meeting of World Leaders

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Summit

Got Water?

How 9/11 Shaped U.S. Foreign Policy

Coup to Revolution: U.S. Foreign Policy in Iran

Changing Circumstances, Changing U.S. Foreign Policy

Related sites

Related topics



The late King Hussein I of Jordan and Queen Noor arriving for a visit to the United States [enlarge]

Religion plays a role in political decision-making in virtually all Middle Eastern countries, but in very different ways. In the Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, the government is run by religious leaders, with a subordinate elected parliament (candidates to which must be approved by the religious leadership). In Jordan and Morocco, the king bases his legitimacy on direct descent from the Prophet, but the king is not a religious leader per se.

In Lebanon, parliamentary representation is divided up according to religious affiliation, with proportions reflecting an outdated census of the population of Lebanon in 1932. Maintaining a tenuous balance of power among the 18 officially recognized religions is an important governmental concern, but the Lebanese government itself is not composed of religious leaders.

Even in strong democracies, like Turkey and Israel, the support of influential religious parties is often needed by major parties to form a coalition government. When religious parties are key members or leaders of a coalition, their political clout can push the government to mold policies in a religious direction.

Pressures for and against democracy in the Middle East

There are both internal and external pressures on Middle Eastern countries for democratic reform, which would allow free and open political systems to develop. The existing governments, however, have resisted this pressure for a number of reasons. Some governments and leaders simply want to hold on to power themselves; others fear political instability if they loosen political control too quickly.



A crowd of Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. The Kurds are an ethnic minority in the Middle East. [enlarge]

Many regimes oppose the struggles of internal minorities for autonomy or independence and restrict political activity related to those efforts. Others face an internal religious critique, particularly from Islamists. Many fear that if an Islamist political party were legitimately elected, that party would refuse to relinquish power in future elections. These pressures against democratization often lead to a cycle of political repression, revolts (sometimes violent), and then further oppression.

In Egypt, as in many other countries in the Middle East, pressures for real democratization have come from internal opposition groups (both leftist and Islamist), international observers like the United States, and non-governmental organizations. To date, though, the governing party allows only a small, controlled group to function as the official political opposition.



Kurdish men, armed with portable rocket launchers [enlarge]

Egypt has followed an uneven policy of economic liberalization over the past 25 years or so. This policy has created a backlash, as Egyptians judge growing globalization to be damaging to local cultures, witness a growing gap between rich and poor, and decide that Western-style democracy undermines local control. Since responses to these political and economic pressures cannot be expressed freely within the political system, there are frequently popular demonstrations and the formation of radical underground opposition groups.

Both Israel and Turkey are Western-style democracies with regularly scheduled elections. But Israeli Arabs and Turkish Kurds experience political restrictions, as these groups are seen as threatening to both the security and the identity of the state.

Turkey's efforts to join an even larger political and economic body, the European Union, has motivated many domestic reforms and may lead to even more. Peer pressure from that group requires that Turkey uphold a standard of

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station

human rights that is comparable to the nations of Western Europe.

Israel is debating a looming political and demographic crisis. The birthrate of Israel's Arab population continues to outpace that of its Jewish population. Can Israel remain a Jewish state and a democracy if Arabs eventually outnumber Jews in the society? More fundamentally, how can Israel reconcile its democratic ideals with unequal treatment of Israeli Arabs?

The cult of personality



Iraqi soldiers posing by a mural of President Saddam Hussein [enlarge]

Some leaders and political families have been in power for so long that they have integrated themselves into the nation's identity. These leaders tend to reach their position based on a charismatic personality rather than on specific policies, and once in power, they can overwhelm any potential rivals. Examples of Middle Eastern demagoguery includeMuammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, the late Hafez al-Asad in Syria, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and the late Gamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt. All of these leaders came to power in military coups, and many used their national military to monitor and attack opposition groups.

Identifying enemies as domestic policy

Related Video

Saddam "Music Video" excerpt (:46)
Watch

Like politicians throughout history and across the globe, political leaders in the Middle East often try to deflect public criticism of internal issues by focusing on external "enemies." This strategy can be effective for diffusing popular anger at the oppression, corruption, or bad governance of a regime.

As a prime example, many Iraqis oppose Saddam Hussein's repression of all political opposition, his economic policies, and his concentration of national resources on military expenditure. If, however, the U.S.-led bombing and U.S. policies are more of a threat to them than Saddam's internal policies, then the Iraqis will support Saddam against the outside enemy. This strategy can be particularly effective when the state controls all media sources and can give its own interpretation of events without competing explanations.

The government of post-revolutionary Iran similarly used the long war with Iraq and anger at the United States to maintain a focus on external rather than internal affairs. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War and a break with relations with the U.S., internal pressures for reform have begun to mount within Iranian society.

Effect of U.S. policies on public opinion

U.S. policies are often a source of tension for many countries in the region. Opposition groups in many Middle Eastern countries say that U.S. support of authoritarian regimes (such as in Egypt or Saudi Arabia) has prevented the development of any real democracy. They therefore find the U.S. to be hypocritical and fickle when it demands that groups like the Palestinian Authority institute democratic changes, or that Saddam Hussein, who was once a U.S. ally, be removed from power. More hypocrisy is seen in American statements about defending Kuwait on the basis of international law and the right of self-determination, while denying the same rights to the Palestinians.



U.S. and Saudi Arabian personnel on the tarmac at Prince Sultan Air Base, Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia [enlarge]

The strong U.S.-Israeli relationship is seen by some as continued Western colonialism in the region. Many observers in the Middle East think the U.S. seeks to control events in the Middle East. They point to the American military presence during the Gulf War, the continued presence of troops in Saudi Arabia (the birthplace of Islam), and the use by Israel of American-made weapons against the Palestinians.

The U.S. does have positive relationships with the governments of many countries in the region. Israel and Turkey (a partner in NATO) are obvious examples, but the U.S. also has strong diplomatic ties with Egypt, Jordan, and others. But growing popular opposition to the U.S. policy vis-•is Palestine is making it difficult for moderate regimes in the region to continue positive and mutually beneficial relationships with the U.S.

Back to top

Related sites

U.S. Strategy in the Middle East:
http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01fm.cfm ?PrgDate=04/01/2002&PrgID=5
Talk of the Nation asks experts what the U.S. strategy should be towards the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.

The Role of Other Arab Countries:
http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01fm.cfm ?PrgDate=04/03/2002&PrgID=5
Talk of the Nation asks experts how the violence in the Middle East affects the political situation in other Arab countries.

King's Ransom: How Vulnerable Are the Saudi Royals?:
http://www.newyorker.com/PRINTABLE/?fact/011022fa_FACT1
In this report, the *New Yorker* looks at the vulnerability of the Saudi royal family.

King Hussein:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east /jan-june99/hussein_2-5.html
As King Hussein of Jordan was near death at his palace in Amman, Jordan, after undergoing cancer treatments at the Mayo Clinic, *NewsHour* led a discussion about his 46-year reign. (February 1996)

The Transformation of Turkey: From Islamic Empire to Modern State:
http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_976.html
Think Tank asks, "Can an Islamic nation be modern, democratic, secular, pro-Western -- and still be Islamic?"

Country Studies:
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/
The research division of the Library of Congress provides extensive overviews of various nations.

The World Factbook 2001:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
The Central Intelligence Agency publishes information on the geography, people, government, and economy of each Middle Eastern country.

Hunting Bin Laden: Interview with Bin Laden:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/interview.html
Osama bin Laden answers questions posed to him by some of his followers at his mountaintop camp in southern Afghanistan. Later, ABC reporter John Miller is asking the questions.

A Middle East History:
http://www.theworld.org/archive/mideast/mideast.htm
The World tells the history of the Middle East in an effort to understand the current conflict and tension.

Secrets of History: The CIA in Iran:
http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast /041600iran-cia-index.html
A CIA document and *New York Times* articles and photographs depict the clumsy yet successful 1953 overthrow of Iran's government.

Commanding Heights Web Site:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/
An economist's look at world history and development from 1910 to the present

Arab Human Development Report 2002:
http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/
A report on the Arab world's attempts to advance human development

Understanding History, Religion, and Politics in Jerusalem and Beyond:
http://www.pbs.org/pov/pov2001/promises/intheclassroom.html
Students will acquire historical knowledge of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the region, learn how to interpret a conflict from multiple perspectives, advocate for a point of view, and develop greater conflict resolution skills.

Debating the News: Iraq:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/debate/iraq.html
Students will debate the following questions: Does the U.S. have the right to go into a country and remove its government? Should the U.S. go to war with Iraq now or wait until Saddam does something against the U.S. directly?

Prospects for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers /lessonplans/middle_east/
Students will examine the root causes of the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and analyze past and present attempts at peace.

Terror and Tehran:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/
Frontline asks, does America's war on terror hold democracy hostage in Iran?

Related topics

How were the modern nation-states of the Middle East created?

What have been the role and effects of U.S. foreign policies and actions in the Middle East?

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Connecting Questions | Explore a Theme | Timeline | Communities Respond | Educator's Resources

Search | Site Map | Maps | Glossary | About the Site | Help | Pledge

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation



In Egypt, merchant ships sit tied up along the shore as they wait to complete their transit of the Suez Canal. DOD, Defense Visual Information Center, March Air Force Base, CA

E-mail a Friend

Economics: It's More Than Oil

National economies throughout the Middle East struggled in the 19th and 20th centuries to develop their natural and human resources, to modernize their societies, and to raise their standards of living. They have made significant, hard-won progress on many fronts (like broad-based education), and some countries are blessed with abundant natural resources (oil, natural gas, phosphates, and other minerals, for example). In general, however, Middle Eastern economies have faced significant obstacles to successful development.

One major obstacle has been Western efforts to control the region's resources. Other challenges include rapidly increasing populations, uneven distribution of resources like water and oil, protracted armed conflicts and the resultant high military spending, rapid urbanization, and incorporation into a global economy. How has the Middle East tried to deal with these challenges?

Capitulations lead to European influence

In 1526, Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent (known as the "Lawgiver" to the Ottomans) granted the first of what came to be called the " capitulations" to the French. The agreements gave France, and later other European powers, the right to trade within the Ottoman Empire without paying taxes and other economic concessions -- a sort of pre-modern free-trade agreement.



A painting of Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent, who ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1520 until his death in 1566 [enlarge]

The Ottomans granted the capitulations from a position of strength. They were eager to encourage imports to supply their population with goods and could afford to do so without heavy import duties. The Europeans wanted markets in which to sell their exports. In the beginning, it was a win-win situation.

Three hundred years later, however, the capitulations gave Europeans an enormous advantage over local merchants in the Ottoman market. Not only were Europeans (and any local prot駐s they hired, especially local Christians) still exempt from taxation, but they were also now mass-producing cheap manufactured goods that were displacing local products. The Ottomans no longer had the political power to rescind the capitulations which had helped the European powers gain control over the economy of the Empire, and thus control over its political and economic decisions.

Borrowing and bankruptcy

As Egypt and the Ottoman Empire watched themselves fall behind Europe's military power, they tried to copy Europe's sources of strength. They began to borrow heavily from European banks, on bad terms, in order to finance the modernization of their armies, social institutions, infrastructure, and industry. The Ottomans took out the first major loan in 1854 at the outset of the Crimean War.

Jump To:

Capitulations lead to European influence

Borrowing and bankruptcy

Economic challenges of independence

The economy of oil

The consequences of unequal distribution of wealth

The economic effect of political crisis

Other economic challenges

Also

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to economics in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Middle East: Land, Resources, and Economics

Got Water?

Oil Crisis: What Would You Do?

Related sites

Related topics

Related maps

As time went on, expensive efforts at reform continued, and the Ottomans were unable to repay the loans on schedule. When they declared bankruptcy in 1875, the Western powers took direct control over parts of the economy.

A similar situation had developed in Egypt. Enormous efforts had been made to modernize the military and infrastructure and to begin industrialization throughout the 19th century.

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station



Opened in 1869, Egypt's 100-mile-long Suez Canal connects the Red Sea with the eastern Mediterranean. [enlarge]

Egypt had two advantages: First, the American Civil War meant that cotton from the South was no longer available on the world market. Cotton prices rose, and Egyptian cotton became an extremely valuable export. Second, the Suez Canal opened in 1869.

Despite the potential represented by these developments, Egypt's expensive reform program, lavish royal spending, and European pressure led to bankruptcy. Partly to ensure economic stability and repayment of debt, and partly to squelch a nationalist uprising, Britain colonized the country in 1882.

Economic challenges of independence



British soldiers in formation before the ancient Sphinx and pyramids on Egypt's Giza Plateau, c. 1893 [enlarge]

Local forces resisted the imposition of European colonial rule across the Middle East. Even as Britain and France carved up what was left of the Ottoman Empire between themselves after World War I, pressure was growing for them to leave and allow the states of the Middle East to govern themselves.

The process of achieving independence was uneven: Egypt, for example, achieved nominal independence from Britain in 1922, but Britain retained enormous influence until the Free Officers' Coup under Gamal Abd al-Nasser deposed King Faruq in 1952. Syria achieved independence from France in 1946, while Britain unilaterally left Palestine in 1948, leading to the creation of a political division between Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Nationalist regimes that came to power upon independence from the Western mandates tended to maintain significant control over their economies. Using a socialist economic model, countries like Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, and Syria wished to pool national resources and spend them centrally to spur economic development.

One common strategy in the 1960s was import-substituting industrialization (ISI). This was an attempt to build local industries that would create jobs, use local resources, and allow countries to stop importing Western goods. Governments raised trade barriers and heavily subsidized infant industries (often owning them outright) to stimulate rapid economic development.

ISI failed when these industries became bloated, inefficient enterprises riddled with bureaucracy and corruption. They couldn't meet local demands and were a drain on national resources.

By the late 1970s, Egypt, under President Anwar Sadat, abandoned the strategy of ISI in favor of infitah, opening up the economy to foreign investment. More and more countries decided to encourage foreign investment in order to stimulate their economies this way.



Outside an Iranian McDonald's restaurant [enlarge]

The strategy of infitah, however, has also been a disappointment. Much of the sought-after foreign investment has been in Western consumer goods and luxuries, like McDonald's and name-brand clothing, rather than in local industry. This importation of Western culture does little to raise the general standard of living in the region. Instead, it tends to increase the cultural and economic gap between a wealthy class that has benefited from Western investment and adopted a more Western lifestyle, and a much larger population of the poor.

Many feel that the importation of Western goods and cultural values challenges important social traditions. This is one factor in the rise of resentment against the West and the increasing popularity of Islamic opposition groups that promise to restore cultural and economic independence to the region.

The economy of oil



An Iraqi oil refinery from the air [enlarge]

The discovery of enormous oil deposits in the Middle East coincided with increasing dependence upon oil in the West in the early 20th century. Money from oil has created enormous opportunities for development in those countries where it is concentrated, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq, Iran, and Algeria.

States without significant oil resources have benefited by sending laborers to work in the richer states. The money these workers send home has contributed to the economies of places like the West Bank and Gaza, Egypt, and Jordan.

The financial benefits from oil, however, have been offset by other problems associated with the economy of a rentier state. A rentier state is one that gets most of its income from selling its natural resources to outside buyers.

Because the government gets its income directly from selling this resource, there is no need to tax its citizens. Nor is there a need to give them a voice in running the country. Rentier states in the Middle East usually have strong, autocratic governments that buy off political dissent by distributing the wealth derived from oil through extensive social programs.

In some ways, money comes in too easily in rentier economies. There is little incentive to increase efficiency in resource production or to diversify the sources of wealth. The state bureaucracy and public industries become bloated. The population may develop unrealistic social expectations, but at the same time has no way to express opposition to those in power. Connections to the source of wealth come to count for more than individual ability.

The consequences of unequal distribution of wealth

In addition, the gap between rich and poor countries can be a source of tension. While guest workers earn good money working in oil-rich nations, they are often treated as second-class members of society.

Another major source of tension in the region is foreign aid. People on the street may be suspicious of the motives behind foreign aid, whether it comes from the U.S. to Egypt and Israel or from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to poorer Arab countries in the region.

U.S. aid to Israel is an especially great bone of contention in the Middle East. Many in the region believe that the current state of Israel is simply an extension of earlier Western colonialism: After all, the original Zionists came from Europe, and Israel's economy and military receive financial support from the U.S. Many Arabs believe that the U.S. cannot be a fair broker of the peace process while it

is tied so closely to Israel by massive aid.

The economic effect of political crisis



Kuwaiti buildings bomb-damaged during Iraq's 1990 occupation, under skies darkened by the smoke of burning oil wells [enlarge]

Political turmoil has had a devastating effect on economies in the Middle East. Iraq, for example, had been using its oil wealth to provide a high level of education and health care to its population, among other benefits. But military expenditures during theIran-Iraq War (1980-88) put a significant strain on Iraq's resources, reducing social spending. Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990, the U.S.-led bombing and U.N. embargo on Iraqi oil that ensued, and the continued use by the government of oil revenues for military purposes have reversed many of the social gains that had been made earlier.

The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have faced extraordinarily difficult economic conditions since Israel has occupied these regions as a result of the1967 Six-Day War. Some families have lived in crowded refugee camps since they fled or were expelled from Israel in 1948 during Israel's war of independence. Gaza has one of the highest population densities in the world. Unemployment is extremely high, particularly since many Palestinians have been unable to get to their jobs in Israel after Israel closed its borders to Palestinians for security reasons during the first intifada.

Other economic challenges



A crowded street in Cairo, Egypt [enlarge]

A further strain on Middle Eastern economies is a rapidly rising population. The introduction of modern medicine and public health and sanitation in the 19th century caused the population of the Middle East to double in only a century (the previous population doubling had taken thousands of years). Now it takes only about 25 years for the region's population to double.

Unfortunately, most of the countries with the highest population growth rates do not enjoy significant oil revenue -- only Iraq, Iran, and Algeria are exceptions. How the region's governments will provide jobs, education, and health care to a fast-growing population is a matter of global concern.

Back to top

Related sites

Country Studies:
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/
The research division of the Library of Congress provides extensive overviews of various nations.

The World Factbook 2001:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
The Central Intelligence Agency publishes information on the geography, people, government, and economy of each Middle Eastern country.

Country Briefings:
http://www.economist.com/countries/
These country profiles from *The Economist* include economic structure, outlook, and basic data.

Middle East Studies Report: Stability and Instability in the Gulf:

http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/EconNME.html
These reports summarize economic, demographic, energy, military spending, and arms-transfer trends.

Is America Stuck in the Middle East?:
http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_978.html
Is Middle East oil still crucial to American security?

Commanding Heights Web Site:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/
An economist's look at world history and development from 1910 to the present

Arab Human Development Report 2002:
http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/
A report on the Arab world's attempts to advance human development

The Palestinian Perspective:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east /july-dec02/almasri_8-09.html
Maher al-Masri, the Palestinian economy, industry, and trade minister, laments the negative effects of Israeli occupation.

Creating a Textile Museum Piece from the Islamic Empire:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the importance of the textile industry to the strength and stability of the Islamic Empire in the 11th and 12th centuries.

Six Billion and Beyond Web Site:
http://www.pbs.org/sixbillion/
On October 12, 1999, the Earth's population reached six billion. PBS travels the globe talking to people about the population issues affecting their lives and countries.

Related topics

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

What is religious militancy and its relationship to terrorism?

Geography: An Ancient and Modern Crossroads

Culture: A Rich Mosaic

Related maps

Historic Political Borders of the Middle East

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation



The Nile River is a prominent feature of the modern cityscape of Cairo, Egypt. DOD, Defense Visual Information Center, March Air Force Base, CA

E-mail a Friend



A fertile bank of the Nile River in Egypt [enlarge]

Geography: An Ancient and Modern Crossroads

Location, location, location

The Middle East is at the junction of trade routes connecting Europe and China, India and Africa, and all the cultures of the Mediterranean basin. Many of these routes have been documented from as early as 5,000 years ago, and the presence of so many different people and products over the years has had a profound effect on the region's culture, politics, and economy.

More than deserts and camels

The landscape of the Middle East is more diverse than the deserts that dominate movie screens and novels would suggest. Rivers allowing for productive agriculture were the key factor in the settling of cities. Mountain ranges kept cultures in separate areas, providing natural barriers to imperialist agendas.

The rich, fertile soil of the Middle East led early civilizations to settle, domesticate plants and animals, and thrive. The Fertile Crescent between the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers known as Mesopotamia (now modern Iraq, and extending north into Syria and Turkey) was the home of the world's first urban culture, the Sumerians, 6,000 years ago. The Sumerians' Egyptian rivals took advantage of the annual flooding of the Nile for their regular harvest, later exporting a large portion of their produce to the Roman Empire. Some time later, the Hittites settled in the golden, rolling hills of Anatolia (modern Turkey) and the Phoenicians of the eastern Mediterranean loaded olive oil and spices into their merchant ships to trade throughout the Mediterranean.

This region introduced many staples into the kitchens of the world, including olives, figs, lemons, coffee, chickpeas, lentils, pomegranates, and asparagus. The cedar trees covering the hills of Lebanon were forested in ancient times for their fragrant and structurally reliable wood.

Jump To:

More than deserts and camels

A well-traveled route

Geographical features bring economic and political riches

Human geography

What's in a name

Also

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to geography in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Mapping the Middle East

Middle East: Land, Resources, and Economics

Got Water?

How 9/11 shaped U.S. foreign policy

A meeting of world leaders

Israeli-Palestinian peace summit

Related sites

Related topics

Related maps



Lebanon's Bcharre Village sits at the base of a picturesque mountain range. [enlarge]

The mountain ranges in the Middle East helped isolate various cultures from each other as much as, if not more than, bodies of water. The Taurus Mountains of southern Turkey separate Anatolia, also known as Asia Minor, from the rest of Asia, just as the Atlas Mountains separate Morocco from the rest of Africa. Iran's Elburz and Zagros Mountains are high enough to host ski resorts.

In tumultuous times, mountains have also provided refuge for oppressed minorities, such as the Ismailis in Afghanistan; the Alawites in Syria; the Christians in Lebanon; the Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq; and the Berbers in North Africa.

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station

A well-traveled route

The Silk Route refers to the trading routes stretching from China through Central Asia to the Middle East. (Even when Europe participated in this overland exchange, traders continued through the Middle East to avoid having to cross the Caspian Sea to the north.) Silk Route merchants were the first to introduce Chinese products like paper and gunpowder to the West. The people who traveled these roads exchanged not only products, but, maybe even more importantly, ideas -- scientific, religious, and artistic -- that would challenge and change institutions in China as well as in the Middle East.

Perhaps the most significant movement of people on this route was the Turks' migration into Anatolia. The Christian Byzantines had ruled Byzantine from Constantinople in western Anatolia for four centuries, with the Taurus Mountains providing a natural barrier against their Muslim neighbors to the south and east. The victory by the Seljuk Turks over the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 in southeastern Anatolia opened the way for Turkish tribes to settle in Anatolia and provoked the first European Crusade.



Ships make their way in an orderly fashion through the Suez Canal, which connects the Red Sea with the eastern Mediterranean. [enlarge]

Although it was religious wars that first introduced European armies into the region, the strategic location of the Middle East was the motivation for a continued European presence in the 19th and 20th centuries. The British and French both coveted a route to India and Southeast Asia. The building of the Suez Canal in Egypt (completed in 1869) allowed military and commercial ships to pass between the Mediterranean and Red Seas and into the Indian Ocean, rendering the long and dangerous trip around Africa unnecessary.

Geographical features bring economic and political riches

Geography and natural resources have always influenced political power in this region. The Nile and Mesopotamian Rivers can support a rich agricultural base, but only if the water distribution can be sustained and controlled through irrigation systems. And the prosperity of these regions has depended on a government's ability to maintain irrigation systems over the long term. If a central government can keep the irrigation systems in good working order, then well-irrigated fields produce more crops, which can then be taxed to support the government. Conversely, when local populations do not cooperate to maintain a stable government, their crop yields may drop.



Cultivated land near Turkey's border with Iraq [enlarge]

Mesopotamian farmers used Persian Gulf seawater to irrigate for centuries, and now, as a result, much of southern Iraq's soil is too salty to grow crops. Agriculture in the region now relies on modern practices like fresh water irrigation, rotating crops each year, and technologically sophisticated dam projects.

Today, the wealth in Middle Eastern soil comes not from crops, but from petroleum. This region contains about two-thirds of the world's known petroleum reserves, the geological remnants of lush tropical forests of eons past. When the United States and Europe increased their consumption of oil drastically during World War II, the oil reserves in the Middle East became critically important to U.S. foreign policy, and have remained so ever since.

Human geography

The ethnic and cultural diversity of the population of the Middle East is as varied as any place on earth, save the New World. People in the Middle East live a variety of lifestyles -- nomadic and semi-nomadic, farming and fishing, and, increasingly, urban.



Shepherds move their flocks along a desert road in Israel. [enlarge]

How people put food on their tables is intimately tied to their physical surroundings. While the herding lifestyle of the nomadic peoples of the Middle East may have captured the romantic imagination of Europeans and Americans, in reality, pure nomads have always been a small minority in this region. In fact, many so-called nomads were simply seasonal migrants who grazed their livestock in one region in the summer and moved elsewhere in the winter. These migratory populations gained a reputation for breeding fine horses and camels, although most supported themselves raising sheep and goats. This system of seasonal migration functioned well until modern states established exclusive ideas of property and land ownership.

Most states in the region with large nomadic or semi-nomadic populations have pursued a settlement policy in order to better track and control the historically independent tribes. Clan and family relationships are still a vital part of their social structure.

Other families depend on the sea, or rivers, for their sustenance. The long Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea coastlines and large river systems of the region support many communities through both fishing and water-borne trade. The pearl industry of the Persian Gulf spawned a specialized economy there.

Productive areas of both rain-fed and irrigated agriculture support rural farming populations, which are usually organized as tight-knit villages rather than isolated farms. Village identity is extremely strong, so much so that when people migrate to the city or even abroad, they often settle in communities of their co-villagers. A neighborhood in Detroit, for example, may be made up of immigrants from one particular village in Lebanon. Immigrants often aspire to earn enough money to return to their village, buy land, and build a large home.



The Nile River is a prominent feature of the modern cityscape of Cairo, Egypt. [enlarge]

Rapid urbanization has been a marked feature of the Middle East in the late 20th century. Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran each have more than 10 million residents and continue to grow. While migration to the cities offers attractive opportunities of employment and modern amenities to poor villagers, the rapid rise in urban populations has strained water resources, transportation facilities, and other public services as well as contributing to pollution.

What's in a name

Many different terms have been used to describe this area of the world, and although various geographic and cultural descriptions have major overlaps, each may significantly exclude different regions.

The region can be referred to most neutrally by continental terms, such as "West Asia" or "Southwest Asia and North Africa."

Linguistically, the "Arab world" includes the Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa, Southwest Asia, and the Arabian Peninsula, but excludes Iran, Turkey, and Israel.

The "Islamic world" includes all of the Arabic countries, as well as neighboring Turkey and Iran. Other nations that are predominantly Muslim, like Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and many sub-Saharan African countries, *should* be considered as integral parts of the Islamic world, but terminology for the region often omits them. In addition, there are significant populations of Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, and other religious groups that live in these same nations that make up the so-called Islamic world.

The "Middle East" is a term derived from a European perspective. For 19th-century Europeans, the Middle East was differentiated from India and the Far East (Southeast Asia and China). Originally, the Near East referred to areas under Ottoman control, from the Balkans to the border of Iran. The term Middle East was introduced in the early 20th century to include the area around the Persian Gulf, and the Near East was used to refer to the Ottoman Balkans. After World War II, Middle East became the dominant term for the whole region.

Because "Middle East" is an outsider's term describing neither geography nor culture, it is an ambiguously applied name. For some, it refers to the area bounded by the Mediterranean Sea, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Taurus and Zagros Mountains. For others, Egypt, Arabia, and the Persian Gulf states fall under their description of the Middle East. Still others use the term as a synonym for the Arab world, sometimes including Turkey and Iran based on their proximity and linguistic and religious affinities to the region. Despite its foreign origins, the term "Middle East" has been translated and adopted into many Middle Eastern languages, including Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, and Turkish.

Back to top

Related sites

New Allies:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/jan- june02/allies_3-12.html
NewsHour reports on the allies America has gained since the attacks of September 11. (March 2002)

Afghans Battle:

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/ july-dec01/reporters_12-7.html
Two reporters discuss the latest military action in Afghanistan, including the fall of Kandahar and the continuing search for Osama bin Laden. (December 2001)

The World Factbook 2001:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
The Central Intelligence Agency publishes information on the geography, people, government, and economy of each Middle Eastern country.

Commanding Heights Web Site:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/
An economist's look at world history and development from 1910 to the present

What Happened to the Near East?:
http://www.houstonreview.com/articles/NearEast.html
An explanation of the terms "Near East" and "Middle East"

Physical Features of the Middle East:
http://geog.tamu.edu/vatch/mideast/photos/photos320.html
Photographs of the Middle East taken by satellite

The Politics of Oil:
http://www.gliah.uh.edu/historyonline/oil.cfm
An essay on the history of oil production

Historical Maps of Islam:
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~brvs/pages/maps.html
Historical maps of Islam

Map of Israel and the Occupied Territories:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/conflict/map.html
A map of Israel and the Occupied Territories

Getting to Know Iran:
http://www.pbs.org/visavis/resources_mstr.html
Students will become familiar with Persian Gulf geography, religions, cultures, and government.

Related topics

How were modern nation-states of the Middle East created?

What have been the role and effects of U.S. foreign policies and actions in the Middle East?

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Culture: A Rich Mosaic

Related maps

Historic Political Borders of the Middle East

Middle East Topographic and Natural Resources

Middle East Religion, Ethnic Groups, and Language Distribution

Muslim Population Worldwide

Israel's Changing Borders

Connecting Questions | Explore a Theme | Timeline | Communities Respond | Educator's Resources

Search | Site Map | Maps | Glossary | About the Site | Help | Pledge

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation



The Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, with the gold Dome of the Rock sitting just behind.
© AFP/CORBIS

E-mail a Friend

Religion: Three Religions, One God

Three of the world's major religions -- the monotheist traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam -- were all born in the Middle East and are all inextricably linked to one another. Christianity was born from within the Jewish tradition, and Islam developed from both Christianity and Judaism.

While there have been differences among these religions, there was a rich cultural interchange between Jews, Christians, and Muslims that took place in Islamic Spain and other places over centuries.

Judaism

A brief history of Judaism

Judaism is the oldest surviving monotheistic religion, arising in the eastern Mediterranean in the second millennium B.C.E. Abraham is traditionally considered to be the first Jew and to have made a covenant with God. Because Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all recognize Abraham as their first prophet, they are also called the Abrahamic religions.



An ancient wall relief depicting a religious scene [enlarge]

While there was always a small community of Jews in historic Palestine, in 73 C.E. the Roman Empire dispersed the Jews after an insurrection against Roman authority. Most Jews then lived in Diaspora, as minorities in their communities, until the founding of the state of Israel in 1948.

When Jews from all over the world came to settle in modern Israel, they found that various subcultures had developed in different areas with distinctive histories, languages, religious practices, customs, and cuisine.

Jewish cultural groups



Homeless Jews arrive in search of a new life, Haifa, Palestine, July 21, 1947. [enlarge]

Jews from Germany and Eastern Europe were known as Ashkenazim (from "Ashkenazic" the Hebrew word for Germany). Yiddish, a fusion of German and Hebrew, was the spoken language of the Ashkenazi. In Europe, Jews had tended to be segregated -- voluntarily or not -- from the Christian population. From the late 19th and through first half of the 20th century, many Ashkenazi Jews came to Palestine to escape the persecution and discrimination they faced because of their religion.

Sephardic Jews trace their ancestry to the Iberian Peninsula (modern-day Spain and Portugal; "Sephardic" comes from the Hebrew word for Spain). They once spoke Ladino, a mixture of Hebrew and Spanish.

Mizrahi Jews (from the Hebrew word for Eastern, also sometimes called Oriental Jews) trace their origin to North Africa and Asia. Mizrahi and Sephardic

Jump To:

Judaism

A brief history of Judaism

Jewish cultural groups

Judaism in Israel and America

What Jews believe

Judaism's views of Christianity and Islam

Christianity

A brief history of Christianity

Christianity in the Middle East

What Christians believe

Christianity's views of Judaism and Islam

Islam

A brief history of Islam

Islamic communities

What Muslims believe

Islam's views of Judaism and Christianity

Also

Jewish communities tended to be integrated into their respective societies.

Judaism in Israel and America

There is great difference of opinion among Israeli Jews over the role Jewish religious law should play in the state. Until recently, Orthodox Judaism was the only form of the religion formally and legally recognized in Israel. Although less conservative branches of Judaism now have partial recognition, Orthodoxy remains dominant politically and legally.



An Orthodox Jewish man prays at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. [enlarge]

Many Israeli Jews describe themselves in terms of their degree of observance of Jewish law. About half call themselves secular; about 15 to 20 percent see themselves as Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox; and the rest describe themselves as traditionally observant, but not as strict as the Orthodox.

In the United States, debate over the necessity of observing Jewish law has led to the development of three major movements. Orthodox Jews believe that Jewish law is unchanging and mandatory. Conservative Jews argue that God's laws change and evolve over time. Reform and Reconstructionist Jews believe that these laws are merely guidelines that individuals can choose to follow or not. In addition, there are many Jews in the United States who are secular or atheist. For them, their Judaism is a culture rather than a religion.

What Jews believe



Reading from the Torah [enlarge]

Jews believe in one god and his prophets, with special respect for Moses as the prophet to whom God gave the law. Jewish law is embodied in the Torah (also known as the Pentateuch) and the Talmud (collected commentary on the Torah completed in the fifth-century C.E.).

Judaism is more concerned with actions than dogma. In other words, observance of rules regulating human behavior has been of more concern than debates over beliefs in the Jewish tradition. According to Orthodox Judaism, Jewish law, or *halakhah*, includes 613 commandments given by God in the Torah, as well as rules and practices elaborated by scholars and custom. Jewish law covers matters such as prayer and ritual, diet, rules regulating personal status (marriage, divorce, birth, death, inheritance, etc.), and observance of holidays (like Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement; and Passover, the feast celebrating the exodus of the Jews from slavery in Egypt).

Judaism's views of Christianity and Islam

Jews do not believe in the prophets after the Jewish prophets, including Jesus and Muhammad. Therefore, they do not subscribe to the idea that Jesus was the Messiah and the son of God, nor do they believe in the teachings of Islam.

Christianity

A brief history of Christianity

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to religion in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Who Wears a Veil?

Muslim Women Through Time

How Many Wives?

Israeli-Palestinian Peace Summit

Terrorist, Freedom Fighter, or Something in Between?

Stereotypes: More Than Meets the Eye

Related sites

Related topics

Related maps

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station



An aerial view of Istanbul, Turkey, formerly Constantinople [enlarge]

Christianity started as an offshoot of Judaism in the first century C.E. Until the emperor Constantine converted to Christianity in 324 C.E., early Christian communities were often persecuted. It was then that the Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire, and its capital relocated from Rome to Constantinople (formerly Byzantium and now Istanbul). The development of Christian groups derived from major and minor splits.

The Orthodox Church and its patriarch split away from the Roman Catholic Church and the Pope in 1054 C.E. because of political and doctrinal differences. In the 16th century, Martin Luther, upset at the corruption of the Catholic papacy, spearheaded a reformation movement that led to the development of Protestantism.

Christian missionaries proselytize all over the world, and there are large populations of Christians on every continent on Earth, although the forms of Christianity practiced vary.

Christianity in the Middle East

Many early Christian saints lived in the Middle East. The tradition of asceticism (denial of physical pleasures in order to come closer to God) developed first in the Middle East, and the monastic tradition has its roots there.

Christians in the Middle East today include Copts, Maronites, Russian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Roman Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Assyrians, and Protestants. These groups have different liturgical languages, rituals, and customs, and different leaders who direct their faith.

The Coptic Church, the dominant form of Christianity in Egypt, arose from a doctrinal split in the Church at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. The Egyptian government supports the Copts' rights to worship and maintain their culture, but there has been some violence against the community by extremist Muslims.



The establishment of Lebanon as an independent state is announced on the steps of a Maronite church, Lebanon, 1920. [enlarge]

The Maronite Church was started in the fifth century by followers of a Syrian priest named Maroun. The Maronite Patriarch, based in Lebanon, guides his followers in the teachings of Maroun and other saints. Maronites are still one of the most powerful political communities in Lebanon.

There are also Christian communities of different sects living today in Syria (10 percent of the population), Jordan (6 percent), the West Bank (8 percent), and Iraq (3 percent), with smaller percentages in other Middle Eastern countries.

In the 19th and early 20th centuries, many Christians from what is now Syria and Lebanon (then the Ottoman Empire) emigrated to the United States and other countries. Although Christians are a minority in the Middle East today, more than 75 percent of Americans of Arab descent are Christian.

What Christians believe

Christianity developed out of the monotheistic tradition of Judaism; Jesus, its founder, was a member of the Jewish community in Roman Palestine. Its holy scriptures are the Old Testament (the Jewish Torah with additions), and the New Testament (written by the followers of Jesus after his death and containing the life story of Jesus and other early Christian writings).



A Christian painting depicting Mary with the baby Jesus [enlarge]

Christians believe that God is revealed through three dimensions: the Father, the Son (Jesus Christ), and the Holy Spirit. Jesus is considered the son of God, born to the virgin Mary and come to Earth to offer redemption for mankind's sins. After Jesus was crucified and executed by the Romans, he rose from the dead and ascended into heaven. This event is celebrated at Easter, while the birth of Jesus is celebrated at Christmas.

Christians believe in an afterlife where those who have lived a good life will reside in heaven with God, and those who have lived an unrepentant life of sin will be punished in hell.

Christianity's views of Judaism and Islam

Although Christianity developed out of Judaic texts, Christians do not follow Jewish law. Instead, they believe that the ritualistic Jewish law was abrogated in favor of a universal gospel for all of humanity and the Christian teaching, "Love thy neighbor as thyself."

Relationships between Jewish and Christian communities have often been difficult, particularly in Christian Europe. There, Jewish communities were often subject to discrimination and violence at the hands of Christians.



An artist's depiction of Christian Crusaders [enlarge]

Christianity has also had a problematic relationship with Islam. Christians do not accept Muhammad as a prophet. While many Christians in the Middle East converted to Islam during and after the seventh century, the Church hierarchy in Rome and Constantinople considered Islam to be both a political and theological threat. The Crusades were an unsuccessful attempt to reverse the Islamic conquest of the eastern Mediterranean and the holy places of all three monotheistic religions.

Islam

A brief history of Islam



Pilgrims surround Kaaba, the holiest temple in Islam, at the center of the ancient shrine of Mecca. [enlarge]

Islam arose in the early seventh century C.E. in the settled desert community of Mecca (in present-day Saudi Arabia). It developed from both the Judeo-Christian tradition and the cultural values of the nomadic Bedouin tribes of Arabia.

Islam expanded into areas controlled by the Byzantine Empire (largely Greek-speaking and Orthodox Christian, but with a diverse population) and the Sassanian Empire (officially Zoroastrian and Persian-speaking, but also diverse). By the mid-eighth century, Islam had spread west into North Africa and Europe, and east into Central Asia. Over the centuries, Islam continued to grow in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia.

As Islam expanded, the new Islamic societies adapted and synthesized many of the customs they encountered. As a result, Muslims in different areas of the world created for themselves a wide array of cultural traditions.

Related Video

Islamist v. Islamic (3:06) Watch

The culture of Islamic Spain, for example, was so cosmopolitan that some

Christian and Jewish parents complained that their children were more interested in developing their knowledge of Arabic than in learning Latin or Hebrew, respectively. Many elements of Islamic society became integral parts of medieval and Renaissance European culture, like the notion of chivalry, and certain forms of music (the lute, the arabesque) and poetry.

On the eastern end of the Islamic world, many Indonesians converted to Islam between the 15th and 17th centuries. Preexisting animist beliefs were often incorporated into the local practice of Islam.

Islamic communities

Within Islam, there are many different communities. Many of these divisions, like the Sunnis, Shiis, Ismailis, Alevis/Alawites, and Druze, originate in political and doctrinal differences in the community. Adherents of Islam may be more or less observant, conservative or liberal.



Whirling dervishes playing musical instruments and dancing, Istanbul, photograph c. 1922
[enlarge]

Sufism is the mystical tradition of Islam, where direct experience of the divine is emphasized. The 13th-century poet Jalaluddin Rumi is a well-known Sufi figure whose work has become popular in the United States today. Whirling dervishes are dancers who are entranced in their experience of Sufism.

What Muslims believe

Muslims believe that Allah (the Arabic word for God) sent his revelation, the Quran, to the prophet Muhammad in the seventh century C.E. to proclaim it to mankind. The Quran contains verses *(surahs)* in Arabic that tell Muslims to worship one god, and explains how they should treat others properly.

Another historical text, the Hadith, written by scholars after the death of Muhammad, describes Muhammad's life as an example of pious behavior, proscribes law for the community based on the Quran and the example of Muhammad, and explains how certain rituals should be performed.

Observant Muslims practice five principles (pillars) of Islam: orally declaring their faith *(shahadah);* praying five times a day *(salat);* fasting in the daylight hours during the month of Ramadan *(sawm);* giving a share of their income for charity *(zakat);* and making a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetime if they can afford it *(hajj).* Many Muslims also observe dietary rules, in origin similar to those of Judaism, that forbid certain foods (like pork), outlaw alcohol, and dictate how animals should be slaughtered for food.

The Muslim calendar is lunar, and shifts in relation to the solar calendar. Just as Christians count years starting with the year of Jesus's birth, Muslims count years beginning with Muhammad's move from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E. Muslim years are labeled as A.H., *Anno Hegirae*, or "year of the Hijra."

Major Muslim festivals include Id al-Fitr (the Fast-Breaking Festival, celebrated at the end of Ramadan) and Id al-Adha (the Festival of Sacrifice, the commemoration of Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Ishmail which takes place during the month of pilgrimage).

Muslims believe in a Day of Judgment, when righteous souls will go to heaven and wrongdoers will go to hell.

Islam's views of Judaism and Christianity

Islam sees Judaism and Christianity as earlier versions of Islam, revelations given within the same tradition by Allah but misunderstood over time by their followers. Muslims see Islam as the final, complete, and correct revelation in the monotheistic tradition of the three faiths.



A 19th-century copy of Islam's holy book, the Quran, hand-copied in Arabic, open to its first chapter, the Fatiha [enlarge]

The Islamic tradition recognizes many of the Jewish and Christian prophets, including Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (although he is not considered to be the son of God). Many non-Muslims mistakenly believe that Muhammad is the equivalent of Jesus in the Islamic tradition; in fact, it is the Quran that stands in the same central position in Islam as Jesus does in Christianity. Muhammad himself is not divine, but a prophet chosen by God to deliver his message and an example of piety to emulate.

Jews and Christians are specifically protected in the Quran as Peoples of the Book, reinforcing their spiritual connection to Islam by virtue of having been given revelations from God. The Islamic legal tradition has upheld the rights of Jews and Christians to maintain their beliefs and practices within their communities in Islamic lands, and this policy of tolerance has generally been upheld.

Back to top

Related sites

Inside the Kingdom - Part II:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east /jan-june02/saudi_2-15.html
NewsHour explores the debate over Islam, education, and culture in Saudi Arabia.

Christians in the Middle East:
http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01fm.cfm ?PrgDate=04/23/2002&PrgID=5
Talk of the Nation looks at the role of Christians who live in Israel and the West Bank. This story was aired during the military standoff at Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity.

The Pope's Journey:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/ jan-june01/pope_5-8.html
NewsHour conducts a discussion on Pope John Paul II's journey of reconciliation to Greece, Syria, and Malta.

Islam: Empire of Faith:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/index.html
The companion Web site for *Islam: Empire of Faith,* a PBS film about the world's fastest growing religion

Observing Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/ july-dec01/islam_11-16.html
Islamic scholars discuss the future of Islam as Ramadan begins amid curiosity and concern. (Novemeber 2001)

Inside Out: Revolutionary Islam:
http://insideout.wbur.org/documentaries/revolutionaryislam/
This radio documentary examines the manifestations of political Islam around the world.

Guide to Religions of the World:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/people /features/world_religions/
A guide to six world religions: Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam,

Judaism, and Sikhism

Beliefnet Web Site:
http://www.belief.net/
A Web site on religion

Judaism 101 Web Site:
http://www.jewfaq.org/index.htm
An online encyclopedia on Judaism

Lexicon of Israeli "English":
http://www.iyba.co.il/lexicon.htm
A glossary of Israeli terms, acronyms, and abbreviations found in English-language publications

Exploring Religions:
http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/religionet/er/default.htm
Information on Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, and Judaism

Who Are Eastern Christians?:
http://www.arimathea.co.uk/whoare.htm
The origin and definition of Eastern Christianity

Syria and Christianity:
http://atheism.about.com/library/world/KZ /bl_SyriaChristianity.htm
The history of Eastern Christianity in Syria

Islam:
http://www.cqpress.com/context/articles/epr_islam.html
An encyclopedia entry on Islam

Islam: A Worldwide Religion:
http://www.seasite.niu.edu/crossroads/russell/islam.htm
Islam's impact on Southeast Asia

Persian Poet Top Seller in America:
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1997/11/25/us/us.3.html
An article on the popularity of mystic Islamic poet Jalaluddin Rumi

Historical Maps of Islam:
http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/~brvs/pages/maps.html
Historical maps of Islam

Islam in Iran:
http://www.pbs.org/visavis/islam_in_iran_mstr.html
Vis •is explores the origins of Islam and its evolution in Iran.

Saudi Time Bomb?:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saudi/
Frontline investigates the hidden undercurrents of Islamic extremism, its far-flung reach, and its threat to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Religion & Culture:
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/classroom/lp5.html
Students will consider the theme of religion and culture as they learn about the Hindu-Muslim conflict in the province of Gujarat, India.

Understanding History, Religion, and Politics in Jerusalem and Beyond:
http://www.pbs.org/pov/pov2001/promises/intheclassroom.html
Students will acquire historical knowledge of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in the region, learn how to interpret a conflict from multiple perspectives, advocate for a point of view, and develop greater conflict resolution skills.

Gender Issues in Islam:

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/muslims/
Students will compare and contrast the roles of men and women with regard to various topics in the six countries featured in the film.

Great Thinkers and Accomplishments of Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the diverse accomplishments of great Islamic scholars.

God Fights Back: 1978-1992:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/teachers/tggod.html
In the 1970s, alienated Iranians flock to the promises of Islamic fundamentalism and Egyptians and Algerians soon follow. In the 1980s, alienated Americans flock to the promises of Christian fundamentalism.

The Fascinating World of Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson2.html
Students will research the people, places, and events that have shaped the history of Islam.

An Introduction to Islam and Muhammad:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson1.html
Students will compare the major monotheistic belief systems of the world.

Middle East: Crossroads of Faith and Conflict (map):

Supplement to *National Geographic,* October 2002

Related topics

Culture: A Rich Mosaic

Geography: An Ancient and Modern Crossroads

How were modern nation-states of the Middle East created?

What is religious militancy and its relationship to terrorism?

Related maps

Middle East Religion, Ethnic Groups, and Language Distribution

Muslim Population Worldwide

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation



A Muslim Palestinian woman and her children prepare traditional foods in their home during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
© Annie Griffiths Belt/ CORBIS

E-mail a Friend

Culture: A Rich Mosaic

The many cultures of the Middle East

Culture, a shared set of traditions, belief systems, and behaviors, is shaped by history, religion, ethnic identity, language, and nationality, among other factors. The Middle East consists of approximately 20 countries, with many different religions and a variety of ethnic and linguistic groups. Given this diversity, we should not be surprised to find a multitude of different cultures coexisting in the region.

Stereotypes about the Middle East

During the 19th century, translations of the *Arabian Nights* and archaeological discoveries in Egypt dominated the imaginations of people in the West who had never visited the Middle East. These armchair explorers conjured up competing images of a desert region populated by nomads and camels and, of course, pyramids, but also brimming with all manner of sweet and savory treats in bustling urban bazaars. During the 20th century, stories about the Middle East have tended to focus on oil wealth, territorial wars, and religious conflicts. All of these do exist, but there is much more to life in this area.



A fruit vendor at a market in Alexandria, Egypt
[enlarge]

Daily life in the region is too complex to be summarized on a Web page; we can only begin to suggest the multiple variables involved in the lives of people there. A common thread that runs through many lives is the importance of family and the values that derive from having a strong extended family: respect, honor, and loyalty.

Religion in the cultures of the Middle East

The Middle East is the birthplace of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all monotheistic religions that grew from the same tradition. Each religion used the texts from earlier groups, and so they share many rules and beliefs. For example, Islam and Judaism observe the same dietary rules and have a similar focus on religion as a foundation for civil law. All three share a tradition of prophets, from Adam and Abraham to Solomon and Joseph. Jesus is significant for both Christianity and Islam, and Muslims in addition follow the teachings of Muhammad.

Religion plays a large part in the rhythm of daily life, not only through prayer and study, but also in determining the end of the work week. Shops in different neighborhoods close down on Fridays for the Muslim holy day, Saturdays for the Jewish Sabbath, and Sundays for the Christian day of rest. Religious festivals and remembrances, like Id al-Fitr (the Festival of Fast-Breaking, celebrated at the end of Ramadan), or the Jewish Passover holiday, or Easter Sunday as determined by the Roman or Eastern Orthodox Christian churches, are all recognized as national holidays in different countries.

Jump To:

Stereotypes about the Middle East

Religion in the cultures of the Middle East

Ethnic diversity at the crossroads of civilizations

Many languages, three families

Culture: Family, city, and the globe

The Middle East in a globalized world

Also

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to culture in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Stereotypes: More Than Meets the Eye

Dissecting the Media

"Reading" Political Cartoons

Who Wears a Veil?

Muslim Women Through Time

How Many Wives?

Related sites

Related topics

Related maps

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station

An awareness of God (Arabic: *Allah*) is exhibited in common Arabic expressions that are used throughout the region -- even in Turkey and Iran, where Arabic is not the local language. A common response to "How are you?" is *"Ilhamdillah!"* -- "Praise be to God." When expressing hope for a future event, one might say *"Inshallah"* -- "God willing." The exclamation *"Mashallah"* -- "What God wills!" -- is often heard as an expression of delight, at the sight of a new baby, for example. While there are those for whom these phrases reflect the divine, others use them the way many English speakers use "Good-bye" (literally, "God be with ye").

Religion plays a role in national and international politics as well. Turkey has a Muslim majority, but is officially a secular nation. Other countries in the region identify themselves with a specific religion, mostly Islam. Lebanon's constitution attempted to provide for power sharing among 18 officially recognized religions, including Maronite and Orthodox Christians, Sunni and Shii Muslims, and Druze. But because the populations of the various groups grew at different rates, this system eventually became less representative of the nation as a whole and civil war broke out.

The poor relations between Israel and most of its Arab neighbors are sometimes described in terms of a perpetual religious conflict between Jews and Muslims. This reading, however, is too simplistic. Although control over important historical sites of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam *is* a factor in the disagreements, many of the details that stall negotiations have to do with control of land and access to water resources. Furthermore, many Palestinians who demand restitution for their property are Christian, not Muslim, and Egypt's historic treaty with Israel provides a model for how Muslim and Jewish neighbors can live peaceably.

Ethnic diversity at the crossroads of civilizations

Situated between Africa, Asia, and Europe, the Middle East has been a crossroads for traders, travelers, and empire builders for thousands of years. Africans, Central Asians, and Celts have all added to the ethnic mix. Major ethnic groups in the Middle East today include Arabs, Iranians (also known as Persians), Turks, Jews, Kurds, Berbers, Armenians, Nubians, Azeris, and Greeks.



Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq [enlarge]

Most of the countries in this region are multiethnic. But even as diversity enhances the cultural richness of a society, it unfortunately may also lead to political conflict. The Kurds, for example, do not have their own nation-state, but are instead spread across Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Their political and military attempts to create an autonomous Kurdistan have been strongly resisted by those states.

Many languages, three families

The multiplicity of languages spoken in the Middle East reflects its ethnic diversity. Most of these languages come from three major language "families":

- Semitic (including Arabic, Hebrew, and Aramaic)
- Indo-European (Kurdish, Persian, Armenian)
- Turkic (Turkish, Azeri)

These language families reflect the successive migrations of different peoples into the region. A quick examination of these languages reveals the influence they have had on each other. Persian, for example, is written in Arabic script, while Turkish incorporates vocabulary words from Persian and Arabic. Arabic

itself is spoken in regional dialectics that are not always mutually understood. Some ethnic and religious communities have preserved "native" languages for religious use, such as Coptic and Greek.

Culture: Family, city, and the globe

The family is an important part of culture in the Middle East, as is evident in the Arabic honorific names that are often used in preference to given names. A man may be called *Ibn* ("son of") followed by his father's name or *Abu* ("father of") followed by his child's name.

In traditional Arab societies the family unit is an extended family -- cousins, grandparents, second cousins, cousins-in-law, nieces, nephews, and more -- all living together. This remains true in rural areas particularly. Migration to the cities has broken up some of these extended families, and the number of people living only with their nuclear family in urban areas is increasing.



Tea drinkers at a caf頻n Turkey [enlarge]

The difference between life in the village and life in the city sometimes seems to be as great or greater than the difference between living in the Middle East and living in America. Two men in Egypt, for example, may share the same language (Arabic), religion (Islam), and nationality (Egyptian), but one may live in an air-conditioned apartment building with his wife and two children and wear a suit to his government job, while the other may live in a naturally cool mud-brick house surrounded by three generations of relatives and wear a traditional robe, called a galabiya, to work a plot of land.

These differences are eroding, however, with the introduction of inexpensive cellular phone service and the ubiquity of television. Even some mud-brick houses are now equipped with satellite dishes that bring news, entertainment, and fashions not only from the capital city, but from around the world as well.

The Middle East in a globalized world



A busy street in Cairo, Egypt [enlarge]

Over the past 200 years, and increasingly in the contemporary age of globalization, more and more Western goods -- everything from clothing to food to computers -- have appeared in Middle Eastern markets. Not only goods, but culture as well, have been imported from the West. Western books and movies are popular, especially (but not exclusively) among the urban elite.

In fashion, Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey, banished the fez and other aspects of Ottoman dress in favor of European three-piece suits. Today, one might see young people clad in jeans and T-shirts that advertise their fondness for Britney Spears or *Titanic* walking down the same street as their peers who are wearing traditional hijab or galibiyas.



Outside an Iranian McDonald's restaurant [enlarge]

There is an active debate in most Middle Eastern communities about how much Western culture and technology can and should be adopted before such influences begin to compromise their culture, traditions, and identity. This discussion will require defining that identity to some degree. Will they characterize themselves as Egyptian? Muslim? Arab? a resident of a particular village? a member of a particular tribe? Most importantly, in what order would they prioritize these qualities? These are not easy questions, but the encroachment of Western influences requires some answers.

Back to top

Related sites

Inside the Kingdom: Fatina Shaker:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east /saudi_arabia/saudi_shaker_full.html
A Saudi Arabian sociologist talks to *NewsHour* about women's issues, religion, and politics.

Life in Israel and the West Bank:
http://search.npr.org/cf/cmn/cmnpd01fm.cfm ?PrgDate=04/08/2002&PrgID=5
Talk of the Nation speaks with Palestinians and Israelis about what life is like. Can kids go out and play? Can adults have dinner with friends? How do people make it to religious services?

Fiesta Bowl:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/poems/jan -june01/middleeast_06-13.html
NewsHour presents poems from Israeli and Palestinian poets.

Fashion Slideshow:
http://www.pbs.org/adventuredivas/index.html
This slide show exhibits Iranian women wearing different kinds of veils.

Observing Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/ july-dec01/islam_11-16.html
Islamic scholars discuss the future of Islam as Ramadan begins amid curiosity and concern. (Novemeber 2001)

Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds:
http://freshair.npr.org/guestInfoFA.cfm?name=stephenkinzer
Writer Stephen Kinzer describes a country caught between the entrenched ruling elite and its younger, well-educated population who wants democracy.

Pari Zanganeh: Prima Folk/Opera Diva:
http://www.pbs.org/adventuredivas/iran/divas/zanganeh.html
Singer Pari Zanganeh speaks about women and music.

Beauty Shop Bop:
http://www.pbs.org/adventuredivas/iran/dispatches /beauty_video.html
This page links to streaming video of an Iranian beauty parlor and offers a clandestine peek underneath the veil.

Iranian Culture:
http://www.pbs.org/visavis/culture_mstr.html
Vis •is looks at Iran's rich traditions of cinema, literature, and music.

Religion & Culture:
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/classroom/lp5.html
Students will consider the theme of religion and culture as they learn about the Hindu-Muslim conflict in the province of Gujarat, India.

Arab Americans: In the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers /lessonplans/lifeafter911/arabamerican.html
Students will begin to understand who Arab Americans are, where they come from, and the cultural diversity and complexity of what it means to be Arab American.

Advertisers Tread Lightly:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers /lessonplans/october01/warads/index.html
Students will analyze how one national company responded to the recent tragedy by incorporating special messages into its advertising.

Gender Issues in Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/teach/muslims/
Students will compare and contrast the roles of men and women with regard to various topics in the six countries featured in the film.

Renaissance Man Comparison Poster:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson5.html
Students will learn about both the Sultan Suleyman (b. 1494 C.E.) and another Renaissance character and make comparisons.

Great Thinkers and Accomplishments of Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the diverse accomplishments of great Islamic scholars.

Creating a Textile Museum Piece from the Islamic Empire:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the importance of the textile industry to the strength and stability of the Islamic Empire in the 11th and 12th centuries.

A Woman's Place:
http://www.pbs.org/visavis/resources_mstr.html
Students will learn about women's status in Iran and the U.S. across different points in history, explain why women in Iran dress and interact with men in specific ways, and relate this to certain groups/religions in the U.S., and adopt the perspective of a woman living at a different time in the U.S. or Iran.

Tolerance in Times of Trial:
http://www.pbs.org/americaresponds/tolerance.html
Students will explore the problems inherent in assigning blame to populations or nations of people. Students will also look at contemporary examples of ethnic conflict, discrimination, and stereotyping at home and abroad.

An Introduction to Islam and Muhammad:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson1.html
Students will compare the major monotheistic belief systems of the world.

Afghanland.com Web Site:
http://www.afghanland.com/home/home.html
A Web site on Afghan culture and politics

Related topics

Religion: Three Religions, One God

How were the modern nation-states of the Middle East created?

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the

Middle East?

Related maps

Historic Political Borders of the Middle East

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation



In October 2001, Dubai hosted Gitex, the Middle East's largest annual information technology exhibition.
© Reuters NewMedia Inc./ CORBIS

E-mail a Friend

Science & Technology: Historic Innovation, Modern Solutions

Cutting-edge science in the Middle East

Following the rise of Islam in the seventh century C.E., science and technology flourished in the Islamic world to a far greater extent than they did in the West. Muslim rulers promoted the translation of Greek philosophy and science texts, and then encouraged further scientific exploration in numerous fields, among them mathematics, astronomy, medicine, pharmacology, optics, chemistry, botany, philosophy, and physics.

In mathematics, Muslim scholars introduced the use of zero, solutions to quadratic equations -- even the Arabic word "algebra."

Muslim astronomers knew the Earth was round and calculated its diameter. Ibn al-Haytham (965-1040) explored momentum, gravity, and optics 600 years before Galileo was accused of heresy for arguing that the Earth orbited the Sun.

Medicine was one of the most important fields of endeavor. Muslim doctors were surgically removing cataracts and treating kidney and gallstones while Europeans were still using leeches on their patients. Ibn Sina (known in the West as Avicenna, 980-1037) wrote *al-Qanun fi al-Tibb*, or the *Canons of Medicine*, a seminal volume that was the first to recognize the contagious nature of tuberculosis, identify meningitis, and describe all the minute parts of the eye. By the 12th century, the *Canons* had been translated into Latin, and European medicine relied on this text until well into the 1700s.



An engraving of Muslim pioneer astronomer Ibn al-Haytham (965-1040)
[enlarge]

Much of the knowledge developed by the Muslims and transmitted to the Europeans enabled Europe to emerge from the Dark Ages into the Renaissance.

The technological advance of the West

Jump To:

The technological advance of the West

Technological advances in the modern Middle East

Access to technology

Also

Timeline (requires Flash)
Key events related to science & technology in the Middle East
Text-Only Timeline

Lesson plans:

Middle East: Land, Resources, and Economics

Got Water?

Oil Crisis: What Would You Do?

Related sites

Related topics

Related maps

Make a Pledge

Support Your Local PBS Station



A page from Avicenna's seminal tome of medical learning, *Canons of Medicine* [enlarge]

During the 16th century, the Ottoman astronomer Taqi al-Din made astronomical tables that were considered at least as accurate as those of fellow 16th-century astronomer Tycho Brahe of Denmark, whose observations of the planets served as the basis for Kepler's Laws of planetary motion. Only a century later, though, the Ottomans and their Muslim contemporaries in Mughal India and the Persian Safavid Empire ceased to support scientific research and innovations.

This change was due in part to the shifting priorities and educational systems of these empires. Not unlike Europe in previous centuries, groups wanting to protect the status quo became more powerful than those advocating growth and experimentation. Meanwhile, building on the earlier accomplishments of Muslim scientists, Europe's scientific and industrial revolutions began to give the West a military and economic advantage over the Islamic world.

By the 19th century, when Middle Eastern states like Egypt, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire decided to develop modern infrastructure, including railroads and telegraph lines, the work had to be contracted to foreign firms. The cash-strapped Middle Eastern governments sold concessions -- the right to develop and then profit from these infrastructure development projects -- to European companies. These opportunities gave European governments an interest in influencing Middle Eastern regimes, in order to both win the contracts and then protect their investments. In this way, the technological and industrial capabilities of the West reinforced its political and economic power in the region. Technological dependence on the West, however, was seen as a threat to the independence of the Islamic world, and resentment against Western power began to rise.

Technological advances in the modern Middle East

Historically, some of the most important technological achievements in the Middle East were related to the use of water, from the ancient Iranian qanats (underground canals that brought water from the mountains to the arid plain) to the modern dam systems on the Nile and Euphrates Rivers.



Begun in 1898, Egypt's Aswan Dam was expanded with Soviet support in the 1960s. [enlarge]

In 1898, the Aswan Dam became the first major modern dam project, resulting in the successful damming of the Nile. In the 1960s, an expansion of the Aswan Dam was built with Soviet support.

Unfortunately, while these Nile dams regulated the water flow to cropland, generated vital electricity, and shielded Egypt from years of drought, they also introduced environmental problems that have cast a shadow on their overall success. Since the Nile no longer floods, the rich silt that used to fertilize Egyptian fields is instead accumulating in Lake Nasser behind the Aswan Dam. As a result, farmers downstream are forced to use massive amounts of artificial fertilizers, which in turn run off into, and pollute, the Nile.



Workmen in this undated photo use a water screw to help in irrigating fields in Egypt's Nile Delta.
[enlarge]

The overall aridity of the region has motivated some of the richer countries to search for technological solutions to their water requirements. Through sustained investment in research, they have become experts in water desalination, water recycling, and solar energy. The region's oil-poor countries, however, Egypt among them, cannot afford such advanced technologies and remain dependent on more traditional water resources.

Scientific discovery and technological implementation varies widely in the Middle East today. Israel's current position as a technological leader and its close economic relationship with the West stand in sharp contrast to its Arab neighbors. Israel, for example, is a world leader in the development of voice-recognition software for computers.

Access to technology

As in other regions of the world, access to technology parallels the disparity in lifestyles throughout the region. Some people are scarcely aware of the Internet, while others make their living from it. Even so, cheap, portable technologies are transforming the Middle East.



A young woman pauses from shopping to talk on a cellular telephone in a Kuwaiti shop, c. 2000.
[enlarge]

Cellular phones, for example, are increasingly popular in the Middle East, providing telephone access in more remote communities as well as in crowded urban areas. Wireless service bypasses the difficult and expensive requirements for laying out and maintaining telephone cables.

Satellite television news stations like Al-Jazeera provide new and varied sources of information to people in the Middle East who once had access only to government-controlled media. The Internet may have a similar effect.

Internet cafes have sprung up in major cities and in regional centers throughout the Middle East, providing access to news and information for people who cannot afford to buy a computer themselves. In some nations, however, the government is the only Internet provider and may censor the available content.

Oil-poor countries do not have the economic resources to take advantage of these new technologies. The ability to access new technology is related to both economic resources and political openness.

Back to top

Related sites

Gunning for Saddam: Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/gunning/etc/arsenal.html
A summary of Iraq's development of biological and chemical weapons

All Things Considered: Islam on the Internet Three-Part Series Explores Intersection of Faith and Technology:
http://www.npr.org/programs/watc/cyberislam/
This NPR series explores the intersection of faith and technology.

Arabs and Astronomy:
http://www.cyberistan.org/islamic
An article on Muslim contributions to the fields of math and astronomy

Bedouin Women Discover Distance Learning:

http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2001/june/j14e.pdf
This article talks about addressing the digital divide with government-sponsored computer centers in Jordan.

Arab Information Project:
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/arabtech/
A look at the Information Revolution occuring in the Middle East

Arab Human Development Report 2002:
http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/
A report on the Arab world's attempts to advance human development

Innovation:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/innoalgebra.html
Information on Muslim contributions to mathematics, engineering, astronomy, and medecine from the PBS special *Islam: Empire of Faith.*

Conflict:
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/classroom/lp5.html
Students will explore the theme of conflict while examining Iraq's use of biological and chemical weapons against the Kurdish people.

Great Thinkers and Accomplishments of Islam:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the diverse accomplishments of great Islamic scholars.

Creating a Textile Museum Piece from the Islamic Empire:
http://www.pbs.org/empires/islam/lesson4.html
Students will learn about the importance of the textile industry to the strength and stability of the Islamic Empire in the 11th and 12th centuries.

How Islam Won, and Lost, the Lead in Science:
http://www.physics.ohio-state.edu/~wilkins /Terror/islamic-science.html
Science in the Middle East from the 13th century to today

Related topics

Economics: It's More Than Oil

What role have natural resources played in the politics and economy of the Middle East?

Geography: An Ancient and Modern Crossroads

Related maps

Middle East Topographic and Natural Resources

Connecting Questions | Explore a Theme | Timeline | Communities Respond | Educator's Resources

Search | Site Map | Maps | Glossary | About the Site | Help | Pledge

© 2002 WGBH Educational Foundation

Home Page | My Times | Today's Paper | Video | Most Popular | Times Topics

Log In Register Now


Archives

The New York Times

Monday, December 3, 2007

Search

World | U.S. | N.Y. / Region | Business | Technology | Science | Health | Sports | Opinion | Arts | Style | Travel | Jobs | Real Estate | Autos



THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS; MIDEAST FOES LIST DEMANDS AND TRADE ANGRY CHARGES ACROSS CONFERENCE TABLE

Print

Save

Share

By R. W. APPLE JR.,
Published: November 1, 1991

In salvos of intransigent oratory, Israel and its Arab neighbors said today that they all hoped to end the bloodshed in their region, but disagreed about almost everything else -- who was at fault, what to do about it, even where further peace talks should be held.

On a day when the Palestinians at last found their place at a major Middle East peace conference, the Arabs demanded that Israel stop creating settlements in occupied territories and give up territory it had taken from Arabs in 1967. The Israelis in turn demanded that the Arabs recognize Israel's right to exist.

Each accused the other of deception, brutality, treachery and aggression, exactly as they have done for most of the 43 years that they have been at each other's throats. Both Sides Listen

But for the first time, representatives of much of the Arab world listened across the same table to an Israeli leader denouncing them, remaining in their chairs throughout, and the Israeli leader, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, listened to their replies. He stayed put even though the Palestinian delegates identified themselves in so many words with the Palestine Liberation Organization, something the Israelis had said could prompt them to walk out.

In one especially heated passage, Farouk al-Sharaa, the Syrian Foreign Minister, accused Mr. Shamir of "faking facts and history." [Excerpts from speeches, pages A10 and A11.]

In reply, at a later news conference, Benjamin Netanyahu, an Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, accused the Arabs of complicity with Hitler, Himmler, Ribbentrop and Eichmann in planning the Holocaust, and said Syria had spoken in terms of "vituperation, slander and condescension." Less Rigidity Expected

"These are just their opening statements, maximalist bargaining positions," a senior American official said. "A lot of it is for television and the political audiences back home. People will start to soften their ideological rigidity once face-to-face negotiations get under way."


Inside NYTimes.com

Fashion & Style »



The Oprah Party Wants You

Opinion »



Op-Ed: Middle East Peace Through Anxiety

Theater »



'Waiting for Godot' in a Damaged New Orleans

Travel »



The Skiing Travel Guide

Opinion » Magazine »

Op-Ed: Giving You Christmas When You Want It

Get your whining out of the way and surrender to the fun of the holiday.



Anna Netrebko, a New Kind of Diva

1. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
2. Ending Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts
3. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
4. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
5. U.S. Credit Crisis Adds to Gloom in Norway
6. Maureen Dowd: O Brother, Where Art Thou?
7. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
8. A New Kind of Diva
9. Op-Ed Contributor: Gospel Truth
10. Weekend in New York | Hot Chocolate: A Sip for Après-Whatever

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times TECH
nytimes.com/tech



What is the Kindle?

Also in Tech:
- Your rock 'n' roll fantasy
- Gmail is more than just mail
- The latest in personal technology

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Adventure Travel China

» Chaoyang China Vacation

But other top-level Americans who have worked for months to bring Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians together in Madrid expressed disappointment at what one called the "truculent tone" of today's speeches. None could point to any overt sign that the participants were ready to yield ground in the private, direct talks scheduled to start Sunday.

Indeed, it was unclear when, where and even whether those talks would begin. The Israelis and the Arabs remained deadlocked tonight, despite mediation efforts by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d, over Mr. Shamir's demand that they be held in the Middle East, with a first round in Israel. The Arabs insisted that the plan had always been to negotiate in Madrid and argued that they would be recognizing Israel, in effect, by going there.

There was even some doubt expressed that the single organizational session that everyone had agreed to for Sunday at the Royal Palace in Madrid would go forward as planned.

The Palestinians said explicitly for the first time that they would accept limited self-rule in the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip as an interim stop on the way to statehood. In accepting the terms of invitation to the conference, they had implictly said the same thing, but some saw an incremental step forward.

Israel accepts the idea of limited autonomy, which it had agreed to in the 1978 Camp David agreement with Egypt and the United States, but rejects the idea of Palestinian sovereignty. Nonetheless, there has been very tentative talk among the Palestinian delegates and others here in the last 48 hours of some form of eventual confederation, possibly economic, possibly economic and political, involving Jordan, Israel and some sort of Palestinian entity. Jordan Faults Radicals

There was also a small conciliatory note from Jordan. Its delegate urged both sides to work for "the dawn of a new era" and pointedly called on Arab radicals to shed their rigid ideologies.

So the initial two days of the conference here, the first of which was dominated by speeches by Presidents Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, have developed into a microcosm of the Middle East, marked by hopeful words from the great powers, hateful words from the countries of the region and fragile theorizing about what might be. So far, Madrid has been spared the physical violence that has long disfigured the eastern end of the Mediterranean.

The mood inside the 18th-century conference hall, with its marble columns and pilasters, its glittering chandeliers and immense Renaissance tapestries, was somber and businesslike. There was little applause after the day's five speeches, ranging in length from 30 to the full 45 minutes allowed.

Mr. Shamir opened this morning's session with a blunt warning that Arabs would lead negotiations into an impasse if they proceeded immediately to demand the return of the remaining land Israel captured in the 1967 Middle East war -- the West Bank, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem. Israel returned all of the Sinai captured from Egypt in 1967 as part of the 1979 peace treaty with Egypt. Earlier Hostility Noted

"We know our partners will make territorial demands on Israel, but an examination of the conflict's long history makes clear its nature is not territorial," Mr. Shamir said. He argued that the Arabs had been equally hostile to Israel in the years when Israel was within its

» China Beijing Hotels
» Free Travel
» Trip to China

Ads by Google what's this?

American Express® Cards
Great Card Offers from American Express.
Compare and Apply Online!
www.americanexpress.com

original borders, after the 1948 war and the truces of the next year, and he made no mention at all of the United Nations resolutions calling upon Israel to virtually return to the pre-1967 borders.

Nor did the grim-faced Prime Minister, who spoke in English, offer any hint of a concession to the Arabs on East Jerusalem, site of Arab as well as Jewish holy places, which is now occupied by Israel, or on the rapidly expanding Israeli settlements on captured Arab land. The Palestinians fear that the settlements will soon be so extensive that there will be no room for a Palestinian state.

Mr. Bush's appeal on Tuesday for territorial compromise appeared to have left Mr. Shamir unmoved, although some Israeli doves said the Prime Minister at least had not made what one called a "not one inch" speech.

Jordan came next, and its Foreign Minister, Kamal Abu Jaber, a onetime professor of politics, opened with the same word as Mr. Shamir: "Peace." That is a traditional greeting in both Hebrew and Arabic. Conquest Is Challenged

The Jordanian delegate focused sharply on United Nations resolutions embodying the principle that land must not be acquired by force of arms.

Apparently frustrated by Mr. Shamir's hard line, Mr. Abu Jaber later demanded at a news conference, "If we can't talk about Jerusalem, if we can't talk about withdrawal, what on earth are we doing here?"

Mr. Shamir had invited the delegations to begin the face-to-face talks in Israel, remarking, "There is no better way to make peace than to talk in each other's home."

Mr. Abu Jaber replied, "The momentum in Madrid is good, the spirit in Madrid is good, and we should keep the talks here."

The Israel Ambassador to the United States, Zalman Shoval, told Reuters, "One meeting and one meeting only can take place in Madrid." Arabs Insist on Madrid

But the Syrian Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharaa, said, "The conference opened here and will continue here."

A Palestinian spokeswoman, Hanan Ashrawi, said, "The Palestinian position is that there can be no bilateral negotiations in Israel as long as Israel occupies Palestinian territory."

It was not clear whether or not the Israelis were bluffing, but several times they threatened to break up the conference. Mr. Shamir said on the "MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour," for instance, that if the Arabs persisted in their view, "we will not have bilateral negotiations, and there will not be any continuation and there won't be any practical results."

But the day's high drama came in the appearance of the Palestinians, and the chief Palestinian negotiator, Dr. Haidar Abdel-Shafi, played the moment for all it was worth, speaking not only to those listening in person but also to a global television audience.

"We come to you from a tortured land and a proud though captive people, having been asked to negotiate with our occupiers," said the 72-year-old physician, a lean and aristocratic man who was briefly expelled from his native Gaza in 1967 by the Israelis.

out, "Set them free!" Arafat Is Invoked

Dr. Abdel-Shafi all but dared the Israelis to walk out, not only invoking the name of Yasir Arafat, the Palestine Liberation Organization leader with whom Mr. Shamir refuses to deal, but also referring to "our acknowledged leadership, clearly and unequivocally recognized by the community of nations, with only a few exceptions." The speech was reportedly approved by Mr. Arafat in telephone conversations with Dr. Abdel-Shafi Wednesday.

Mr. Shamir just sat there, now drumming his fingers, now closing his eyes. He wrote notes furiously and passed them to aides sitting behind him.

A new state of Palestine "must be born on the land of Palestine to redeem the injustice and destruction of its historical reality and to free our people from the shackles of victimization," Dr. Abdel-Shafi declared.

"The people of Palestine look at you with a straightforward, direct gaze, seeking to touch your heart, for you have dared to stir up hopes that cannot be abandoned," he said to the conference organizers. "You cannot afford to let us down, for we have lived up to the values you espouse."

For his part, the Lebanese Foreign Minister, Faris Bouez, renewed his Government's demand that Israel pull its troops out of the 400-square-mile section of Lebanon that lies along Israel's northern border, an area he compared to "a vital limb." The occupation and the fighting accompanying it "have cost Lebanon and the world dearly," the 36-year-old official said. Toughest Line by Syria

The toughest line was taken by Syria's chief delegate, Mr. Sharaa, who said it was Israel's bellicosity that had kept the Middle East at war or on the brink of it for decades. He also accused the Israeli Government of inhumane treatment of Palestinians who live in the occupied territories.

"It is no exaggeration," the minister said, according to the official translation of his Arabic text, "to state that the continuing intransigence is a position which is bereft of any justification and is the one thing that places the world on the brink of incalculable danger."

He added: "Peace and the usurpation of the land of others cannot co-exist. Every inch of Arab land occupied by the Israelis by war and force -- the Golan, the West Bank, Jerusalem -- must be returned in their entirety to their legitimate owners."

On Friday, each of the five delegations will make a rebuttal speech.

HomeWorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutosBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

Home Page . My Times . Today's Paper . Video . Most Popular . Times Topics

Log InRegister Now

Archives

The New York Times

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World . U.S. . N.Y. / Region . Business . Technology . Science . Health . Sports . Opinion . Arts . Style . Travel . Jobs . Real Estate . Autos





Palestinians Refuse to Attend Moscow Peace Talks

Print

Single-Page

• Save
• Share

REUTERS
Published: January 28, 1992

Middle East peace talks opened in Moscow today without a Palestinian delegation.

Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d read a prepared opening speech and made no mention of the Palestinians' refusal to attend.

The leader of the Palestinian delegation, Faisal al-Husseini, told reporters: "We decided not to go because the Americans did not accept our formula."

The Palestinian formula included having people from Jerusalem and from outside the Israeli-occupied territories in their negotiating team, which would have been a change in the ground rules set before peace talks began last October. Jordan's Role Disputed

Israel has insisted that it would talk only to Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, ruling out delegates from Arab East Jerusalem and repesentatives of Palestinians in exile.

Arab sources said Jordan was also locked in a dispute with the Russians over the number of seats allocated to them.

The Russian hosts offered four seats, the sources said. The Jordanians said they wanted eight, like every other delegation.

Reporters at the conference hall later saw three delegates sitting at seats allocated to the Jordanians.

Most of the other Arab delegations which accepted invitations to the two-day conference appeared to be in the hall.

Yazid al-Sayegh, one of a nine-member Palestinian team which arrived in Moscow on Monday, said: outside his hotel: "All the Americans were willing to do was make vague futuristic nice noises, nothing substantial at all."



MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed | Blogged | Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
5. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business

He said the Palestinians had no special formula, adding that they just presented a list of names and never received their accreditation badges allowing them to join the conference.

Only three members of the group were reported to be acceptable to the Israelis. Signs Changed

A few minutes before the talks were due to start, an official removed a printed sign from the conference table saying "Jordanian-Palestinian delegation." He replaced it with a hand-written one saying "Jordanian delegation."

Mr. Baker arrived in the conference hall about 30 minutes after the talks were supposed to have begun.

Russia and the United States, co-sponsors of the multilateral conference, said the compositon of the Palestinian team broke ground rules set before peace talks were begun in Madrid.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is excluded from the Middle East process, but it advises the Palestinian team from behind the scenes.

The P.L.O. leadership authorized the expanded delegation to Moscow after two days of argument at its Tunis headquarters.

Saudis Pay the Bill

Special to The New York Times -- The conference, most of which is being paid for by Saudi Arabia since the Russians are strapped for cash, was part of the peace process begun in Madrid last October.

While the Madrid conference brought together Israel and its immediate Arab neighbors to settle their longstanding territorial disputes, the Moscow talks sought to bring together Israel and more than 20 other Arab, European and Asian nations to discuss broad regional issues. These were scheduled to include arms control, water rights, the environment and economic development.

Whether or not the Palestinian negotiators take their places at the conference's opening session, the talks will mark a series of "firsts" in both Middle Eastern diplomacy and international relations.



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Setting Up a FTP Server

» Mac Emulation

» SSH Linux

» SSH Chroot

» SSH Protocol

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Palestinian

» Palestine

» Arab Israeli Conflict

» Middle East

» Arab Children

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Palestinian

» Palestine

» Arab Israeli Conflict

» Middle East

» Arab Children

Ads by Google what's this?

For the first time, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the other Arab countries will enter into a set of direct negotiations with Israel. For the first time the North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania will engage in talks involving the Israelis. For the first time Japan and China, which just established diplomatic relations with Israel, will take part in a Middle East peace negotiation.

And for the first time Russia's Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, who will be co-chairman of the conference with Mr. Baker 3d, will assume the role previously held by the Soviet Foreign Minister at a major international conference.

The conference is to be held at the House of Unions, near the Kremlin. Although the Russians are themselves short of food, money and energy, and needed their own international conference to assist in economic development, they insisted on holding this meeting in Moscow as originally scheduled -- before the collapse of the Soviet Union -- by Mr. Baker and Eduard A. Shevardnadze.

1 2 Next Page >

RG&E Voice Your Choice

Be Sure To Voice Your Choice For Your Electricity Supply.

rge.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Magazine »



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Arts »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

Opinion »

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Theater »



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

HomeWorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutosBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

Amre Moussa



"Our common objective must be a consensus on how to coexist as equals. This will no doubt entail many difficult decisions for all sides. We

must learn to reconcile ourselves with reality. There cannot be peace if we allow our dreams to cloud our vision." --Amre Moussa

Read his

speeches at Madrid!

Amre M. Moussa: A Nationalist Vision for Egypt

Middle East Quarterly
September 1996

Amre M. Moussa has been Egypt's minister of foreign affairs since 1991, during which time he has attracted much notice in the United States due to his outspokenness on questions relating to the Arab-Israeli peace process and the forcefulness with which he expresses his views. Mr. Moussa is a career diplomat, having joined the foreign ministry in 1958 and been posted in Switzerland, India, and the United Nations. Robert Satloff and Daniel Pipes interviewed him in his Cairo office on July 20, 1996.

VISION

Middle East Quarterly: Do you have a vision for Egypt?

Amre Moussa: I aim to close the file of confrontation and animosity between the countries of this region. This would be a major achievement. It is an especially appropriate goal for we Egyptians, for the peace process started under President Anwar as-Sadat, making the whole initiative an Egyptian one. When it reaches its end and peace prevails, it will be a great achievement for President Husni Mubarak, for Egyptian diplomacy, and for Arab diplomacy.

An era has come to an end; let us move ahead now, and leave all this conflict behind. We have the possibility to achieve peace before the end of the century -- if the Israeli government really cooperates and goes ahead in accordance with the Madrid conference, in accordance with land-for-peace, and in accordance with the agreements that have been achieved. The Israeli government must understand and believe that security cannot be attained

without peace, and that peace is really the guarantee for generations to come. In Israel, fortunately, a substantial portion of the body politic does believe in this possibility and can push things to realize that result.

MEQ: What, beyond a comprehensive peace with Israel, would you like your legacy as foreign minister to be?

Moussa: My wider vision is to develop this region to become a productive one and a full participant in international politics and economics. This will come with peace; its full realization will not precede peace because peace will open doors. What [former Israeli prime minister] Shimon Peres says about the need for prosperity is correct; we want to put it into effect by creating the appropriate circumstances, not to leave it as only talk.

MEQ: So you're a believer in the "new Middle East"?

Moussa: Yes, but not preceding peace. It cannot be a carrot to lead people to peace if peace is not there. It must be the reward of peace. The reverse is nonsense; that would mean asking everyone to enter into the new Middle East before peace is achieved. The Palestinians are now living in closure and the Syrians have got nothing; that's not the new Middle East. If you want to advance, you have to advance in a fair way. Israeli negotiations with Syria must resume, Palestinians must feel the benefits of peace in their standard of living, in their security. Israelis must not harass them every day, nor build new settlements. The new Middle East can't just benefit some and not others.

I am still concerned about pressures to reach a peace that benefits one party at the expense of the other. This cannot work. It would never lead to a comprehensive peace acceptable to the people. In other words, we want an Arab-Israeli peace, not an Israeli peace.

MEQ: Can you foresee an end to the peace process other than full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state?

Moussa: No, it cannot but be that way. Whoever believes that Israel can get peace and security along with the land is absolutely mistaken. Nobody will play that game. To give peace but abandon Palestinian rights, the territories, the Golan Heights, and southern Lebanon . . . who would play such a game?

MEQ: What about something in between . . .

Moussa: What we are in now is the in-between. The process can't move any more except if Prime Minister Netanyahu moves; when he does, then the whole thing moves.

SOVIET COLLAPSE

MEQ: What is your assessment of the Soviet bloc's collapse? Was that a good thing for Egypt?

Moussa: It has its positive side, definitely. The communism they gave the Third World contributed to the underdevelopment of so many countries, in particular in the Middle East.

MEQ: Including Egypt?

Moussa: In the Middle East in general. It killed the feeling of competitiveness and so stymied personal initiative. The dependence on the state and the economic collapse in this region results from this. Its collapse has freed the economies of the Middle East from the shackles of communism.

MEQ: And the negative side?

Moussa: Its negative aspects center around the lack of international balance. If you are now looking for a balance

to help the Arab-Israeli negotiations, sometimes you can't find it.

MEQ: You're telling us that the United States is too strong?

Moussa: You can take it as you like. The United States, for its policy to succeed and be productive, must play the honest broker. Less than that and negotiations won't be fruitful.

MEQ: This is a remarkable comment; America's foremost Arab partner says it misses the balance provided by the Soviet Union!

Moussa: No, I am talking about the international balance. The Soviet Union was not in the peace game. The American role enabled Egypt and Israel to reach a peace agreement. Had it not been for the United States, there would have been no agreement between Egypt and Israel because of the difficulties we encountered in negotiations. As an honest broker, the United States understood exactly what Egypt wanted and exactly what Israel wanted. That's what we need now.

NUCLEAR PROFLIFERATION

MEQ: You are urgent for Israel sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the NPT, which would place its nuclear program under international inspection. Israel said it is too early to discuss the NPT, citing ongoing threats from rogues states and the uselessness of its inspections in Iraq. Although Israelis view Egypt as a partner and friend, and direct their nuclear potential only against such adversaries as Iraq and Iran, you seem to view it as threatening Egypt. Is there anything the Israelis could do, while keeping a nuclear option, to assuage Egypt's concerns?

Moussa: If Israel is afraid of this or that country, it cannot deal with the problem with nuclear weapons. Once Israel has it, how can you deny any other country from acquiring it? By now, any country can easily acquire the nuclear option. It would help to put the Israelis' nuclear facilities under international inspection. They can keep what they have in terms of a peaceful nuclear capability, but within the framework of the international legal system. We cannot live with Israel hiding it and seeking the approval of certain powers to keep the nuclear option. This undermines our efforts to restrict nuclear proliferation; if this goes for Israel, why not for any other country?

MEQ: Could Egypt recognize that Israel has legitimate security concerns about the rogue states that necessitate its maintaining the nuclear option?

Moussa: I don't believe in the notion of rogue states. There might be rogue governments and rogue ministers, and they could wreak havoc through using wrong policies, but not rogue states.

MEQ: But there is a difference between Israel -- a stable, democratic state -- and Iran, which is not. Similarly, France and England are . . .

Moussa: But France and England put themselves in the framework of the international legal system. Why should a democracy be outside that system? Why does Israel have this exceptional status? Why should we be ignorant about what goes on in Israel? The rules have to apply to democracies; go and place your facilities under international inspection. Then it is fine.

MEQ: Given what we now know about the Iraqi nuclear efforts, do you now think that what the Israelis did in June 1981, when they bombed the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak, was the right thing to do?

Moussa: No. Our opposition remains exactly as it was then; we remain committed to what we said in the circumstances of that time. Why revisit now something that happened fifteen years ago?

MEQ: The reason is that Prime Minister Netanyahu, in his address to Congress, spoke almost exactly the same words about Iran in 1996 as his predecessor said about Iraq in early 1981, six months before the attack on Osirak.[1] Does this give you reason also to deal urgently with the Iranian nuclear program?

Moussa: The Iranian nuclear program is under the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which can at any time inspect it.

MEQ: But that's a weak and flawed inspection system.

Moussa: This is no reason for Israel to keep a nuclear option outside the IAEA framework.

MEQ: Fair enough. But the IAEA inspection regimen not being effective gives us few assurances about Iran, right?

Moussa: Then go and ask the Iranians for more inspection rights. We do not understand why Israel develops a nuclear option out of fear that Iran will acquire a nuclear option -- when Iran so far does not have one. Israeli policy makes it hard to argue with the Iranians. If we ask them, "What are you doing, why are you building a nuclear option?" they can point to Israel. This prevents us from arguing strongly against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this region.

FUNDAMENTALIST ISLAM

MEQ: What does the term fundamentalist Muslim or Islamist mean?

Moussa: It applies only to someone engaged in ideas and discussion; anyone who resorts to violence is automatically not an Islamist.

MEQ: Even if the person who resorts to violence talks in an Islamic vernacular and asserts that "Islam is the solution"?

Moussa: "Islam is the solution" is a belief; he has to convince me of it. And he has to listen to me in turn. Perhaps he'll be convinced. But if he uses a gun, it's a different story.

MEQ: If he uses a gun, that automatically means he's not a sincere Muslim?

Moussa: It means that he has moved from being a sincere Muslim to being a terrorist.

MEQ: And a terrorist cannot be a sincere Muslim?

Moussa: He cannot be. Such a terrorist cannot be a good Muslim, nor can he be defending Islam. How might a sincere Muslim kill somebody just because he has a different point of view? Islam deplores killing of this sort. If you commit a crime, punishment follows; but why punish a person for believing in a different way of applying Islam? Who is to be the judge? Who permits such an act?

MEQ: Do you fear that Islamist movements outside Egypt may have a harmful impact inside Egypt?

Moussa: No, the Middle East is predominately Islamic and we cannot stop religious trends afoot. Nor do we wish to; let people believe as they would. Fundamentalists go back several centuries and engage in a very active discussion of ways to order society, to apply Islamic tenets, and so on. This goes on in all religions and is no concern of ours.

Our concern is terrorism. We must pay attention when a "religious" or political group becomes an armed force that

resorts to violence against society. We are concerned with all kinds and sorts of terrorism, whatever the motive, whatever the organization, whatever the country, because it is detrimental to the society's security and interests. This has nothing to do with Islam.

MEQ: But violence comes out of the fundamentalist discussion.

Moussa: No, not from that discussion. This violence started already in the 1940s, when terrorists killed prime ministers, and later attacked Abdel Nasser and murdered Sadat.[2] So it is not a product of today, but something we've lived with for decades. This trend is very deep in Middle Eastern society, and must be faced.

It requires three responses. Number one, make a success of the peace process, so people feel that justice has been done. Number two, improve economic conditions, so that these fundamentalist organizations cannot exploit frustrations. The more jobs you create, the less terrorists you have. Number three, each country must vigilantly maintain security against terrorists.

MEQ: What about engaging in the battle of ideas?

Moussa: There must be a free flow of ideas. In Israel, religious parties are doing whatever they want and making their own demands. We'll have to deal with them.

MEQ: Not long ago, President Mubarak and other Egyptian officials criticized America for being solicitous and maybe even too soft on fundamentalist Muslims, specifically the New Jersey sheikh, `Umar `Abd ar-Rahman, but also as a general approach.[3]

Moussa: No, you have it wrong. He did not discuss fundamentalists but the radicals who themselves or whose organizations have engaged in violence.

MEQ: `Umar `Abd ar-Rahman is not a fundamentalist?

Moussa: What do you mean by fundamentalist? He uses Islam and preaches violence -- a contradiction in terms. `Abd ar-Rahman was calling for violence and leading a certain group into violence. This is what we oppose. If he were just preaching Islam, and offering a point of view without encouraging violence, we would have no problem with him.

MEQ: Do you still criticize the U.S. government for engaging in a dialogue with what we might call Islamically oriented terrorists? Do you think U.S. policy has improved in the past year or so?

Moussa: I believe American officials understand the situation much better in recent months due to developments that have affected American interests.

FUNDAMENTALIST REGIMES

MEQ: Do you believe that the Islamic nature of the Iranian government is now a permanent feature of that country?

Moussa: I don't know if it's a permanent feature, but it's quite solid.

MEQ: Do you worry about developments in Algeria?

Moussa: No. In fact, they are going in the right direction because Algeria is very much hopeful and determined and confident that the terrorist challenge is declining.

MEQ: What about the Sudan? Hasan at-Turabi, the eminence grise there, is now speaker of the parliament and officially a very powerful figure.

Moussa: The Sudanese will understand that their way of doing things cannot be sustained. They will have to change their attitude or will suffer from isolation.

HANDING OVER TERROSITS

MEQ: Do you support American initiatives at the United Nations to isolate the Sudan?

Moussa: The Security Council finds that Sudan is harboring, protecting, and even unleashing terrorists, among them the three who attacked President Mubarak in Ethiopia last year. These have to be handed over. The sanctions relate to this case is particular and have nothing to do with isolating the country.

MEQ: Do you favor isolating the Sudan?

Moussa: It depends on what you mean by isolation. The Sudanese have to put an end to their present policies. But as a general principle, we do not favor isolation, so why should we favor this policy in the case of the Sudan? If the Sudan implements the Security Council resolution and is honest in its dealing about the terrorists they shelter, they will hand them over to the country that requested them.

MEQ: And if it does not?

Moussa: If not, the Security Council will address that issue.

MEQ: If we apply that same principle to Libya, they have to hand over the terrorists they harbor from the Pan Am 103 explosion in 1988.

Moussa: Absolutely, you are right.

MEQ: The final communiqué you read out following the Arab League summit meeting last month called for a different approach on Libya. It deemed Libya's offer to hand the terrorists to a third country or the United Nations "an appropriate and practical solution that will end the crisis" and demanded the lifting of sanctions against Libya.[4] Bluntly put, it declares that if the U.N. Security Council does not accept the Libyan offer, the Arab League will consider circumventing sanctions to assist the Libyan people. Aren't you being inconsistent?

Moussa: This is exactly the same principle. The Libyans have said they are ready to hand over the suspects to a third country; this resolves that matter. Libya has moved from "No, we cannot hand them over" to a different position, "Yes, we are going to hand them over, but not to the U.S., only to a third country." That is a major change in the Libyans' position: they were adamantly against handing the suspects over, now they agree to it.

MEQ: Would you accept the Sudanese's handing the suspects over to the United Nations or a third country?

Moussa: We would certainly seriously consider such an offer.

A NASSERIST?

MEQ: It's said in the United States that you are the last Nasserist.[5] Is there any truth to that?

Moussa: No, I don't believe in people being Nasserists or Sadatists. I am an Egyptian, a nationalist. I believe we

should do what we have to do and at the same time I am for peace. I participated in all phases of the peace process and firmly believe in peace. My goal is to close the file of animosity and confrontation between Israel and Arabs, but in a way that will benefit both, and that will result in actually putting an end to this conflict.

It does not work to play diplomatically, to hide things about security and explain things falsely. For the Arabs to agree to something and then discover that they were deceived is a recipe for problems. You have to be very firm now, not tomorrow. We should negotiate honestly, in a balanced way, and reach an agreement that future generations will endorse.

MEQ: Is the idea wrong that you have fond memories for the Abdel Nasser period?

Moussa: This is not a question of wrong or right; I don't have to defend myself. Abdel Nasser was one of the leaders of this country, and his era was one of the most active in the region's political development. He made mistakes, definitely, but he also had a leadership and a charisma that should not be forgotten. Abdel Nasser was among the leaders who tried to do things in a way that would enable the Arabs to feel that they are a people and to be respected.

At the same time, his charisma, leadership, and policy worked in the sixties and would not work in the nineties. Politics must change. President Jacques Chirac was a Gaullist but his policies are much different from those of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle lived in the sixties; Chirac in the nineties pursues a different policy from the one he pursued at the beginning of his career. You cannot follow the same policy.

MEQ: Abdel Nasser was the right leader for Egypt at the time?

Moussa: He definitely was one of the region's major leaders in his time. He was one of the important leaders even before the revolution of 1952. How can we ignore, for example, Sa`d Zaghlul and Mustafa an-Nahhas. They are two major figures in our history, and so is Abdel Nasser. And before him was General Muhammad Neguib.[6] We do not ignore any of these leaders under King Faruq or under the revolution.

I don't have to be harsh on Abdel Nasser to please some circles, but if you want to categorize me as Nasserist you are wrong. Nor am I a Sadatist. I am not following this or that tradition. I do say we have to serve Egypt and the Arabs and the region at this juncture, and not follow policies of the sixties.

CAREER

MEQ: You have a reputation of being one of the most popular politicians in Egypt. Can you tell us why that might be?

Moussa: I don't know. Perhaps because of the frankness, the direct talk about issues of major importance to the people. In particular, the peace process, Middle Eastern relations, and the future of this region.

MEQ: You're saying things the way that people want to hear them?

Moussa: No, that's not the issue. I am saying things as they are.


MEQ: Perhaps one of the characteristics about you that wins the most support is your seeming to act as Egypt's foreign minister to the Arabs and the Arabs' foreign minister to the rest of the world. Is that an accurate description?

Moussa: I don't know whether it is right or not. If it is, I welcome it; in fact, I would be proud.

MEQ: It's common to ask this of American leaders, so we'd like to close by asking it of you: Do you have ambitions to serve your country as president?


Moussa: (Laughter) Well, this question should be addressed to an American, since your elections are coming very soon. No, I don't, if you are asking me, I don't. I already suffer from being minister. My private life is totally gone and the burden on me is so heavy that I don't have time to read, to relax, and the like. It is quite enough to be foreign minister, and it's my intention to stay this way, and that's it.

James Addison Baker III



Read his speeches at Madrid!

"When you walk out these doors, you carry with you great responsibilities. You carry with you the responsibility to your peoples to seek peace. You carry


with
you
the
responsibility
to
the
world
to build
a comprehensive
and
just
peace.
You
carry
with
you
the
responsibility
to
yourselves
to
break
with
the
past
and

pursue a new future."
-James Baker

Description

The James A. Baker III Papers document nearly every aspect of Baker's long career in politics and public service, including his time as White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of the Treasury under President Ronald Reagan, his term as Secretary of State under George H.W. Bush, and his work leading the presidential campaigns of Presidents Ford, Reagan, and Bush. Little documentation of Baker's time as Chief of Staff to President Bush from August 1992 to January 1993 is present in the papers.

The collection includes a variety of correspondence, memos, handwritten notes, speech transcripts, video and audio tapes, and other material related to Baker's positions in government and on political campaigns. The collection also includes material documenting Baker's legal career and early political efforts, including a substantial amount of correspondence with future President George H.W. Bush, written between Baker and Bush in the 1960s and 1970s. Substantial documentation of the 1978 Texas Attorney General Campaign, the only time Baker ran for political office himself, also exists.

A full finding aid, including descriptions of each series and a folder-level contents list, is available at the library.

Permission to access the papers must be granted by James A. Baker III. Collection will open to the public on April 28, 2030 or upon Baker's death.

Arrangement

Organized into the following series:

- Series 1. Personal and Legal Career, 1930-1992
- Subseries 1A. Correspondence, 1957-1975
- Subseries 1B. Diaries and Datebooks 1957-1992

Biography

James Addison Baker III was a central figure in the presidential administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Baker served as Reagan's White House Chief of Staff from 1980 to 1985 and Secretary of the Treasury from 1985 to 1988, and as Bush's Secretary of State from 1989-1992. Baker also led presidential campaigns for both Bush and Reagan, as well as Gerald Ford, over the course of five consecutive presidential elections from 1976 to 1992. Along with Bush, he was one of the few people to retain high level government positions for all twelve years of the Reagan-Bush era. He ended the Reagan-Bush years in the same position as he started, as Chief of Staff and Executive Assistant to the President.

Baker was born on April 28, 1930, into an established Houston, Texas family. Both his great-grandfather and his grandfather, Captain James Baker, joined the venerable Baker Botts law firm in the 19th century. Captain Baker, who played a prominent role in the history of Rice University and was also member of the Rice Institute Board of Trustees in 1891, eventually became Chairman of the Board. Baker's grandfather is reported to have advised his grandson, and other young lawyers, to "work hard, study hard, and stay out of politics." Baker's father, James A. Baker Jr., also joined Baker Botts, after graduating from Princeton University in 1915 and serving in World War I.

James A. Baker III, like his father, attended the Hill School in Pennsylvania and Princeton University. He studied classics at Princeton and graduated in 1952. While on a trip to Bermuda with the Princeton rugby team he met Mary Stuart McHenry, whom he married in 1953. After two years of active duty as a Lieutenant in the United States Marine Corps, Baker entered the University of Texas School of Law at Austin. He received his J. D. with honors in 1957 and practiced law with the Houston firm of Andrews and Kurth from 1957 to 1975. Baker has said that he was "apolitical" during his early law career; he told the New Yorker that he was "too busy trying to make it in competitive law practice" to become heavily involved in politics and that he often voted Democratic (Newhouse, p. 62).

Baker and others have remarked that he would not have become involved in politics if not for the influence of his first wife, Mary Stuart, who was active in the Republican Party and had worked on George H. W. Bush's congressional campaigns. Baker and Bush had become friendly by the late 1950s and were often tennis partners at the Houston Country Club. When Bush decided to run for the Senate in 1969, Baker considered running for his friend's vacated congressional seat. Bush strongly endorsed the idea, but Baker decided against the campaign when his wife was diagnosed with cancer. She died in February 1970.

Baker's first political experience came when he served as Harris County Campaign Chairman for Bush's Senate campaign. Bush had encouraged his friend to become active in the campaign in part to help relieve his grief over the loss of his wife. Lloyd Bentsen defeated Bush in the election, but Baker's work led to roles as State Finance Chairman for the Republican Party of Texas in 1971 and Gulf Coast Regional Chairman for the Nixon campaign in 1972. Baker returned to the full-time practice of law in 1973 and 1974. He also remarried in 1973. His second wife, Susan Garrett Winston, had been a close friend of his first wife.

In the summer of 1975 President Ford nominated Baker to be Under-Secretary of Commerce. Although he has never acknowledged it, Bush, who was then serving as United States Ambassador to China, is widely believed to have lobbied Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton to find a place for Baker in the administration. Baker stayed at the Commerce Department for only nine months, but served as Acting Secretary of the department for three of those months.

In the spring of 1976 Ford asked Baker to leave the Commerce Department to work on his presidential campaign. In May Baker resigned and became Deputy Campaign Chairman for delegate operations for the Ford Campaign. In the close primary race between Ford and Ronald Reagan, the position of chief delegate

- Subseries 1C. Financial Records, 1969-1980
- Subseries 1D. Legal Career, 1957-1975
- Subseries 1E. Subject Files, 1957-1975
- Series 2. Early Political Career, 1957-1977
- Series 3. Undersecretary of Commerce, 1975-1976
- Series 4. Post-1976 Election, 1977-1979
- Series 5. 1978 Texas Attorney General Campaign, 1976-1981
- Subseries 5A. Campaign Administration
- Subseries 5B. Correspondence
- Subseries 5C. County Files
- Subseries 5D. Fundraising
- Subseries 5E. Issues and Strategy Files
- Subseries 5F. Polling, Surveys, and Research
- Subseries 5G. Press and Publicity
- Subseries 5H. Scrapbooks and Clippings
- Series 6. Chief of Staff, 1980-1985
- Subseries 6B. Financial Records
- Subseries 6C. Gift Reports
- Subseries 6D. Legislative Strategy Group
- Subseries 6E. Office Files and Notes
- Subseries 6F. Personnel and Staffing
- Subseries 6G. Political Action Plans and Reports
- Subseries 6H. Reagan-Carter Transition Material
- Subseries 6I. Scheduling
- Subseries 6J. Senior Staff Meetings
- Subseries 6K. Subject Files
- Series 7. Secretary of the Treasury, 1985-1988
- Subseries 7A. Confirmation
- Subseries 7B. Congressional Appearances
- Subseries 7C. Correspondence
- Subseries 7D. Gift Reports
- Subseries 7E. Memoranda and Notes
- Subseries 7F. Scheduling
- Subseries 7G. Subject Files
- Series 8. Secretary of State 1988-1992
- Subseries 8A. Confirmation
- Subseries 8B. Correspondence
- Subseries 8C. Monthly Files
- Subseries 8D. Scheduling
- Subseries 8E. White House Meetings and Notes
- Series 9. Post-Secretary of State, 1992-2002
- Subseries 9A. Baker Institute, 1976-2000
- Subseries 9B. Subject Files, 1994-2002
- Series 10. Presidential Campaigns, 1970-2000
- Subseries 10A. Nixon Campaign, 1972
- Subseries 10B. Ford Campaign (Republican Primary), 1976
- Subseries 10C. President Ford Committee (General Election), 1976
- Subseries 10D. George Bush for President (Republican Primary), 1980
- Subseries 10E. Reagan-Bush Committee (General Election), 1980
- Subseries 10F. Reagan-Bush (General Election), 1984
- Subseries 10G. Bush-Quayle (General Election), 1988
- Subseries 10H. Bush-Quayle (General Election), 1992
- Subseries 10I. Dole-Kemp (General Election), 1996
- Subseries 10J. Bush-Cheney (General Election), 2000
- Series 11. Speeches and Interviews, 1975-1995

hunter was more important than in most campaigns, and Baker was considered extremely efficient and effective. Ford won the nomination by a few delegate votes at the last contested convention of either major political party to date.

In August 1976, just a few weeks after the convention and despite his limited experience running campaigns at a national level, Baker was appointed National Campaign Chairman of the Ford Campaign. At the time the campaign was struggling. Ford trailed Jimmy Carter by 30 points in the polls and Baker was the third campaign chairman in five months. When Ford made up large deficits in the polls, eventually losing by only one percent of the total vote, Baker was considered to have done a remarkable job.

Baker returned to Andrews, Kurth, Campbell, and Jones in 1977 and briefly resumed law practice. Coming off the experience of running a presidential campaign Baker was, in his words, "bitten by the political bug" (Newhouse, p. 65). Baker briefly considered running for governor of Texas, but eventually set his sights on the attorney general's office. The 1978 Texas attorney general race is the only time Baker has himself run as a candidate for political office. Though Baker lost the race to conservative Democrat Mark White (who would later become governor of Texas) Baker's 44 percent of the vote was a more than credible showing; only two Republican candidates since Reconstruction had done as well in a "down-ballot" (any state office below the level of Governor or Senator) Texas race.

When George Bush began organizing a run for the Republican presidential nomination in 1979, Baker was intimately involved. Even before his campaign for attorney general Baker had established a political action committee, the Fund for Limited Government, to help explore a possible Bush campaign, and in 1978 Baker and Bush had flown to California to inform Ronald Reagan that Bush would be running against him. With well-known opponents such as Reagan, Senate minority leader Howard Baker, and fellow Texan John Connally, Bush was met with skepticism until an unexpected win in the 1980 Iowa primary.

Despite Bush's early successes, including victories in Michigan and Pennsylvania, by May 1980 it was clear that Reagan would win the nomination. Baker is credited with accurately reading the situation and, eventually, helping to secure a spot for Bush on the Republican ticket as Reagan's running mate. Earlier in the campaign, in an effort to avoid offending the Reagan camp, Baker had discouraged use of the term "voodoo-economics" to describe Reagan's economic policies. In May, when the press questioned Baker about what he later described as "a decoy operation" in California, he admitted that the Bush Campaign had no real organization in the state. Although Bush would still deliberate whether to contest other upcoming primaries before leaving the race, the move essentially signaled the end of the campaign. Many believed that if Bush had contested Reagan's home state of California he would not have been selected as the vice-presidential nominee. Baker was asked to work on the Reagan-Bush campaign as a senior campaign advisor and was given responsibility for negotiating the format and number of the Reagan and Carter debates.

During the campaign, Baker's abilities caught the attention of key Reagan aides, including Mike Deaver. The day after the Reagan victory in November 1980, Reagan and Deaver told longtime aide Ed Meese, who had been Reagan's Chief of Staff in California, that Baker and not Meese would be Chief of Staff at the White House, with Meese serving as Reagan's counselor. Baker negotiated an agreement with Meese, even drafting a typed agreement which both men signed, that split the duties of the Chief of Staff and Counselor. Meese was given cabinet rank and supervision of the operations of the National Security Council staff and Domestic Policy staff, while Baker controlled the President's daily schedule and the flow of paper in and out of the White House. Although Baker's responsibilities seemed administrative on the surface, it soon became apparent that the agreement gave Baker a great deal of influence in political areas. Baker controlled liaison units, the political affairs office and the congressional affairs unit, and his early morning staff meetings became crucial to defining the daily agenda of the administration.

Baker is credited with creating and running an efficient and organized White House operation. Although he was sometimes criticized by the more conservative elements of the Republican Party, including some long-time Reagan supporters, he was often viewed as a steadying and moderating influence on the Reagan White House. He recruited and hired talented people from outside of the Reagan circle, including his deputy, Richard Darman. As during campaigns, he was credited with developing excellent relationships with the press. He also worked toward establishing strong relationships with key Congressional leaders; Baker has said he instituted a personal rule that by the end of each day, he would return every phone he received from any member of Congress. The Legislative Strategy Group created and led by Baker played a key role in the administration's early legislative victories, including the 1981 federal tax cut proposal and budget and congressional approval for the sale of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWAC) planes to Saudi Arabia.

Baker headed Reagan's reelection efforts in 1984 in a campaign that was essentially run from the Chief of Staff's office in the White House. Following Reagan's landslide victory over Walter Mondale, Baker and

- Subseries 11A. Under Secretary of Commerce, 1975-1976
- Subseries 11B. Political and Miscellaneous, 1976-1979
- Subseries 11C. Chief of Staff, 1981-1984
- Subseries 11D. Secretary of the Treasury, 1985-1988
- Subseries 11E. Secretary of State, 1989-1992
- Subseries 11F. Miscellaneous Speech Material, 1981-1995
- Series 12. *The Politics of Diplomacy,* 1989-1995
- Subseries 12A. Background and Research Materials, 1989-1995
- Subseries 12B. Chapter Files, 1989-1995
- Series 13. Scrapbooks and Memorabilia, 1980-1992
- Series 14. Audiovisual Materials, 1981-1995
- Series 15. Photographs, circa 1978-1984

Secretary James Baker

- Following the Gulf War in early 1991, Secretary of State James Baker embarked on an intensive course of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. With the United States firmly established to be the world's sole superpower, Baker saw a new era of opportunity for a region exhausted by war.

- In March of 1991, Baker traveled to the Middle East on the first of what would later become a series of eight peace missions.

- The Madrid Conference, lasting from Oct. 30 to Nov. 1, 1991, was a direct result of Baker's shuttle diplomacy earlier in the year. The conference set up two separate tracks of negotiations: a bilateral track, between Israel and each of its immediate neighbors (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians), and a multilateral track to resolve issues pertaining to the region as a whole.

- Bilateral talks began two days after the conference on Nov. 3, while multilateral negotiations opened in January of the following year.

- The bilateral talks between Israel and Jordan led directly to the historic 1994 peace agreement between the two nations, as well as the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Treasury Secretary Donald Regan engineered a job switch, arguing the switch would reinvigorate both men, while keeping both in key positions within the administration.

At the Treasury Department, Baker, along with Darman, whom Baker had brought from the White House, was heavily involved in the tax reform and deficit cutting measures of Reagan's second term. Late in 1985 he met with economic leaders of Great Britain, West Germany, France, and Japan, in order to discuss ways to jointly address problems resulting from an inflated value of the dollar. The meeting, which was initiated by Baker, was a departure from the more relaxed style of Regan and his staff, and resulted in an agreement to devalue the dollar, let other currencies rise, and coordinate regulation of interest rates. Canada and Italy also subsequently agreed to the same measures. The following year the ad hoc process was formalized and evolved into regularized "Group of Seven" (G7) meetings and efforts to discuss economic policy and other political issues.

The most dramatic occurrence of Baker's tenure at the Treasury Department centered on the Reagan Administration's efforts to enact tax reform legislation. Through negotiations with key members of Congress Baker and Darman were able to push forward legislation that was seen as strewn with political traps.

Toward the end of Reagan's second term, speculation began that Baker would leave the Treasury Department to take over George Bush's 1988 presidential campaign. Baker stayed at the department through the primary season. He later said that although he "would have preferred to help my pal by keeping the economy on track rather than by requiring the patina of the pol," Bush always knew that Baker would be available to help his campaign in the general election. He left the Treasury Department on August 5 and took over the Bush Campaign shortly before the Republican Convention. A few days before the end of a sometimes bitter campaign, with Bush leading comfortably in the polls, Bush asked Baker to become his Secretary of State if he won the election. After Bush's victory Baker was easily confirmed by the Senate, and was sworn in as the 61st Secretary of State in January 1989.

As Secretary of State Baker traveled to 90 foreign countries as the United States confronted a number of unprecedented challenges and opportunities. As in his previous high level positions, Baker worked closely with a key group of trusted advisors and made it an early priority to establish good working relationships with Congress, efforts that paid off in his early attempts to forge a bipartisan agreement on aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. Baker's close relationship with Bush worked to Baker's advantage during his years at the State Department. He later wrote, while serving as Secretary of State, "I never worried about being undercut. I could operate without ever having to worry about looking over my shoulder or worry about my backside." (Baker, p. 21).

Baker's years as Secretary of State included some of the most important world events of the second half of the 20th century. Most of these events are chronicled in a wide variety of published sources, including Baker's own book, The Politics of Diplomacy. The book records Baker's reactions to, and efforts to manage, world events, including the Chinese repression in Tiananmen Square, the United States invasion of Panama and arrest of Manuel Noriega, the release of Nelson Mandela and beginning of the end of Apartheid in South Africa, free elections in Nicaragua, and a peace agreement in El Salvador. Baker's efforts towards establishing peace in the Middle East led to a historic meeting between Palestinian and Israeli representatives at the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991.

Foreign policy during the Bush years was dominated by historic changes in relations between the United States and Soviet Union. During Baker's time at the State Department the Berlin Wall was dismantled, Germany was reunified and brought into NATO, and the Soviet Union itself dissolved. Baker played a key role in the development of the "two plus four" plan and the talks that led to German reunification. He also established a personal rapport with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. In 1989 the two met at a historic ministerial in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, a meeting which Baker would later say was a key towards developing a "new atmosphere of trust." Baker and Shevardnadze's working relationship is also considered to have been instrumental in Shevardnadze's willingness to issue a joint statement condemning Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and agreeing to an arms embargo without first clearing the position with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. The two men also worked towards nuclear and strategic arms reduction agreements, which culminated in the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement (START) in July of 1991.

Baker was a central figure in negotiating and gaining support from a worldwide coalition of nations joined in opposition to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. In January 1991, Baker met with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva in a last ditch effort to convince the Iraqis to withdraw. On January 16, the U.S. and Allied forces began Operation Desert Storm by launching massive air strikes on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. Thirty-seven countries contributed militarily or financially to the operation.

In the summer of 1992, with his campaign struggling, Bush asked Baker to return to the White House as Chief of Staff in order to manage his reelection efforts. Baker remained in the position until Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in January 1993.

Since leaving Washington Baker has held a number of positions in both public service and the private sector. From 1997 to 2004, Baker served as the Personal Envoy of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to seek a political solution to the conflict over Western Sahara. In 2003, Baker was appointed Special Presidential Envoy for President George W. Bush on the issue of Iraqi debt. In perhaps his most visible role since leaving Washington, Baker served as a chief spokesman and led George W. Bush's legal team during the recount of votes in Florida during the 2000 presidential election.

As of January 2005 Baker was a senior partner in the law firm of Baker Botts and Senior Counselor to The Carlyle Group, a merchant banking firm in Washington, D.C. Baker also established and served as Honorary Chairman of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, a non-partisan organization dedicated to the goal of helping bridge the gap between the theory and practice of public policy by drawing together experts from academia, government, the media, business, and non-governmental organizations.

Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber



"We have not come to Madrid, the venue of this historic international conference, simply to debate, discuss, or score points against each other. We came here with the intention of seriously

considering the elements of a comprehensive peace settlement. Our approach remains constructive, and our faith and confidence in the seriousness and commitment of the co-sponsors is unshakable."

--Dr.Kamel Abu Jaber

Read his speeches at Madrid

Dr. Abdul Malik Al Jaber
Chief Executive Officer
Paltel Group

Dr. Abul Malik Al-Jaber returned to Palestine with the onset of the Peace Process in 1993, during which he joined the Peace Negotiations as part of the Palestinian Technical Committees headed by the then late Faisal Husseini.

Dr. Al-Jaber established the first Palestinian Energy Research Center, which was tasked with providing strategic plans for the Energy Sector in Palestine. Under Presidential Decree Dr. Al-Jaber became Head of the Center, after which he also acted as principal advisor for the Ministry of Planning. Dr. Al-Al-Jaber's tenure in the Public sector also included assuming responsibility for the Palestinian Industrial Estate Authority as Director General.

In the year 2000 Dr. Al-Jaber moved to the private sector and held several senior positions. He became the CEO for the Palestinian Industrial Estates Development Company, during which he supervised the establishment of Palestine's first Industrial Estate in Gaza.

Hans Van Den Broek



"A bold and imaginative approach is called for. We will be putting forward our own ideas. We will share with you our own experience in this regard to the benefit of all nations of the Middle East"
--Hans Van Den Broek

Hans van den Broek (born 11 December 1936 in Paris) is a Dutch politician.

He is most known for being a Netherlands minister of the foreign affairs between 1982 and 1993, when he took a job as a member of the European Commission.

Hans Van Den Broek started his career as a lawyer. He joined the Katholieke Volkspartij (KVP) and was member of the municipality council of Rheden between 1970 and 1974. Between 1976 and 1981 he was member of Tweede Kamer, the lower house of the Dutch parliament, as representative of KVP and later of the Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA).

He was Netherlands minister for foreign affairs in Ruud Lubbers governments three times and was in 1991 one of the EU negotiators in Brioni Agreement that ended ten day war in Slovenia. On 6 January 1993 he became member of the European Commission and has been once again charged for the foreign relations, especially the Enlargement of the European Union. He remained on that position until March 1999, when he retired from European politics.

Hans van den Broek is nowadays president of the Netherlands Institute of

International Relations (Clingendael) and president of the Radio Netherlands.

Hans van den Broek is married and has two daughters, one of them is Marilène van den Broek, the wife of Prince Maurits of Orange-Nassau, van Vollenhoven.

Member of the Commission

External relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Mongolia, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta and other European countries; Common foreign and security policy and human rights (in agreement with the President); External missions , European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)

- Born in Paris, France, on 11 December 1936.
- Married, two daughters.
- Doctor of Law, Utrecht; Postgraduate course in senior management at "De Baak", Noordwijk.
- *1965-68*
  Lawyer
- *1969-73*
  Secretary of the managing board of ENKA BV, Arnhem
- *1970-74*
  Member of Rheden municipal council
- *1973-76*
  Commercial manager with ENKA BV
- *1976-81*
  Member of the Lower House of Parliament
- *1978*
  Member of the executive of the Christian Democratic Party
- *1981-82*
  State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
- *1982*
  Minister of Foreign Affairs (reappointed in 1986 and 1989)
- *1993-94*

Member of the European Commission, responsible for external political relations, common foreign and security policy and enlargement negotiations

Yitzhak Shamir



"I stand before you today in yet another quest for peaace, not only on behalf of the State of Israel, but in the name of the entire Jewish

people, that has maintained an unbreakable bond with the Land of Israel for almost 4,000 years."

--Yitzhak Shamir

Read his

speeches at Madrid!

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Yitzhak Shamir-underground leader, spymaster, parliamentarian and the seventh Prime Minister of the State of Israel. Was born Yizhak Yzemitzky in Ruzinoy, Polan in 1915. He attended Bialystok Hebrew secondary school and at age 14 joined the Betar Youth movement. In 1935 he left Warsaw, where he was studying law, moved to Palestine and enrolled at the Hebrew University.

In 1937, opposing the mainstream Zionist policy of restraint vis-à-vis the British Mandatory administration, Shamir joined the Irgun Tzeva'i Le'umi (Etzel) - the Revisionist underground organization - and in 1940 became a member of the small, but more militant, faction led by Avraham Stern, the Lehi (Lohamei Herut Israel - Fighters for the Freedom of Israel), that broke away from the larger body. There, as part of the leadership troika, he coordinated organizational and operational activities.

Twice arrested by the British - during and after World War II - Shamir escaped both times, the second time in 1947 from the British prison camp in Eritrea to neighboring French Djibouti. Granted political asylum in France, he returned to Palestine in 1948 and resumed command of the Lehi until it was disbanded following the establishment of the State of Israel.

After several years during which he managed commercial enterprises, Shamir joined Israel's security services in the mid-1950s and held senior positions in the Mossad. He returned to private commercial activity in the mid-1960s and became involved in the struggle to free Soviet Jewry. In 1970 he joined Menachem Begin's opposition Herut party and became a member of its Executive. In 1973 he was elected a Member of Knesset for the Likud party - a position he held for the next 23 years. During his first decade as a parliamentarian, Shamir was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and, in 1977, became Speaker of the Knesset. In this capacity he presided over the historic appearance of Egyptian President Sadat in the Knesset and the debate over ratifying the Camp David Accords two years later. He abstained in the vote on the Accords, primarily because of the requirement to dismantle settlements. Yitzhak Shamir served as Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1980 and 1983. Among his achievements were closer ties with Washington - reflected in the Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation with the United States and the agreement in principle on free trade between the two nations. Shamir also initiated diplomatic contacts with many African countries which had severed diplomatic ties during the 1973 oil crisis. After the 1982 "Operation Peace for Galilee," Yitzhak

Shamir directed negotiations with Lebanon which led to the 1983 peace agreement (which was, however, never ratified by the Lebanese government).

Following the resignation of Menachem Begin in October 1983, Yitzhak Shamir became Prime Minister until the general elections in the fall of 1984. During this year, Shamir concentrated on economic matters - the economy was suffering from hyper-inflation - while also nurturing closer strategic ties with the United States.

Indecisive results in the 1984 general elections led to the formation of a National Unity Government based on a rotation agreement between Shamir and Labor leader Shimon Peres. Shamir served as Vice-Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs for two years, while Shimon Peres was Prime Minister. Subsequently, Shamir served for six years as Prime Minister - from 1986 to 1992 - first heading a National Unity Government, and then as head of a narrow coalition government.

Yitzhak Shamir's second term as Prime Minister was marked by two major events: the 1991 Gulf War, in which Shamir - despite Iraqi missile attacks on Israel's civilian population - chose a policy of restraint; and the October 1991 Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid that inaugurated direct talks between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as well as multilateral regional talks. Two momentous events overshadowed other issues on the public agenda. The first, beginning in 1989, was the victory in the long struggle for Jewish emigration from the USSR, which brought 450,000 immigrants to Israel in the next two years; the second was "Operation Solomon," in May 1991, in which 15,000 Ethiopian Jews were rescued and brought to Israel in a massive airlift.

After his party lost the 1992 elections, Shamir stepped down from the party leadership and in 1996 also retired from the Knesset.


BIOGRAPHY

born 20 February 1931, he was Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for a brief period in 1991. A reformer and journalist, Pankin had only 100 days to serve as Foreign Minister before the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. In that short period, he established diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, managed the collapse of the GDR, began the Soviet-US disarmament process, brought the Soviet Union closer to the European Union and purged the KGB from the ranks of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

Pankin is best known for being the highest-ranking diplomat to stand against the August putsch which sought to bring down Mikael Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader and promulgator of Glasnost and Perestroika.

Pankin was Soviet Ambassador to Sweden for eight years from 1982-1990. He was brought-in to clean-up after the Soviet Union's reputation was seriously tarnished in the aftermath of a diplomatic scandal in which

Boris Dimitrievich Pankin



"The broad range of views which surfaced in the course of initial and,

a Soviet Whiskey class submarine became marooned in Swedish territorial waters outside of Stockholm. The incident became widely-known as "Whiskey on the Rocks." Pankin became, and remains, very popular in Sweden, and was the Soviet Union's longest-serving Swedish envoy.

Pankin was the last Soviet Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (1990-1991). Pankin is credited with preventing the Communist-Czechoslovak government from interfering in the Velvet Revolution- which led to playwright and dissident Vaclav Havel's rise to the presidency. Pankin was later recalled to Moscow to become Gorbachev's Foreign Minister after standing against the putsch which attempted to topple the reform-minded Soviet leader.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Pankin was named Russian Ambassador to the Court of St. James (UK), where he served until 1994. He resigned in protest over Russia's invasion of Chechnya.

Pankin now lives in Bromma borough outside Stockholm, Sweden and works as a

so far, indirect discussions

does not overshadow the common

feature in the positions of all the parties - the desire to have a durable

and just peace in the Middle East

and to solve the most difficult

problems that have

turned this region into the global

powderkeg."

--Boris Dimitrievich Pankin

lecturer and writer. In January 2005 he was given the "Stockholm Citizen of the Month Award" by the city government, recognizing his dedication and loyalty to his adopted home - the city of Stockholm. Boris Pankin sits on the Board of Advisors of the Global Panel Foundation.

Comments By Baker and Pankin

Published: October 19, 1991

Following are excerpts from remarks today by Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d and Foreign Minister Boris D. Pankin of the Soviet Union on invitations to a Middle East peace conference :

MR. BAKER

An American Secretary of State and a Soviet Foreign Minister are together in Jerusalem for the first time

in history.

What's more, the Soviet Union has today restored full relations with Israel after a break of 24 years.

But I think that our joint presence here today represents something more. Foreign Minister Pankin and I are pleased to announce that President Bush and President Gorbachev are today inviting Israel, Arab states and Palestinians to attend a Middle East peace conference to be held beginning Oct. 30 in Madrid. That conference is to be followed by direct negotiations designed to achieve real peace.

We have witnessed new beginnings in other parts of the world. The negotiating process that we are seeking

to launch with this invitation holds the hope of a new era in the Middle East. The hope of an era marked by acceptance and not by rejection, the hope of an era marked by dialogue and not by violence, the hope of an era marked by cooperation and not by conflict, and the hope of an era marked by hope itself and not despair.

This invitation offers the peoples in this region a pathway to ending an era of confrontation, and it offers a basis for a new future.

The road to peace, and I think we both understand this exceedingly well, will not be simple. To the contrary, it will be extremely difficult, with many problems, many hitches and probably many interruptions along the

way. Old suspicions will not disappear quickly. The gaps are real, and the gaps will not be easily overcome. So we have no illusions about the hard work that lies ahead.

But we take encouragement from the issuance of these invitations, which is the product of work of the last eight months. As we have all along, we intend to take this one step at a time. And so if we receive positive responses to this invitation, we will be taking one more step forward toward achieving the peace and security that the peoples of the Middle East have so long been denied. MR. PANKIN

Ladies and gentlemen, the Secretary of State James Baker has just informed you of the joint Soviet-

American statement. Therefore I have no other papers to read out to you. I can only say that I fully share what has just been said by Secretary Baker. However, I'd like to add a few comments.

The stage that we have now come to represents a very important turning point for the entire situation in the Middle East. We have come a long way, and we have come a long way together. We made an important contribution to the convening of this conference in our capacity as future co-chairmen of the conference, just as important contributions have been made by all the other sides in their hard and untiring efforts.

We are convinced that history is now holding out

an opportunity that we must not pass up. And I urge all the participants of the conference to take this opportunity.

As has just been mentioned by Secretary Baker, we have restored full diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, and we signed a joint Soviet-Israeli statement together with my counterpart, Foreign Minister David Levy, to that effect.

1990 Nobel Prize Winner

Mikhail Gorbachev



"This task is an extremely difficult one."

Biography

1931:	March 2, born, Privolnoye, Krasnogvardeisky District, Stavropol territory in the North Caucasus, to a peasant family in a small village, his father an agricultural mechanic on a collective farm.
1942:	German army occupies the Privolnoye area.
1945:	Begins work as assistant to combine harvest operator.
1949:	Awarded Order of Red Banner of Labour.
1950:	Enrolled in Faculty of Law, Moscow University.

1952:	After having been a member of Komsomol (Communist Youth Organisation), now joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).
1955:	Marries Raisa Maximovna Titorenko, philosophy student. Receives degree in law.
1955-60:	Appointed First Secretary, Komsomol Territorial Committee, then moves up to higher posts, finally becoming top Komsomol official in Stavropol.
1956:	Daughter Irina born.
1961:	Delegate from Stavropol to 22nd Communist Party Congress in Moscow.

1962:	Appointed to key position in Stavropol Communist Party, responsible for personnel in administration, farms and industry.
1964-67:	Studies for second degree at Stavropol Agricultural Institute.
1970:	Appointed First Secretary for Stavropol territory, governing an area of 2.4 million people.
1971:	Member CPSU Central Committee.
1978:	Moves to Moscow as Secretary of Agriculture in Central Committee.
1980:	Becomes youngest full member of Politburo.
1985:	March, Elected by Central Committee as General Secretary of CPSU.

1989:	Elected by new parliament as Executive President of Soviet Union.
1991:	August, abortive coup of hardliners, resigns as General Secretary of CPSU, dissolves Central Committee.
1991:	December 25, resigns as President when Soviet Union disintegrates.
1992:	Head of Foundation for Social, Economic and Political Research, think-tank founded after August coup.

Profile on Gorbachev

The man credited with helping end the Cold War was born into a peasant family on March 2, 1931, near Stavropol. As a boy, he did farm work along with his studies. He joined the Communist Party in 1952 and completed a law degree at Moscow University the following year. During the early 1960s he became head of the agriculture department for the Stavropol region. By the end of the decade he had risen to top of the party hierarchy in the region. He came to the attention of Politburo members Mikhail Suslov and Yuri Andropov, who got him elected to the Central Committee in 1971 and arranged foreign trips for their rising star. In 1978 he was back in Moscow, and the next year he was chosen as a candidate member of the Politburo. His stewardship of Soviet agriculture was not a success. As he came to realize, the collective system was fundamentally flawed in more than one way.


A full Politburo member since 1980, Gorbachev became more influential in 1982 when his mentor, Andropov, succeeded Leonid Brezhnev. He built a reputation as an enemy of corruption and inefficiency. Gorbachev finally rose to the top party spot in March 1985. Almost from the start, he strove for significant reforms, so that the system would work more efficiently and more democratically. Hence the two key phrases of the Gorbachev era: "glasnost" (openness) and "perestroika" (reform). Hoping to shift resources to the civilian sector of the Soviet economy, Gorbachev also began to argue in favor of an end to the arms race with the West.

Throughout his six years in office, Gorbachev always seemed to be moving too fast for the party establishment, which saw its privileges threatened, and too slow for more radical reformers, who hoped to do away with the one-party state and the command economy. Desperately trying to stay in control of the reform process, he seemed to have underestimated the depth of the economic crisis. He also seemed to have had a blind spot for the power of the nationality issue: Glasnost created ever-louder calls for independence from the Baltics and other Soviet republics. He was successful in foreign policy, but primarily from an international perspective. While his arms control agreements with the United States could be seen as in the Soviet interest too, the peaceful breakaway of the countries of Eastern Europe, followed by German unification and NATO membership for the new Germany, appeared to old-line Communists more a sell-out.

In August 1991 hard-liners had had enough. With Gorbachev on vacation in the Crimea, they staged a coup. However, they failed because of incompetence, lack of support from the military and massive street protests in Moscow. After the coup, Gorbachev lost the political initiative. This now belonged to the leaders of the various Soviet republics, in particular the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin. At the end of the year, Gorbachev was forced to resign as president of a Soviet Union no longer in existence. Since that time, he has been blamed by many Russians for their current political and economic predicament. In the West, he remains the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize winner who helped end the Cold War.

George H. W. Bush

An exciting video of a crazy adventure of former President Bush!



"I am committed to strengthening our relationship with the democratic nations in this hemisphere. I will continue to seek solutions to the problems of this region through dialog and multilateral diplomacy."

George H.W.

Bush

Read his speeches at Madrid

Bibliography

George Herbert Walker Bush was the 41st president of the United States, from January 20, 1989 to January 20, 1993. He was born on June 12, 1924, in Milton, Massachusetts, to Dorothy Walker Bush and Senator Prescott Bush (Republican of Connecticut 1952-1962). Bush graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts, on his 18th birthday, June 12, 1942. That day, he enlisted in the U.S. Navy as a Seaman Second Class. Receiving his wings and commission in June 1943, while still 18 years old, he was the youngest pilot in the Navy at that time.



Navy pilot George H.W. Bush

The war years

On active duty from August 1942 to September 1945 during World War II, Bush flew torpedo bombers off the carrier USS *San Jacinto* . On September 2, 1944, Bush's plane was hit by anti-aircraft fire while making a bombing run over the Bonin Island of Chichi Jima, 600 miles south of Japan. Although the plane was afire and severely damaged, he completed his strafing run on a Japanese installation before flying towards the sea to bail out. Bush managed to bail out and was rescued by a Navy submarine, the USS *Finback* . Tragically, his two crew members were killed. Bush flew 58 missions. For his courageous service in the Pacific Theater, Bush was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross and three Air Medals.

Education and marriage

On January 6, 1945, Bush married Barbara Pierce of Rye, New York. Today they are the parents of five children: George, John (Jeb), Neil, Marvin, and Dorothy Bush Koch. Their second child, Robin, died of leukemia in 1953. The Bushes have 14 grandchildren. Following World War II, Bush entered Yale University, where he pursued a degree in economics and served as captain of the varsity baseball team. He graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1948.

Entrepreneurial years

Following his graduation, George and bride Barbara Bush moved to Texas, where he worked as an oil field supply salesman for Dresser Industries. In 1951, he co-founded a small royalty firm, the Bush-Overbey Oil Development Company. Two years later, he co-founded the Zapata[1] Petroleum Corporation. In 1954, at the age of 30, he became the co-founder and president of a third firm, Zapata Off-Shore. Zapata pioneered in experimental offshore drilling equipment.

Government and politics

Following an unsuccessful bid for a Senate seat in 1964, Bush was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1966 from Texas' Seventh District. One of the few freshman members of Congress elected to serve on the Ways and Means Committee, he was reelected to the House two years later without opposition. Bush lost a second campaign for the Senate in 1970.

During the 1970s, Bush held a number of leadership positions. In 1971, he was named U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He served there until 1973, when he became chairman of the Republican National Committee. In October 1974, Bush traveled to Beijing, China, where he served as chief of the U.S. Liaison Office during the critical period when the United States was renewing ties with that country.

Director of the CIA

In 1976, Bush was appointed director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was credited with strengthening the intelligence community and helping to restore morale at the agency.

The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 was signed into law by then President Bill Clinton on October 20, 1998. Among its provisions, the law directed that the new headquarters compound of the Central Intelligence Agency located in Langley, Virginia, be known as the George Bush Center for Intelligence. In a dedication ceremony, a letter from then President Clinton was read. Clinton wrote in part,


> "As you know, in my time as president, I have turned to you more than once for your wise counsel, and I have benefited greatly from it. And I have been well served by the talented and dedicated men and women who make up the intelligence community that you did so much to preserve and strengthen."

Bush was director of Central Intelligence and head of the Central Intelligence Agency from January 30, 1976, to January 20, 1977.

Vice President Bush

In 1980, Ronald Reagan chose George Bush to be his running mate. On January 20, 1981, Bush was sworn in for the first of two terms as vice president. In that office, Bush coordinated administration efforts to combat international terrorism and wage the international war on drugs. Vice President Bush also piloted a task force on regulatory relief, aimed at reducing government size and increasing American competitiveness. In 1988, George H.W. Bush became his party's nominee and the American people's choice to be the 41st President of the United States.

President Bush



George H.W. Bush

Bush's initial Cabinet choices reflected a balanced choice for an efficient, nonideological government. With his usual cautious instinct, in 1990 he nominated to the Supreme Court the erudite David H. Souter, known to have broadly conservative views.

In his first year, Bush was confronted with the Lebanese hostage crisis, the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill in Alaska, and the continuing War on Drugs. His public approval soared following the invasion of Panama in late 1989, but a spectacular budget deficit and the savings and loan crisis caused the president's popularity to dip sharply in his second year. That decline followed Bush's relinquishment of his famed campaign "no new taxes" pledge as he sat down with congressional leaders to tame the budget deficit and deal with a flagging economy.

Operation Desert Storm

President Bush marshaled a 30-nation coalition of Western democracies, Japan, and even some Arab states to free Kuwait following an invasion by Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein in August 1990. Operation Desert Storm stands as an example of presidential leadership and American resolve in an uncertain and often dangerous world.

The coalition forces drove out the Iraqi invaders in little more than a month after Desert Storm was launched

on January 17, 1991, and a nation grateful for sensing the end of the "Vietnam syndrome" gave the president an 89 percent approval rating in the polls. However, the high rating fell as the year went on, as doubts persisted about the war's outcome. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein remained in power and persistently avoided complying with the terms of the peace treaty. In addition, concerns continued to grow about the faltering U.S. economy and other domestic problems.

A major Bush accomplishment in 1991 was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), signed in July with Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev at their fourth summit conference, marking the end of the long weapons buildup.

President Bush's leadership proved critical to the resolution of some of the most daunting conflicts of the time. After 40 years of superpower stalemate, historic events became nearly commonplace: the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War and the flowering of democracy in Eastern Europe, the emergence of a new partnership with Russia, anchored by the historic arms reduction treaties; START I and START II — the first-ever agreements to dismantle and destroy strategic weapons since the advent of the nuclear age.

On the international economic front

President Bush sought to seize new opportunities through a policy of free trade, pushing to lower trade restrictions and tariff barriers in the GATT talks. In this hemisphere, President Bush's free trade efforts culminated in the Enterprise for the Americas initiative and the North American Free Trade Agreement, (NAFTA). With the passing of the Cold War came new challenges, including seeking to demonstrate the post-Cold War possibilities of collective security.

On the domestic scene

The Bush administration promoted new ideas for educational reform, home ownership, and environmental protection. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) paved new ground for accommodating disabled people, and the revision of the Clean Air Act was deemed the most significant environmental legislation ever passed.

In the 1992 presidential election, Bush was defeated by Governor Bill Clinton of Arkansas.


Latter lives

The former president and Mrs. Bush are residents of Houston, Texas, and serve on the Board of Visitors of M.D. Anderson Hospital. They are members of St. Martin's Episcopal Church, where President Bush has been a vestryman. He is currently on the board of the Episcopal Church Foundation and serves on the vestry of St. Ann's Episcopal Church in Kennebunkport, Maine.

In 2005, former president Bush appeared on national television with former president Clinton to beseech American citizens and the world to generously contribute to the December 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami relief effort, where more than 100,000 people died.



Former U.S. President George H.W. Bush



Former U.S. President George H.W. Bush comes in for a landing after performing a tandem parachute jump June 13, 2004 in celebration of his 80th birthday.

Learn More About the Oslo Peace Accords

Understand the Road to Oslo

Document-Oslo Peace Accords (Full Text)

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

September 13, 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the, two sides agree to the following principles:

ARTICLE I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

ARTICLE II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

ARTICLE III

ELECTIONS

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

ARTICLE IV

JURISDICTION Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

ARTICLE V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

ARTICLE VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

INTERIM AGREEMENT

The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement")

The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the

number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

ARTICLE VIII

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

ARTICLE IX

LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

ARTICLE X

JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

ARTICLE XI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex iii and Annex iv.

ARTICLE XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

ARTICLE XIII

REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

> After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and

the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

ARTICLE XIV

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex ii.

ARTICLE XV

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles. or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

ARTICLE XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS Both parties

view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan", the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex iv .

ARTICLE XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel
For the P.L.O.

Witnessed By:

The United States of America
The Russian Federation

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

the system of elections;

the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and

rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

The above agreement will include, among other things:

Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

Gaza - Egypt; and

Jericho - Jordan.

The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by

experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli- Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

The Development Program will consist of two elements:

an Economic Development Program for the 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

a Regional Economic Development Program.

The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza strip will consist of the following elements:

A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.)

A Human Resources Plan.

Other programs.

The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza) - Dead Sea Canal.

Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

Interconnection of electricity grids.

Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

Regional cooperation in other spheres.

The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the

Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

It is understood that:

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

:It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows

The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee.

It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

Done at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel
For the P.L.O.

Witnessed By:

The United States of America
The Russian Federation

Home Page . My Times . Today's Paper . Video . Most Popular . Times Topics

Log InRegister Now

Archives The New York Times

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World . U.S. . N.Y. / Region . Business . Technology . Science . Health . Sports . Opinion . Arts . Style . Travel . Jobs . Real Estate . Autos



<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie;sz=728x90;click=http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738120/mnum=0000510259/cstr=63877289=_4754f0f4,6433145398,738120^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=63877289/optn=64?trg=;ord=6433145398?"></SCRIPT><NOSCRIPT><A HREF="http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738120/mnum=0000510259/cstr=63877289=_4754f0f4,6433145398,738120^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=63877289/optn=64?trg=http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=6433145398?"><IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=6433145398?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=728 HEIGHT=90 ALT="Click Here"></A></NOSCRIPT>

Peace and Aid In the Middle East

Print
Save
Share

Published: November 27, 1994

To the Editor:

"In Israel, a Ho-Hum Response to Peace" (World Markets, Oct. 30) was salutary. In questioning a so-called peace dividend, Paul Lewis took a step to correct grave misunderstandings about the peace process, a step that may help temper expectations in other areas.

Mr. Lewis, however, did not get to the root of the matter: the peace process itself is unlikely to advance economic reform in Israel. The talks in Casablanca aren't likely to help, either.

Mr. Lewis reports that reform of Israel's socialized economy is a key step to taking "advantage of the new economic opportunities that peace is creating." But changing the "sclerotic socialized economy" represents something far more fundamental than a mere step in Israel's would-be reforms. The economy is socialized and sclerotic because Israel is a socialist regime -- period.

The privatization success that Mr. Lewis cites is inconsequential -- 8 nonbank companies of the 160 Israel owns. Israel has no private sector in the Western sense; socialism based on aid is the highest policy of the Israeli state, for the Likud as well as the Labor Party. This is the heart of the matter.

Looking for the peace dividend in economic reforms turns reality on its head. The purpose of the peace process, in fact, is to make reform unnecessary. The aid that will now flow will go to Jordan and the P.L.O. as well as Israel. This serves Israel's socialist purposes: aid to the Arabs will find its way to Israel via the monopolies and cartels that the peace process is saving from privatization. This is the peace dividend. Of course, Syria is on the agenda; it is the hinge.

Thus the Golan: if Israel can persuade the Americans to send troops to the Golan, (convincing the Israelis will be much easier), the aid spigot will be wide open.

The United States will have become the protector of the peace, while the aid will be necessary to protect the troops. What surer way to guarantee continued Congressional appropriations than to put United States troops at risk if the appropriations stop? What better way to insure the troops remain than to make them responsible for the peace?

The Middle East peace process has arisen because of two factors: the balance-of-power vacuum created by demise of the Soviet Union and the Israeli socialist system's rapacious need for American aid, which is threatened by Soviet breakup. The peace process is supposed to bring about a balance of power by way of the implanting of United States troops on the Golan. In other words, when this unconventional aid-based peace is in place, the assistance will sustain Israel's socialism, making reform unnecessary. ROBERT J. LOEWENBERG Jerusalem, Oct. 31 The writer is president of the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, based in Jerusalem.

MOST POPULAR

- E-Mailed
- Blogged
- Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
5. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads

What are Related Ads?

» Palestine

» War in the Middle East

» Iraq

» War in Iraq

» Palestinian

Ads by Google what's this?

New BlackBerry® Curve™

Small, Portable, Stylish. Brains & Beauty. BlackBerry Curve.

www.BlackBerryCurve.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »

Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On



Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Magazine »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans



Arts »

Monkey Business


Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.


Opinion »

Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

Theater »









Time Running Out

Print
Single-Page
Save
Share

By ANTHONY LEWIS
Published: April 11, 1997

Dr. Eyad Sarraj is a Palestinian psychiatrist in Gaza and a campaigner for human rights. I wrote about him last year when he criticized the Palestinian Authority for mistreatment of prisoners and was then himself imprisoned for 25 days.

Dr. Sarraj is a longtime advocate of peace with Israel. He supported the Camp David agreement when the P.L.O. rejected it. He took part in the post-Madrid peace negotiations in Washington. But now he

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed . Blogged . Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
5. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

sees belief in the possibility of peace fading. So he said during a visit to Boston to receive an award from Physicians for Human Rights.

"People wanted to believe that this peace process would lead to something," he said, "that Netanyahu would go along with it, that he might even be better for it.

"Then came Har Homa $(the Israeli settlement project in East Jerusalem$). It undermined that thinking. It gave the opponents of peace the chance to say, 'We told you Israel didn't really want peace.'

"Netanyahu's shortsightedness is so painful. All he can see is his power. He plays on fear to build support. The result will be violence, repression, more violence. Everything will erupt, but Israelis will cling to him in the storm. He will survive -- on the bones of the dead."

Dr. Sarraj was talking about despair and bitterness in his own community in Gaza. But the feelings he described are widespread among Palestinians now. In a recent poll, taken by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus in the West Bank, 52 percent agreed with the statement, "There is no possibility of reaching a solution acceptable to the two parties." It was the first time the poll had found a majority for that position.

No realist can doubt that Prime Minister Netanyahu's recent acts have caused an ominous loss of hope for peace among Palestinians. And not just Palestinians. The Financial Times of London summed up the wider significance:

"Arab governments have lost confidence in the peace process. They are themselves under varying degrees of challenge from Islamic revivalists, and every Israeli step back from peace undermines them."

The Clinton Administration's response to this crisis in one of its proudest achievements, the Middle East peace process, seems curiously low-key.

"We want to help," I was told in Washington this week, "but we can't unless the parties give us something to work with. Netanyahu will be Prime Minister for the next four years. Criticizing him openly would only build support for his policy."

9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"
Also in Business:
- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?
» Setting Up a FTP Server
» Mac Emulation
» SSH Linux
» SSH Chroot
» SSH Protocol

Related Ads What are Related Ads?
» Peace Corps
» Peace Corps Cape Verde
» Peace Corps Congo Zaire
» Peace Corps Costa Rica
» Volunteer Abroad

Related Ads What are Related Ads?
» Peace Corps

U.S. officials say they still hope that gestures from the two sides will let talks resume. Mr. Netanyahu, for example, could let the Palestinians open their airport. (Officials seem to have given up hope of persuading him to suspend work on Har Homa.) Yasir Arafat could talk tougher on terrorism.

But why would the Palestinians see any point in negotiations with an Israeli leader who thinks they are not even worth informing before he acts in the most sensitive area, Jerusalem? How can they have any hope of negotiating their minimum objective, a meaningful homeland, with a man who seems to rule it out?

President Clinton's description of his meeting with Mr. Netanyahu this week -- "very specific, frank, candid and long" -- made it plain enough that he was critical of what the Israeli Prime Minister has done. But can private disagreement be enough? And isn't the real reason for keeping it private concern about the reaction of Israel's American supporters?

Only a bold American demarche, I fear, can save the peace process from crumbling altogether now for lack of trust. Only an American President can make the dominant party in the conflict, our ally Israel, see again the truth that security lies not in particular bits of territory but in a peace that gives Palestinians the dignity to build a stable society.

Benjamin Netanyahu is a skillful politician. But he seems to lack the crucial ingredient for a leader who wants to settle an aching conflict. That is the ability to see the other side's needs and treat it with generosity.

1 2 Next Page >

Ads by Google what's this?

» Peace Corps Cape Verde

» Peace Corps Congo Zaire

» Peace Corps Costa Rica

» Volunteer Abroad

The Bible as a Timeline
Easily see 6000 years of Bible and world history together!
www.BibleTimeline.net

Coffee Exposed
A shocking secret big coffee co's don't want you to know.
www.coffeefool.com

World History Book
Looking for World History Book? Find exactly what you want today.
Yahoo.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Magazine »



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Arts »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

Opinion »

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Theater »



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map



<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie;sz=728x90;click=http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738122/mnum=0000510259/cstr=40347056=_4754f697,6247572373,738122^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=40347056/optn=64?trg=;ord=6247572373?"></SCRIPT><NOSCRIPT><A HREF="http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738122/mnum=0000510259/cstr=40347056=_4754f697,6247572373,738122^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=40347056/optn=64?trg=http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=6247572373?"><IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=6247572373?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=728 HEIGHT=90 ALT="Click Here"></A></NOSCRIPT>

8 High Ex-U.S. Aides Ask Netanyahu to Shun Pre-emptive Acts

Print
Single-Page
Save
Share

By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: December 16, 1996

Concerned that the Israeli Government's settlement policies are harming the chances for peace in the Middle East, eight former high-ranking American officials have written to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, urging him "not to take unilateral actions that would preclude a meaningful settlement and a comprehensive and lasting peace."

The letter, a copy of which was provided to The New York Times, was to be delivered today to Mr. Netanyahu, said one of the signers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser under President Carter.



The other signers are James A. Baker 3d, Cyrus R. Vance and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, all former Secretaries of State; Frank C. Carlucci and Brent Scowcroft, former national security advisers, and Robert S. Strauss and Richard Fairbanks, former Middle East negotiators.

The letter urges all sides in the Middle East conflict to refrain from unilateral actions that could prejudice peace talks. But it is addressed to Mr. Netanyahu, and Mr. Brzezinski was explicit about what the group is criticizing.

"The letter is about settlements," he said. "It's precipitated by Mr. Netanyahu's policies, which seem to us inimical to the peace process and even dangerous."

Using more diplomatic language, the letter says: "We write because we are concerned that unilateral actions, such as the expansion of settlements, would be strongly counterproductive to the goal of a negotiated solution and, if carried forward, could halt progress made by the peace process over the last two decades. Such a tragic result would threaten the security of Israel, the Palestinians, friendly Arab states, and undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East."

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, said today that he had chosen not to sign the letter, believing that Mr. Netanyahu's Likud Government needs a period to "form a strategy" and that he was elected with a mandate different from that of the previous Labor Party Government.

"I have not agreed with everything he's done," Mr. Kissinger said of Mr. Netanyahu. "But I have not disagreed sufficiently to make a joint public appeal with other former Secretaries."

The joint appeal to Mr. Netanyahu, while drafted earlier last week, comes at a time of increased concern in the Clinton Administration about Mr. Netanyahu's settlement policies. On Friday, the Israeli Cabinet voted to restore large subsidies, including tax concessions, for existing Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

The vote did not create any new settlements or authorize the expansion of existing ones, though many Palestinians and Israelis expect expansion to be an inevitable result. Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordecai would have to authorize any extensions, Israeli officials said. Mr. Netanyahu promised that no new settlements would be authorized before negotiations with the Palestinians on the final status of the land.



MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed · Blogged · Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
5. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business

Still, Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, has called on Palestinians "to firmly confront with all possible means the Israeli settlement aggression in order to defend the land."

On Friday, the State Department spokesman, Nicholas Burns, called the Israeli Cabinet vote "troubling," and reiterated the department mantra that settlement activity is "complicating and unhelpful" to the peace process. But Mr. Burns also added an appeal to all sides not to do "things that are seen to pre-empt the outcome of a negotiation."

That American appeal, which Mr. Burns described as new, is the essence of the letter to Mr. Netanyahu by the former senior officials. Mr. Strauss said the process of drafting the letter began "because each of the signatories has been so intellectually and emotionally involved in the Middle East peace process for so many years, and we are concerned."

The letter is intended to fit current American policy, Mr. Brzezinski said, and "do nothing to offend the Administration or the Secretary of State," Warren Christopher, or his nominated successor, Madeleine K. Albright. "It has bipartisan support, and it was calculated to be of assistance," Mr. Brzezinski said.

12 Next Page >



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Mac Emulation

» SSH Linux

» SSH Chroot

» SSH Protocol

» SSH Terminal

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel

» Chaoyang China Vacation

» Hotels in Beijing China

» Adoption China Travel

» China Hotel Hong Kong

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel

» Chaoyang China Vacation

» Hotels in Beijing China

» Adoption China Travel

» China Hotel Hong Kong

Ads by Google what's this?

New BlackBerry® Curve™

Small, Portable, Stylish. Brains & Beauty.

BlackBerry Curve.

www.BlackBerryCurve.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Magazine »



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Arts »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

Opinion »

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Theater »



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

With Mideast in Crisis, Albright Considers First Trip to Region

Print

Single-Page

Save

Share

By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: March 28, 1997

Convinced that the Middle East peace process is at one of its most dangerous junctures since 1993, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright is considering making her first trip to the region if it could help to bring the Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table.

At a brief afternoon appearance with the Estonian Foreign Minister, Toomas Ilves, Ms. Albright said: "I will go to the region as it is appropriate. I suspect I will be deeply involved because the issue of the Middle East peace process is one of major national interest to the United States."

The final decision is to be made by President Clinton and his top foreign-policy aides after his special envoy, Dennis B. Ross, returns this weekend from the Middle East.

Mr. Ross met the Palestinian leader, Yasir Arafat, for two hours today in Morocco and then flew to Israel.

Upon his arrival in Israel tonight, Mr. Ross met for about three hours with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at his home in Jerusalem.

An Israeli official said Mr. Ross had reported on his meetings with Mr. Arafat and said that Israel



<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.2;abr=!ie;sz=300x250;click=http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738118/mnum=0000510257/cstr=23279942=_4754f5a3,3102953132,738118^510257^1^0,1_/bnum=23279942/optn=64?trg=;ord=3102953132?"></SCRIPT><NOSCRIPT><A HREF="http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738118/mnum=0000510257/cstr=23279942=_4754f5a3,3102953132,738118^510257^1^0,1_/bnum=23279942/optn=64?trg=http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.2;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=300x250;ord=3102953132?"><IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.2;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=300x250;ord=3102953132?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=300 HEIGHT=250 ALT="Click Here"></A></NOSCRIPT>

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed | Blogged | Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for

would watch over the next two weeks to see what Mr. Arafat's statements and actions would be with regard to terrorism and violence. The official, however, would not say what the Israelis had been asked to do or whether they had made any pledges on their part. Mr. Ross will have further meetings with the Israelis on Friday before leaving Israel to return to the United States.

Mr. Ross said little in public, other than that his talks with Mr. Arafat had been "very thorough."

At the White House, President Clinton said of Mr. Ross, "I don't have anything else to tell you, but he was encouraged by the response of Chairman Arafat to the matters that we discussed here before he left."

But senior American officials here said Mr. Ross's prime message to Mr. Arafat had been the need for "an unambiguous signal, in words and deeds, that violence and terrorism are unacceptable."

The central issue, one official said, is the need to "re-establish a sense of trust and confidence" among Israelis and moderate Palestinians. Only then, the official said, can Mr. Arafat expect the United States to "move beyond that to help resume a meaningful process of negotiations."

The message for Mr. Arafat was that "for us to work with you, then there must be no question about your commitment on the issue of terrorism," the official added.

Another official added that American intelligence remained "ambiguous" about whether Mr. Arafat, as Mr. Netanyahu has charged, had given "a green light" to radical Palestinians like the suicide bomber who blew up a Tel Aviv cafe last week, killing three women.

"But to the extent there is a perception that an ambiguous message was sent, then that needs to be refuted immediately by an explicit, unambiguous message by words and deeds that violence is unacceptable," the official said. The Americans also want Mr. Arafat to return home immediately.

Ms. Albright has been careful not to engage herself too directly and visibly in the Middle East, conscious of the widespread criticism of her predecessor, Warren Christopher, who made many trips there without securing the comprehensive peace he sought.

She has been busy on the telephone with Middle East leaders and has met them in Washington, her aides say. But they say she recognizes that the current situation, which one senior official described as

Gay Tourists
5. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"
Also in Business:
- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Setting Up a FTP Server
» Mac Emulation
» SSH Linux
» SSH Chroot
» SSH Protocol

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Peace Corps Volunteers

"a nadir in the process, where confidence has collapsed," may require her first visit to the region as Secretary of State.

Washington has made no secret of its annoyance with Mr. Netanyahu for breaking ground on a new Israeli housing project in Jerusalem despite American warnings not to do so. The construction was soon followed by the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv and eight days of sporadic clashes. Today, 200 Palestinians threw stones at Israeli troops near the West Bank town of Ramallah, and the troops responded with tear gas and rubber bullets. Mr. Arafat wants a halt to the construction.

1 2 Next Page >

Ads by Google what's this?

The Syrian Ambassador
Imad Moustapha on the Peace Process free streaming video
www.fora.tv

Big Oil's Nightmare
Is suddenly an investor's dream. Get the full story.
www.investmentu.com

Israeli/Palestinian Peace
Show support for two-state solution Lapel pins, buttons, banners & more
www.SupportSanity.org

» Peace Corps
» Volunteer Peace Corps
» Volunteer Abroad
» Volunteer Abroad Dublin

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Peace Corps Volunteers
» Peace Corps
» Volunteer Peace Corps
» Volunteer Abroad
» Volunteer Abroad Dublin

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion » | Business » | Magazine » | Arts » | Opinion » | Theater »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map



The Words of Clinton and Netanyahu: Trust but Little Movement

Print
Single-Page
Save
Share

Published: October 3, 1996

Following are excerpts from remarks today by President Clinton and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel, as transcribed by the Federal Document Clearing House, a private transcription agency. Mr. Clinton spoke at the White House after meeting with Mr. Netanyahu, Chairman Yasir Arafat of the Palestinian Authority and King Hussein of Jordan; Mr. Netanyahu spoke at the Israeli Embassy. Mr. Arafat issued no statement.

PRESIDENT CLINTON

I'd like to begin by thanking King Hussein, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat for coming here to Washington at this critical and very difficult moment for the Middle East peace process. Their journey reflects a true commitment to peace and an understanding that there is no alternative to the path of peace their people have traveled so far along in the last few years.

I invited them here with three urgent goals in mind.

First, to seek to curb the terrible violence and death that we saw last week.

Second, to get the Israelis and the Palestinians talking again at the highest levels.

And third, to help both parties return to the hard work of building peace through negotiations.

Today, I can report progress on these goals. First, the Israelis and Palestinians clearly are talking again at the highest levels. I believe that calm, constructive, face-to-face meetings Prime Minister Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat have had here will help to build trust between them, and promote progress on the issues that still divide them.

The Prime Minister and the chairman agree that they are partners in peace, understand that it is vital to take each other -- take into account each other's needs and concerns and realize the importance of removing the frictions between them.

Second, the Prime Minister and Chairman Arafat have recommitted themselves to a nonviolent future, to renouncing violence in the resolution of their disputes.

Third, they are ready to renew and intensify negotiations on implementing the interim agreement, with Hebron as the first priority.

They are committed to engaging immediately in talks. And to achieving tangible progress quickly. To assist them in this effort, I am sending Dennis Ross, our special Middle East coordinator, to the region now. The very first meeting will take place on Sunday morning at Erez. They want to resolve the problem of Israeli redeployment from Hebron, and they want to achieve this as soon as possible.

I might point out that these talks will be occurring continuously, and we will -- these will be the first continuous peace talks that have been held since the Prime Minister assumed office with the Palestinians.

Finally, the leaders also understand they need to make arrangements between their security forces so that cooperation is more reliable and the situation on the ground is stabilized.

They are prepared to do what is needed to achieve that, as well.

All of us have put the meetings we have had over the last few days into the proper perspective. The peace process did not start today and it will not be finished tomorrow.

For three years now, the Israelis and the Palestinians have been moving forward along the path to a lasting peace. Every step is hard. It requires both sides to make difficult decisions and to keep their eyes fixed on the prize of lasting peace.

But the progress they have made has proved to the world that progress is possible and peace is possible.

Both sides know there is no turning back. Just as there can be no peace without security, there can be no true security without peace.

MR. NETANYAHU

I think this was the first step to break down certain barriers that were there of lack of confidence in one another. I cannot say that we now know each other fully well and so on, but we did spend several hours together discussing a lot of the issues openly and in a very cordial environment.

And I think this will facilitate trust. I think we accomplished a significant improvement in that area.

I say that when you have trust, all sorts of things that are problematic can be solved. And when you

don't have trust, everything becomes a problem.

We've accomplished quite a few things. And I think the most important one is to cement the principle that the path to peace is through negotiations and not through violence. That is that the principle that we must cease any forms of violence and that if anyone has a grievance, he brings it to the negotiating table and nowhere else. I think that is a central principle by which we can guard peace.

I want to assure you about our commitment to peace. This is our compass. It's our map. It's our hope for our children and for the children of the Palestinians as well. We know that such a peace is inextricably bound with security and that peace can progress as long as security holds.

12 Next Page >

MOST POPULAR

- E-Mailed
- Blogged
- Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
5. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads

What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel

» Chaoyang China Vacation

» Hotels in Beijing China

» China Hotel Hong Kong

» Travel to China

Ads by Google what's this?

BlackBerry® Curve™ 8300

Portable. Stylish. Smart. Style Meets Substance. BlackBerry Curve.

www.BlackBerryCurve.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »

Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On



Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Magazine »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans



Arts »

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Opinion »

Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

Theater »



HomeWorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutosBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

Home Page | My Times | Today's Paper | Video | Most Popular | Times Topics

Log In Register Now

Archives

The New York Times

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World | U.S. | N.Y. / Region | Business | Technology | Science | Health | Sports | Opinion | Arts | Style | Travel | Jobs | Real Estate | Autos

Consumer-driven health plans. A better way to help employees improve their health.
From UniCare's Solaura plans.
UniCare. A Healthy Dose of Innovation.
> Learn More

2 Leaders: To Speed the Peace Effort

Print
Save
Share

Published: July 20, 1999

Following are excerpts from a transcript of a news conference yesterday in the Old Executive Office Building by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak of Israel, as recorded by The New York Times.

PRESIDENT CLINTON -- Prime Minister Barak and I have had a very good series of meetings over the past few days. Of course we have focused primarily on the Middle East peace process. We strongly agree that a negotiated peace is the best way to make Israel more secure, the best path to lasting stability and prosperity for all the peoples of the Middle East.

The Prime Minister is determined to accelerate that process, to reach, with Chairman Arafat, a permanent-status agreement between Israel and the Palestinian people and to achieve a broader regional peace that includes Syria and Lebanon. As he has said, the objective now is to put the peace process back on all its tracks.

But we should have no illusions. The way ahead will be difficult. There are hard decisions to be made. Knowing his long record of accomplishment, both as soldier and civilian, and having spent a good deal of time with him these past few days, I believe the Prime Minister is ready to move forward decisively. And America is clearly ready to help in any way we can. As Israel takes calculated risks for peace, we will continue to support Israel's defense. Today we have agreed to strengthen our security assistance to Israel, so Israel can best meet the threats to its citizens, including terrorism and the growing threat of long-range missiles and weapons of mass destruction. We have also agreed to establish a high-level joint planning group to consult on security issues and to report back regularly. . . .

To enhance our scientific cooperation, we will create a working group between NASA and the Israel Space Agency to advance scientific research, educational activities and the peaceful uses of space. And an Israeli astronaut and a payload of Israeli instruments will fly on a space shuttle mission next year. . . .

PRIME MINISTER BARAK -- President Clinton and I have just concluded the last in our series of meetings. Those meetings were held in an atmosphere of deep friendship and understanding that characterizes the bilateral relationship between Israel and the United States. Our policy is based on the following.

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Magazine »



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Arts »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript">
document.write('<a href="http://adopt.specificclick.net/lnk.
sm?aplcd=34750;3002;3087;26128;51890.f.9.fh.
nr.494@@gc@@zmm ziyli@@-4_9@@f@@f:1196749181438;
href=http://clk.atdmt.com/MUP/go/
spcfactb0030000003mup/direct/01/" target="_blank"><img
src="http://view.atdmt.com/MUP/view/
spcfactb0030000003mup/di
script><noscript><a href="http://
sm?aplcd=34750;3002;3087
Monkey Business
Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Opinion »

Theater »



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

POPULAR

Searched
Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Note for Iran
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
5. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:
- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Energy Independence

» Clean Energy Fund

We are committed to the renewal of the peace process. It is our intention to move the process forward simultaneously on all tracks: bilateral, the Palestinian, the Syrians and the Lebanese, as well as the multilateral. We will leave no stone unturned in our efforts to reinvigorate the process, which must be based upon direct talks between the parties themselves and conducted in an atmosphere of mutual trust. Any unilateral steps, acts or threats of terrorism, violence or other forms of aggression have no place in the process of peace. The peace we seek to establish is only the one that will enhance the security of Israel. Only a strong and secure Israel is capable of making the difficult choices that the process requires. I will not shy away from those difficult choices but I have responsibility to the people of Israel to do all that I possibly can to minimize the risks and dangers involved. . . .

Q. Mr. President, the Prime Minister has committed himself to implementing the West Bank pullback agreed on at Wye River. You just talked about accelerating the peace process. Realistically speaking, looking ahead, how long before the final-status talks get under way on the tough issues like Jerusalem, the Palestinian hopes for a homeland, refugees and what specific steps can the United States do to facilitate this process?

CLINTON . . . We should support the security of Israel, the stability of the region, the economic development of the region, and we should help to work out any of the particular problems as they arise. In terms of the timing, I don't think it's for the United States to set the timetables here. . . .

BARAK . . . I would suggest a kind of framework of about 15 months within which we will know whether we have a breakthrough and are really going to put an end to the conflict, or, alternatively, I hope this will not be the case, we are stuck once again.

I use the kind of framework of 15 months to signal to all publics and us, the players, that we are not talking about a magic solution that will drop upon us from heaven in three weeks. And we do not intend to drag our foot for another three years. . . .

Q. What is your reaction to the meeting of [Syrian Vice President] Abdel-Halim Khaddam in Damascus with the few Palestinian organizations that are opposing the peace process? Do you think that it's a significant step for peace?

BARAK . . . I did not get a real report about this meeting but if there was such a meeting and the Syrians really asked the terror organizations to reduce the level of activity, it is, of course, good news for all of us. . . .

Q. You've said that when Mrs. Clinton expresses her opinions publicly she's just doing something in public which you've done in private before, that is have disagreements. That's the American way. But when she talks about an opinion in which she takes the Israeli position on Jerusalem, doesn't this make it more difficult for you to be that honest broker?

CLINTON -- No, no. For one thing, let me say, that issue is not one. That's not the public-private distinction. The Government of the United States, the Executive Branch, the President, is a sponsor of the peace process and a facilitator of it. In that context, those of us with positions of official responsibility who are all the time asking Israel and the Palestinians were all the time asking both sides not to do anything which prejudices final-status issues. I have taken the position that my Government should not prejudice final-status issues. There are many American citizens who consider, for example, Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel. . . .

» Alternative Energy Jobs
» Alternative Energy
» Clean Energy Economy

Q. Do you see, Mr. President, and you, Prime Minister Barak, a Palestinian state at the end of this period of time?

BARAK -- I think it's too early to think of the results of the negotiations about permanent status that were hardly begun. And I don't think that you should interpret this 15-month framework as a kind of a deadline where everything should be either fully concluded and implemented or the whole thing is blown apart. . . .

Ads by Google what's this?

NSA Training & Careers
Earn a degree in Criminal Justice and work in National Security.
www.uphoenixonline.com

Terrorism Studies
Earn a certificate in terrorism studies 100% online. Get free info.
www.APUS.edu/Terrorism-Studies

5300+ C4ISR Jobs
Intelligence, Engineers, Linguists PMs, Scientists, Technologists
www.IntelligenceCareers.com

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune | Opinion

iht.comBusinessCultureSportsOpinion

Morning home delivery - save up to 65%

AMERICASEUROPEASIA/PACIFICAFRICA/MIDDLE EAST TECH/MEDIASTYLEHEALTH

SEARCH Advanced Search

TRAVELPROPERTIESBLOGSDISCUSSIONSSPECIAL REPORTSAUDIONEWS


A New Middle East Peace Initiative

By Mikhail Gorbachev Published: SATURDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2000

MOSCOW: It is almost a decade since former President George Bush and I co-sponsored the first Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid in 1991. We were filled with hope then. For the first time the two sides explicitly recognized the rights of the other to exist and vowed to work together towards peace. Now it seems that both sides have forgotten this promise.

In my experience, when you take a step forward, your opponent is forced to do the same. Rather than continue with the impossible task of resolving all the issues in advance, it would be more fruitful, especially given the current situation, for the Israeli leadership to make a firm statement that they accept the right of Palestine to become a viable independent state and then to support the long-awaited declaration of this state.

The two nations of Israel and Palestine could then proceed to discuss the details of borders, and even the question of Jerusalem, on the basis of inter-state negotiations, with the help of international mediators as necessary. It should not be forgotten that once a people have their



Most E-Mailed

24 Hours | 7 Days | 30 Days

1. Paris suburb riots called 'a lot worse' than in 2005
2. Abu Dhabi breaks from its past with Citigroup investment
3. Dutch lawmaker planning film criticizing the Quran

own state, violence becomes a threat to security rather than a tool.

Nothing less than the creation of their own state will satisfy the people of Palestine enough to put their trust back in the diplomatic process. It will then be time for the international community to seriously reassess its role in the peace process. There is currently a strong opposition on the part of Israel and the United States to what is being called Yasser Arafat's desire to "internationalize the conflict" by demanding an international investigation into the violence, and a UN protection force to shield the Palestinians. I would rather call for the internationalization of the peace process.

In the 1980s the United States attempted to solve the Middle Eastern problem unilaterally. When these attempts proved futile, George Shultz visited me in Moscow to suggest that we work together. This opened the way to the Madrid conference. Should we not draw some lessons out of these decade-old mistakes?

Today in Opinion

Starting from Annapolis

A loss for privacy rights

The citizenship surge

The discussions in Camp David in July should have been welcomed as the first real talks on Jerusalem. Instead, the diplomatic breakdown, ensuing violence and the U.S. elections, have highlighted the fact that the three-party process is intensely vulnerable to both the pressures of domestic politics and accusations of partiality.

We need to involve more players, and adopt a transparent approach less likely to fall hostage to domestic politics. The recent return to arms has also made it painfully clear that peace based only on diplomatic efforts can never last long. There must also be a safety net of economic, infrastructure and other interdependencies to serve as a backbone for peace.

We need a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East to develop the region, reduce the inequalities that are a source of so much frustration, and act as a catalyst for cooperation. This should in no way be seen as an exercise in charity, as any success in resolving the conflict in this strategically and economically vital part of the world, and building long-term international cooperation and stability, will not only remove the enormous cost of the conflict but be a wise investment in the future.

In this regard, I strongly believe that water could be a natural vehicle for peace in the Middle East. Therefore, rather than deter us, this tragic deterioration of the political process has given new resolve to the work of Green Cross International, the environmental organization of which I am president. Whatever the political climate, the people of this region need to drink water and to

4. To Muslim girls in U.S., Girl Scouts offer a chance to fit in
5. Google's next frontier: Renewable energy
6. 'Gray' market for iPhones thriving
7. In French suburbs, same rage, but new tactics
8. Oil producers see the world and buy it up
9. As tension with Volkswagen mounts, Porsche doesn't rush into takeover
10. The funeral industry increasingly goes digital

INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune

iht.com/ luxury



Video Exclusive:
Suzy Menkes interviews Luxury Leaders

Also from Supreme Luxury: Moscow 2007

- In Russia, luxe in the bloodline
- Moscow has hot clubs but it's a cold wait to get in
- In Russia, luxury no longer means loud

Blogs: Passages

The Globalist, Roger Cohen, begins a conversation with readers in the spirit of free debate and dissent.



» Read Passages

Ads by Google

Coffee Exposed
A shocking secret coffee co's don't want you to know.
www.coffeefool.com

grow their crops.

I was greatly heartened by meetings which I had with Prime Minister Ehud Barak, Mr. Arafat and King Abdullah II of Jordan earlier this year, in which all three leaders agreed that solutions to the region-wide water scarcity cannot be arrived at unilaterally. The Middle East's shared water sources could provide an avenue for mutually-beneficial cooperation in order to meet the essential water and food needs of the people. It also eliminates, or at least alleviates, one of the major security concerns in the region. And it could lead to an innovative and united international initiative to build a lasting peace in the region.

-

The writer, the last president of the former Soviet Union, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.]

Volunteer Abroad with GVI
Over 120 projects in more than 30 countries from 1 to 52 weeks
www.gviusa.com

Gap Year Volunteer Abroad
Make a real difference, working side-by-side with local people.
www.crossculturalsolutions.org

Volunteer Teaching
Teach English on the tropical island of Koh Samui, Thailand!
www.IslandTEFL.com

Home > Opinion Back to top

Copyright © 2007 The International Herald Tribune. All rights reserved.

<SCRIPT language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript">document.write('');</SCRIPT>

INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune | Opinion

To Reach Middle East Peace, Leave Oslo and Return to Madrid

By Marwan Bishara Published: THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 2001

PARIS: These days one needs reminding that the purpose behind the Middle East peace process has not been to help Ehud Barak get re-elected or earn Bill Clinton a Nobel Peace Prize. It is to stop the century-old conflict between Palestinians and Jews.

Prime Minister Barak has failed. President Clinton had more than an ample chance in the last years to put an end to occupation. His administration has sponsored seven accords that were never fully implemented, and his last ditch effort to finalize a framework agreement will fail because it has been subjugated to Israel's electoral logic.

Only a deal favorable to Israel could get Mr. Barak re-elected. In the present Israeli circumstances, an accord that fulfilled UN Resolution 242 and met minimum Palestinian requirements to end the conflict would help Mr. Barak's opponent, the infamous Ariel Sharon, to

<SCRIPT language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript">document.write('');</SCRIPT>

Most E-Mailed

24 Hours | 7 Days | 30 Days

1. Paris suburb riots called 'a lot worse' than in 2005
2. Abu Dhabi breaks from its past with Citigroup investment
3. Dutch lawmaker planning film criticizing the Quran
4. To Muslim girls in U.S., Girl Scouts offer a chance to fit in
5. Google's next frontier: Renewable energy
6. 'Gray' market for iPhones thriving
7. In French suburbs, same rage, but new tactics
8. Oil producers see the world and buy it up
9.

win.

Today the bets are on Mr. Sharon because Mr. Barak has alienated many of those who supported him in the last elections, notably the Arab minority and many in the peace camp, who together comprise almost one-third of the Israeli electorate.

Mr. Barak's mixed signals leave Israelis bewildered. One day he makes overtures to the religious parties, the next he shifts to the secular camp. He tries to negotiate a peaceful solution but aims at a unilateral physical separation.

Today in Opinion

Starting from Annapolis

A loss for privacy rights

The citizenship surge

It is not clear whether Mr. Barak is competing against Mr. Sharon or Yasser Arafat, or whether he is the candidate capable of bringing peace or the iron man who orders inhumane closures and assassination of Palestinian leaders.

For Israel and for the sake of peace, a moderate government lead by Labor is far better than a coalition government of rightist and fundamentalist parties headed by Mr. Sharon. Unfortunately, Israelis are offered two generals and no real choice.

Perhaps, as some in the peace camp contend, the focus should be on transforming Labor into a true peace party after the elections, one that exchanges its generals for able statesmen. Sooner rather than later, Mr. Sharon will fail to bring peace or security, and Israelis would then have a real alternative.

In the meantime, Palestinians who chose not to surrender their basic historical rights will endure more hardships. But their intifada has curbed settlement activity and minimized security cooperation. The Palestinian Authority can no longer do Israel's bidding while the occupation continues.

In cases of colonialism, permanent peace comes after, not before, occupation ends and historical injustice is addressed — here, in particular, the uprooting of more than three-quarters of the Palestinian population during the 1948 war.

This does not necessarily mean that the 3.7 million registered Palestinian refugees would return to Israel once their right was recognized. But the right of return is an inalienable and must be recognized in order to facilitate the end of the conflict. Such recognition would not lead to the

As tension with Volkswagen mounts, Porsche doesn't rush into takeover

10. The funeral industry increasingly goes digital

INTERNATIONAL Herald Tribune

iht.com/luxury



Video Exclusive:
Suzy Menkes interviews Luxury Leaders

Also from Supreme Luxury: Moscow 2007

- In Russia, luxe in the bloodline
- Moscow has hot clubs but it's a cold wait to get in
- In Russia, luxury no longer means loud

Blogs: Passages

The Globalist, Roger Cohen, begins a conversation with readers in the spirit of free debate and dissent.



» Read Passages

Ads by Google

Iran Nuclear War Prophecy
Bible reveals fate of Iran & Arabs Discover why next event in prophecy
EscapeAllTheseThings.com

Pongo - Israeli T-Shirts
Your Shop for Israel & Army T-Shirt 100% cotton, Made in Israel.
www.Pongo.co.il

Coffee Exposed
A shocking secret coffee co's don't want you to know.
www.coffeefool.com

annihilation of Israel, as some claim. Rather, it would liberate Israel from its dark past and pave the way for its peaceful existence in the region.

A resolution of the Jerusalem and the refugee problems can be found in a regional context and will require international guarantees. This can be accomplished through the convening of a conference along the lines of the 1991 Madrid conference, with the participation of Europe, Russia and the United Nations in addition to the United States. This would facilitate discussion of paramount regional issues such as water, security, borders and economic cooperation.

Such a package deal could enable the Palestinians and other Arabs to take the necessary steps to normalize relations with Israel.

All of this could be helped by the fact that the foreign policy team that led the first Bush administration's initiative at Madrid, after the Gulf War, is returning to power. The peace conference was meant to show, after the liberation of Kuwait, that America was willing to work for a comprehensive settlement between Israel and its neighbors.

A decade later, and after seven years of the Oslo process, reviving the Madrid spirit is the best available option. This should be based on UN resolutions, not on the Clinton ideas, although all parties should be free to bring forward their suggestions.

If politics is the art of the possible, then intelligent politics in the Middle East should be to convince the parties that a peace is not a zero-sum game but a win-win choice.

Mr. Bishara is a researcher at l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, Paris) and author of the forthcoming book "Israel, Palestine: What Peace?" He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.]

1 | 2 Next Page

MA Conflict Resolution
You Can Make a Difference University of Oregon
conflict.uoregon.edu

Features
Business
Opinion
Classifieds
Company Info
Newspaper
Other Formats
More

Culture Style & Design Travel At Home Abroad Blogs Reader Discussions Weather
Business Home Marketplace by Bloomberg Your Money Funds Insite Currency Converter
Opinion Home Email the Editor Newspaper Masthead
Classifieds Home Properties Education Center
About the IHT Advertise in the IHT IHT Events Press Office
Today's Page One in Europe Today's Page One in Asia Publishing Partnerships
IHT Mobile RSS AudioNews PDA & Smartphones Netvibes IHT Electronic Edition E-Mail Alerts Twitter
Daily Article Index Top 10 Hyper Sudoku IHT Developer Blog

Search

Contact Us | Site Index | Archives | Terms of Use | Contributor Policy | Privacy & Cookies

Copyright © 2007 the International Herald Tribune. All rights reserved.

Home Page . My Times . Today's Paper . Video . Most Popular . Times Topics

Log InRegister Now

Archives

The New York Times

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World . U.S. . N.Y. / Region . Business . Technology . Science . Health . Sports . Opinion . Arts . Style . Travel . Jobs . Real Estate . Autos

<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N3016.advertising.com/B2577592.3;abr=!ie;sz=728x90;click=http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000725904/mnum=0000513305/cstr=37409461=_4754fad3,1222223568,725904^513305^81^0,1_/bnum=37409461/optn=64?trg=;ord=1222223568?"> </SCRIPT> <NOSCRIPT> <A HREF="http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000725904/mnum=0000513305/cstr=37409461=_4754fad3,1222223568,725904^513305^81^0,1_/bnum=37409461/optn=64?trg=http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N3016.advertising.com/B2577592.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=1222223568?"> <IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N3016.advertising.com/B2577592.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=1222223568?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=728 HEIGHT=90 ALT=""></A> </NOSCRIPT>

MIDEAST TURMOIL: THE ENVOY; From Oslo Talks to Jenin: U. N. Aide Comes Under Fire

Print

Single-Page

Save

Share

By SERGE SCHMEMANN
Published: April 23, 2002

Since he visited the Jenin refugee camp last week and expressed his horror at what he saw, Terje Roed-Larsen, the chief United Nations representative here and the man who began the secret contacts that led to the Oslo agreements, has come under an unusually harsh personal attack by the Israeli government. He has been accused of "record-high audacity" and "anti-Semitic ideas," and officials in the prime minister's office have talked of having him expelled.

The attacks may be the most furious the 54-year-old Norwegian has faced, but they are hardly the first. As an active supporter of the land-for-peace process that he helped begin in Oslo a decade ago,



 <noscript></noscript>

he has been assailed by both Israeli and Arab foes of the agreements. His denunciations of suicide bombings have also prompted some accusations of bias from the Palestinians.

"I feel supremely confident because I know I did the right thing and I know I'm doing the right thing," Mr. Roed-Larsen said in a telephone interview. "Any decent human being in that place on that day, seeing corpses dug out just below the surface, smelling the stench of decay, would have been shocked and horrified. That is not an accusation. That is a reaction to human tragedy."

Today, at a news conference announcing the composition of a United Nations team to look into the events in Jenin, Secretary General Kofi Annan said he was disappointed that Mr. Roed-Larsen was being publicly attacked by Israeli officials "for just talking about what he saw."

"He never accused Israel of massacre," Mr. Annan said. "He never even used the word massacre."

The intensity of the criticism from the Israeli government has come as something of a surprise. The devastation of the refugee camp has been the focus of many news accounts, and other foreign officials who have visited the Jenin camp -- including the United States assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs, William J. Burns -- have deplored the destruction. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell had called on Israel to allow relief workers into the camp.

But it is on Mr. Roed-Larsen, whose formal title is United Nations special coordinator for the Middle East peace process, that the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon appears to have focused its greatest anger, especially since the decision to send a United Nations fact-finding team to Jenin.

While visiting the Jenin camp last Thursday, Mr. Roed-Larsen made various comments to reporters. He described the destruction by the Israeli Army as "morally repugnant," and said it was "shocking" that relief workers had not been allowed into the camp for 11 days. "Combating terrorism does not give a blank check to kill civilians," he said. He also infuriated the Israeli government by summoning foreign ambassadors to relate what he had found.

Defense of Mr. Roed-Larsen has come from Israeli officials he has worked with over the years. "Generally speaking he's a great friend of the state of Israel," said Danny Yatom, a former head of the Mossad intelligence agency who worked with him for many years.

Uri Savir, an Israeli negotiator who worked with Mr. Roed-Larsen on the Oslo accords, called the

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed · Blogged · Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
5. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:
- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Setting Up a FTP Server

charges leveled against the United Nations envoy a "disgrace." Ron Pundak, an academic who was involved in the secret meetings in Oslo and who is now director of the Peres Center for Peace, described the attacks on Mr. Roed-Larsen as "outrageous."

"Knowing him for almost a decade, I can say he's definitely not anti-Israeli," Mr. Pundak said. "I consider him as a very, very honest broker. On every occasion, when a bomb exploded here, he was one of the first to stand up against Yasir Arafat and criticize him."

By most accounts, Mr. Sharon's antipathy for Mr. Roed-Larsen predates the current furor, and is grounded in the prime minister's abhorrence of the Oslo accords. Since his election, Mr. Sharon has refused to meet him and has resented his constant efforts to act as go-between between Mr. Arafat, the Palestinian leader, and the Israeli government.

1 2 Next Page >

Ads by Google what's this?

Terrorism Studies
Earn a certificate in terrorism studies 100% online. Get free info.
www.APUS.edu/Terrorism-Studies

NSA Training & Careers
Earn a degree in Criminal Justice and work in National Security.
www.uphoenixonline.com

FISA is Broken. Act Now
Block Immunity for Phone Companies Demand individual warrants
www.aclu.org/FISA

» Mac Emulation
» Mac OS X
» SSH Linux
» SSH Chroot

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Learn Arabic Lessons
» Learn Hebrew com
» I Want to Learn Arabic
» Hebrew Lessons
» Learn Hebrew with a CD

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Learn Arabic Lessons
» Learn Hebrew com
» I Want to Learn Arabic
» Hebrew Lessons
» Learn Hebrew with a CD

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion » | Health » | Television » | Opinion » | Business » | Sports »



Bloggingheads Video: Stem-Cell Semantics



Asperger's Syndrome Gets a Very Public Face



Morning TV Veers From News to Frills

Editorial: Evolution and Texas

Is Texas about to become the next state to undermine the teaching of evolution?



A Lurid Aftermath to a Fund Manager's Fast Life



Driver Piles Up Victories and the Miles

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

Home Page . My Times . Today's Paper . Video . Most Popular . Times Topics

Log InRegister Now

The New York Times Archives

Tuesday, December 4, 2007

Search

World . U.S. . N.Y. / Region . Business . Technology . Science . Health . Sports . Opinion . Arts . Style . Travel . Jobs . Real Estate . Autos

After Oslo

Print

Single-Page

Save

Share

By ETHAN BRONNER
Published: May 4, 2003

SHATTERED DREAMS
The Failure of the Peace Process
in the Middle East, 1995-2002.
By Charles Enderlin.
Translated by Susan Fairfield.
Illustrated. 458 pp. New York:
Other Press. $28.

I once asked King Hussein of Jordan whether he considered Zionism legitimate. Did he accept that there was any historical basis to the Jews' claim to a portion of Palestine as their homeland? He looked at me as if I were from Mars and ducked the question. Later he told a Jordanian colleague that only a Jew could have posed such a strange question. Perhaps by the time of his death in 1999 he had softened his view. But his reaction still exemplifies that of the vast majority of Arabs today.

Even the many who favor peace with Israel under certain conditions accept its reality but not its legitimacy. On the Israeli side there are similar denials. Ask most Israelis about Palestinian nationalism or the centrality of Jerusalem to Palestinian history and you will get a dismissive wave of

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed . Blogged . Searched

1. Op-Ed Contributor: A Vote for Latin
2. Paul Krugman: Innovating Our Way to Financial Crisis
3. Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans
4. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
5. Buenos Aires Journal: In Macho Argentina, a New Beacon for Gay Tourists
6. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
7. Official Leaves Post as Texas Prepares to Debate Science Education Standards
8. Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?
9. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
10. U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Arms Work

Go to Complete List »

The New York Times BUSINESS
nytimes.com/business

the hand and a lecture asserting that there was no Palestinian identity until the Arabs invented it as a weapon to wield against Israel. While covering the conflict, I was struck by how fundamental a gap these perceptions represented. But when the Oslo peace framework was signed by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in 1993, I started to reconsider. When I asked officials on both sides to reconcile their contradictory versions of history, they would do that dismissive hand wave and say the past was no longer their concern. I wanted to believe them.

Following the failure of the Camp David peace summit in 2000 and since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada shortly thereafter, it seemed clear that the process could never succeed without a more fundamental reassessment of competing versions of the past. Reading "Shattered Dreams," by Charles Enderlin, reaffirms that concern. Until the two sides teach their children what it means to have stood in the shoes of their adversaries -- something the Israelis began doing but stopped, and something the Palestinians have never done -- the chance of real peace remains slim.

"Shattered Dreams" is a deeply reported and scrupulous account of seven key years in the history of the conflict -- from the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November of 1995 to the first election of Ariel Sharon a little over two years ago. Enderlin has been the Jerusalem bureau chief for one of French television's main stations for the past 13 years. He persuaded a number of officials to allow him to interview them on videotape during their negotiations on condition that he not broadcast the tapes before the end of 2001. Later, he interviewed them again, and persuaded many to share notes from secret meetings. From these he produced a documentary that was shown in numerous countries, and on PBS last summer.

This book is a written record of those interviews and notes. When it appeared last year in France, it was a best seller. Fortunately, it has now been translated into English by Susan Fairfield. Unfortunately, "Shattered Dreams" has a slightly amateurish feel. It is written entirely in the present tense, which becomes irritating. The story gushes forward with little context or analysis. But this also proves to be a kind of virtue. As Enderlin moves from event to notes to taped interview, you have the refreshing sense that you are not being spun. He is simply seeking to represent reality in its complexity -- the personalities, the accidents of fate, the sins of omission and commission. In fact, despite the book's narrative flaws, it offers the most complete and balanced picture yet of the failure of the Middle East peace process.

The accepted story in the United States is that after several years of halting negotiations, at Camp



ABC's sequel to "Dancing with the Stars"

Also in Business:

- Jay Leno's gift
- NBC will buy TiVo data
- What's on, who's watching and why it matters

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Setting Up a FTP Server

» Mac Emulation

» Mac OS X

» SSH Linux

» SSH Chroot

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel

» Chaoyang China Vacation

» Hotels in Beijing China

» China Hotel Hong Kong

» Viking Travel

Related Ads What are Related Ads?

» Beijing Travel

» Chaoyang China Vacation

» Hotels in Beijing China

» China Hotel Hong Kong

» Viking Travel

Ads by Google what's this?

David the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak offered Yasir Arafat some 90 percent of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and a reasonable deal on Jerusalem. Arafat balked, made no counteroffer and two months later gave his real response, the violent uprising, complete with suicide bombings. Enderlin's story makes clear that there is truth to this version but, by itself, it will not do. Unless you understand the way Barak ignored the Palestinians in 1999 in a failed effort to cut a deal with the Syrians first; unless you see the accelerated level of Jewish settlement building; unless you grasp the dynamic by which the Israeli right interrupted the peace process, forcing Barak to pull back, you will not have a complete picture. In this book, we learn what was offered at Camp David -- 76 percent of the West Bank -- and how it grew to 92 percent the following January before talks broke down. Errors, misjudgments, false moves and internal tensions -- Israeli, Palestinian and American -- are all part of the sad story.

1 2 Next Page >

Ethan Bronner, assistant editorial page editor of The Times, was the Middle East correspondent for The Boston Globe from 1991 to 1997.

New BlackBerry® Curve™

Small, Portable, Stylish. Brains & Beauty.

BlackBerry Curve.

www.BlackBerryCurve.com

Inside NYTimes.com

Opinion »



Letters: Hospice Care | When the Dying Live On

Business »

Spam's End? Maybe, if Time Allows

Magazine »



Kill the Cat That Kills the Bird?

Arts »



Brad Pitt Commissions Designs for New Orleans

Opinion »

Monkey Business

Stanley Fish on a clash between the imperatives of religion and the rule of law.

Theater »



Love, War and Betrayal in 'Cymbeline'

HomeWorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutosBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times CompanyPrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsMedia KitSite Map

The New York Times

Editorials/Op-Ed

Get an inside look at the latest fashion trends



<SCRIPT language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie;sz=728x90;click=http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738121/mnum=0000510259/cstr=81390530=_4754f39d,1130691500,738121^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=81390530/optn=64?trg=;ord=1130691500?"></SCRIPT><NOSCRIPT><A HREF="http://servedby.advertising.com/click/site=0000738121/mnum=0000510259/cstr=81390530=_4754f39d,1130691500,738121^510259^1^0,1_/bnum=81390530/optn=64?trg=http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=1130691500?"><IMG SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/ad/N1773.Advertising.com/B2563720.3;abr=!ie4;abr=!ie5;sz=728x90;ord=1130691500?" BORDER=0 WIDTH=728 HEIGHT=90 ALT="Click Here"></A></NOSCRIPT>

OP-ED COLUMNIST

After Arafat, Hope

By WILLIAM SAFIRE

Published: November 10, 2004

WASHINGTON — The only lifelong terrorist to win a Nobel Peace Prize lies comatose in Paris, with his well-heeled wife - for years unwilling to share his privations in Ramallah - screaming at Palestinian leaders on Al Jazeera television that "they're trying to bury [him] alive!" More likely, they may be trying to learn in what secret accounts he buried millions of dollars.

ARTICLE TOOLS

E-Mail This Article

Printer-Friendly Format

Most E-Mailed Articles

Columnist Page: William Safire



Forum: Discuss This Column

E-mail: safire@nytimes.com

Advertisement

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> document.write(''); </script><noscript></noscript>

TIMES NEWS TRACKER

Topics	Alerts
Palestinians	Create
Israel	Create
Sharon, Ariel	Create
Blair, Tony	Create

Track news that interests you.

Create Your Own | Manage

Most Popular Alerts | Take a Tour

CLICK HERE TO SUBSCRIBE

Israelis should remember Arafat's one "good deed": four years ago, a soon-to-be ousted Israeli prime minister and a Nobel-hungry U.S. president made the Palestinian Authority an incredibly generous and dangerous offer: dividing Jerusalem, handing over almost all of the West Bank, and even partially establishing a "right of return" for some Palestinians who fled an Arab invasion of the new Jewish state a half-century ago.

Arafat's "good deed" was to reject this sweeping offer and to launch another wave of suicidal homicide. In a macabre diplomatic sense, his refusal to take "yes" for an answer was a lucky thing for Israel's image: if those huge concessions had later been presented to Israelis in a promised referendum, Jewish voters would surely have turned down the Clinton-brokered deal. Proof of that was in the avalanche that then ousted the desperate Ehud Barak and elected the determined Ariel Sharon.

In that case, world opprobrium would have been aimed at Israelis for their concern about defensible borders rather than at Arafat for revealing his goal of driving out the Jews.

That blame did not fall on Israel. Thanks to worldwide disgust at Arafat's all-or-nothing demand and his refusal to stop the killing of innocents on school buses, Sharon was able to freeze him out of civilized diplomacy. Plain prudence required the isolation of the Palestinian dedicated to the war process until new leadership emerged to show that the Arabs were ready to create a peaceful neighboring state.

President Bush, especially after terrorism reached us on 9/11, saw the wisdom in Sharon's approach. Arafat, squelching all Palestinian leaders who wanted to disarm Hamas and other jihadists, abruptly ceased to be the most frequent foreign visitor to the White House. Bush did not object, as France and the U.N. bureaucracy did, to the security fence designed to save Israeli lives.

Sharon, with no Palestinian empowered to end the violence, then made his historic disengagement move, stunning fellow Jews who saw him as the defender of the Gaza settlers. He insisted the Palestinians take "yes" for an answer and began the painful business of withdrawal (a word he avoids).

Despite the uproar from his religious right, Sharon - with the Israeli majority and his American ally firmly behind him - faced down his Likud Party and members of his cabinet and marched implacably ahead.

Now here comes Tony Blair to Washington. In Iraq, the gutsy Brit stands shoulder to shoulder with the U.S., at

considerable political cost at home; Bush owes him plenty. Blair needs a big favor to get the Bush-haters in Britain off his back, so welcomed Bush's re-election with "the need to revitalize the Middle East peace process is the single most pressing political challenge in our world today."

Translated into undiplomatic English, that means: Let's you, me, Vladimir Putin and Kofi Annan get together and tell Sharon to re-offer the old Barak-Clinton deal to whichever Palestinian will listen. Then the Muslim violence will stop all over the world. Step 1: appoint a big-name special envoy to deliver the ultimatum.

Just imagine: this suggests that if there had been no stiff-necked Israel, we would never have had the bombing of Pan Am 103 by Qaddafi, no massacre of 10,000 Sunnis at Hama by Hafez al-Assad, no poison-gassing of 5,000 Kurds at Halabja by Saddam, no continued unpleasantness in Chechnya, or that incident in Lower Manhattan. Just lean on Israel and we'll solve "the most pressing political challenge in the world today."

C'mon, Tony; we don't thank one big ally by selling out a smaller one. There's an honorable way.

Let Arafat pass from the scene. Let the Palestinians show they are ready to be a nation and not a bunch of warring factions. Let them register voters, including women, as the Afghans did, hold their first competitive election, and eschew violence.

Then let us invite the elected Palestinian and Israeli leaders to Camp David to work out their final settlement.

RELATED ARTICLES

- Israel, the U.S. and the Age of Terror (November 7, 2004)
- Palestinian Leaders to Visit Arafat's Doctors (November 7, 2004)
- Arafat's Feud With Israel May Outlive Him (November 6, 2004)
- Arafat Condition Still Serious; Said to Be at 'Critical Juncture' (November 5, 2004)

Find more results for Palestinians and Israel

TOP OPINION ARTICLES

- Editorial: Cleaning Up China
- Editorial: Of Animal Eggs and Human Embryos
- Editorial: An Opportunity for Mr. Schwarzenegger
- Editorial Observer: Larry Craig's Great Adventure: Suddenly, He's a Civil Libertarian

Go to Opinion

Copyright 2004 The New York Times Company | Home | Privacy Policy | Search | Corrections | RSS | Help | Back to Top

Op-Ed Columnist

What Palestinians?

Sign In to E-Mail This
Printer-Friendly
Save Article

ARTICLE TOOLS SPONSORED BY
JUNO

By DAVID BROOKS
Published: November 17, 2005

The swallows fly to Capistrano; I go to the Middle East.

Every few years I fly to Israel and Palestine and I get out my notebooks, and every time I go the experience is the same. Some world leader will have proposed a peace plan. Some set of lines on a map will be debated. Some elaborate procedure to get both sides to the table will be in the process of being hammered out.

Advertisement





The Way We Live Now

Send Your Comments About This Column

The columnist posts about issues that shape his perspective and addresses reader feedback.

• Read Other Readers' Comments

• Columnist Page

Audio Versions of Op-Ed Columns

TimesSelect subscribers can now listen to a

Podcasts

reading of the day's Op-Ed columns.

Over the years, the Shultz plan begat the Oslo process, which begat the Mitchell plan, which begat the road map. Even though the names may change, the grievances are the same, the intensity is the same, and the addictive three-dimensional chess game we call the Middle East peace process is fundamentally the same.

Until this year.

I just got back from a Saban Center conference that took me once again to Jerusalem and Ramallah, and I discovered the most amazing thing: the Israelis have lost interest in the chess match. They have become desensitized to the thoughts and actions of their dysfunctional neighbors, the Palestinians, with whom they used to share such an intimate feud.

The second intifada, coming on the heels of Yasir Arafat's rejection of a deal at Camp David, cut some visceral bond that used to

join the two peoples. The Israelis are separating themselves from the Middle East emotionally and psychologically, and with a security barrier.

The dream of peace has been replaced by another dream, the dream of disengagement. Until I spoke to people here, I thought the Gaza disengagement might lead back to the peace process, but now I realize it's a replacement for that process. It's a step toward a new (and even more illusory) dream: the dream of disengaging Israel from its geographic and historical situation.

The security barrier has not only reduced suicide bombings; it has also helped change the nation's psychology. On the Israeli side of the barrier, there is increasing safety, prosperity and normalcy. Jerusalem's streets are crowded again. People no longer choose restaurants by how good their security arrangements are and no longer avoid tables by the windows.

While the barrier makes the Palestinians seem farther away, the Internet makes the rest of the

world seem closer at hand. Israel is in the midst of a tech boom, fueled in part by the brainpower of Russian immigrants, and the nation is proud of its ties to Silicon Valley. The economy is thriving (even while income inequality soars), and Israel is developing closer bonds with China, Turkey and the world.

Over there, on the other side of the barrier, Mahmoud Abbas, a new sort of Palestinian leader, promises to impose order and defeat terror. But Israelis don't seem to feel their destiny is intertwined with his success, and they have not helped him deliver the tangible benefits he needs to have any chance of victory.

Israelis have, as I say, disengaged.

Given recent history, no one can blame Israel. The Palestinians richly deserve to be left behind. Even now they expect Israel to allow Palestinian trucks to cross its border, even though both sides know some significant portion will contain bombs designed to kill Jews.

And yet, despite it all, I wonder

whether the Israelis know in their hearts that disengagement is not a long-term option.

It's not an option because while Israelis may no longer be dependent on the Palestinians, the Palestinians remain dependent on them. Today, Gaza is spiraling into the abyss, cut off from Israeli markets and abandoned by the Arab world. When Gaza sinks, the West Bank will surely follow, and if Palestine turns into Somalia, Israel will not survive untouched. The Israeli Arabs, if no one else, will see to that.

Disengagement is not an option because America will not allow it. Americans still believe in the peace process and in democratizing the Arab world, which is the opposite of disengagement. The U.S. will always pressure Israel - as it did so forcefully this week - to re-engage with Palestine, to open up trade and movement.

Finally, unilateral disengagement is no option because the Israelis will never do it well. Driven by normal self-interest and by the bitterness of war, Israelis will grab

too much land, and impose too much pain. A nation of philosopher-kings could impose a just unilateral solution, but no such nation exists. Unilateral action is bound to be unjust and thus unstable.

The sad fact is that no matter how long and futile the chess game sometimes appeared, someday it will have to start up once again.

Bob Herbert is on vacation.

More Articles in Opinion >

Related Articles

- World Briefing | Middle East: West Bank: Israelis Kill Palestinian Youth (November 9, 2005)
- Voted In, Hamas Sets a West Bank City Astir (November 4, 2005)
- Islamic Jihad's Vow to Cease Rocket Fire Ends Hours Later (October 31, 2005)
- Israel Steps Up Reprisals in West Bank and Gaza, Killing 7 (October 28, 2005)

Related Searches

- Israel
- West Bank
- Palestinians

Inside NYTimes.com




Charles Taylor's Rise and Fall



The Ghost in the Baghdad Museum



Making of a Toddler Supergroup




Digital Composer



Brooks: Immigrants to Be Proud Of

Copyright 2005 The New York Times CompanyHomePrivacy PolicySearchCorrectionsXMLHelpContact UsWork for UsSite MapBack to Top



Israeli strikes are part of a broader strategy

U.S., Israel aim to weaken Hezbollah, region's militants

The Washington Post

U.S.: Iran Halted Nuclear Weapons Program in 2003

U.S. Weighs New Strategies in Afghanistan

Pro-Democracy Groups Call Russian Elections Unfair

Paris Suburb Hit by Rioting Tries Healing Power of Talk

Pro-Democracy Candidate Wins Seat in Hong Kong

Most Popular

Most Viewed - Top Rated - Most E-mailed

Sponsored links

Support St. Jude Kids
Let your gifts give back this holiday. Donate online today.
www.StJude.org

Official Site: AMBIEN CR™
(zolpidem tartrate extended release/CIV): Get free 7-day trial supply.
AmbienCR.com

Unique Holiday Gifts
For the person who has everything. Give gifts with real meaning today.
www.SavetheChildren.org

American Express® Cards
Great card offers from American Express. Compare and apply online!
www.americanexpress.com

Alternative to Open Back

Politics
Business
Sports
Entertainment
Health
Tech & science
Travel
Weather
Local news

Browse

Video
Photos
Community

Disable Fly-out

Strong winds, mudslides batter Northwest
Meet the losers of the Joy Fit Club
Russian election called unfair
Holidays bring heart attacks along with revelry
Jury weighs Sears Tower terrorism allegations
Most viewed on MSNBC.com
National debt grows $1 million a minute
'Poster child' gorillas heading to Cameroon
Saudi on defense over rape ruling
Dino mummy unlocks Jurassic secrets
Secrecy invoked on Abramoff lawsuits
Most viewed on MSNBC.com
Why buy a lobster when you can buy the trap?
Strong winds, mudslides batter Northwest
Debate on lower drinking age bubbling up
Parents want airlines to do more for kids
Woman survives direct hit by lightning
Most viewed on MSNBC.com

Marketplace

- Shopping via MSN Shopping
- Start a business Entrepreneur.com
- Dating via PerfectMatch.com
- Real estate via HomePages.com
- Credit score via Experian
- Investments $7 online stock buys
- Online degrees from Kaplan University
- Home equity via Wells Fargo
- Autos via MSN Autos

By Robin Wright

washingtonpost.com

updated 10:03 a.m. ET, Sun., July. 16, 2006

Israel, with U.S. support, intends to resist calls for a cease-fire and continue a longer-term strategy of punishing Hezbollah, which is likely to include several weeks of precision bombing in Lebanon, according to senior Israeli and U.S. officials.

For Israel, the goal is to eliminate Hezbollah as a security threat -- or altogether, the sources said. A senior Israeli official confirmed that Hezbollah leader Hasan Nasrallah is a target, on the calculation that the Shiite movement would be far less dynamic without him.

For the United States, the broader goal is to strangle the axis of Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and Iran, which the Bush administration believes is pooling resources to change the strategic playing field in the Middle East, U.S. officials say.

Story continues below ↓

advertisement

Surgery
Minimally invasive, corrects most spinal disorders
www.laserspineinstitute.com

Resource guide

perfectmatch.com
Dating - Get two months free!

Wells Fargo Apply Now
Home equity Wells Fargo

Kaplan Higher Education
Get your degree online

msn autos
Find your next car

Seniors for Living
Search for Senior Housing

HomePages
Find your dream home today!

Entrepreneur
Find a business to start

Scottrade Member SIPC
Fast $7 trades, no limit

FREE Credit Report
Check your 2007 Credit $0

Holiday Gift Shop



<script language='JavaScript1.1' SRC="http://ad.doubleclick.net/adj/N3285.msn/B1705259.189;abr=!ie;dcadv=895178;sz=300x250;ord=1345391147?"> </script>

• Shop by price
• Gifts for her
• Gifts for him
• Shop by personality



Whatever the outrage on the Arab streets, Washington believes it has strong behind-the-scenes support among key Arab leaders also nervous about the populist militants -- with a tacit agreement that the timing is right to strike.

washingtonpost.com
Full international coverage

"What is out there is concern among conservative Arab allies that there is a hegemonic Persian threat [running] through Damascus, through the southern suburbs of Beirut and to the Palestinians in Hamas," said a senior U.S. official who requested anonymity because of sensitive diplomacy. "Regional leaders want to find a way to navigate unease on their streets and deal with the strategic threats to take down Hezbollah and Hamas, to come out of the crisis where they are not as ascendant."

A 'unique moment'
Hezbollah's cross-border raid that captured two Israeli soldiers and killed eight others has provided a "unique moment" with a "convergence of interests" among Israel, some Arab regimes and even those in Lebanon who want to rein in the country's last private army, the senior Israeli official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the ongoing conflict.

Israel and the United States would like to hold out until Hezbollah is crippled.

"It seems like we will go to the end now," said Israeli Ambassador Daniel Ayalon. "We will not go part way and be held hostage again. We'll have to go for the kill -- Hezbollah neutralization."

White House officials said Friday that Bush has called on Israel to limit civilian casualties and avoid toppling the Lebanese government but has not pressured Israel to stop its military action. "He believes that the Israelis have a right to protect themselves," spokesman Tony Snow said in St. Petersburg, where Bush is attending the Group of Eight summit. "The president is not going to make military decisions for Israel."

Specifically, officials said, Israel and the United States are looking to create conditions for achieving one remaining goal of U.N. Resolution 1559, adopted in 2004, which calls for the dismantling and disarming of Lebanon's militias and expanding the state's control over all its territory.

"We think part of the solution to this is the implementation of 1559, which would eliminate that [armed group operating outside the government] and help Lebanon extend all of its authority throughout the whole country," national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley told reporters with Bush in Russia yesterday.

The other part of the resolution calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, which was completed in April last year -- after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri, which was widely linked to Syria.

If Lebanon as a first step takes over Hezbollah's stockpiles, which included more than 12,000 rockets and missiles before the current strife began, then cease-fire talks could begin, the Israeli official said.

"The only way a cease-fire will even be considered is if 1559 is fully implemented," said the senior Israeli official. Lebanese troops must be deployed to take over positions in Hezbollah's southern Lebanon strongholds to ensure that there are no more cross-border raids or rocket barrages into northern Israel.

Backlash at Israel possible
There are no guarantees, however, that this strategy will work. Israeli airstrikes could backfire, experts warn.

"Hezbollah was risking alienating not only the Lebanese public at large but, incredibly, its very own Shiite constituency. But if Israel continues with its incessant targeting of exclusively civilian targets, and, as a result, life becomes increasingly difficult for the people, I would not be surprised if there is a groundswell of support for Hezbollah, exactly opposite of what Israel is trying to achieve," said Timur Goksel, an analyst and former spokesman for the U.N. force in Lebanon who lives in Beirut.

The Bush administration's position -- and diplomacy -- are the opposite of what happened during the Clinton administration.

The last Hezbollah-Israel cease-fire was just before dawn on April 27, 1996, after the United States brokered a deal to end a punishing 16-day Israeli offensive designed to end Hezbollah's rocket barrages. More than 150 Lebanese, mostly civilians, were killed; more than 60 Israelis were injured. Tens of thousands on both sides of the border had fled or gone into bunkers.

Then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher shuttled for a week between Jerusalem and Damascus to mediate a written agreement, a sequel to a similar oral deal he negotiated after skirmishes in 1993.

For now, that is not a viable option to end the current conflict, U.S. officials say. With its diplomacy redefined by the war on terrorism, the Bush administration has opted for a course that plays out on the battlefield.

Pressed on whether a cease-fire was possible soon, the Israeli official said it was "way, way premature" to consider an end to hostilities. "There is no sense to have a cease-fire without a fundamental change," he said. "That change is to make sure the explosiveness of the situation cannot carry over to the future. That means neutralizing Hezbollah's capabilities."

'Space to operate'
The Bush administration is also using Resolution 1559 as a barometer, U.S. officials say, acknowledging that the Lebanese government has shown neither the ability nor the willingness to deploy its fledgling army to the southern border.

U.S. officials have cautioned Israel to use restraint, particularly on collateral damage and destruction of infrastructure, which might undermine the fragile government. There was some U.S. concern about attacks on the Beirut airport, but otherwise Washington is prepared to step aside and defer diplomacy unless there is a dramatic break, U.S. officials say.

"They do have space to operate for a period of time," the U.S. official said about Israel. "There's a natural dynamic to these things. When the military starts, it may be that it has to run its course."

Israel and the United States believe that the Israeli strikes in Gaza, following the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier, have undermined Hamas. "There is no Hamas government -- eight cabinet ministers or 30 percent of the government is in jail, another 30 percent is in hiding, and the other 30 percent is doing very little," said the senior U.S. official.

© 2007 The Washington Post Company

Rate this story Low  High

Current rating: **4** by **494** users • **View Top Rated stories**

Print this **Email this** **IM this**

MORE FROM WORLD NEWS

Next → World news Section Front

Hamas charities closed; 429 Palestinians freed

Pakistan opposition leaders draft strategy

12 bodies dumped near Iraq lake

U.S.: Iran nuclear arms work ended in '03

Chavez loses constitutional vote

'Teddy bear' teacher leaves Sudan

Holocaust denier gets prison in Austria

Marine's court-martial begins

Official: Iran expels Canadian ambassador

Australia ratifies Kyoto warming treaty

World news Section Front

Add World news headlines to your news reader:

MY MSN Windows Live MY YAHOO! Bloglines XML

More RSS feeds from MSNBC.com

Top MSNBC stories

Storm pounds Pacific Northwest

Holiday revelry brings on heart attacks

Foreclosure wave threatens economy

Clinton office suspect held on bond

U.S.: Iran nuke arms work ended in '03

NBC News highlights

Brad Pitt's ambitious Christmas list

How to make good sex great

Mom loses 160 pounds

Taking it to the extreme

SPONSORED LINKS Get listed here

Support St. Jude Kids
Let your gifts give back this holiday. Donate online today.
www.StJude.org

Official Site: AMBIEN CR™
(zolpidem tartrate extended release/CIV): Get free 7-day trial supply.
AmbienCR.com

Unique Holiday Gifts
For the person who has everything. Give gifts with real meaning today.
www.SavetheChildren.org

American Express® Cards
Great card offers from American Express. Compare and apply online!
www.americanexpress.com

Alternative to Open Back Surgery
Minimally invasive, corrects most spinal disorders
www.laserspineinstitute.com

msnbc.com
A Fuller Spectrum of News

Featuring TodayNightly NewsDatelineMeet the PressMSNBC TVNewsweek
Categories Top storiesLocal newsU.S.WorldPoliticsBusinessSportsEntertainmentHealthTech & scienceTravelWeather
About About usContactSite mapJobsTerms & conditions

Alerts via IM



Widgets

Google Image Result for http://damascus-online.com/history/madrid.jpg

Google



See full-size image.

damascus-online.com/history/madrid.jpg
564 x 376 - 36k
Image may be scaled down and subject to copyright.

Remove Frame

Image Results »

Below is the image in its **original context** on the page: **www.prospectsforpeace.com/2007/07/israel_and_...**

Prospects for Peace

A joint project of The Century Foundation and the New America Foundation

« More Expert Voices on Political Islamists and the Dangers of Current Policy | Main | Day One of the New Blair Mission »

Israel and Palestine: an invitation to negotiate

Here is my attempt to be constructive on the President Bush speech from this week - an effort to grab some kind of victory from the jaws of defeat.

It is on the Guardian Online.

Can anything good possibly come out of President Bush's Middle East speech earlier this week and the flurry of diplomatic activity that will come in its wake beginning today with the Quartet meeting in Lisbon, Portugal?

First of all, let's be clear. The speech represented more of the same failed policies with even less chance of success. Anyone who thinks that the new speech was a constructive contribution should read an op-ed by Michael Oren in yesterday's Wall Street Journal that was distributed by the official White House Jewish Public Liaison, presumably signifying that Oren's interpretation has formal blessing.

Oren, of the Shalem Center, a Jerusalem-based, neocon-sympathetic creation of Benjamin Netanyahu, wrote the following: "Mr. Bush has not backtracked an inch from his revolutionary Middle East policy. Never before has any American President placed the onus of demonstrating a commitment to peace so emphatically on Palestinian shoulders...the bulk of his demands were directed at the Palestinians...Mr. Bush set unprecedented conditions for Arab participation in peace efforts."


I have detailed my own thoughts on the speech elsewhere, and the search for a silver lining is not an easy one.

What I propose is a jujitsu move that leverages the expectations created by the speech toward achieving a constructive, if unlikely, outcome. To call this jujitsu move a long shot is an understatement, but it is worth a try. Here is how it could be done.

Despite White House efforts to lower expectations, Bush's speech did call for an international meeting in the fall that is being touted everywhere as a peace conference. In the speech, Bush committed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to chairing that meeting.

Her undoubted desire to avoid a huge flop is the point of departure. The Americans will be very keen to have key regional and international players at the table in the fall, which in turn gives the Arab states and the Quartet partners an invitation to negotiate the terms of reference for the conference should they choose to use it.

This would be the moment for the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians and the majority of European states who are uncomfortable with current American policy to articulate and bargain over a new approach. It is even conceivable that Rice herself would welcome a strong stand on the part of her interlocutors in order to use such a negotiation to carry the president toward a more realistic policy.


Photo by Jacob Silberberg
George H. W. Bush speaks at Tufts.

The model for diplomatic efforts should be the Madrid conference of 1991. There is of course an important similarity, but an even more important and complicating difference - the president's name then and now was Bush. But Bush the father showed commitment and courage in advancing peace efforts, while Bush the son is not on board. Rice would have to cast herself in the role of James Baker, this time with the additional challenge of having to convince her boss, the president.

At the closing of that Madrid Conference, Baker said, "The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, and an energizing force, and a driving force in the negotiating process." Rice would have to adopt that mantle and be all of those things and more.

Baker shuttled for eight months around the region putting together the conference and negotiating the terms of reference for Madrid, which appeared in the letter of invitation and to which all sides agreed. He succeeded in creating a peace process that brought together Israel, the Palestinians, all the neighbouring states and an additional 10 Arab countries, none of whom had formal relations with Israel.



The substance of the Madrid terms of reference contained four elements, crucial to its success.
First, the effort was comprehensive, involving not only the Palestinians and Jordanians (not yet at peace with Israel), but also the Lebanese and the Syrians.
Second, the terms for engagement represented at the time a breakthrough, namely the land-for-peace formula with a comprehensive settlement to be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
Third, the letter of invitation provided a timetable for an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement. Finally, Madrid managed to bring Israel and the broader Arab world together, holding out the prospect of regional peace and acceptance that is so vital for Israelis.

Interestingly, Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was in attendance at Madrid. The conference set in motion five multilateral regional working groups to build confidence between Israel and the Arab world. Politicians and experts would meet to discuss the environment, economic developments, water, arms-control and regional security, and refugees in such places as Muscat, Rabat, Doha and Tunis.

A similarly ambitious approach calibrated to today's realty is what Rice should pursue. Of course it is far from clear whether she has the appetite for such a mission or whether Bush would agree. Perhaps new envoy Tony

Blair can be helpful in this regard.

Pursuing such a course would also be the implementation of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group and fulfill their call for a regional diplomatic peace effort to restore American credibility and alliance-building capacity, and to deal a blow to Salafist radicalism.

The president's speech may inadvertently have issued an invitation to Europe and the Arab states to start negotiating a contemporary version of the Madrid letter of invitation. These might include detailed terms of reference for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, provisions for a comprehensive, inclusive process with Syria on board, a reasonable timetable and modalities for implementing the Arab peace initiative. Forcing the frontloading of Arab deliverables outside of a broader comprehensive peace framework is likely to be a non-starter and recipe for diplomatic gridlock.

The alternative would be for this fall's meeting to resemble the January 2003 conference on Palestinian reform that was convened in London - an eminently forgettable experience.

The Madrid model offers one further clue on the way forward with regards to an even more thorny issue. At the time of Madrid, Israel and the PLO still did not recognize each other and Israel refused to talk to the PLO or to have its representatives officially in attendance. A formula was concocted whereby there would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Palestinian members of which could be claimed by Israel to not formally represent the PLO, but who themselves insisted that they were doing everything in coordination with the exiled PLO leadership.

Hamas today is the group whose name dare not be spoken in polite company. Yet a process, today, that excludes Hamas (just like excluding the PLO then) is unlikely to deliver sustainability, legitimacy or security. A peace process cannot be built on Palestinian division, and Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah leadership will have to be quietly and patiently climbed back down from the tree that they are so rapidly ascending.

Most of the European Union member states and the Arab states understand this. A discreet but crucial backchannel in the lead-up to any conference would have to be devoted to internal Palestinian reconciliation. This approach would ultimately have to be accepted by both the US and Israel. At least Blair, with his Northern Ireland experience, will have an informative frame of reference with regard to bringing militants into a peace process.

Like I said, it is a very long shot, but this is what I would argue that realists and genuine believers in peace should be advocating for. Today's Quartet meeting in Portugal will likely be all smiles and rhetorical platitudes, but the real work needs to begin and soon.

Posted by Daniel Levy on July 19, 2007 6:00 PM | Permalink

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/mt/mt-tb.cgi/170

Comments (3)

seth:

mr. oren's op-ed is just

the beginning of a murdoch-owned WSJ. What a sad, sad thing...

I won't disagree that the demise of the WSJ's reporting will be a sad sight if it comes to pass, but have you read the editorial page of the WSJ in past years? They're as nutty as they get. Michael Oren is positively sane and even keeled by their standards.

Posted by seth | July 25, 2007 9:56 PM

Posted on July 25, 2007 21:56

deb:

mr. oren's op-ed is just the beginning of a murdoch-owned WSJ. What a sad, sad thing...

Posted by deb | July 20, 2007 2:48 PM

Posted on July 20, 2007 14:48

Nyer:

I wish people like you understood the definition of realism. Didnt you study polisci. You are advocating a contructivist approach to the conflict. If the definition of realism is a theory "primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics" - than our actions and what you advocate is not a realist approach. Israel is the ideal - not an economic or security must. In fact ending Israel would be - which obvioulsy isnt an option. So stop using the term.

Posted by Nyer | July 20, 2007 12:52 AM

Posted on July 20, 2007 00:52

Post a comment

(If you haven't left a comment here before, you may need to be approved by the site owner before your comment will appear. Until then, it won't appear on the entry. Thanks for waiting.)

Name:

Email Address:

URL:

☐ Remember personal info?

Comments: (you may use HTML tags for style)

Preview Post



Menu

- **About**
- **Resources**
- **Events**

Search

Search this blog:

Search

Categories

Recent Posts

- Somebody's listening…and getting angry: an exchange with a British neo-con
- A little catch up on Israel-Palestine
- UK-US shadow dance over Iraq troop withdrawal
- Lebanon by-Elections
- Efraim Halevy in WSJ: "We don't need their recognition"
- Muslim Brotherhood Coverage on Al Jazeera
- Fayad on Resistance
- Brotherly Love?

- Another One Bites the Dust
- What Would a Diplomat Do?

Subscribe to this blog's feed
[What is this?]

Archives

- August 2007
- July 2007
- June 2007
- May 2007
- April 2007

Powered by
Movable Type 3.33

About

This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on **July 19, 2007 6:00 PM**.

The previous post in this blog was More Expert Voices on Political Islamists and the Dangers of Current Policy.

The next post in this blog is Day One of the New Blair Mission.

Many more can be found on the main index page or by looking through the archives.

Subscribe to this blog's feed
[What is this?]

Works Cited

Completion Date: Dec.3,2007

I would like to thank Ann Evans Larimore for her continuous support during my triumphs and frustrations. I am also truly indebted to Sandy Alinghaus, who spent countless hours helping me understand the difficult concepts that were required to complete this project. She was always willing to extend to me her limitless knowledge of geography, computer programming, and web design. I have grown to love using the art of web design in visual interpretation. The skills I learned in this class are invaluable. Thanks for opening my eyes to this new discovery!



Below is a complete list of the references that were used to complete this GeoMat Study

"Timeline" The Jewish Agency For Israel, 1992-2006, http://www.jafi.org.il/education/jafi75/timeline6f.html

Bentsur, Eytan, "The way to peace emerged at Madrid," Feb. 15, 2002, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, accessed July 21, 2006, http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp472.htm

"Middle East Peace Chronology," U.S. Department of State, accessed July 21, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle_east_north_africa/me_vision/me_vision_timeline.html#1989%20-%201991

"The Madrid Framework," Jan. 28, 1999, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed July 21, 2006, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20ProcessThe%20Madrid%20Framework

Gearan, Anne, "Administration seeks lasting cease-fire," *Associated Press* , July 20, 2006.

Grier, Peter. "Summits and Valleys," April 23, 2002, *Christian Science Monitor* , accessed July 21, 2006,

http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0423/p01s01-uspo.html

Compiled from "Secretaries travel abroad: Israel," U.S. Department of State, accessed July 21, 2006
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/trvl/12924.htm

Wright, Robin, "Israeli strikes are part of a broader strategy," July 16, 2006, *The Washington Post* , accessed July 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13884768/

Chronology of Operation Grapes of Wrath," *Agence France Presse* , April 26, 1996.

Wright, Robin, "Israeli strikes are part of a broader strategy," July 16, 2006, *The Washington Post* , accessed July 21, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13884768/

Country Studies:
http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/
The research division of the Library of Congress provides extensive overviews of various nations.

The World Factbook 2001:
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html
The Central Intelligence Agency publishes information on the geography, people, government, and economy of each Middle Eastern country.

Country Briefings:
http://www.economist.com/countries/
These country profiles from *The Economist* include economic structure, outlook, and basic data.

Middle East Studies Report: Stability and Instability in the Gulf:
http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/EconNME.html
These reports summarize economic, demographic, energy, military spending, and arms-transfer trends.

Is America Stuck in the Middle East?:
http://www.pbs.org/thinktank/show_978.html
Is Middle East oil still crucial to American security?

Commanding Heights Web Site:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/

An economist's look at world history and development from 1910 to the present

Arab Human Development Report 2002:
http://www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr/
A report on the Arab world's attempts to advance human development

The Palestinian Perspective:
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east /july-dec02/almasri_8-09.html
Maher al-Masri, the Palestinian economy, industry, and trade minister, laments the negative effects of Israeli occupation.

ACTORS

Home Page



(New York Times) 1930s- Palestinians' failed attempt of rebelling against Britain

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/08/weekinreview/08erlanger-ART.html?n=Top/Reference/Times%20Topics/People/A/Arafat,%20Yasir&_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1196875782-4/ci+tWzD+zXVl4PvMCZeg


Britain

Exerted influence as a colonial power in the middle east and India.

In the early 1900s Britain gained control of Palestine and by 1920 had established a Jewish homeland.

The following decades are characterized by a continuation of violence and a series of failed attempts at making peace.

David Ben-Gurion



Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO)
established in 1964



Egyptian President **Anwar el-Sadat**

US President **Jimmy Carter**

Israeli Prime Minister **Menachem Begin**

Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978
http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/art-74951/Egyptian-President-Anwar-el-Sadat-US-President-Jimmy-Carter-and



Oslo Accords, September 13, 1993
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/717/_profile.htm

from left to right:

Israeli Prime Minister **Yitzhak Rabin**

US President
Bill Clinton

Palestinian
Yassar Arafat



Israeli Defense Force (IDF)

http://www.historama.com/about_us.html



(New York Times) **Annapolis Peace Conference**: November 2007

From left to right:

Palestinian Authority Leader, **Mahmoud Abbas**


Israel's Prime Minister **Ehud Olmert**

US President
George Bush

HOME PAGE

http://www.mapsofworld.com/flags

Debates Concerning the Security Fence





Terrorism

Israel's Ministry of Defence frames the need for a security fence in the context of increasing terrorism since 2000. This site includes information regarding the operational concept, the route, humanitarian concerns, execution aspects, as well as new briefs. The most recent news brief refers to 39 petitions, 28 of which object to the proposed route for the security fence.

The United States' CIA remarks, "Israel continues construction of a "seam line" separation barrier along parts of the Green Line and within the West Bank". (World Factbook)

#Environmental Considerations

Natural Resources

Only 15.45% of Israel's land is arable. Droughts are a frequent threat to the land's sustainability. (CIA World Factbook)





Water in Gaza undrinkable.

Olive Groves

Some olive groves are threatened by the construction of the security fence. The fence/wall encroaches onto areas of land previously covered by these olive groves.



Archaeological



Weather

Today's animated preciptation forecast.



8 nov, 2007

Home Page

Timeline of Documents

1917-2007

Balfour Declaration

November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour

© 1996-2007 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. The Lillian Goldman Law Library in Memory of Sol Goldman.
127 Wall Street New Haven, Connecticut 06520. http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm

Letter from President Roosevelt to King Ibn Saud

April 5, 1945
GREAT AND GOODFRIEND:

I have received the communication which Your Majesty sent me under date of March 10, 1945, in which you refer to the question of Palestine and to the continuing interest of the Arabs in current developments affecting that country.

I am gratified that Your Majesty took this occasion to bring your views on this question to my attention and I have given the most careful attention to the statements which you make in your letter. I am also mindful of the memorable conversation which we had not so long ago and in the course of which I had an opportunity to obtain so vivid an impression of Your Majesty's sentiments on this question.

Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews. Your Majesty will also doubtless recall that during our recent conversation I assured you that I would take no action, in my capacity as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove hostile to the Arab people.

It gives me pleasure to renew to Your Majesty the assurances which you have previously received regarding the attitude of my Government and my own, as Chief Executive, with regard to the question of Palestine and to inform you that the policy of this Government in this respect is unchanged.

I desire also at this time to send you my best wishes for Your Majesty's continued good health and for the welfare of your people.

Your Good Friend,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
His Majesty
ABDUL AZIZ IBN ABDUR RAHMAN AL FAISAL AL SAUD

King of Saudi Arabia
Riyadh

Department of State Bulletin of October 21, 1945, p. 623. A Decade of American Foriegn Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49
Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations By the Staff of the Committe and the Department of State.
Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1950 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade/decad161.htm

Excerpts from: **United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181**
November 29, 1947

"...The Jewish State
The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Trans-jordan. It includes the whole of the Huleh Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan Sub-District, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State. The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat El-Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza Sub-District and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba Sub-District, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza Sub-District, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron Sub-District boundary line to 'Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State..."

"...Security measures
The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no para-military formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed

or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of one or more sections of the population the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of administration.

To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order, especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force..."

"...Freedom of Transit and Visit: Control of residents.
Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

Relations with Arab and Jewish States. Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connection with the international administration of thc City.

Official languages.
Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required..."

Source: A Decade of American Foriegn Policy : Basic Documents, 1941-49 Prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations By the Staff of the Committe and the Department of State. Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1950 © 1996 The Avalon Project. Example UM Home Page was last modified on: undefinedThe Avalon Project : UN General Assembly Resolution 181 was last modified on: 12/04/2007 18:30:45 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm

excerpt**: Declaration of Israel's Independence, May 14, 1948**

"...This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.

This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.

ACCORDINGLY WE, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S COUNCIL,

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY OF ERETZ-ISRAEL AND OF THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, ARE HERE ASSEMBLED ON THE DAY OF THE TERMINATION OF THE BRITISH MANDATE OVER ERETZ-ISRAEL AND, BY VIRTUE OF OUR NATURAL AND HISTORIC RIGHT AND ON THE STRENGTH OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HEREBY DECLARE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JEWISH STATE IN ERETZ-ISRAEL, TO BE KNOWN AS THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

WE DECLARE that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel".

THE STATE OF ISRAEL will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations..."

© 1996-2007 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. The Lillian Goldman Law Library in Memory of Sol Goldman.
127 Wall Street New Haven, Connecticut 06520 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/israel.htm

United Nations Security Council Resolution in Response to the Sinai War

March 30, 1955

The Security Council,

Taking note of those sections of the report by the Chief of Staff of the TSO which deal with the general conditions on the Armistice Demarcation Line between Egypt and Israel, and the causes of the present tension;

Anxious that all possible steps shall be taken to preserve security in this area, within the framework of the General Armistice Agrement between Egypt and Israel;

Requests the Chief of Staff to continue his consultations with the Governments of Egypt and Israel with a view to the introduction of practical measures to that end;

Notes that the Chief of Staff has already made certain concrete proposals to this effect;

Calls upon the Governments of Egypt and Israel to co-operate with the Chief of Staff with regard to his proposals, bearing in mind that, in the opinion of the Chief of Staff, infiltration can be reduced to an occasional nuisance if an agreement were effected between the parties on the lines he has proposed;

Requests the Chief of Staff to keep the Council informed of the progress of his discussions.

(1)U.N. doc. S/3379, Mar. 28, 1955. The resolution was submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, and was adopted unanimously. For statement by Ambassador Lodge on Mar. 30, 1955, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 18, 1955, pp. 661-663. For background discussion see Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1954 to 15 July 1955 (A/2935), pp. 10-13
(2)Truce Supervision Organization. U.N. doc. S/3373.

Source: American Foreign Policy 1950-1955 Basic Documents Volumes I and II Department of State Publication 6446 General Foreign Policy Series 117 Washington, DC : U.S. Governemnt Printing Office, 1957 © 1996-2007 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. The Lillian Goldman Law Library in Memory of Sol Goldman. 127 Wall Street New Haven, Connecticut 06520 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/mid011.htm

Camp David Accords

September 17, 1978

"...The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following..."

"...Egypt-Israel

Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter..."

"...Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

full recognition;

abolishing economic boycotts;

guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of Israel: Menachem Begin For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

Witnessed by Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America..."
© 1998 The Avalon Project. The Avalon Project : Camp David Accords; September 17, 1978 was last modified on: 12/04/2007 19:08:11 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/campdav.htm Example UM Home Page was last modified on: undefined

Oslo Accords

September 13, 1993

"... Article XI:
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in economic fields:

Recognising the mutual benefit of co-operation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Co-operation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a co-operative manner the programmes identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII:
Liaison and co-operation with Jordan and Egypt:

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and co-operation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote co-operation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII:
Redeployment of Israeli forces:

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the

principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV:
Israeli withdrawal
from the Gaza strip
and Jericho area:
Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II..."

http://www.fmep.org/documents/Oslo_Accords.html

Transcript from dinner in Jerusalem, November 4, 2007- preparing for the Annapolis Peace Conference


Home Page


ISRAEL
Political Map
LEBANON
N
Golan Heights
Akko
Haifa
Northern
SYRIA
Haifa
Nazareth
Mediterranean
Sea
Netanya
Central
Tel Aviv
TEL AVIV
West Bank
Ramla
Ashdod
Jerusalem
Ashqelon
Jerusalem
Qiryat Gat
Gaza Strip
Beersheba
Southern
Dimona
Zefa
JORDAN
Negev Desert
Zin
Mizpe Ramon
EGYPT
Yotvata
Gulf of Aqaba
0 30 60 90Km
Copyright © 2007 Compare Infobase Limited
International Boundary
District(mehoz) Boundary
National Capital
District Capital
Cities

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2036.jpg


THE UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN, 1947

On 29 November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to set up both a Jewish and an Arab State, and fixed their borders. The Jewish State was to be three segments, and was to exclude Jaffa (to become an Arab enclave) and Jerusalem (to be an International Zone). The Jews accepted Statehood. The Arabs not only rejected it, but at once attacked Jewish settlements in every part of Palestine



http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2036.jpg (1 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:34:42 AM]

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2036.jpg



http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2036.jpg (2 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:34:42 AM]


http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2046.jpg

THE ISRAELI WAR OF INDEPENDENCE, 1948-1949

0 5 10 15
Miles


Between May 1948 and January 1949, the State of Israel fought to retain its independence against the combined forces of six Arab armies. Following the initial Arab invasion, the Israelis reopened the road to Jerusalem, won control of the Coastal Plain, secured the upper Galilee, and drove the Egyptians from the Negev. But the Israelis were themselves driven from the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem (whose synagogues were desecrated and whose Jewish houses were destroyed)

During Israel's struggle for independence between November 1947 and January 1949, more than 4,000 Jewish soldiers and 2,000 civilians were killed out of a total Jewish population of only 650,000. The figures for Arab dead were not disclosed by the Arab States




http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2046.jpg (1 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:34:52 AM]


http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2046.jpg



The regular forces of the neighbouring countries - with their equipment and their armaments - enjoy superiority at this time. However, evaluation of the possibilities cannot be merely a military consideration of arms against arms and units against units, since we do not have those arms or that armoured force. The problem is to what extent our men will be able to overcome enemy forces by virtue of their fighting spirit, of our planning and our tactics. YIGAEL YADIN, 21 MAY 1948
CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, ISRAELI ARMY

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/pg%2046.jpg (2 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:34:52 AM]


THE ARAB REFUGEES, 1948
Main areas from which Arabs fled, April - December 1948
Towns with large Arab populations, most of whom fled
Percentage of refugees reaching new areas
000 United Nations estimate of the number of refugees reaching new areas
LEBANON
14°o
100,000
IRAQ
0·6°o
4,000
SYRIA
10°o
75,000
Safed
Acre
Haifa
Tiberias
Beisan
Mediterranean Sea
River Jordan
THE WEST BANK
38°o
280,000
Jaffa
TRANSJORDAN
10°o


Ramla
70,000
THE GAZA STRIP
26%
190,000
Dead Sea
Beersheba
0 10 20
Miles
EGYPT
1%
7,000
The United Nations Partition Plan envisaged an Arab as well as a Jewish State. Most Arab refugees fled to the areas of the potential Arab State. But one of these areas, the Gaza Strip, was occupied by Egypt in 1948. Another, the West Bank, was occupied by Transjordan in 1948, and annexed in 1950
The United Nations estimated that over 725,000 Arabs fled from Palestine between April and December 1948. The Israelis estimated that between 550,000 and 600,000 Arabs fled. Many Arabs were encouraged to leave by their own political leaders, who promised them that they would soon be able to return to their homes, once Israel had been destroyed. But over 160,000 Arabs either remained in Israel or returned to their homes in Israel during 1949
© Martin Gilbert
47

THE ARAB REFUGEES 1949-1967

In April 1949, at the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees within the framework of a general settlement. The Arab delegations rejected the offer. In 1950 the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) proposed resettling Arab refugees in Sinai, Jordan and Syria, but the Arab Governments also rejected this proposal. In 1952 the UN Refugee Rehabilitation Fund offered the Arab States $200 million to find 'homes and jobs' for the refugees. The Arab States used some of the money for relief work, but did not even apply for the greater part of the fund


The refugees are the corner-stone in the Arab struggle against Israel. The refugees are the armaments of the Arabs and Arab nationalism.

RADIO CAIRO 19 JULY 1957

The refugees will not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when the flag of Palestine is hoisted over




http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/ArabRefugees49.67.jpg





http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/ArabRefugees49.67.jpg (2 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:34:58 AM]


THE ISRAELI RESPONSE TO TERROR
1951 - 1966
In an attempt to halt terrorist activity, the Israeli Government organized a series of raids, first against villages sheltering terrorists (up to 1953), then against regular terrorist and Egyptian military units
LEBANON
Houle
29 APRIL 1966
Meiss el Jebel
The Golan Heights
SYRIA
Safed
2 MAY 1951
Acre
Nuqeib
Haifa
Tiberias
1 FEB 1960
Tawafiq
Shuna
27 MAY 1965
Jenin
27 MAY 1965
Netanya
Mediterranean Sea
Kalkiliya
10 - 11 OCT 1956
4 DEC 1965
Azzun
Tel Aviv
J O R D A N
Kibya
14 OCT 1953
Nilin
27 MARCH 1954
Beit Likya
2 SEPT 1954
Jerusalem
Ashdod
Husan
25 - 26 SEPT 1956
Gaza
28 FEB - 1 MAR 1955


Khan Yunis
31 AUG 1955
Ar Rah
Samua
Dead Sea
13 NOV 1966
Beersheba
11 SEPT 1956
Dimona
2 NOV 1955
Sabkha
E G Y P T
Negev
S i n a i
13 - 14 SEPT 1956
28 OCT 1955
Gharandal
Kuntilla
Eilat
The borders of the State of Israel, 1949 - 1967
Principal direction of terrorist infiltration
Main areas of terrorist activity
Main counter-terrorist attacks, with dates
0 10 20 30
Miles
© Martin Gilbert

59


CAMP DAVID, THE WEST BANK, AND THE GAZA STRIP
Principal Arab towns.
Arab villages.
Jewish settlements established in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank between June 1967 and August 1978.
Mediterranean Sea
Jenin
Tulkarm
Tubas
Nablus
Kalkilya
River Jordan
Ramallah
Bira
Jericho
Bethlehem



On 18 September 1978, at Camp David, near Washington, Israel and Egypt agreed to set up an 'elected self-governing authority' on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The agreement added: 'A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of Israeli forces into specified security locations'. After this, and within three years, 'negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbours, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan'. These negotiations 'will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza'.


WEST BANK POPULATION, 1978	
Arabs	650,000
Jews	5,500

GAZA STRIP POPULATION, 1978	
Arabs	380,000
Jews	800


—·—· The cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan, 1949-1967.

The River Jordan, boundary between Israel and Jordan following the Six-Day War of June 1967.

© Martin Gilbert 1978


THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEES BY 1989
LEBANON
Damascus
SYRIA
LEBANON 13 camps
In camps 143,809
Not in camps 134,800
Total 278,609
SYRIA 10 camps
In camps 75,208
Not in camps 182,789
Total 257,989
Haifa
Sea of Galilee
Mediterranean Sea
GAZA 8 camps
In camps 244,416
Not in camps 200,981
Total 445,397
WEST BANK 19 camps
In camps 94,824
Not in camps 278,762
Total 373,586
Tel Aviv
WEST BANK
River Jordan
Amman
Jerusalem
JORDAN
Dead Sea
Gaza
JORDAN 10 camps

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/PalRefugees1989.jpg




In camps	208,716
Not in camps	636,826
Total	**845,542**


Number of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza:	818,983
Number of Palestinians in countries bordering on Israel:	1,382,140
Total:	**2,201,113**

The continued reluctance of Arab States to absorb the Palestinian refugees in their midst, and the political desire of many Palestinians to retain their identity and status as a dispossessed people, led to the perpetuation of the refugee camps set up in 1948 and 1967. These camps received funding from the United Nations, and also from individual Arab States, but were essentially areas of poverty and deprivation. Inceasingly, however, Palestinians left the camps, specially in Jordan and on the West Bank, and entered Palestinian Arab society. The 27 camps inside Israel became centres of the uprising that began in December 1987 (the Intifada)

The figures on this map were compiled by the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) as at 30 June 1989

http://www-personal.umich.edu/~jentri/PalRefugees1989.jpg (2 of 2) [5/25/2008 7:35:06 AM]



THE INTIFADA INTENSIFIES, 1 NOVEMBER - 17 DECEMBER 1992
LEBANON
SYRIA
Even as the peace talks progressed, Palestinians who did not want them to succeed intensified their activities. The killing of three Israeli soldiers on 7 December 1992, the fifth anniversary of the start of the Intifada, was claimed by the military wing of the Islamic fundamentalist group Hamas. On December 13 Hamas militants kidnapped an Israeli army Sergeant, Nissim Toledano, whose body was found, stabbed and bound, on December 15. Two days later Israel deported 415 Hamas activists (of a total of 1,600 then being held in detention)
Between 1967 and 1973 a total of 1,200 Palestinians were deported on suspicion of terrorist activity. Between the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, and January 1991, a further 66 Palestinians were deported. On 2 January 1992, 12 Palestinians were deported. On 24 August 1992 a further 11 deportation orders were cancelled as a goodwill gesture by Israel as peace talks resumed in Washington
Golan Heights
Sea of Galilee
I S R A E L
14 November
Israeli troops kill a Palestinian suspected of being a fugitive
13 December
Nissim Toledano kidnapped, tortured and murdered by Hamas. His body was found two days later
Nablus
Balata refugee camp
3 December
a 17-year-old Palestinain killed while a bomb he was preparing exploded
WEST BANK
Mediterranean Sea
23 November
Israeli soldiers kill a 12-year-old Palestinian boy while firing at stonethrowers
River Jordan
J O R D A N



Tel Aviv
Lod
A-Ram
SAMARIA
1-30 November
3,000 stoning incidents
400 cars burnt
24 non-fatal stabbings
14 November
Palestinians kill a Palestinian accused of collaboration
27 November
Israeli troops kill a stonethrower
Jerusalem
12 December
1 Palestinian stonethrower shot dead by Israeli troops
Beit Omar
11 November
Israeli troops kill a 15-year-old Palestinian youth in a stone throwing crowd
Hebron
Sheikh Radwan
Jibalya refugee camp
Gaza City
7 November
Palestinians kill a Palestinian accused of collaboration
JUDAEA
Dead Sea
GAZA STRIP
Shati refugee camp
Khan Yunis
1 December
Israeli troops kill a 12-year-old and a 22-year-old stonethrower
7 December
3 Israeli soldiers killed
13 November
Israeli troops kill a 17-year-old stone thrower who refuses to halt
Rafah
14 November
Palestinians kill a Palestinian accused of collaboration
Kezlot
10 November
Israeli troops kill three Palestinians during a demonstration
17 December
415 Hamas activists deported to Lebanon
EGYPT
0 miles 10
0 kilometres 20
©Martin Gilbert 1993


"ENCLAVES FOR PEACE", THE BAILEY MAP, 1 FEBRUARY 1993


On 24 October 1991 a plan for three self-governing Palestinian enclaves was put forward by an Israeli expert on Palestinian affairs, Clinton Bailey. The aim was to devise areas of contiguous Arab settlement which would contain the maximum number of Arabs and the minimum number of Jewish settlers. Under this plan, an updated version of which was submitted to the Israeli Cabinet on 1 February 1993, almost 90% (1,076,000) Arabs of the West Bank would be released from Israeli control, while leaving 90% (101,000) of the Jewish West Bank settlers in retained contiguous Israeli territory, and just over 10% (12,470) inside the Arab enclaves.

124,000 Arabs would be outside the enclaves, as would all 140,000 Arabs of East Jerusalem




KEY
Israel's border with Jordan since 1967
The cease fire lines of 1949 (the "Green Line")
Possible borders of the three proposed self-governing Palestinian enclaves
Main Palestinian Arab towns and villages
Jewish settlements beyond the "Green Line"
Jerusalem municipal boundary
Under the Bailey plan, the Palestinians would retain the whole of the Gaza Strip, with its 1,000 Jewish settlers
GAZA STRIP
0 miles 5
0 kilometres 10
©Martin Gilbert 1993
SAMARIA
Jericho
JORDAN
Beit Horon
Jerusalem
Ma'ale Adumim
WEST BANK
Bethlehem
Efrat
Tekoah
Halhul
JUDAEA
Judaean Desert
Dead Sea
Hebron
Kiryat Arba


- Unclassified -
Revised Route of the Security Fence
as of April 2007
I D F M U
Ministry of Defence
Scale 1:250,000
Legend
Area A
Area B
Nature Reserve
Revised route
Concrete Wall
Road Protection
Route Subject To Completion of
Temporary Route
SURVEY OF ISRAEL
Haifa
Tiberias
Nazerat
Afula
Jenin
Hadera
Netanya
Tul - Karem
Nablus
Kfar Saba
Kalkilya
Tel-Aviv
TEL AVIV-YAFO
Ben Gurion Airport
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem
KM 29
MILE 18
KM 32
MILE 19
KM 8
MILE 5
KM 28
MILE 15
KM 12
MILE 7.5
KM 13
MILE 8
KM 17
MILE 10
KM 4
MILE 2.5
MILE 2.7
MEDITERRANEAN SEA


Beit Lehem
Hebron
Beer Sheba
KM 11
MILES 7
KM 3
MILES 2
YAM HA-MELAH
Produced by the IDFMU GIS team

Terrorism, Border Conflicts, & The Need for Security



Palestinian Authority Police
West Bank (4/11/07)

West Bank Crisis
Settlements of Displaced Persons



Settlements are still growing: 7/11/07

Home Page

Annapolis Peace Conference

To be hosted by the United States in Annapolis, Maryland, tentatively scheduled for Nov 25-27, 2007.

Is giving up the West Bank the solution for peace?



US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Prime Minister Olmert, Haim Saban, Tony Blair, and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas have been meeting in an attempt to reach an atainable solution for the crisis. The current suggestion is to create two separate states, one for the Jewish people and the other for the Palestinian people.

Transcript of Secretary Rice's speech in Jerusalem at the Saban Forum Dinner

excerpt:

SECRETARY RICE: "...Now we hear, and I've heard it many, many times, now is not a propitious time for peace. I do not deny that the present moment is complicated and challenging. I do not deny that the situation in Gaza is deeply troubled. But when has the Middle East ever been uncomplicated or unchallenging? I believe we have a real opportunity now to advance the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state..."

Link to video regarding the peace conference.





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Gaza
Bethlehem
Hebron
Khan Yunis
Dead Sea
Port Said
Port Fouad
Beersheba
El Arish
Ras el-Arish
Suez Canal
Kantara
Abu Aweigila
Negev
Ismailia
Lake Timsah
JORDAN
Bur Gafgata
Bitter Lakes
SINAI
766 Israeli soldiers were killed during the 'Six Day War'. The number of Arab dead was never announced
Suez
Kuntillla
EGYPT
Eilat
Akaba
Gulf of Suez
Abu Zeneima
Gulf of Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA
St.Catherine's Monastery



Source : Sir Martin Gilbert

JERUSALEM MAPS

Palestinian and Israeli Neighborhoods in Metropolitan Jerusalem, 2000



Planned settlements and settlements under construction have not been included e.g Har Homa

Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)




A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Israeli Settlements in the Golan Heights, July 1989





Source : The United Nations




A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh







Source : The United Nations

A(the) Case(s) for Peace



A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh


UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 06336 2688

Colonization of Palestine, 1947-2003

الاستعمار الإسرائيلي لفلسطين، ١٩٤٧-٢٠٠٣

Main City
Segregation wall
Eastern Segregation Zone
United Nation Partition Plan, 1947
Proposed Arab State
Proposed Jewish State
Occupied West Bank and Gaza after 1967
Areas under Palestinian Control, 2000

Diminishing Palestine



LEBANON
SYRIA
Sur
Al Qunaytirah
Safad
'Aka
Haifa
Tabariyya
L. Tabariyya
An Nasirah
Irbid
Beisan
Jenin
Tulkarm
Tubas
Nablus
Qalqilya
Tel Aviv
Yafa
Salfit
Jordan River
Amman
Al Lid
Ar Ramlah
Ramallah
Ariha (Jericho)
Asdod
Al Quds (Jerusalem)
Madaba
Bethlehem





Mediterranean
'Asqalan
Jabaliya
Gaza
Deir al Balah
Khan Yunis
Rafah
Al Khalil (Hebron)
Dead Sea
Bi'r As Sabi'
Al Karak
Al 'Arish
ISRAEL
JORDAN
EGYPT
Ma'an
Ras An Naqab
Al 'Aqaba
Gulf of 'Aqaba
SAUDI ARABIA
0 5 10
Kilometers

Source : Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ)

"Today's war is not a new war but part of an old war." King Hussein of Jordan, June 1967

The Arab world, convinced that the creation of Israel was nothing more then imperial Britain displacing Arabs, never accepted the sovereignty of Israel, convincing themselves that the new nation would continue the imperial the British spirit of imperialism and attempt to take more territory. Arab fears seemed to be justified after the Arab Israeli war of 1948, in which Israel attempted to take complete control of Jerusalem and gained significant new territory through the armistice signed at the conclusion of the war,. While not harboring any malevolance towards the Jewish people, many Arab countries continued to harbor resentment at what they saw as the occupation of Arab land by Israel, and fear at future incursions on other Arab land. The Arab world continued to pressure Israel by restricting its airpspace and shipping options. Terrorist activity against Israel and Israeli retaliations both violated the armistice of 1949.

In 1956, with the military and political support of the British and the French, Israel invaded the Sinai peninsula in an attempt to capture the Suez Canal, recently nationalized by Egypt and now blocked to Israeli shipping. After significant military gains, the British ended hostilities in November of 1956, with France and Israel following suit shortly after. A UN peacekeeping force was put in place on the peninsula, and in March of 1957, Israel withdrew its remaining troops from Sinai.

Israel	Arabs
 Moshe Dayan	 Gamal Abdel Nasser
 Yitzhak Rabin	 King Hussein bin Talal
 Uziel Narkiss	 Hafez al-Assad

1956 -Israel withdraws from the Sinai Peninsula and is replaced by a UN peacekeeping force. Egypt reopens the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

1957

1958

1959

1960

1961 - Syria secedes from Egypt.

1962

1963 -National Council of the Revolutionary Command, led by the Baath party, comes to power in Syria

1964 -Israel begins withdrawing water from the Israel Water Carrier project for potable water and agriculture.

1965 - Syria begins the Headwater Diversion Plan, planning to divert the flow of the Banias Stream before it reached the Sea of Galilee, significantly impacting the water flow in the Israeli Water Carrier project.
-Israeli Defense Forces directly attack the Headwater Diversion project, initiating border tensions and sporadic violent clashes.
- Syria routinely shells Israel from locations in the Golan Heights.

1966 - Syrian President Amin Hafiz is removed from power and replaced with a civilian Baath government

1966

- Egypt and Syria agree to a military alliance
- The "Samu Incident," Israeli border patrol hit by mine on Jordanian border. Israel directs message to King Hussein declaring that Israel intends no violence towards Jordan. Israel attacks West Bank village of Es Samu.

1967

- Border skirmishes between Israel and Syria over the border at the Golan Heights result in the loss of six Syrian aircraft
- Egypt ejects UN peacekeeping forces
- Egypt closes the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping
-Israel executes pre-emptive air strike against Egyptian targets
-Israel invades Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, and West Bank
-Israeli Defense Forces capture East Jerusalem

References

Israel's Disengagement from the Gaza Strip
August-September 2005

The complete withdrawal of Israelis from the Gaza Strip was one of the biggest historical withdrawals a nation has ever made. In an effort for peace, Ariel Sharon went against his historical support and implementation of the Israeli settlement movement. The disengagement uprooted and removed 21Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip totalling about 9,000 people. The disengagement plan faced a large amount of opposition, mostly stemming from the major Israeli settlement of Gush Katif. In the year leading up to the disengagement the color orange identified people, restaurants, and stores as against the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip. The prominent slogan of the opposition movement was,*Yehudi lo megaresh Yehudi,* translated to "A Jew doesn't expel a Jew."

For More Information:
Israel's unilateral disengagement plan
Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
Disengagement Plan and President Bush's Acceptance
Outline of Disengagement Plan
In Gaza, A test Case for Peace
Map of Settlement Withdrawal
Gaza Disengagement: The History
Ben Eliezer: Disengagement a mistake- The Jerusalem Post

A residential street in the Neve Dekalim settlement in Gush Katif.





With people power and faith, Gush Katif can still be saved from destruction. Do not despair!!

An anti-Disengagement protest in Gush Katif.



Anti-Disengagement protesters wearing the shirts with the Hebrew slogan of the opposition movement, *Yehudi lo megaresh Yehudi,* translated to "A Jew doesn't expel a Jew."



Anti-Disengagement protesters in Ofakim, a city in southern Israel near the Gaza Strip with an Israeli police presence.



Artistic picture showing the relationship of Judaism to the opposition to the disengagement plan. The black leather straps are called *tefillin* or phylacteries. They are used in a daily morning prayer ritual. The orange wristband shows the man's opposition to removing the Jewish settlements from the Gaza Strip. This wristband shows the Hebrew slogan of the opposition movement, *Yehudi lo megaresh Yehudi,* translated to "A Jew doesn't expel a Jew."

Un-Armed Israeli soldiers during the Gaza Disengagement



Palestinians Celebrating the Gaza Disengagement on its coast.



The destruction of Israeli settlements in the Gaza Strip as a result of the disengagement.


VIEWIMAGES





Map Showing Gaza Settlements Evacuated



Settlement	Founded	Population***
Atzmona (Bnei Atzmona)	1982**	650
Bedola'h	1986	220
Dugit	1982	80
Elei Sinai	1983	350
Gdid	1982	310
Ganei Tal	1979	400
Gan Or	1983	350
Katif	1985	405
Kerem Atzmona	2001	70
Kfar Darom***	1989	365
Kfar Yam	1983	20
Morag	1972	220
Netzarim	1972	390
Netzer Hazani	1973	410
Neveh Dekalim	**1983**	**2,500**
Nissanit	1980	1050
Pe'at Sadeh	1989	105
Rafiah Yam	1984	150
Shirat Hayam	2000	50
Slav	1980	50
Tel Katifa	1992	75



* Founded 1979 in Sinai. Moved to Gaza, 1982.

**Kfar Darom was founded about 1935; destroyed 1939; re-founded 1946; destroyed 1948

*** Estimates are about 15% below published total of 8,500

Palestinian Parliamentary Elections
January 2006

In the January 25, 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary elections Hamas became a major player on the international arena by shocking the Western world with a victory over Fatah. Within a 132 seat Parliament, Hamas won 74 seats and Fatah won 45 seats, with a voter turnout of around 77%. The elections came after a large American push for a democratic process with the Palestinian Authority, even though Israel strongly warned of the dangers of these elections. This victory of Hamas over Fatah on what appeared to be a legitimate contest, gave birth to a stronger and appearingly more legitimized terrorist faction.

For more Information:
Palestinian Parliamentary Elections 2006- GlobalSecurity.org
Palestinian legislative election, 2006- Wikipedia
Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast- The Washington Post
Hamas' past casts shadow over peace plans- CNN
Helping Palestinians Build a Better Future- Condoleeza Rice
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
Rice Urges Israel to Aid Palestinian Election- The New York Times



US President George BUSH and US Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice




Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas Leader Khaled Meshaal

Official Election Results

Election results by Specific district

Election Results by Seat Distribution



This map does a great job of showing the high voter turnout in the 2006 Palestinian elections. The map also shows the higher voter turnout of the cities in the Gaza Strip as compared to the cities in the West Bank. This demonstrates the high political activity of the residents of the Gaza Strip.

Palestinian Elections

Palestinian voters will choose the Palestinian Authority parliament on Wednesday in the first legislative elections in a decade. Fatah, the secular, nationalist movement that has dominated Palestinian politics for decades, is slightly favored over Hamas, the radical Islamic movement. Polls suggest that no party may win a majority, which could lead to a coalition government.


Areas of formal Palestinian authority

How Seats Are Assigned

Each voter receives two ballots because the 132 seats in the parliament are allocated two ways.

66 seats are elected from more than 700 candidates in 16 districts. Candidate names appear on the ballots.

66 seats are elected by the proportion of overall votes won by each party. Only the 11 party names appear on the ballots.




Seats From Electoral Districts

White borders on each map mark the district boundaries.

GAZA Poor, religious and conservative, the Gaza Strip has been Hamas's traditional stronghold. The group is expected to do well here, as it did in the municipal elections last year.

Source: Central Elections Commission–Palestine



JENIN The four district seats could be split among the parties. In the local council elections, Hamas won the same number seats as the coalition of Fatah and a small leftist group.

NABLUS Although it is a longtime Fatah stronghold and the West Bank's commercial center, Hamas won 13 of the city's 15 local council seats last month and could win several of the district's six Parliament seats.

RAMALLAH Another Fatah stronghold, and the party is expected to take most of the seats in what is effectively the Palestinian political capital in the West Bank.

JERUSALEM Israel controls all of the city, and barred Hamas from campaigning here. Most Palestinian voters will have to travel elsewhere, though Israel reluctantly agreed to allow several thousand residents to vote at post offices in East Jerusalem.

BETHLEHEM With a large Christian minority, Bethlehem has traditionally been politically moderate, but Hamas made a strong showing in the local elections last year and could perform well again.

HEBRON No municipal elections were held here last year, but Palestinian polling data suggests that Hamas is favored to win most of the nine seats in a town that has been a stronghold for militants.

This map does a great job of portraying the system that is used in the Palestinian elections. There is a brief description of all the major cities in terms of the inhabited population and most of all the faction they will most likely support. The support for Hamas in Gaza and in the West Bank does not come across as a surprise when looking at this descriptive map.

The Capture of Fatah's Headquarters in Gaza
June 15, 2007
Gaza City, Gaza Strip

After a week of fighting between Hamas and Fatah, Hamas captured the Presidential compound of PA President Mahmoud Abbas. This marked the official takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. In this victory Hamas militants celebrated by posing for several photographs that mock the United States and Fatah.

Resources on the Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip

Hamas Takes Full Control of Gaza- BBC

Siege on Gaza- Btselem

Hamas conquers Gaza Strip- Haaretz


Takeover by Hamas Illustrates Failure of Bush's Mideast Vision- The Washington Post











Since the Hamas Takeover of the Gaza Strip

Since Hamas violently tookover, the Gaza Strip has been in shambles. The region has turned into chaos controlled by a violent faction. The rocketing of Israeli towns has not ceased and the area's hostility is increasing. As a response to the continual rocket attacks on Israeli cities, Israel has reduced the fuel supply to the entire strip. Even though, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Stip in 2005, Israel is still responsible for the situation because they control the border crossings in and out of the Gaza Strip. The fuel cut is not helping the already spiralling downhill economy in the Gaza Strip. The humanitarian situation is also spiralling out of control as borders have been closed and Hamas has boycotted several food and aid shipments to the region. Amidst the horrible situation in the Gaza Strip, Hamas has vowed for more violence against Israel as they were not invited to the Annapolis Summit.

More Information on the Situation Since the Hamas Takeover

Israel to Seal Gaza After Hamas Takes Over- AP
What Comes After Hamas?- The Jerusalem Post
'How can people live, I wonder?'- The Guardian
Background: What the state needs to explain about Gaza fuel cuts- The Jerusalem Post
See Gaza and weep - uruknet.info
Ben Eliezer: Disengagement a mistake- The Jerusalem Post
Hamas bans Israeli produce in Gaza- The Jerusalem Post
IDF colonel: Hamas creating humanitarian crisis- The Jerusalem Post
EU halts aid to Gaza, closes border- USA Today
Hamas warns of violence after talks- The Observer
Stranded Palestinians May Get to Gaza- The NY Times

Hamas Lion King Video



On the Hamas owned television channel, Al-Aqsa TV, Hamas aired a Lion King parody of the Hamas-Fatah conflict. In its propaganda, Hamas depicts Fatah as greedy traitors of Islam while being puppets of the United States. Hamas depicts themselves as a noble lion that protects the integrity of Islam and the Palestinian people. The title of the video is "Message to the criminal gangs in the occupied West Bank," it aired in August 23, 2007.

Hamas battle cartoon mimics 'Lion King'- The Jerusalem Post



Important People to Know



Former Palestinian Prime Minister Yasser arafat



Political Leader of Hamas Khaled Meshaal

Political Leader of Hamas and Former Prime Minister of Palestinian National Authority, Ismail Haniyeh



Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas



Former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon





Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert



US President George W. Bush

Key Players Interacting



Haniyeh, Meshaal, and Abbas in the Kaaba in Mecca.



Olmert and Abbas meeting in Israel.



Abbas, Bush, Sharon at the Red Sea Summit in Aqaba, Jordan.



Olmert and Sharon in a Knesset session in Jerusalem.

Olmert and Bush in the White House in Washington, D.C.



Basic Information on the Gaza Strip




The Gaza Strip is located in the Middle East (at 31°25′N 34°20′ECoordinates: 31°25′N 34°20′E). It has a 51 kilometers (32 mi) border with Israel, and an 11 km border with Egypt, near the city of Rafah. Khan Yunis is located 7 kilometers (4 mi) northeast of Rafah, and several towns around Deir el-Balah are located along the coast between it and Gaza City. Beit Lahia and Beit Hanoun are located to the north and northeast of Gaza City, respectively.

The Gush Katif bloc of Israeli localities used to exist on the sand dunes adjacent to Rafah and Khan Yunis, along the southwestern edge of the 40 kilometers (25 mi) Mediterranean coastline. A few months after the disengagement in December 2005, a controversial buffer zone was created on the northern border with Israel, in the area often used to launch Qassam rockets into Israel. Part of it reaches 2.5 kilometers (1.6 mi) into the Palestinian Authority-controlled territory, on roughly the area of the former northern Israeli localities.

The Gaza Strip has a temperate climate, with mild winters, and dry, hot summers subject to drought. The terrain is flat or rolling, with dunes near the coast. The highest point is Abu 'Awdah (Joz Abu 'Auda), at 105 meters (344 ft) above sea level. Natural resources include arable land (about a third of the strip is irrigated), and recently discovered natural gas. Environmental issues include desertification; salination of fresh water; sewage treatment; water-borne disease; soil degradation; and depletion and contamination of underground water resources.

The Strip currently holds the oldest known remains of a man-made bonfire, and some of the world's oldest dated human skeletons. It occupies territory similar to that of ancient Philistia, and is occasionally known by that name.

Map of the Gaza Strip Overlain on a Satellite Image



Israel and The Palestinian Territories




District (meḥoz) boundary
National capital
District (meḥoz) center
Railroad
Divided highway
Other road
0 40 Kilometers
0 40 Miles
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, SP 30N / 36N
Israel proclaimed Jerusalem as its capital in 1950, but the US, like nearly all other countries, maintains its Embassy in Tel Aviv.
The West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli-occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement – permanent status to be determined through further negotiation.
Mediterranean Sea
GOLAN HEIGHTS (Israeli occupied)
SYRIA
NORTHERN
HAIFA
CENTRAL
TEL AVIV
WEST BANK
GAZA STRIP
JERUSALEM
SOUTHERN
NEGEV
JORDAN
Nahariyya
'Akko
Haifa
Tiberias
Lake Tiberias
Nazareth
As Suwaydā'
Dar'ā
Irbid
Buṣrā ash Shām
Al Mafraq
Jarash
Nahr al Yarmūk
Jordan
Ḥadera
Janin
Netanya
Ṭūlkarm
Nablus
Herzliyya
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Nahr az Zarqā'
Az Zarqā'
1994 Treaty Line
Bat Yam
Rām Allāh
Rehovot
Ramla
Amman
Jericho
Ashdod
Jerusalem
Mādabā
Ashqelon
Bethlehem
Qiryat Gat
Dead Sea
Gaza
Hebron
1950 Armistice Line
Khān Yūnis
1949 Armistice Line
Beersheba
Al Karak
Al Qaṭrānah
Al 'Arīsh
Dimona
Zefa'
Aş Şafi
Bi'r Lahfān
Abū 'Ujaylah
Zin
Nahal Ha'Arava
Wādī al Jayb
'Ayn al Quṣaymah
Mizpe Ramon
Bi'r Ḥasanah
Wādī al 'Arīsh
31
32
33



More Basic Information on the Gaza Strip
[Gaza Strip- MSN Encarta]
[The Gaza Strip- CIA World Factbook]
[BBC Profile: Gaza Strip]
[Gaza Strip- Wikipedia]
[Interactive Map of Israel- The Jerusalem Post]



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

This document has been produced with the financial support of the European Union as part of the EUBorderConf project, administered in Israel at Ben Gurion University. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of a Working Group of Geographers (names mentioned above) and cannot be regarded as reflecting the policies and views of the European Union.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Introduction

Following the unilateral Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, the next stages of an Israel-Palestine conflict resolution have been raised. Central to these discussions is the issue of a border demarcation acceptable to both sides. The State of Israel has never formally stated the preferred course of its boundaries. In all previous negotiations between Israel and her neighbours, the other side always presented a clearly defined boundary option, to which Israel had to respond during the negotiations. The aim of this document is to present the parameters which will enable the Israeli government to determine a clear negotiating position on its future boundary with a Palestinian State. Although numerous border proposals have been presented during the past decade by both academics and politicians, these have focused more on the drawing of possible lines and less on key parameters and principles to be taken into consideration by the negotiators, if and when official negotiations are resumed with the aim of reaching a resolution of the conflict.

Motivated by the purpose of examining such professional criteria for the demarcation of a future boundary, a working group of Israeli geographers held a series of discussions, and field trips, during November-December 2005. All of the participants

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

have been involved, at one stage or another, in both the professional and public discourse, and have conducted research projects, relating to boundary demarcation, land zoning and/or regional planning within Israel / Palestine. The objective of the working group was to identify the key problems involved in boundary demarcation and to suggest alternative ways and methods of dealing with these problems, by putting to use the professional and geographical expertise of the group members. As an exercise in professional planning, the working group would identify and confront key issues which are not necessarily taken into account by negotiators and diplomats during negotiations

It should be emphasized that the objective of the working group was NOT to come up with a single optimal line of separation, not least because there is no such single line which will be agreed upon by all the workshop participants, nor would it necessarily reflect the diverse political positions held by members of the workshop. A main purpose of the exercise was to offer a framework for resolving specific problems



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

related to the boundary demarcation process, if and when negotiations are resumed, suggesting alternative courses for the boundary in those areas where the course of the Green Line is no longer deemed appropriate.

Three main demarcation scenarios were identified as the basis for discussion:

1. The course of the Green Line with minor territorial changes, reflecting the course of the line following 1949.
2. The course of the Green Line with major territorial changes, to allow for the inclusion of some Israeli settlement blocs inside Israel, in exchange for unsettled areas of territory to be transferred to the Palestinian State
3. The demarcation of a completely new line which would reflect the existing geographic and demographic realities of the region.

At this stage (January 2006), the working group has not yet dealt with issues of boundary demarcation relating to the Jerusalem metropolitan region. This will be examined at a later stage in the project. Boundary demarcation between Israeli and Palestinian territory in the Jerusalem metropolitan region is a prerequisite to any resolution of the conflict.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference


March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference



General Principles and Assumptions

The working group discussions were based on the following key assumptions:

1. Resolution of the conflict will be achieved by a situation of two states, Israel and Palestine, living in a state of coexistence, and mutually recognizing the rights of territorial sovereignty and non-belligerence.
2. The two-state solution requires the demarcation of a physical boundary. Other political solutions to the conflict (such as a single bi-national state or the continuation of occupation) though they constitute part of the current political discourse, do not constitute part of the agenda of the Boundary Demarcation project working group.
3. The specific course of an existing boundary (the Green Line), particularly an armistice line which was only demarcated less than sixty years ago, is not sacrosanct. The course of boundaries can be redrawn according to contemporary demographic, geographic and political realities.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

4. Assuming a bilateral negotiation process, any line which is agreed upon by both sides to the conflict will have international recognition, regardless of the extent to which such a line may or may not deviate from the existing Green Line.
5. The future functional nature of the boundary will be dependent on the willingness of the respective leaders to engage in cross-boundary cooperation, regardless of where the boundary is located. Nevertheless, a future boundary must be demarcated in such a way that boundary management is workable and efficient in enabling the movement of people, goods and economic products to the extent that the two sides are prepared.

Rules for boundary demarcation

1. Demarcation of boundaries should be carried out in a way that will ensure a compact and contiguous territory for both Israel and for a Palestinian State, avoiding, as far as possible, the establishment of exclaves, enclaves or bypass transit routes (excepting the route(s) which will link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip).
2. In the first instance, the Green Line separating Israel from the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes the default border from which boundary

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

and Gaza Strip constitutes the default border from which boundary demarcations and changes take as their reference point. The Green Line was demarcated, and implemented on the ground in 1949-50, based on existing military considerations, with only minimal attention paid to geographical considerations. It was not originally perceived as constituting an international boundary. Notwithstanding, the significance of the presence of the Green Line is noted, including its general recognition by the international community, despite the fact that for long periods of time following 1967, successive Israeli governments argued that the Green Line had been erased and was not included on official maps

3. The Security Fence / Separation Barrier - does not constitute a political boundary and, as such, is not taken as a de facto border. Notwithstanding, the Security Fence constitutes a geographical reality in the landscape and, unlike all other border proposals of the past decade; it has been implemented on the ground. Its unilateral imposition and deviation from the course of the



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Green Line makes certain sections of the Fence (which, at the time of writing, had been implemented along 40 percent of its planned course) unacceptable as the basis for boundary negotiations which have to be reached on a bi-lateral basis.

4. Any annexation of territory to Israel must be met with a fair exchange of territory, such that the Palestinian State will encompass approximately the same extent of area as exists within the existing boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The optimal territorial exchange along the Green Line should be undertaken at a ratio of 1:1, although this principle is negotiable with respect to both Israeli and Palestinian territory. The relative value and significance of different types of land must also be taken into consideration as part of a process of territorial exchange / compensation.
5. Areas exchanged between Israelis and the Palestinians should follow the rule of contiguity. West Bank areas assigned to Israel should be contiguous with Israeli territory. Israeli areas assigned to the future Palestinian state should be contiguous with its future territory.
6. In special cases, the establishment of ethno-territorial enclaves can be considered, but this is not to be encouraged.
7. The demarcation of boundaries should minimize, wherever possible, the

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

inclusion of Palestinian population resident in the West Bank, in areas assigned to Israel under the accepted boundary demarcation.

8. Any proposal to redraw boundaries in such a way that localities of Arab citizens of Israel will be included within the territory of a future Palestinian State, even if it is agreed by the representatives of the Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority, is problematic.*[1]

9. Israeli settlements on the Palestinian side of the boundary will have to be evacuated.

---

* **Regarding the issue of border demarcation which would result in the incorporation of Arab citizens of Israel as part of the Palestinian State, there were major differences of opinion amongst the group participants. Three main opinions were prevalent:**
- **Avoiding discussion of this alternative altogether because of the legal and moral implications.**
- **Including this alternative but making it conditional on the agreement of the population involved**
- **Including this alternative by virtue of the agreement between the formal representatives of both sides only.**



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

10. Boundary demarcation must, as far as possible, take account of existing infrastructural realities, not least the location of major transportation arteries, water sources, agricultural land etc; in such a way as to cause as little human and economic dislocation as possible. This includes consideration of Route 6 (the Trans-Israel highway) which runs parallel to much of the Green Line, as well as the five major boundary transit points which are currently in the process of construction.
11. Security considerations of both sides are to be taken into account in the process of boundary demarcation. What constitutes the respective security considerations require professional input from experts in this area.
12. The international status of the existing Green Line must be determined in accordance with the principles of International Law and its application to what was, in effect, an Armistice Line, but which has been increasingly recognized by the International Community as a default boundary.
13. A suitable territorial arrangement to the passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip must be finalized in such a way that it does not infringe upon Palestinian rights and ease of access on the one hand, or on Israeli sovereignty on the other

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

sovereignty on the other.

14. Both sides are encouraged to enable free and safe passage through their respective territories, by means of open borders, enabling ease of access and shortening of traveling time to places of employment, holy sites and other destinations.

15. The Working Group proposes the establishment of a formal Boundary Commission, including representatives of the Israeli Government, the Palestinian Authority and international boundary experts, to demarcate a future boundary, taking into account as many of the above considerations as possible, which will be equally acceptable to both sides of the conflict.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Alternatives for the Demarcation of a Future Boundary between Israel and the Palestinian Authority

The attempt to implement these principles focused on three alternative lines of demarcation:

Alternative I: Demarcating the Border along the "Green Line" with Minor Modifications

In choosing this option, it is necessary to take into account the fact that in the original demarcation of the Green Line, the decision makers closely followed the Armistice Line without consideration of numerous geographical features such as, the value of different types of land, the location of wells and water sources, the route of transportation arteries, etc; Even though some changes were made in the course of the Line as part of the "Officers Agreement" in 1949-1950, it is necessary to make change in some places because of environmental conditions and in order to make it more "user friendly" for the local inhabitants. We are aware of the fact that the precise location of the Green Line is unclear, not least because it was never properly delimited on the ground by the two sides following the Rhodes Agreement, and was only ever drawn on the maps.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

Alternative II: Demarcating the Border along the Green Line as a Default but with Major Modifications

This alternative proposes territorial exchange between Israel and the Palestinian State, in particular the retention of major Jewish settlement blocs in exchange for the transfer of unsettled areas inside Israel to the Palestinian Authority

Alternative III: Demarcating a New Boundary which will divide the Territory between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea into Two States

This proposal is based largely, although not exclusively, on the patterns of population dispersal, both Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian-Arab, in Israel-Palestine. This proposal, which would result in changes in the citizenship status for part of the Arab residents of Israel, was a point of major dispute amongst the Workshop participants, some of whom view such an action as being immoral and contrary to the principles of international law and human rights. It was also seen as raising the suspicions of the



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

remaining Arab citizens of Israel concerning their future status and rights as equal citizens within the State.

Analyzing these three options in greater detail enabled the group to determine those parts of the Green Line which did not present any "problems" (geographical, demographic, environmental etc;) and which could be maintained in situ, while allowing decision makers and negotiators to focus their attention on resolving issues of boundary demarcation in the remaining areas.

A more detailed analysis of the course of the border by the Working Group was based on splitting the Green Line into the following twelve sub-sections:

A. Section of the border in the south Judean desert and Hebron mountains, between En Gedi to the east and the community of Sansanna to the west

Two possible routes for the border were proposed for this section. The first posits that the Green Line, with slight adjustments to accommodate the topography and potential for cultivated areas, can be adopted as the border, and this despite the fact that to its north there are Jewish settlements established

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

after 1967: Karmel, Ma'on, Sussia, Mezadot Yehuda, Eshtemoa, Otni'el, Tene, Sansanna and Eshkolot. The geographical demarcation did not create a spatial problem in this area, it does not cross geographical areas, it is based partially on the contours of the natural landscape, nor does it create any ethno-demographic problem. The Jewish communities on the northern side of the proposed border should not prevent the demarcation of this proposed border according to this option. A second proposal suggests moving the border north to include the communities of Sansanna, Eshkolot, Tene, Eshtemoa, Mezadot Yehuda, and Sussia that are adjacent to the Green Line, within Israeli territory. The implications of this proposal are the annexation of 50 sq.km. or 50, 000 dunam by Israel, in exchange for the transfer of Israeli territory to the Palestinian state by moving the border south along the eastern section of the line, east of Mezadot Yehuda.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

B. Section of the border in the western Judean hills between Sansana and Avi'ezer (Highway # 367) in the north

There appears to be no need to change the route of the Green Line in this section. The present border clearly follows the eastern slopes of the Hebron hills. There is a distinct settlement demarcation, with Jewish communities only on one side of the line, and Palestinian communities to the east of the line. In this section of the border there are relatively large stretches of unsettled land, used principally on the Israeli side for pasture and cultivated crops. . In this section, it would therefore be possible to divert the border westwards to compensate for moving the border east in other areas.

C. Section of the border in the southern Jerusalem corridor in a north-east direction – from route # 367 (adjacent to Avi'ezer) as far as Battir

This area includes the broader Ezyon bloc (including the town of Efrata) as well as the town of Betar Illit. On the other hand, the Arab villages of Surif, Battir, Wadi Fuqin, Nahhalin and Jab'a are all located in this area, immediately to the east of the Green Line, but to the west of the Ezyon bloc. Contrary to the aim

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

of creating a border without any "panhandles" or gerrymandered borders i, due to the general consensus among the Israeli public, and even some agreement amongst Palestinian politicians, it is proposed that the course of the border should be redrawn to include the Ezyon bloc within Israeli territory. This includes Efrata, Elazar, Newe Daniel, Alon Shevut, Rosh Zurim, Bat Ayin and Kefar Ezyon. The proposed border will continue from the junction with Highway # 367 as far as Mt. San Sun, then taking a south - east route as far as Highway # 60, skirting the Jewish communities of the Etyon bloc. From there it will continue east, to include Migdal Oz and follow a northerly route to include the southern, built-up part of Efrata. It will then take a north-east route to include Elazar and Rosh Zurim, passing south of Nahhalin (which will remain in the Palestinian state), crossing the valley between Nahhalin and Betar Illit as far as Highway # 375, and from there along this road west as far as the Green Line. Due to the importance of this section of the border and the fact that both the Jewish and Palestinian communities lie in close proximity to one



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

another, the precise course of the border must be reviewed with extreme care, making an effort to include the small Jewish communities located on the fringes of the Ezyon bloc, as well as preventing the Arab villages from being severed from the rest of the Palestinian state. This will form a panhandle covering an area of some 35 sq.km., or 35,000 dunam, of the West Bank. Compensation for this area is available to the south of Highway # 375. We do not discount the possibility of including the village of Wadi Fuqin within the territory of the State of Israel, although this is to be avoided if possible

D. Section of the border from Highway # 375 to the south-west outskirts of Jerusalem (east of Battir)

The route of the border can follow the Green Line.

E. Jerusalem envelope, from Battir as far as Mevasseret Zion

We have not plotted the line and it will only be drawn after the discussion on the borders of Jerusalem.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

F. Section of the border in the northern Jerusalem corridor along the east – west line from Mevasseret Zion as far as Latrun

The proposed border will leave the community of Har Adar within Israel, it will continue west along the Green Line, with a small adjustment placing the entire village of Katana in Palestinian territory rather than straddling the original Green Line. The border will continue as far as Mevo Horon and from there will continue north along Highway 3 as far as Highway 443. This will annex some 17 sq.km. (17,000 dunam) to the State of Israel, as well as the area of no-man's land at Latrun.

The second option proposed is more far reaching and seeks to leave the entire area as far as Highway 443, including the road, within Israeli territory in an effort to enhance the transport link between Jerusalem and the coastal plain.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

This proposal would result in the inclusion of a large number of Palestinians into the State of Israel, including those in the villages of Bet Liqia, Bet Inan, Bidu, Kobeiba, Beit Iksa, Beit Ijza and Beit Zureik, as well as Hirbet el Misbakh, in addition to a 60 sq.km. area (excluding the Jerusalem envelope). As a solution to this problem, the possibility of free passage for Israelis along Highway # 443 was proposed, with the road remaining within the area of the Palestinian State.

G. Northern Shfelah and Modi'in area

The proposed line in this area will continue north from Highway # 443 along Highway # 445 as far as east Modi'in Illit and from there west along the line between Modi'in Illit to the south and Ni'lin to the north, in a south-east direction. This line will not include the Palestinian community of Midiyah and the Israeli communities of Na'aleh and Nili within the State of Israel. In contrast, the border will include Modi'in Illit and greater Modi'in within the borders of the State of Israel. This will add 10 sq.km (10,000 dunam) to the State of Israel.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

H. Section from the western slopes of the Binyamin hills, Budrus, as far as Highway # 5

In this section the border can follow the Green Line. It may deviate slightly west as far as the outskirts of Shoham. This frequently raises the issue of the security of Ben Gurion International Airport with regard to potential terror attacks. Since we assume a situation of conflict resolution, we have not taken this point into account. The flight path for aircraft landing from the east may have to be adjusted, but this does not seem to pose a problem. This will allow 25 sq.km. to be transferred to the Palestinian State in exchange for areas to be transferred to Israel in other locations.



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

I. Southern Sharon section, from Highway # 5 as far as Kalkilya

This section is the most problematic due to the location of Jewish communities adjacent to, and east of, the Green Line, which are in close proximity to Palestinian communities. In our view, the route of the security fence from Elkana northwards can be used (including a section of Highway # 5 from Kfar Kassem as far as Elkana), so that the communities of Elqana, Sha'arei Tikva, Eitz Ephraim and Oranit remain within the State of Israel. Residents of the Jewish communities to the east of this section, principally the town of Ariel and the communities of Qedumim, Emmanuel and Barqan, will be evacuated.

The area to be transferred to Israel contains Palestinian populations in Azoun Athma which would be located inside the State of Israel or relocation of the small number of residents of this community to the Palestinian State. The area to be annexed by Israel in this manner is 30 sq.km (30,000 dunam).

An alternative option was raised – to review the possibility of creating an Israeli enclave around Ariel in the heart of the Palestinian state, which will function along the lines of West Berlin when Germany was divided.

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

From Oranit to Qalqilya the border should follow the Green Line. The most problematic Jewish community in this area is Alfei Menashe, situated east of Qalqilya and the large Arab village of Hableh. The route of the security fence, despite its winding location, seems to be preferable to evacuating the entire community of Alfei Menashe. Here too the possibility of creating a Jewish enclave in Palestinian territory may be considered, thus avoiding the need to create a tortuous border in this area.

J. Qalqilya to Tulkarm

In this section the border could hug the Green Line, although for a variety of reasons, many of which remain unclear, the security fence was moved further east. The Jewish community of Sal'it lies east of the line although it seems illogical to adjust the border on account of this community. On the other hand, the Arab-Israeli town of Taiyiba is located in this area. Those who support the



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

concept of an exchange of territory and population believe that the border should be moved west here, so that it is adjacent to Highway # 6, leaving Taiyiba in the Palestinian state. The Green Line could be moved west along this section, so that the area to the east of Taiyiba is transferred to the Palestinian state without actually moving the town itself.

K. Slopes of the Samarian hills, from Tulkarm as far as the Jezreel Valley (Highway # 66)

This section is also highly problematic, and three possibilities have been put forward in this regard. One option plots the course of the line so that all the communities inhabited by Arab citizens of Israel in this area (including the Iron Valley communities, Ibtin-Zemer, the town of Baq'a el Arabia-G'att, and both parts of Barta'a) remain in the Palestinian state. Israelis who live in Me Ami (the only Israeli settlement in Wadi Ar'a) and possibly in Qazir as well, will have to evacuate their communities. Another possibility is to transfer only the eastern section of the Iron Valley to the Palestinian State (this includes Umm el Fahm and its satellite villages Salma and Zalpa). A third possibility seeks to leave the Green Line as the border in this section. We cannot accept the

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

position of the security fence in this area which leaves the Jewish communities of Shaked, Hinnait and Reichan west of the fence. We propose that this area should remain part of the Palestinian state and, as stated in our introduction, the course of the Security fence has no political significance in this area.

L. Section of the border in the valley area and Mt. Gilboa as far as the Jordan valley

The Green Line should remain as the border between Israel and the Palestinian state in this section, beginning at Highway # 66 from Megido to Jenin. This would also correspond with demographic separation - Palestinian communities on one side and Jewish communities on the other (excluding the Arab communities of Sandala and Muqeibila, adjacent to the Green Line in Israeli territory on Highway # 60). This line also follows the geographical – physical terrain. The route of the security fence in this section mostly follows the Green



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

A Framework for Demarcating a Border Between Israel and a Palestinian State: Parameters and Principles

As submitted by David Newman and Gideon Biger at the 6th Herzliya Conference, January 21-24, 2006

Home page of the Herzliya Conference

Key actors of the Herzliya Conferences







The Calendrical History of the Development of Dr. Gideon Biger's Framework

Page: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

January 20-23, 2008 - The Eighth Herzliya Conference

September 7, 2007 - Criticism of the Framework

January 21-24, 2007 - The Seventh Herzliya Conference

June 19, 2006 - Defended the Framework in the Jerusalem Post

Line, although there were a few deviations of the Fence / Barrier into the area beyond the Green Line which, we believe, should not be accepted.

An alternative proposal seeks to move the line so that the communities of Sandala and Muqeibila remain in Palestinian territory, relocating Magen Shaul slightly to the north. Another possibility for deviating from the Green Line in this area is to move the line north, west of Highway # 90 in the area of Nahal Bezeq, thus transferring several hundred dunam to the Palestinian state to compensate for the transfer of land in other locations.

Conclusion

This document has attempted to refocus the discussion of future Israeli-Palestinian boundaries on the technical and professional considerations which have to be taken into account. We have attempted to identify those parts of the

January 21-24, 2006 - The Framework is submitted

January 21-24, 2006 - The Sixth Herzliya Conference

March 18, 2005 - Wrote in the National Post

January 4, 2005 - Discussed border changes in the Financial Times

December 16, 2004 - Co-authored the *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Plans* (A Herzliya Paper, includes an analysis of The Arab Peace Initiative)

December 16, 2004 - Submitted a plan for territorial changes (map)

December 13-16, 2004 - The Fifth Herzliya Conference

Green Line which can be retained in situ and do not present any political demarcation problems while, at the same time, suggesting alternative demarcations for the remaining sections. The alternatives chosen by policy makers and negotiators will have to reflect their respective prioritizations of the key criteria noted in the first section of this document. We strongly recommend the appointment of a professional Boundary Commission, including international boundary experts, to help resolve these issues if, and when, Track I negotiations aimed at reaching a Final Status solution to the conflict, recommence.

BBC Monitoring International Reports

September 3, 2007 Monday

BBC MONITORING QUOTES FROM ISRAEL'S HEBREW PRESS 3 SEP 07

LENGTH: 1092 words

The following is a selection of quotes from editorials published in 3 Sep editions of Hebrew-language Israeli newspapers available to BBCM.

Regional conference

"Abu Mazin [Mahmud Abbas] also knows well the dynamics of expectations a conference of the planned kind stirs and therefore he warns every week against convening such a conference before reaching clear understandings on all issues. However, even if he finds the courage and signs an agreement along the parametres of 'improved Oslo', 'Camp David' or 'Clinton' it should be remembered that Abu Mazin has no ability to impose the agreement at least on half of his territory: The Gaza Strip is not in his hands... In such a situation and in order to prevent another round of violence the two leaders should do preparation work. First, define for the conference limited, realizable objectives IDF withdrawal from most of the [West] Bank territories, building joint economic infrastructures and giving Palestinians additional symbols of sovereignty like a currency... Second, work immediately to lower expectations... Explain the difficulties facing both sides and make clear that there is no chance for a comprehensive settlement at this stage. And finally, give the Palestinian public hope for the future by easing living conditions now..." [From commentary by Ze'ev Dror in centrist, largest circulation Yediot Aharonot]

"In addition to the direct threat that nuclear Iran poses for Israel the Iranian intentions of strategic penetration of its neighbours have special other implications. The Gaza Strip under Hamas rule has already become a forward opposition for the ayatollahs and the [West] Bank could follow suit... The theory guiding both Jerusalem and Washington is that the 'moderate' Arab world, headed by Saudi Arabia, will force the Palestinians to settle the conflict with Israel by peaceful means for fear of the Iranian intentions. But to judge by Arab spokesmen declarations or by the 'Arab peace plan' which it seems will be the focus of the planned international conference its real objective is to line Arab unity with unilateral Israeli concessions. Tehran will of course publish announcements condemning the conference but deep in its heart will rejoice at the steps liable to pave the way to consolidation of its hegemony in the whole Middle East." [From commentary by former ambassador to US Zalman Shoval in centrist, largest circulation Yediot Aharonot]

"See with what calm, what public and political apathy, the contacts between [Ehud] Olmert and Abu Mazin [Mahmud Abbas] on shaping the agreement of principles or on a framework agreement for a permanent settlement in the run-up to the international conference expected in November are received. Is it because of the summer heat or because the public feels that it is before something that is detached from reality, a little hallucinatory? No matter what is the cause both do not have many other gladdening alternatives. Both have been ordered into the water by Condoleezza Rice and have to swim in order not to drawn... There is nothing bad in Olmert's swimming on two

conditions: first, that he does not commit himself to anything he cannot implement in the future; and that he does not delude himself and us that at the end of the swimming we will reach a safe shore. At the most, this swimming can help us in the international and Arab arenas when the crisis on the northern front develops... There is no midnight summer dream here...! There is a cruel reality." [From commentary by Amos Gilboa in centre-right Ma'ariv]

"Inviting the 'nice Palestinians' to a party in Washington, where they will be showered with plenty while trying to isolate, boycott and humiliate the 'bad Palestinians', will lead - in the best of circumstances - to the creation of two Palestinian states: a pro-American one in the West Bank and a pro-Iranian regime in Gaza. In the worst of cases (if these talks fail), the conference will further entrench the diplomatic stalemate and diminish the chances for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is in Israel's interest to revive the dialogue between Fatah and Hamas, just as Russia and Egypt suggest, and not to contribute to a wider rift between the Palestinian organizations, as Washington proposes..." [From commentary by former Foreign Ministry Director-General Alon Li'el in English-language Jerusalem Post]

Population exchanges

"Following the reports on renewed negotiations on a permanent settlement with the Palestinians Prof. **Gideon Biger** again proposed passing territories populated by Israeli-Arabs to the future Palestinian state... **Biger** claims the move would shrink the Arab minority to 14 per cent of Israel's population and that 200,000 Arabs would pass to the Palestinian state. But in fact this is impossible. The thing obligates passing Arab communities west of 'Israel Cross Road' Qalanswah, Tirah and Jaljulyah; conceding the Shaked block of settlements in order to the pass the Wadi Arah communities and conceding the Western Shomron settlements block (Elkana, Oranit, Sha'ari Tikvah, Etz Efraim and others) if we want to pass Kafr Qasim and its surroundings. If these settlements are dismantled, which is impossible, the outcome will be that 12 per cent of Israel's Arab minority 2.3 percent of the country's population would pass to the Palestinian Authority. Moreover, this small population sits on a little more than 120 square kilometres, much less than what Israel wants to annex in the West Bank... The right way to shrink Israel's Arab minority is a permanent agreement in which 250,000 East Jerusalem Arabs pass to the Palestinian Authority and lose their resident status..." [From commentary by Shaul Arieli in left-of-centre, independent broadsheet Ha'aretz]

Iran

"Iran claims it has reached the magic number of 3,000 centrifuges, the level often cited in the West as the one at which Tehran's mullahs could enrich enough uranium to produce one or two nuclear weapons a year... The mullahs evidently think that the moment such a conclusion is reached [that it is already too late to stop an Iranian bomb], complacency toward the inevitable will set in and the West will focus on how to accommodate, rather than prevent, the reality of a nuclear Iran... Israel's message should be that the choice is not between preventing a nuclear Iran or living with that scenario, but between better and worse ways of confronting the Iranian threat." [From editorial of English-language Jerusalem Post]

Sources: As listed

BBC Monitoring

LOAD-DATE: September 3, 2007

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

ACC-NO: A200709036-15D93-GNW

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Other

JOURNAL-CODE: WBMS

Copyright 2007 Financial Times Information
All Rights Reserved
Global News Wire - Asia Africa Intelligence Wire
Copyright 2007 BBC Monitoring Service , Source: The Financial Times Limited

1 of 13 DOCUMENTS

The Jerusalem Post

June 19, 2006, Monday

Population swap debate goes mainstream

BYLINE: Anshel Pfeffer

SECTION: NEWS; Pg. 22

LENGTH: 1083 words

The concept of a population swap in which Israeli Arab towns would become part of a Palestinian state will get its first serious airing Monday at an academic conference in Jerusalem.

The position of the organizers of the symposium the Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies is summed up by the title of a study they authored entitled "Injustice and Folly - On the proposals to cede Arab localities from Israel to Palestine." But both those against the idea and those in favor are aware that it's no longer a crackpot proposal on the margins of the political discussion.

As recently as two years ago few experts or politicians expressed the view that Israel could transfer sovereignty of areas within the 1967 borders of the state heavily populated by Arabs to a Palestinian entity. But in 2004 Israel Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman began talking about the idea in interviews and even wrote a book about it. His party's success in the last elections opinion polls showing a growing acceptance of the concept and the willingness of respected experts and academics to address the issue have raised both hopes and fears that it is an idea whose time has come.

"We are of course against the idea that thousands of Israeli Arabs who are integrated into our society and are full citizens can have their citizenship stripped away from them says joint head of the Floersheimer Institute Prof. Amiram Gonen but we think that the idea should be debated."

The majority of speakers at the conference will be voicing arguments against the idea - including Arab politicians who are totally opposed to it - even though Gonen says that they made an effort to have more speakers in favor.

One speaker who will argue in favor is Prof. **Gideon Biger** of the Geography Department of Tel Aviv University who has been writing about a population swap for almost a decade and identifies with Lieberman's policies.

"I've been writing for years that the Wadi Ara and Triangle areas shouldn't remain a part of the state says **Biger.** My belief is that we founded the State of Israel for the Jewish people that's the objective. We are prepared to give rights to Arab citizens but when they don't identify with the state and they're talking about changing the anthem the flag and the Law of Return this is where we have a problem. It's absurd. If you don't want to be a part of this state so don't."

Biger believes that the solution is now becoming more accepted by the Israeli public and establishment. "I hope that it becomes a legitimate part of the public agenda. Now that everyone on the Right and Left knows that we can reach a quick solution with the Palestinians people are worried for the future identity of the Jewish state. I am trying to speak with as many politicians as possible to make sure that the idea doesn't go away. When Lieberman began talking about it I met with him and he accepted what I had to say.

"I think that it already has wide acceptance in the public but many politicians despite admitting in private that it's a good idea say that they're afraid to talk about out in the open."

During the election campaign Lieberman didn't emphasize the "swap" part of his platform. He followed the advice of American election guru Arthur Finkelstein who suggested that talking about personal security and the concerns of the Russian community would bring more votes.

Brig.-Gen. (res.) Shaul Arieli was a candidate on the Meretz Knesset list and is a senior research fellow at the Economic Cooperation Foundation. Together with Doubi Schwartz and Hadas Tagari he wrote the study "Injustice and Folly" which highlights what they see as the legal moral and practical shortcomings of the population swap.

"Lieberman is talking about canceling the citizenship of Israeli Arabs he says and not only those living near the Palestinian areas also in Jaffa. He is willing to kill off democracy just to get some more votes."

According to the study stripping Israeli Arabs of their citizenship and transferring their towns and villages to Palestinian sovereignty is against Israeli and international law and should not be done without the agreement of the Israeli Arabs and the Palestinians. The authors argue that such a step would alienate Israeli Arabs and internationalize issues such as the control of land within the 1967 borders issues that until now have been regarded as internal Israeli affairs.

They also claim that such a step is barely feasible on the ground since many of the Arab towns slated for transfer are to the west of Jewish towns and Route 6. According to their estimates only about 120 0 Israeli Arabs could really be transferred in this way and that is canceled out by the 220 0 east Jerusalem Arabs who according to the study would become part of Israel after it annexes the areas where they live.

Biger disputes this point saying that according to his plan Israel would also relinquish control of outlying neighborhoods of Jerusalem in effect leaving more Palestinians out of its control.

The study does admit however that debate over the plan should become a part of the political discussion in Israel since there is a creeping acceptance - not only on the Right where hopes are that it would allow Israel in return to keep more settlements within its control - but also among some on the Left who see the population swap as a way of convincing Israelis to support a two-state solution.

"I'm aware that having the discussion might stoke the fire says Arieli but it's important to counter the ignorance of the public with these facts. Some people on the Left said that we shouldn't even be talking about it but most realize that we have to bring it up."

Even Arieli isn't totally discounting the swap idea. In his opinion once a Palestinian state has been founded if the Israeli Arabs once they have the option feel that they identify with it more perhaps people will make 'aliya' to the Palestinian state.

Another speaker at the conference will be MK Otniel Schneller of Kadima who is a former secretary-general of the Council of Jewish Communities in Judea Samaria and Gaza (Yesha).

"Jewish morals and democratic ideals says Schneller forbid going ahead with such an idea in the way Lieberman is saying but once the realignment from parts of Judea and Samaria is a fact we will have to address the question of how to create a process in which Wadi Ara and the Triangle become part of the Palestinian state."

LOAD-DATE: January 10, 2007

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

Copyright 2006 The Jerusalem Post

National Post (f/k/a The Financial Post) (Canada)

March 18, 2005 Friday
National Edition

The big swap: For decades, Jews and Arabs have fought over the shape of Israel's borders. What's needed is a little horse-trading

BYLINE: **Gideon Biger**, National Post

SECTION: ISSUES & IDEAS; Pg. A23

LENGTH: 947 words

Since Israel's creation in 1948, the question of what territory rightfully belongs to the Jewish state has been a catalyst to war and terrorism. To this day, Syria refuses to make peace with Israel until it relinquishes the Golan Heights. Palestinians insist on a complete Israeli evacuation from the West Bank and Gaza. And the Lebanese-based terrorist group Hezbollah justifies its militancy with the claim that a small portion of southern Lebanon remains occupied by Israel.

There have been bright spots, however. Negotiations in the 1970s produced a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, and moved the ceasefire line of 1967 back to an older boundary established in 1906. Likewise, Jordan and Israel have agreed on a border, based approximately on a line established in 1922.

Underlying the success of these exchanges is the assumption that the contours of historically recognized borders may be modified to accommodate demographic and security needs. Furthermore, land entitlements should not be seen merely as a matter of total acreage, but should also take into account the quality and significance of the territories involved: Towns, holy sites, farmland and strategic landscape features all count for more than uninhabited desert.

In December, 2004, a task force at the Institute for Policy and Strategy of the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, applied these principles to produce a plan for settling Israel's long-standing territorial disputes through a series of connected land swaps. The broad outlines are shown on the map below.

The proposal involves accommodations with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority. Given the atmosphere of distrust that animates the Middle East, implementing this blueprint would be difficult. But if all the parties approached the project in good faith, there is no reason why it could not be implemented.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE

In recent years, a variety of plans have been put forward to produce a bilateral solution between Israel and the Palestinians. Virtually all require Israel to hand the Palestinians the entire Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank.

The Israeli proposal at Camp David in September, 2000, as well as president Bill Clinton's follow-up initiatives, included provisions for Israeli annexation of certain West Bank settlement blocs in return for ceding unpopulated territory on the Israeli side of the 1949 armistice line (or "Green Line" as it is commonly known). Several citizens' initiatives -- the "Geneva accord" and the People's Voice plans, for instance -- likewise recommend a limited territorial swap. Proposals range from symmetric swaps, whereby each side would give up exactly as much territory as it receives, to arrangements tilted in Israel's favour.

A more ambitious option, which has been raised in Israel, would expand the concept to include a swap of Arab towns and villages in northern Israel for additional territory in the West Bank. This would not only permit the annexation of more Jewish settlements, but also reduce the non-Jewish population within the final borders of the Israeli state, a crucial consideration for those who worry that the higher Arab birth rate might eventually threaten Israel's Jewish character.

ISRAEL-PALESTINE-EGYPT

The Gaza Strip, once occupied by Egypt, has been controlled by Israel since 1967. To make the tiny region a viable entity in Palestinian hands, Egypt would cede to Palestine an area of about 800-1,000 square kilometres southwest of the Gaza strip, with a coastline of some 30 kilometres. A million Palestinians could settle there, an airport and a sea port could be built, and beach tourism, industry and other sources of employment could develop.

In return, the Palestinians would cede to Israel an area of about 600 sq. km., which would include settlement blocks in the West Bank and an area along the Jordan River. The Judaen Desert would become a mutual ecological area.

For its part, Israel would make two concessions to Egypt. First: 600 sq. km. in the Faran Desert area, and on the border with Sinai (opposite Kuntila). These territories would be governed by the same security restrictions that apply in the adjacent areas of the Egyptian-controlled Sinai. Second: a land corridor from the edge of the above-mentioned territory to Jordan, which would permit the construction of an Egyptian-Jordanian railway line, a road and an oil pipeline.

ISRAEL-SYRIA-JORDAN

Israel would withdraw from most of the Golan Heights -- the strategic mountainous area occupied by Israeli troops in 1967. But to protect its security interests, Israel would continue to hold an area up to a line running roughly five miles east of the international boundary of 1923, demarcated by the cliffs in the southern sector of the Golan and running north, including the city of Katsrin.

Most of the established Israeli positions there would remain within Israel. The total area remaining in Israeli hands would be about 230 sq. km. The Mount Hermon area could be a joint ecological reserve, run by Syria, Israel and Lebanon. Jordan would compensate Syria for the territory left in Israeli hands with land along the Syrian-Jordanian border and in the El-Hama area. Israel would then compensate Jordan with an equal amount of land in the Arabah Valley, south of the Dead Sea, along the Israeli-Jordanian border.

The map that would emerge from these land swaps would represent the first fundamental change in the region's borders since colonial times. Such a success would not only improve relations among these long-time antagonists, it would also offer a meaningful example to other Middle Eastern countries that are engaged in their own embittered border disputes.

LOAD-DATE: March 18, 2005

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

GRAPHIC: Map: National Post; PROPOSED TERRITORY EXCHANGE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: (See print copy for complete map.)

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Opinion

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

Copyright 2005 National Post
All Rights Reserved

Financial Times (London, England)

January 4, 2005 Tuesday
London Edition 1

In spite of the violence of the past four years, there is extraordinary consensus As Palestinians prepare to elect a successor to Yassir Arafat, many observers see a rare opportunity to restart progress towards a peace deal, writes Harvey Morris

BYLINE: By HARVEY MORRIS

SECTION: COMMENT & ANALYSIS; Pg. 13

LENGTH: 2461 words

Expectations are running high that 2005 might be the year in which Israelis and Palestinians finally discern the beginning of the end of their seemingly intractable conflict. Since the death of Yassir Arafat in November, would-be peacemakers have been lining up to exploit what one Israeli official, in a burst of hyperbole that aptly summed up the current mood, called "a ray of hope streaming through a window of opportunity".

The apparent transformation is likely to be underlined by the election on Sunday of Mahmoud Abbas as new president of the Palestinian Authority and - despite last-minute hitches - the formation of a new centrist Likud-Labour coalition in Israel that would implement the first stage of the plan to withdraw Jewish settlers from Gaza.

The expressions of hope are not evenly spread. On the Israeli side, they tend to be highest within an Israeli political establishment that saw the late Palestinian leader as the single biggest obstacle to progress. They are lowest among a marginalised, leftwing camp that remains sceptical about the commitment of Ariel Sharon, prime minister, to an equitable settlement.

Mr Sharon, setting the tone in a speech in mid-December, said: "In 2005, we have the opportunity for a historic breakthrough in the relations between us and the Palestinians, a breakthrough for which we have waited many years . . . This is the hour, this is the time. This is the national test."

Optimism is also evident among Palestinians, relieved that dire warnings of internal chaos following Arafat's death on November 11 have so far failed to materialise. And diplomats, while continuing to temper their hopes with professional caution, broadly endorse the view that the conflict has reached a turning point.

Reflecting a perception that both Israelis and Palestinians have lost substantially in more than four years of violence, James Wolfensohn, visiting World Bank president, said that "both sides are tired of the killing".

In the current atmosphere, there is an understandable optimism among those who have been struggling to revive the peace process. "In spite of the violence of the past four years, there is an absolutely extraordinary broad depth of consensus, not only between the two parties but among the international community," said Terje Roed Larsen, outgoing United Nations representative in the region.

"If we look at the courage that is required for Sharon to say what he is saying and the equally courageous statements of Mahmoud Abbas, we have leaders ready to work for broadly the same goals."

As always, however, the desire of the two communities to see a return to normality has to be set against the realities of the situation on the ground. Previous windows of opportunity have opened only to be brutally slammed shut by either party or both and the history of the region is littered with unfulfilled peace plans.

The most recent casualty was the international "road map", launched with great fanfare in June 2003 when President George W. Bush told the leaders of Israel, the PA and Jordan: "All here today now share a goal: the Holy Land must be shared between the state of Palestine and the state of Israel, living at peace with each other and with every nation of the Middle East."

Few argued with the president's vision. The dilemma remains how to reconcile vastly different interpretations of what has to be fulfilled to achieve it.

Within a month, the ill-fated peace plan, drafted by a quartet of the US, European Union, United Nations and Russia, went into deep freeze, only to be kept alive by being grafted on to Mr Sharon's unilateral proposal to evacuate Jewish settlements in Gaza and part of the West Bank.

Mindful of earlier false starts, Mr Larsen tempered his optimism with the same warning he gave before the "road map" launch. "The international community should not raise expectations so high that we yet again have to dash the hopes of the Palestinians," he said.

There are already indications that Israel's honeymoon with Mr Abbas might be short-lived. Although he has reiterated his long-standing opposition to the militarisation of the Palestinian uprising, he also restated Arafat's minimum demands for a final resolution of the conflict - including full Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, of which east Jerusalem is one.

Silvan Shalom, Israeli foreign minister, responded by saying: "At a time when there is perhaps a great atmosphere of hope here in the region and in the world as a whole, harsh statements such as this are not encouraging."

Some sceptical Palestinian officials believe Israel has been building up Mr Abbas, the better to knock him down once he is voted into office. "Within six months, they'll be saying the same thing about Abu Mazen (Abbas) as they said about Arafat," commented a leading reformist.

Mr Abbas's tough stance might be put down to pre-election rhetoric aimed at an electorate that is unwilling to accept any crossing of the "red lines" established by Arafat. But, despite the radically contrasting personalities of the two men, there is no hint that the softly spoken and self-effacing Abbas is ready to compromise on the fundamental demands of his old comrade.

There are, however, enough plus factors in the balance sheet to justify at least some of the present euphoria. Mr Sharon is, after all, the first Israeli prime minister to endorse the concept of a Palestinian state, a notion that was

absent from the Oslo peace accords that created the PA.

In his public statements, he has turned his back on irredentists in the settler movement who still cleave to the dream of Jewish sovereignty throughout the Biblical Land of Israel and has apparently moved back towards his old Labour Zionist roots by forging an alliance with the Labour party of Shimon Peres.

Since Arafat's death, he has also softened the "unilateral" aspect of his Gaza withdrawal plan, opening up the prospect of co-ordination with the new Palestinian leadership on implementation of the proposed pullout.

On the Palestinian side, there is growing enthusiasm that a series of elections planned for next year will enhance the prospects for genuine reform within the PA.

There are also encouraging signs on the international and regional fronts. Mr Bush has said the quest for Middle East peace will be a priority of his second term, assuring doubters at a pre-Christmas press conference: "I know the world is wondering whether or not this is just empty rhetoric, or do I really believe that now is the time to move the process forward. And the answer is: now is the time to move the process forward."

Tony Blair, UK prime minister, has already seized the initiative by visiting the region and announcing a London conference on Palestinian reform.

International aid donors are holding out the carrot of an additional Dollars 500m a year in funding to the PA as long as violence ends and Israel lifts restrictions on movement and trade in the Palestinian territories.

Egypt, meanwhile, has taken the first steps towards a thaw in its "cold peace" with Israel by working closely with the Sharon government on co- ordinating the Gaza withdrawal, signing a new trade deal and indicating it would soon be ready to send its ambassador back to Tel Aviv. here is still ample material, however, for sceptics who fear that the latest hopes for peace may prove to be yet another false dawn.

Violence continues, principally in the Gaza Strip, as the Israeli army stages almost daily incursions, destroying Palestinian homes in the process, to counter rocket fire against Jewish settlements. Despite his aversion to armed struggle, there is little indication that Mr Abbas, even once elected, will abandon his policy of consensus-building in order to confront the militants.

In the early days of his two-week election campaign, Mr Abbas was pictured with cheering Fatah gunmen, some of them on Israel's wanted list, as he pledged them his protection.

In Israel itself, the alliance between Likud and Labour has failed to paper over the cracks in the unity of either party. Likud's intransigent wing is still opposed to relinquishing any Jewish settlements, while some on the Labour left fear Mr Sharon is trying to use the party as a fig leaf for an imposed interim solution to the conflict.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the Yesha Council, the principal mouthpiece of the Jewish settler movement, has announced a campaign of civil disobedience to try to ensure that the Gaza withdrawal plan never takes place. Palestinian officials and Israeli leftwingers note that, although Mr Sharon's withdrawal plan has galvanised political debate for more than a year, not a single settler has so far been relocated, while existing settlements continue to expand.

Even the apparent readiness of the US and its allies to become actively re-engaged has not been universally welcomed. Palestinians, one of the few communities in the Arab world to have experienced free elections, are irked by the demands of Mr Bush and Mr Blair that they embrace democracy. Some, including Ahmed Qurei, prime minister, criticise the planned London conference as an attempt to micromanage a reform process they regard as a purely internal affair.

"We are not waiting for the US and Europe to give us a green light for democracy," said Sheikh Hassan Yousef, a West Bank Hamas leader recently freed from two years' detention in Israel. "Consultation is a major pillar of Islam."

Such sour notes might be viewed as inconsequential amid the overall mood of optimism, were it not that seemingly unbridgeable gaps still divide the two sides.

Although Mr Sharon has skilfully managed to seize the political high ground with his Gaza withdrawal proposal, not even his supporters appear entirely clear about his longer term plans. Sceptics on both sides are concerned that the "Gaza first" proposal might turn out to be "Gaza only".

Labour supporters of the party's alliance with Mr Sharon believe that the withdrawal of settlements in Gaza, the first such evacuation of Jewish communities in the occupied territories, will create an unstoppable impetus for similar pullouts from much of the West Bank. Mr Sharon, in his December speech, nevertheless ruled out any concessions on the main blocs of Jewish settlement in the West Bank and on the status of Jerusalem.

Palestinian suspicions that Mr Sharon intends to entrench Israeli control over much of the Palestinian heartland have been fuelled by the re-emergence of ideas for complex land swaps that would consolidate existing settlement blocs (see accompanying story).

In an open letter to Sunday's voters, 559 leading Palestinians, including reformists, academics and Fatah moderates, rejected any interim settlement of the conflict that was aimed at "slamming the door in the face of a comprehensive peace settlement".

They also demanded that whoever is elected on Sunday must not accept the existence of Jewish settlements on territory occupied by Israel since 1967. According to the UN's Terje Roed Larsen: "There are profound changes that mark the dawning of a new era." He cautioned, however, that if process faltered, a new explosion of violence could not be ruled out. "The lesson in the Middle East is always to expect the unexpected."

A final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict could include a complex land swap that would redraw the boundaries between Israel and its neighbours, according to a paper delivered in December at the prestigious Herzliya Conference.

Gideon Biger, a Tel Aviv University geographer, told senior Israeli politicians and academics at the annual forum that the Middle East's present borders were not sacred. "They are the results of battles and wars and not agreements, and therefore are not holy lines. There is a possibility to change these lines according to the facts on the ground."

Professor **Biger** set out a comprehensive territorial swap in which Egypt would cede land in the Sinai Peninsula to allow for the creation of an enlarged Gaza Strip as part of a future Palestinian state. Egypt would be compensated by receiving a bite-shaped area in Israel's southern Negev desert.

The new Palestinian state would meanwhile give up claims to areas of the West Bank that are home to the majority

of the 240,000 Jewish settlers in the occupied territory. Israel would also hold on to the northern part of the Jordan valley.

In the north, Israel would withdraw from around four-fifths of the Israeli-annexed Syrian Golan Heights and Syria would be compensated for the remainder with Jordanian land along the present border of the two Arab states. Jordan would receive in turn a slice of Israeli territory south of the Dead Sea.

Land swaps are nothing new in the history of Middle East peace plans. A Palestinian-Israeli swap was an integral part of ideas put forward by President Bill Clinton in the course of the failed Camp David talks in 2000. Last May, Giora Eiland, national security adviser to Ariel Sharon, Israel's prime minister, submitted a plan that called for Egypt to give up 600 sq km in Sinai to the Palestinians to triple the size of the Gaza Strip, a proposal swiftly rebuffed by Cairo.

The attraction to Israel of the swap proposals, which have moved from the Israeli right into the mainstream, is that they would maximise the number of Jews within the state's final borders and minimise the number of Arabs. They would also ensure Israeli possession of the major settlements in the West Bank, something already effectively conceded by President Bush last spring.

Some politicians on the Israeli right would go further and cede to the Palestinians some areas in Israel with a predominantly Israeli-Arab population. This suggestion was put forward at Herzliya by Avigdor Lieberman, a former right-wing minister sacked by Mr Sharon for opposing his Gaza withdrawal plan.

The Soviet-born Mr Lieberman told the conference: "I would like Israel to be a homogenous nation, which can be compared to the processes in Poland and Hungary, countries that are practically cleansed of other minorities." Although Mr Lieberman represents a far-right view, his ideas reflect wider concerns about the so-called demographic timebomb that, in little more than a decade, would see Arabs outnumber Jews between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River.

The Herzliya proposals do not for now represent the views of the Sharon government. But some have the backing of influential figures such as Uzi Arad, a government adviser, former senior official in the Mossad intelligence service and director of the Herzliya Conference.

Analysts noted that ideas floated at the annual forum, where Mr Sharon first laid out his Gaza plan and where in December he spoke of 2005 as a year of opportunity, frequently reflect or influence future government policy.

LOAD-DATE: January 3, 2005

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

DOCUMENT-TYPE: Features

PUBLICATION-TYPE: Newspaper

Copyright 2005 The Financial Times Limited





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




West Bank areas to be retained by Israel
BANK
Ramallah
Israel
square kilometres)
Amman
Jerusalem
Jericho
Ashkelon
PALESTINE
Gaza City
GAZA STRIP
Bethlehem
Hebron
Dead Sea
In return for Israel retaining the western escarpment of the Golan Heights, Syria would be compensated with land from Jordan. In its turn, Jordan would be compensated by Israeli territory in the Aravah Valley
El Arish
Palestinian-controlled road for safe passage (78 kilometres)
Ecological area under joint Israeli-Palestinian protection
JORDAN
Egyptian territory to be transferred to the new State of Palestine (800-1,000 square kilometres)
Negev Desert
Israeli territory to be transferred to Jordan (200 square kilometres)
Aravah Valley
PROFESSOR BIGER ON THE EXISTING BORDERS: "They are the results of battles and wars and not agreements, ad therefore are not holy lines. There is a possibility to change these lines according to facts on the ground."
EGYPT
Sinai Desert
Israeli territory to be transferred to Egypt
Israel's borders since 1967
The 'Green Line': the cease-fire line of 1949; Israel's border until 1967



Source : Sir Martin Gilbert




A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh



Source : The Arab Atlas

Fateh - Palestinian National Liberation Movement



A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




HAPPY FAMILY
DON'T WORRY
BE JEWISH
WEAR
SHORTS
putin
PUTIN
jack chirac
HELLO FROM ISRAEL
בנץ
BERT
ארין
ERNIE
MOUNT ✡ ZION
RONALDO
SIEMENS
mobile

<html> <head><title>webservices@umich.edu</title></head> <body bgcolor="#ffffff" >

Web SERVICES HOME

The Web Environment at U-M

U-M Personal WWW Server

You have reached the personal homepage server for the University of Michigan.

UM Gateway

The UM Gateway, http://www.umich.edu/, is an entry point to networked information created or maintained by units of the University.

Access Statistics

Access statistics for www.umich.edu and www-personal.umich.edu.

CGI Programs

CGI programs available for use on the UM World Wide Web servers.

Please contact: webmaster@umich.edu with questions or comments about the U-M web servers.

Disclaimer: The information and statements appearing on personal Web pages are solely those of the particular individuals who own the pages and do not reflect the view of, or sponsorship or endorsement by, The Regents of the University of Michigan (or The University of Michigan) and its employees and agents.

	Event Horizon: Nested Timeline (1994)
January February March April May 4 June July 25 August September October 26 November December	**The Washington Declaration** **Gaza-Jericho Agreement** **Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty**

Home
The Library
About Us
Bookstore
Contact Info
Feedback
Glossary
Israel & the States
Links
News
Publications
Search
Sponsorship
Virtual Israel Experience
© 2007 AICE

JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY
A Division of The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise

The Palestine National Charter

(July 17, 1968)

Stuart Hersh comments: The Fourth Palestine National Assembly, meeting in Cairo July 10-17, 1968, was charged with forming a committee to revise the 1964 Palestinian National Charter [sometimes called the PLO Covenant] in a manner that reflected a more Palestinian-oriented organization. This included revising the objective of Palestine's liberation as

being the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. Pan-Arabism, the dominant theme of the 1964 version, became subordinate to the re-emerging Palestinian nationalism.

---

1. This Charter shall be known as "The Palestine National Charter."

Articles of the Charter:

Article 1. Palestine, the homeland of the Palestinian Arab people, is an inseparable part of the greater Arab homeland, and the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab Nation.

Article 2. Palestine, within the frontiers that existed under the British Mandate, is an indivisible territorial unit.

Article 3. The Palestinian Arab people alone have legitimate rights to their homeland, and shall exercise the right of self-determination after the liberation of their homeland, in keeping with their wishes and entirely of their own accord.

Article 4. The Palestinian identity is an authentic, intrinsic and indissoluble quality that is transmitted from father to son. Neither the Zionist occupation nor the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as a result of the afflictions they have suffered can efface this Palestinian identity.

Article 5. Palestinians are Arab citizens who were normally resident in Palestine until 1947. This includes both those who were forced to leave or who stayed in Palestine. Anyone born to a Palestinian father after that date, whether inside or outside Palestine, is a Palestinian.

Article 6. Jews who were normally resident in Palestine up to the beginning of the Zionist invasion are Palestinians.

Article7. Palestinian identity, and material, spiritual and historical links with Palestine are immutable realities. It is a national obligation to provide every Palestinian with a revolutionary Arab upbringing, and to instill in him a profound spiritual and material familiarity with his homeland and a readiness for armed struggle and for the sacrifice of his material possessions and his life, for the recovery of his homeland. All available educational means and means of guidance must be enlisted to that end, until the liberation is achieved.

Article 8. The Palestinian people is at the stage of national struggle for the liberation of its homeland. For that reason, differences between Palestinian national forces must give way to the fundamental difference that exists between Zionism and imperialism on the one hand and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On that basis, the Palestinian masses, both as organizations and as individuals, whether in the homeland or in such places as they now live as refugees, constitute a single national front working for the recovery and liberation of Palestine through armed struggle.

Article 9. Armed struggle is the only way of liberating Palestine, and is thus strategic, not tactical. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm their unwavering determination to carry on the armed struggle and to press towards popular revolution for the liberation of and return to their homeland. They also affirm their right to a normal life in their homeland, to the exercise of their right of self-determination therein and to sovereignty over it.

Article 10. Commando action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular war of liberation. This requires that commando action must be escalated, expanded and protected and that all the resources of the Palestinian masses and all scientific potentials available to them be should be mobilized and organized to play their part in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires solidarity in national struggle among the different groups within the Palestinian people and between that people and the Arab masses, to ensure the continuity of the escalation and victory of the revolution.

Article 11. Palestinians shall have three slogans: national unity,

national mobilization and liberation.

Article 12. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Arab unity. To fulfill their role in the achievement of that objective, they must, at the present stage in their national struggle, retain their Palestinian identity and all that it involves, work for increased awareness of it and oppose all measures liable to weaken or dissolve it.

Article 13. Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are complementary objectives; each leads to the achievement of the other. Arab unity will lead to the liberation of Palestine and the liberation of Palestine will lead to Arab unity.. To work for one is to work for both.

Article 14. The destiny of the Arab nation, indeed the continued existence of the Arabs, depends on the fate of the Palestinian cause. This interrelationship is the point of departure of the Arab endeavor to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian people are the vanguard of the movement to achieve this sacred national objective.

Article 15. The liberation of Palestine is a national obligation for the Arabs. It is their duty to repel the Zionist and imperialist invasion of the greater Arab homeland and to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine. The full responsibility for this belongs to the peoples and governments of the Arab nation and to the Palestinian people first and foremost. For this reason, the task of the Arab nation is to enlist all the military, human, moral and material resources at its command to play an effective part, along with the Palestinian people, in the liberation of Palestine. Moreover, it is the task of the Arab nation, particularly at the present stage of the Palestinian armed revolution, to offer the Palestinian people all possible aid, material and manpower support, and to place at their disposal all the means and opportunities that will enable them to continue to perform their role as the vanguard of their armed revolution until the liberation of their homeland is achieved.

Article 16. On the spiritual plane, the liberation of Palestine will establish in the Holy Land an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity in which all religious institutions will be safeguarded and freedom of worship and the right of visit guaranteed to all without discrimination or distinction of race, colour, language or creed. For

this reason, the people of Palestine look to all spiritual forces in the world for support.

Article 17. On the human plane, the liberation of Palestine will restore to the Palestinians their dignity, integrity and freedom. For this reason, the Palestinian Arab people look to all those who believe in the dignity and freedom of man for support.

Article 18. On the international plane, the liberation of Palestine is a defensive measure dictated by the requirements of self-defense. This is why the Palestinian people, who seek to win the friendship of all peoples, look for the support of all freedom, justice and peace-loving countries in restoring the legitimate state of affairs in Palestine, establishing security and peace in it and enabling its people to exercise national and sovereignty and freedom.

Article 19. The Partition of Palestine, which took place in 1947, and the establishment of Israel, are fundamentally invalid, however long they last, for they contravene the will of the people of Palestine and their natural right to their homeland and contradict the principles of the United Nations Charter, foremost among which is the right of self-determination.

Article 20. The Balfour Declaration and the Mandate Instrument, and all their consequences, are hereby declared null and void. The claim of historical or spiritual links between the Jews and Palestine is neither in conformity with historical fact nor does it satisfy the requirements for statehood. Judaism is a revealed religion; it is not a separate nationality, nor are the Jews a single people with a separate identity; they are citizens of their respective countries.

Article 21. The Palestinian Arab people, expressing themselves through the Palestinian armed revolution, reject all alternatives to the total liberation of Palestine. They also reject all proposals for the liquidation or internationalization of the Palestine problem.

Article 22. Zionism is a political movement that is organically linked with world imperialism and is opposed to all liberation movements or movements for progress in the world. The Zionist movement is essentially fanatical and racialist; it objectives involves aggression, expansion and the establishment of colonial settlements, and its methods are those of the Fascists and the

Nazis. Israel acts as cat's paw for the Zionist movement, a geographic and manpower base for world imperialism and a springboard for its thrust into the Arab homeland to frustrate the aspirations of the Arab nation to liberation, unity and progress. Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the whole world. Inasmuch as the liberation of Palestine will eliminate the Zionist and imperialist presence in that country and bring peace to the Middle East, the Palestinian people look for support to all liberals and to all forces of good, peace and progress in the world, and call on them, whatever their political convictions, for all possible aid and support in their just and legitimate struggle to liberate their homeland.

Article 23. The demands of peace and security and the exigencies of right and justice require that all nations should regard Zionism as an illegal movement and outlaw it and its activities, out of consideration for the ties of friendship between peoples and for the loyalty of its citizens to their homelands.

Article 24. The Palestinian Arab people believe in Justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to enjoy them.

Article 25. In pursuance of the objectives set out in this charter, the Palestine Liberation Organization shall perform its proper role in the liberation to the full.

Article 26. The Palestine Liberation Organization, as the representative of the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people to regain, liberate and return to their homeland and to exercise the right of self-determination in that homeland, in the military political and financial fields, and for all else that the Palestinian cause may demand, both at Arab and international levels.

Article 27. The Palestine Liberation Organization shall cooperate with all Arab countries, each according to its means, maintaining a neutral attitude vis-•is these countries in accordance with the requirements of the battle for liberation, and on the basis of that factor. The Organization shall not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab country.

Article 28. The Palestinian Arab people hereby affirm the authenticity and independence of their national revolution and reject all forms of interference, tutelage or dependency.

Article 29. The Palestinian Arab people have the legitimate and prior right to liberate and recover their homeland, and shall define their attitude to all countries and forces in accordance with the attitude adopted by such countries and forces to the cause of the Palestinian people and with the extent of their support for that people in their revolution to achieve their objectives.

Article 30. Those who fight or bear arms in the battle of liberation form the nucleus of the popular army which will shield the achievements of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article 31. The Organization shall have a flag, an oath of allegiance and an anthem, to be decided in accordance with appropriate regulations.

Article 32. Regulations to be known as Basic Regulations for the Palestine Liberation Organization, shall be appended to this Charter. These regulations shall define the structure of the Organization, its bodies and institutions, and the powers, duties and obligations of each of them, in accordance with this Charter.

Article 33. This Charter may only be amended with a majority of two thirds of the total number of members of the National Assembly [this name was later changed to the Palestine National Council] of the Palestine Liberation Organization at a special meeting called for that purpose.

Sources: Archives: Middle East News Service. op.cit.; Archives: Institute for Palestine Studies. The Palestine National Charter, adopted by the First Palestine National Conference, in Jerusalem in 1964, composed by the first PLO chairman Ahmed Shukeiry, was revised by the Fourth Palestine National Assembly, meeting in Cairo from 10-17 July, 1968.

Copyright 2007 The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise

Farouk Al-Shara



Read his speeches at Madrid

"Finally, and simply, Mr. President, we have come here for peace. We shall continue to work for peace out of our faith in the peace. We declare with confidence and resolution our determination to work for just and comprehensive peace that liberates the land, and guarantees rights and security for all parties."
--Farouk Al-Shara

Farouk Al-Shara: Stepping into the Spotlight

By Tekla Szymanski

Syria's Foreign Minister Farouk al-Shara has many faces.

He once stated that the time has come to focus on the "battle of borders, not the battle for existence." He is a difficult man to analyze: Some observers see him as President Hafez al-Assad's puppet in the peace negotiations with Israel—but others suggest that, in reality, Al-Shara is pulling the strings behind the scenes.

Al-Shara, 61, rose through the ranks of the ruling Baath Party until his appointment to foreign minister in 1984. In this position, he has proved to be a tough man with whom to parry in peace talks. He has academic credentials in international law—the focus of his studies at Damascus University and at the University of London before he turned to a career in politics.

The Israeli press is eyeing al-Shara with skepticism bordering on open resentment, and many commentators have fixed upon his lack of charisma as the key to understanding the Syrian strategy. For many, he embodies "Syrian chutzpah."

His arrogant behavior is said to be testing the nerves of enthusiastic supporters of peace. Meron Benvenisti of Tel Aviv's liberal *Ha'aretz* notes his "dour expression, refusal to behave civilly and shake hands, and his avoidance of any direct public contact with the people he went to talk peace with."

Al-Shara has been compared to "a man who has forgotten his indigestion tablets," while craning his neck not to miss a word at the negotiation table. But contrary to Orli Azulay-Katz's prediction in Tel Aviv's mass-circulation *Yediot Aharonot* that Barak and Al-Shara would never take a dip in the hotel pool together or run side by side on treadmills—that is exactly what happened in January at the peace talks in Shepherdstown, West Virginia: Barak went to the hotel gym and invited Al-Shara to join him in his a workout. Surprisingly, the Syrian accepted.

Al-Shara is the most trusted aide of the ailing Assad, who is preparing his country for an imminent power shift. If Assad's son, Bashar, assumes the presidency [as he indeed did after his father's death], Al-Shara's expertise in dealing with Israel is likely to provide a vital element of continuity

Fares Boueiz



"This Conference held under the title of Peace is, without any doubt, of paramount importance and can become possibly the most

important gathering since the Second World War. Peace is the aspiration of humanity, the end sought by peoples the world over, the purpose

for which all religions, philosophies, and ideologies strive."

-Fares Boueiz

Read his speeches at Madrid!

Bibliography

Fares Boueiz, former Kesruoan MP, former minister

Place and Date of Birth: Born in Beirut on January 15, 1955. Son of Nouhad Boueiz (MP, deceased) and Jacqueline Debbs.
Sect: Maronite.
Marital status: Married to Zalfa Hrawi (daughter of former president Elias Hrawi) with four children: Rhea, Nouhad, Tareq and Andrea.
Education: Bachelor of Laws (Saint Joseph University, Beirut), and a degree in French law from Jean Moulin University, Lyon, France.
Professional Career: Lawyer as of graduation in 1978. Special advisor to former president Elias Hrawi. Special envoy to France, Syria and the Vatican (1989-1990).
Political Career: Minister of Foreign Affair and Emigrants in Omar Karame government (December 24, 1990-May 10, 1992), Minister of Foreign Affair and Emigrants in Rashid Solh government (May 16, 1992-October 30, 1992), Minister of Foreign Affair and Emigrants in Rafic Hariri first government (October 31, 1992 to May 25, 1995), Minister of Foreign Affair and Emigrants in Rafic Hariri second government (May 25, 1995-November 6, 1996), and Minister of Foreign Affair and Emigrants in Rafic Hariri third government (November 7, 1996-December 3, 1998). Minister of Environment in Rafic Hariri's fifth government (April 17, 2003 - October 26, 2004) . Member of Parliament: appointed in June 7, 1991, elected in 1992, reelected in 1996 and 2000.
Current Political Status: Former Kesrouan MP.
Aspirations: Boueiz is a presidential candidate who was the fith to annouce his candidacy after MPs Nayla Moawad, Boutros Harb, Robert Ghanem and Mikahel Daher. An outlay of his ideas, program and career were covered in a recent Interview with Daily As Safir.

Arrival in North Korea | Daily Press Briefing | What's New

KEYWORD SEARCH GO

Subject Index

Briefing on Secretary's Upcoming Travel to Ethiopia | Secretary's Remarks at FSI Shultz Center Groundbreaking | Briefing on Iraqi Refugee Issues | Fact Sheets on Avian and Pandemic Influenza | Diversity Visa Lottery Registration Ends Dec. 2 | Doors to Diplomacy Contest: Register Now! | Visit the Website for Students

Home | Issues & Press | Travel & Business | Countries | Youth & Education | Careers | About State | Video

You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office > Background Notes

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
March 2007

People
History
Government
Political Conditions
Economy
Defense
Foreign Relations
U.S. Relations
Travel/Business
Background Notes A-Z

Background Note: Egypt



PROFILE

OFFICIAL NAME:
Arab Republic of Egypt

Geography
Area: 1,001,450 sq. km. (386,000 sq. mi.); approximately equal to Texas and New Mexico combined.
Cities: *Capital*--Cairo (pop. estimated at 16 million). *Other cities*--Alexandria (6 million), Aswan, Asyut, Port Said, Suez, Ismailia.
Terrain: Desert, except Nile valley and delta.
Climate: Dry, hot summers; moderate winters.

People
Nationality: *Noun and adjective*--Egyptian(s).
Population (July 2006 est.): 78,887,007.
Annual growth rate (2006 est.): 1.75%.
Ethnic groups: Egyptian, Bedouin Arab, Nubian.
Religions: Muslim 94%, Coptic Christian and other 6%.
Languages: Arabic (official), English, French.
Education: *Years compulsory*--ages 6-15. *Literacy*--total adult: 58%.
Health: *Infant mortality rate* (2006 est.)--31.33 deaths/1,000 live births. *Life expectancy* (2006 est.): 71 years.

Government
Type: Republic.
Independence: 1922.
Constitution: 1971.
Branches: *Executive*--president, prime minister, cabinet.
Legislative--People's Assembly (444 elected and 10 presidentially appointed members) and Shura (consultative) Council (176 elected members, 88 presidentially appointed). *Judicial*--Supreme Constitutional Court.
Administrative subdivisions: 26 governorates.
Principal political parties: National Democratic Party (ruling). Principal opposition parties--New Wafd Party, Liberal Party, National Progressive Unionist Grouping (Tagammau), and Nasserite Party.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy
GDP (2005 est.): $303 billion.
Annual growth rate (2005 est.): 4.8%.
Per capita GDP (2005 est.): $4,282.
Natural resources: Petroleum and natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, manganese, limestone, gypsum, talc, asbestos, lead, zinc.
Agriculture: *Products*--cotton, rice, onions, beans, citrus fruits, wheat, corn, barley, sugar.
Industry: *Types*--food processing, textiles, chemicals, petrochemicals, construction, light manufacturing, iron and steel products, aluminum, cement, military equipment.
Trade (FY 2005): *Exports*--$14.3 billion: petroleum, clothing and textiles, cotton, fruits and vegetables, manufactured goods. *Major markets*--EU, U.S., Middle East, Japan. *Imports*--$24.1 billion: machinery and transport equipment, petroleum products, livestock, food and beverages, paper and wood products, chemicals. *Major suppliers*--EU, U.S., Japan.

PEOPLE AND HISTORY
Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and the second-most populous on the African Continent. Nearly all of the country's 79 million people live in Cairo and Alexandria; elsewhere on the banks of the Nile; in the Nile delta, which fans out north of Cairo; and along the Suez Canal. These regions are among the world's most densely populated, containing an average of over 3,820 persons per square mile (1,540 per sq. km.), as compared to 181 persons per sq. mi. for the country as a whole.

Small communities spread throughout the desert regions of Egypt are clustered around oases and historic trade and transportation routes. The government has tried with mixed success to encourage migration to newly irrigated land reclaimed from the desert. However, the proportion of the population living in rural areas has continued to decrease as people move to the cities in search of employment and a higher standard of living.

The Egyptians are a fairly homogeneous people of Hamitic origin. Mediterranean and Arab influences appear in the north, and there is some mixing in the south with the Nubians of northern Sudan. Ethnic minorities include a small number of Bedouin Arab nomads in the eastern and western deserts and in the Sinai, as well as some 50,000-100,000 Nubians clustered along the Nile in Upper (southern) Egypt.

The literacy rate is about 58% of the adult population. Education is free through university and compulsory from ages six through 15. Rates for primary and secondary education have strengthened in recent years. Ninety-three percent of children enter primary school today, compared with 87% in 1994. Major universities include Cairo University (100,000 students), Alexandria University, and the 1,000-year-old Al-Azhar University, one of the world's major centers of Islamic learning.

Egypt's vast and rich literature constitutes an important cultural element in the life of the country and in the Arab world as a whole. Egyptian novelists and poets were among the first to experiment with modern styles of Arabic literature, and the forms they developed have been widely imitated. Egyptian novelist Naguib Mahfouz was the first Arab to win the Nobel prize for literature. Egyptian books and films are available throughout the Middle East.

Egypt has endured as a unified state for more than 5,000 years, and archeological evidence indicates that a developed Egyptian society has existed for much longer. Egyptians take pride in their "pharaonic heritage" and in their descent from what they consider mankind's earliest civilization. The Arabic word for Egypt is Misr, which originally connoted "civilization" or "metropolis."

Archeological findings show that primitive tribes lived along the Nile long before the dynastic history of the pharaohs began. By 6000 B.C., organized agriculture had appeared.

In about 3100 B.C., Egypt was united under a ruler known as Mena, or Menes, who inaugurated the 30 pharaonic dynasties into which Egypt's ancient history is divided--the Old and the Middle Kingdoms and the New Empire. The pyramids at Giza (near Cairo), which were built in the fourth dynasty, testify to the power of the pharaonic religion and state. The Great Pyramid, the tomb of Pharaoh Khufu (also known as Cheops), is the only surviving monument of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World. Ancient Egypt reached the peak of its power, wealth, and territorial extent in the period called the New Empire (1567-1085 B.C.).

Persian, Greek, Roman, and Arab Conquerors
In 525 B., Cambyses, the son of Cyrus the Great, led a Persian invasion force that dethroned the last pharaoh of the 26th Dynasty. The country remained a Persian province until conquered by Alexander the Great in 322 BC, ushering in Ptolemeic rule Egypt that lasted for nearly 300 years.

Following a brief Persian reconquest, Egypt was invaded and conquered by Arab forces in 642. A process of Arabization and Islamization ensued. Although a Coptic Christian minority remained--and remains today, constituting about 10% of the population--the Arab language inexorably supplanted the indigenous Coptic tongue. For the next 1,300 years, a succession of Arab, Mameluke, and Ottoman caliphs, beys, and sultans ruled the country.



The Sphinx, Giza, Egypt, May 21, 1996. [• AP Images]



European Influence
The Ottoman Turks controlled Egypt from 1517 until 1882, except for a brief period of French rule under Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1805, Mohammed Ali, commander of an Albanian contingent of Ottoman troops, was appointed Pasha, founding the dynasty that ruled Egypt until his great-great grandson, Farouk I, was overthrown in 1952. Mohammed Ali the Great ruled Egypt until 1848, writing the first chapter in the modern history of Egypt. The growth of modern urban Cairo began in the reign of Ismail (1863-79). Eager to Westernize the capital, he ordered the construction of a European-style city to the west of the medieval core. The Suez Canal was completed in his reign in 1869, and its completion was celebrated by many events, including the commissioning of Verdi's "Aida" for the new opera house and the building of great palaces such as the Omar Khayyam (originally constructed to entertain the French Empress Eugenie, which is now the central section of the Cairo Marriott Hotel).

In 1882, British expeditionary forces crushed a revolt against the Ottoman rulers, marking the beginning of British occupation and the virtual inclusion of Egypt within the British Empire. In deference to growing nationalism, the U. K. unilaterally declared Egyptian independence in 1922. British influence, however, continued to dominate Egypt's political life and fostered fiscal, administrative, and governmental reforms.

In the pre-1952 revolution period, three political forces competed with one another: the Wafd, a broadly based nationalist political organization strongly opposed to British influence; King Fuad, whom the British had installed during World War II; and the British themselves, who were determined to maintain control over the Canal. Other political forces emerging in this period included the communist party (1925) and the Muslim Brotherhood (1928), which eventually became a potent political and religious force.

During World War II, British troops used Egypt as a base for Allied operations throughout the region. British troops were withdrawn to the Suez Canal area in 1947, but nationalist, anti-British feelings continued to grow after the war. On July 22-23, 1952, a group of disaffected army officers (the "free officers") led by Lt. Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Farouk, whom the military blamed for Egypt's poor performance in the 1948 war with Israel. Following a brief experiment with civilian rule, they abrogated the 1923 constitution and declared Egypt a republic on June 19, 1953. Nasser evolved into a charismatic leader, not only of Egypt, but the Arab world, promoting and implementing "Arab socialism." He nationalized Egypt•s economy.

Nasser helped establish the Non-Aligned Movement of developing countries in September 1961, and continued to be a leading force in the movement until his death in 1970. When the United States held up military sales in reaction to Egyptian neutrality vis-•-vis Moscow, Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955.

When the U.S. and the World Bank withdrew their offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam in mid-1956, Nasser nationalized the privately owned Suez Canal Company. The crisis that followed, exacerbated by growing tensions with Israel over guerrilla attacks from Gaza and Israeli reprisals, resulted in the invasion of Egypt that October by France, Britain, and Israel.

Nasser's domestic policies were arbitrary and frequently oppressive, yet generally popular. All opposition was stamped out, and opponents of the regime frequently were imprisoned without trial. Nasser's foreign and military policies helped provoke the Israeli attack of June 1967 that virtually destroyed Egypt's armed forces along with those of Jordan and Syria. Israel also occupied the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. Nasser, nonetheless, was revered by the masses in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world until his death in 1970.

After Nasser's death, another of the original "free officers," Vice President Anwar el-Sadat, was elected President. In 1971, Sadat concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, but a year later, ordered Soviet advisers to leave. In 1973, he launched the October war with Israel, in which Egypt's armed forces achieved initial successes but were defeated in Israeli counterattacks.

Camp David and the Peace Process
In a momentous change from the Nasser era, President Sadat shifted Egypt from a policy of confrontation with Israel to one of peaceful accommodation through negotiations. Following the Sinai Disengagement Agreements of 1974 and 1975, Sadat created a fresh opening for progress by his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. This led to President Jimmy Carter's invitation to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to join him in trilateral negotiations at Camp David.

The outcome was the historic Camp David accords, signed by Egypt and Israel and witnessed by the U.S. on September 17, 1978. The accords led to the March 26, 1979, signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, by which Egypt regained control of the Sinai in May 1982. Throughout this period, U.S.-Egyptian relations steadily improved, but Sadat's willingness to break ranks by making peace with Israel earned him the enmity of most other Arab states.

Domestic Change
Sadat introduced greater political freedom and a new economic policy, the most important aspect of which was the infitah or "open door." This relaxed government controls over the economy and encouraged private, including foreign, investment. Sadat dismantled much of the existing political machine and brought to trial a number of former government officials accused of criminal excesses during the Nasser era.

Liberalization also included the reinstitution of due process and the legal banning of torture. Sadat tried to expand participation in the political process in the mid-1970s but later abandoned this effort. In the last years of his life, Egypt was racked by violence arising from discontent with Sadat's rule and sectarian tensions, and it experienced a renewed measure of repression.

From Sadat to Mubarak
On October 6, 1981, Islamic extremists assassinated President Sadat. Hosni Mubarak, Vice President since 1975 and air force commander during the October 1973 war, was elected President later that month. He was subsequently confirmed by popular referendum for four more 6-year terms, most recently in September 2005. Mubarak has maintained Egypt's commitment to the Camp David peace process, while at the same time re-establishing Egypt's position as an Arab leader. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989. Egypt also has played a moderating role in such international fora as the UN and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Since 1991, Mubarak has overseen a domestic economic reform program to reduce the size of the public sector and expand the role of the private sector. There has been less progress in political reform. The November 2000 People's Assembly elections saw 34 members of the opposition win seats in the 454-seat assembly, facing a clear majority of 388 ultimately affiliated with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Opposition parties continue to face various difficulties in mounting credible electoral challenges to the NDP. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, remains an illegal organization and is not recognized as a political party (current Egyptian law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion). Members are known publicly and openly speak their views, although they do not explicitly identify themselves as members of the organization. Members of the Brotherhood have been elected to the People's Assembly and local councils as independents, and most recently scored a major victory in 2005 parliamentary elections, winning 20% of the seats, thus forming the largest opposition group.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The Egyptian Constitution provides for a strong executive. Authority is vested in an elected president who can appoint one or more vice presidents, a prime minister, and a cabinet. The president's term runs for 6 years. Egypt's legislative body, the People's Assembly, has 454 members--444 popularly elected and 10 appointed by the president. The constitution reserves 50% of the assembly seats for "workers and peasants." The assembly sits for a 5-year term but can be dissolved earlier by the President. There also is a 264-member Shura (consultative) Council, in which 88 members are appointed and 174 elected for 6-year terms. Below the national level, authority is exercised by and through governors and mayors appointed by the central government and by popularly elected local councils.

Opposition party organizations make their views public and represent their followers at various levels in the political system, but power is concentrated in the hands of the President and the National Democratic Party majority in the People's Assembly and those institutions dominate the political system. In addition to the ruling National Democratic Party, there are 18 other legally recognized parties, whereas in 2004 there were only 16 other legally recognized parties.

The November 2000 elections were generally considered to have been more transparent and better executed than past elections, because of universal judicial monitoring of polling stations. On the other hand, opposition parties continue to lodge credible complaints about electoral manipulation by the government. There are significant restrictions on the political process and freedom of expression for non-governmental organizations, including professional syndicates and organizations promoting respect for human rights.

Progress was seen in the September 2005 presidential elections when parties were allowed to field candidates against President Mubarak and his National Democratic Party. In early 2005, President Mubarak proposed amending the constitution to allow, for the first time in Egypt's history, competitive, multi-candidate elections. An amendment was drafted by parliament and approved by public referendum in late May 2005. In September 2005, President Mubarak was reelected, according to official results, with 88% of the vote. His two principal challengers, Ayman Nour and No'man Gom'a, took 7% and 3% of the vote respectively.

Egypt's judicial system is based on European (primarily French) legal concepts and methods. Under the Mubarak government, the courts have demonstrated increasing independence, and the principles of due process and judicial review have gained greater respect. The legal code is derived largely from the Napoleonic Code. Marriage

and personal status (family law) are primarily based on the religious law of the individual concerned, which for most Egyptians is Islamic Law (Sharia).

Principal Government Officials
President--Mohamed Hosny Mubarak
Prime Minister--Dr. Ahmed Nazif
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Ahmed Aboul Gheit
Ambassador to the United States--Ambassador Nabil Fahmy
Permanent Representative to the United Nations--Ambassador Maged Abdel Fattah Abdelaziz

Egypt maintains an embassy in the United States at 3521 International Court N.W., Washington, D.C., 20008 (tel. 202-895-5400). The Washington consulate has the same address (tel. 202-966-6342). The Egyptian Mission to the United Nations is located at 304 East 44th Street, New York, N.Y. (tel. 212-305-0300). Egyptian consulates general are located at: 1110 Second Avenue, New York, N.Y., 10022 (tel. 212-759-7120); 1990 Post Oak Boulevard, Suite 2180, Houston, TX, 77056 (tel. 713-961-4915); 500 N. Michigan Avenue, Suite 1900, Chicago, IL, 60611 (tel. 312-828-9162); and 3001 Pacific Avenue, San Francisco, CA, 94115 (tel. 415-346-9700).

NATIONAL SECURITY
Egypt's armed forces, among the largest in the region, include the army, air defense, air force, and navy. The armed forces inventory includes equipment from the United States, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, the former Soviet Union, and China. Equipment from the former Soviet Union is being progressively replaced by more modern American, French, and British equipment, a significant portion of which is built under license in Egypt. To bolster stability and moderation in the region, Egypt has provided military assistance and training to a number of African and Arab states. Egypt remains a strong military and strategic partner of the United States.

ECONOMY
With the installation of the 2004 Egyptian parliament, the Government of Egypt began a new reform movement, following a stalled economic reform program begun in 1991, but moribund since the mid-1990s. In the past year, the cabinet economic team has simplified and reduced tariffs and taxes, improved the transparency of the national budget, revived stalled privatizations of public enterprises and implemented economic legislation designed to foster private sector-driven economic growth and improve Egypt's competitiveness. Despite these achievements, the economy is still hampered by government intervention, substantial subsidies for food, housing, and energy, and bloated public sector payrolls. Moreover, the public sector still controls most heavy industry.

In sectoral terms, agriculture is mainly in private hands, and has been largely deregulated, with the exception of cotton and sugar production. Construction, non-financial services, and domestic marketing are also largely private. The Egyptian economy, however, relies heavily on tourism, oil and gas exports, and Suez Canal revenues, much of which is controlled by the public sector and is also vulnerable to outside factors. The tourism sector suffered tremendously following a terrorist attack in Luxor in October 1997. The tourism sector feared a repeat of the downturn in tourist numbers when terrorists attacked resorts in the Sinai Peninsula in 2004 and 2005. So far, however, the sector has not suffered as greatly as expected.

The U.S. has a large assistance program in Egypt and provides funding for a variety of programs in addition to some cash transfers. A portion of U.S. assistance to Egypt under the 2003 Iraq war supplemental appropriations was provided in the form of bond guarantees, which were contingent upon Egyptian compliance with a series of economic conditions. Egypt met the conditions and in September 2005 issued $1.25 billion in 10-year bonds that were fully guaranteed by the United States. To support the Middle East peace process through regional economic integration, the United States permits products to be imported from Egypt without tariffs if they have been produced in Qualified Industrial Zones and 11.7% of the inputs of these products originate from Israel.

Agriculture
Approximately one-third of Egyptian labor is engaged directly in farming, and many others work in the processing or trading of agricultural products. Nearly all of Egypt=s agricultural production takes place in some 2.5 million hectares (6 million acres) of fertile soil in the Nile Valley and Delta. Some desert lands are being developed for agriculture, including the ambitious Toshka project in Upper Egypt, but some other fertile lands in the Nile Valley and Delta are being lost to urbanization and erosion.

Warm weather and plentiful water permit several crops a year. Further improvement is possible, but land is worked intensively and yields are high. Cotton, rice, wheat, corn, sugarcane, sugar beets, onions, and beans are the principal crops. Increasingly, a few modern operations are producing fruits, vegetables and flowers, in addition to cotton, for export. While the desert hosts some large, modern farms, more common traditional farms occupy one acre each, typically in a canal-irrigated area along the banks of the Nile. Many small farmers also have cows, water buffaloes, and chicken, although larger modern farms are becoming more important.

The United States is a major supplier of wheat, corn, and soybean products to Egypt, almost all through commercial sales. Egypt is, in fact, traditionally the U.S.'s largest market for wheat sales. U.S. agricultural sales to Egypt average $1 billion annually. U.S. food assistance programs to Egypt ended in 1992 as Egypt became more prosperous. Egypt continues to receive modest food assistance through the World Food Program and from France.

"Egypt," wrote the Greek historian Herodotus 25 centuries ago, "is the gift of the Nile." The land's seemingly inexhaustible resources of water and soil carried by this mighty river created in the Nile Valley and Delta the world's most extensive oasis. Without the Nile, Egypt would be little more than a desert wasteland.

The river carves a narrow, cultivated floodplain, never more than 20 kilometers wide, as it travels northward toward Cairo from Lake Nasser on the Sudanese border, behind the Aswan High Dam. Just north of Cairo, the Nile spreads out over what was once a broad estuary that has been filled by riverine deposits to form a fertile delta about 250 kilometers wide (150 mi.) at the seaward base and about 160 kilometers (96 mi.) from south to north.

Before the construction of dams on the Nile, particularly the Aswan High Dam (started in 1952, completed in 1970), the fertility of the Nile Valley was sustained by the water flow and the silt deposited by the annual flood. Sediment is now obstructed by the Aswan High Dam and retained in Lake Nasser. The interruption of yearly, natural fertilization and the increasing salinity of the soil has been a manageable problem resulting from the dam. The benefits remain impressive: more intensive farming on millions of acres of land made possible by improved irrigation, prevention of flood damage, and the generation of billions of low-cost kilowatt hours of electricity.

The Western Desert accounts for about two-thirds of the country's land area. For the most part, it is a massive sandy plateau marked by seven major depressions. One of these, Fayoum, was connected about 3,600 years ago to the Nile by canals. Today, it is an important irrigated agricultural area.

Natural Resources
In addition to the agricultural capacity of the Nile Valley and Delta, Egypt's natural resources include petroleum, natural gas, phosphates, and iron ore. Crude oil is found primarily in the Gulf of Suez and in the Western Desert. Natural gas is found mainly in the Nile Delta, off the Mediterranean seashore, and in the Western Desert. Oil and gas accounts for approximately 12% of GDP. Export of petroleum and related products (including bunker and aviation sales) amounted to $2.7 billion in fiscal year 2003-04.

Crude oil production has been in decline for several years, from a high of more than 920,000 barrels per day (BPD) in 1995 to less than 662,000 BPD as of April 2006. To minimize the growing domestic demand of petroleum products, currently estimated at 25 million metric tons per year, Egypt is encouraging the production of natural gas. Over a 5-year period, production of natural gas increased by approximately 75% to reach about 3.3 billion cubic feet per day (BCFD) by the end of FY 2003/04. Currently, gas accounts for almost 50% of all hydrocarbon usage in Egypt.

Over the last 22 years, more than 230 oil and gas exploration agreements have been signed and multinational oil companies spent more than $27 billion in exploration companions. As of September 2003, crude oil reserves were estimated at 2.8 billion barrels, and proven natural gas reserves were estimated at 62 trillion cubic feet (TCF) with probable additional reserves totaling another 40-60 TCF. Texas-based Apache Oil Company is the largest American investor in Egypt, with a total investment of more than $2.8 billion since 1996.

Egypt's excess of natural gas will more than meet its domestic demand for many years to come. The Ministry of Petroleum has determined that expanding the Egyptian petrochemical industry and increasing exports of natural gas as its most significant strategic objectives. As of September 2005, three liquefied natural gas (LNG) trains had been in operation. The first is in Damietta on the eastern side of the Delta and started exporting in early 2005. It is headed by the Spanish electric utility, Union Fenosa. The second LNG project is located at Idku on the western side of the Delta and started exporting in 2005. The first train started in April 2005, and the second in September. British Gas (BG) Group and the Malaysian state oil company Petronas are the major investors. Another project that will utilize gas for export and domestic consumption is the Mediterranean Gas Complex in Port Said where the Italian company AGIP and BP are the main shareholders. This facility will have a total cost of about $315 million and went on line in late 2004.

Egypt and Jordan established the Eastern Gas Company to export natural gas to Jordan, and then later to Syria and Lebanon. In summer 2003 Egypt began exporting gas to Jordan via a new pipeline from El Arish on Egypt=s north Sinai cost to Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba, and then underwater to the Jordanian city of Aqaba. Gas exports to Jordan generated gross revenues of approximately $60 million in 2003/04 and are currently reaching $85-100 million.

Transport and Communication
Transportation facilities in Egypt are centered in Cairo and largely follow the pattern of settlement along the Nile. The main line of the nation's 4,800-kilometer (2,800-mi.) railway network runs from Alexandria to Aswan. The well-maintained road network has expanded rapidly to over 21,000 miles, covering the Nile Valley and Delta, Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts, the Sinai, and the Western oases.

Egypt Air provides reliable domestic air service to major tourist destinations from its Cairo hub, in addition to overseas routes. The Nile River system (about 1,600 km. or 1,000 mi.) and the principal canals (1,600 km.) are important locally for transportation. The Suez Canal is a major waterway of international commerce and navigation, linking the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Major ports are Alexandria, Port Said, and Damietta on the Mediterranean, and Suez and Safraga on the Red Sea.

Egypt has long been the cultural and informational center of the Arab world, and Cairo is the region's largest publishing and broadcasting center. There are eight daily newspapers with a total circulation of more than 2 million, and a number of monthly newspapers, magazines, and journals. The majority of political parties have their own newspapers, and these papers conduct a lively, often highly partisan, debate on public issues.

Egyptian ground-broadcast television (ETV) is government controlled and depends heavily on commercial revenue. ETV sells its specially produced programs and soap operas to the entire Arab world. In addition to Egyptian programming, the Middle East Broadcast Company, a Saudi television station transmitting from London (MBC), Arab Radio and Television (ART), Al-Jazeera television, and other Gulf stations as well as Western networks such as CNN and BBC, provide access to more international programs to Egyptians who own satellite receivers.

ETV has two main channels, six regional channels, and three satellite channels. Of the two main channels, Channel I uses mainly Arabic, while Channel II is dedicated to foreigners and more cultured viewers, broadcasting news in English and French as well as Arabic.

Egyptian Satellite channels broadcast to the Middle East, Europe, and the U.S. East Coast. In April 1998, Egypt launched its own satellite known as NileSat 101. Seven specialized channels cover news, culture, sports, education, entertainment, health, and drama. A second, digital satellite, Nilesat 102, was launched in August 2000. Many of its channels are rented to other stations.

Three new private satellite-based TV stations were launched in November 2001, marking a great change in Egyptian government policy. Dream TV 1 and 2 produce cultural programming, broadcast contemporary video clips and films featuring Arab and international actors, as well as soap operas; another private station focuses on business and general news. Both private channels transmit on NileSat.

Radio in Egypt almost all government controlled, using 44 short-wave frequencies, 18 medium-wave stations, and four FM stations. There are seven regional radio stations covering the country. Egyptian Radio transmits 60 hours daily overseas in 33 languages and three hundred hours daily within Egypt. In 2000, Radio Cairo introduced new specialized (thematic) channels on its FM station. So far, they include news, music, and sports. Radio enjoys more freedom than TV in its news programs, talk shows and analysis.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
Geography, population, history, military strength, and diplomatic expertise give Egypt extensive political influence in the Middle East and within the Non-Aligned Movement as a whole. Cairo has been a crossroads of Arab commerce and culture for millennia, and its intellectual and Islamic institutions are at the center of the region's social and cultural development.

The Arab League headquarters is in Cairo, and the Secretary General of the League is traditionally an Egyptian. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Amre Moussa is the present Secretary General of the Arab League. President Mubarak has often chaired the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity). Former Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali served as Secretary General of the United Nations from 1991 to 1996.

Egypt is a key partner in the search for peace in the Middle East and resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Sadat's groundbreaking trip to Israel in 1977, the 1978 Camp David Accords, and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty represented a fundamental shift in the politics of the region--from a strategy of confrontation to one of peace as a strategic choice. Egypt was subsequently ostracized by other Arab states and ejected from the Arab League from 1979 to 1989. Egypt played an important role in the negotiations leading to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, which, under U.S. and Russian sponsorship, brought together all parties in the region to discuss Middle East peace. This support has continued to the present, with President Mubarak often intervening personally to promote peace negotiations. In 1996, he hosted the Sharm El-Sheikh "Summit of the Peacemakers" attended by President Clinton and other world leaders. In 2000, he hosted two summits at Sharm El-Sheikh and one at Taba in an effort to resume the Camp David negotiations suspended in July of 2000, and in June 2003, Mubarak hosted President Bush for another summit on the Middle East peace process. Throughout mid-2004, Egypt worked closely with Israel and the Palestinian Authority to facilitate stability following Israel=s withdrawal from Gaza, which occurred in August and September of 2005. Prior to this Egypt and Israel reached an agreement that allowed Egypt to deploy additional forces along the Philadelphi Corridor in an attempt to control the border and prevent the smuggling of weapons.

Egypt played a key role during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. President Mubarak helped assemble the international coalition and deployed 35,000 Egyptian troops against Iraq to liberate Kuwait. The Egyptian contingent was the third-largest in the coalition forces, after the U.S. and U.K. In the aftermath of the Gulf war, Egypt signed the Damascus declaration with Syria and the Gulf states to strengthen Gulf security. Egypt continues to contribute regularly to UN peacekeeping missions, most recently in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. In August 2004, Egypt was actively engaged in seeking a solution to the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, including the dispatch of military monitors. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Egypt, which has itself been the target of terrorist attacks, has been a key supporter of the U.S. war against terrorists and terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda, and actively supported the Iraqi Governing Council, as well as the subsequent government of Prime Minister Allawi. In July 2005, terrorists attacked the Egyptian city of Sharm El Sheikh. In the same month, Egypt's envoy to Iraq was assassinated.

U.S.-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS
The United States and Egypt enjoy a strong and friendly relationship based on shared mutual interest in Middle East peace and stability, revitalizing the Egyptian economy and strengthening trade relations, and promoting regional security. Over the years, Egypt and the United States have worked together assiduously to expand Middle East peace negotiations, hosting talks, negotiations, and the Middle East and North Africa Economic (MENA) Conference. Multinational exercises, U.S. assistance to Egypt's military modernization program, and Egypt's role as a contributor to various UN peacekeeping operations continually reinforce the U.S.-Egyptian military relationship.

An important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains U.S. security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. U.S. military aid to Egypt totals over $1.3 billion annually. In addition, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) provided over $25 billion in economic and development assistance to Egypt between 1975 and 2002. A shift in assistance from infrastructure, health, food supply, and agriculture toward market-based economic development, good governance, and training programs is reflected in the motto, "From Aid to Trade." The Commodity Import Program, through which USAID provides hundreds of millions of dollars in financing to enable the Egyptian private sector to import U.S. goods, remains one of the largest and most popular USAID programs. Since 2003, U.S. assistance is also focusing more on economic reform, education, civil society, and other programs supported by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).

U.S. military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability. Under Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, the U.S. has provided F-4 jet aircraft, F-16 jet fighters, M-60A3 and M1A1 tanks, armored personnel carriers, Apache helicopters, antiaircraft missile batteries, aerial surveillance aircraft, and other equipment. The U.S. and Egypt also participate in combined military exercises, including deployments of U. S. troops to Egypt. Every other year, Egypt hosts Operation Bright Star, a multilateral military exercise with the U.S., and the largest military exercise in the region. Units of the U.S. 6th Fleet are regular visitors to Egyptian ports.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Francis J. Ricciardone
Deputy Chief of Mission--Stuart E. Jones
Economic/Political Affairs--William R. Stewart
Consular Affairs--Richard Hermann
Management Affairs--Nick Baskey
Public Affairs--Haynes Mahoney
USAID--Ken Ellis
Defense Attach•--COL Ted Seel
Office of Military Cooperation--Maj Gen Michael Collings
Foreign Commercial Service--Amer Kayani
Foreign Agricultural Service--Peter Kurz

The U.S. Embassy is located at 8 Kamal ElDin Salah St., Garden City, Cairo, Egypt, tel: [20] [2] 797-3300, fax [20] [2] 797-3200.

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION

The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program advises Americans traveling and residing abroad through Consular Information Sheets, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings. **Consular Information Sheets** exist for all countries and include information on entry and exit requirements, currency regulations, health conditions, safety and security, crime, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. **Public Announcements** are issued to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term conditions overseas that pose significant risks to the security of American travelers. **Travel Warnings** are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country because the situation is dangerous or unstable.

For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at http://www.travel.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings can be found. Consular Affairs Publications, which contain information on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad, are also available at http://www.travel.state.gov. For additional information on international travel, see http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Travel/International.shtml.

The Department of State encourages all U.S citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department's travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.

The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State's single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778). Customer service representatives and operators for TDD/TTY are available Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight, Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 877-FYI-TRIP (877-394-8747) and a web site at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet entitled "Health Information for International Travel" (HHS publication number CDC-95-8280) is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Further Electronic Information

Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at http://www.state.gov, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including Background Notes and daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website http://www.osac.gov

Export.gov provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.

STAT-USA/Internet, a service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides authoritative economic, business, and international trade information from the Federal government. The site includes current and historical trade-related releases, international market research, trade opportunities, and country analysis and provides access to the National Trade Data Bank.

BACK TO TOP

Updates | **Frequent Questions** | **Contact Us** | **Email this Page** | **Subject Index** | **Search**
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov | **Privacy Notice** | **FOIA** | **Copyright Information** | **Other U.S. Government Information**

Video Profile of his Legacy

Yasser Arafat

1929-2004



"The dream we entertained at the time was to establish a democratic State of Palestine in which Muslims, Christians, and Jews would live with equal

rights and obligations as one unified community, like other peoples in this contemporary world."

--Yasser Arafat

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Yasser Arafat President of the Palestinian Authority

Born: 24 August, 1929, in Cairo, Egypt. Died: 11 November, 2004, in Paris, aged 75.

YASSER Arafat fought for the Palestinian cause all his life - and his indomitable style of leadership over 35 years ensured he never lost control.

Over the decades he advocated violence, peace, war and diplomacy to try to establish the state of Palestine.

As steps to a settlement with Israel were played out in the last days of his life, it seemed a cruel twist of fate that his health should fail.

Although George Bush, the United States president, refused to negotiate with Arafat, the Palestinian leader welcomed his re-election and expressed hope that he would be "more engaged" in solving the Middle East conflict.

The decline began last month when it emerged that the 75-year-old was suffering from flu and gallstones.

Speculation that he might have stomach cancer was dismissed, but after he briefly passed out at his West Bank headquarters, Israel lifted a two-year travel ban to allow Arafat to fly to a French military hospital for tests.

In his last days Arafat's grip on power appeared to be slipping. As the ailing leader lay in hospital, his subordinates assumed control of the major Palestinian organisations and some politicians predicted his domination was at an end.

Before flying to France, he had resided at his Ramallah headquarters for more than two-and-a-half years.

Israeli attacks had turned part of the compound into rubble, but Arafat stubbornly stayed on, fearing he would never be able to return if he left. It was a strange existence - and end - for a man leading one side of one of the most volatile conflicts in recent history.

Palestinians already fear infighting over who might succeed Arafat - he had unrivalled popularity and authority over the security forces.

Mohammed Abdel-Raouf Arafat As Qudwa al-Husseini was born on 24 August, 1929, in Cairo, Egypt. His father was a Palestinian textile merchant with part-Egyptian ancestry while his mother came from an old Palestinian family in Jerusalem.

At the age of five, his mother died and he was sent to live with his uncle in Jerusalem, which was then under British rule - a set-up much opposed by both Jews and Palestinians.

One of Arafat's earliest memories was of British soldiers breaking into his uncle's house after midnight, beating members of the family and smashing furniture.

Four years later he was taken back to Cairo by his father, but the two were not close. When his father

died, in 1952, he did not attend the funeral.

By 17, Arafat was smuggling arms into Palestine to fight the British and Jewish settlers, and at 19 he left his studies at King Faud University to fight in Gaza.

After the Arabs were defeated and the state of Israel was created in 1948, he returned to university in Cairo to study for a degree in engineering.

In 1958 he left Egypt for Kuwait, where he used his engineering skills, although he spent most of his time developing Fatah, the Palestinian National Liberation Movement.

Arafat and his colleagues advocated an armed struggle against Israel, and he returned to Palestine to set up Fatah on 1 January, 1965. Collective leadership was never his plan, and his contemporaries noted how he "exercised total control over the Fatah war chest, and bribed people to join him".

At the same time, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was being set up under the Arab League in Jordan. Arafat moved there in 1967, where two years later he was elected chairman of the executive committee of the PLO, a title he kept until his death.

The leader adopted violent means to get the world's attention, hijacking planes and carrying out terrorist acts.

In 1969, the PLO was expelled by King Hussein of Jordan, and Arafat moved to Lebanon, from where he directed attacks on northern Israeli settlements. In 1982, prompted by the murder of Shlomo Argov, the Jewish state's ambassador to London, the Israeli army swept into Lebanon forcing Arafat and the PLO to exit by sea.

From here he moved to Tunisia, and continued his struggle for independence, surviving assassination attempts, a plane crash and a serious stroke. He married Suha Tawil, a Christian Palestinian woman half his age, with whom he had a daughter Zahwa.

Many Palestinians compared him to David Ben-Gurion, Israel's founder and first leader, seeing Arafat as an Arab pioneer who struggled to lead his people back to their promised land. Many Israelis, by contrast, regarded him as an arch-terrorist, an opportunist who endorsed peace merely as a tactic to destroy Israel - "a beast on two legs", as the late Israeli leader Menachem Begin once called him.

In 1988, Arafat changed tactics and made a speech to the United Nations renouncing terrorism and supporting "peace and security" in the region.

In September 1993, Arafat and the then Israeli prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, signed the Oslo Accord, which pledged to place the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip, and eventually the rest of the West Bank, under Palestinian rule.

The following year, Arafat, Rabin and Shimon Peres were jointly awarded the Nobel peace prize. Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli extremist during a rally in Tel Aviv in 1995.

In 1996, Arafat was elected president of the Palestine Authority, and had secured his reputation of a more dictatorial than democratic style of rule.

When the promises of the Oslo agreement never materialised, and the violence in the area continued, his popularity waned. He was seen to have little control over the more violent elements among the extremist Arab groups. But - ever the survivor - Arafat's knack for countering repeated targeting by

the Israelis turned the Palestinians back towards him.

Arafat considered himself a leader of significant international standing and came to Britain in October 2001 to meet Tony Blair. His visit to Downing Street led to Mr Blair reportedly telling the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon that Arafat was making a "concerted" effort to end the violence. In the previous 12 months, more than 800 people - most of them Palestinians - had been killed.

But his role on the international diplomacy circuit was cut short more than two-and-a-half years ago when he holed up in his Ramallah headquarters. But despite his exclusion, he kept a firm grip on his party and swatted challenges to his authority.

In May 2003, fellow PLO member Mahmoud Abbas was appointed prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, but Arafat's power was never seriously challenged. Abbas may have been backed by the Bush administration - which considered Arafat to be "tainted by terrorism" - but he never got Arafat's support and eventually resigned in September last year.

In recent upsurges in violence, Arafat maintained a relatively low profile. In September, he voiced support for the British hostage Ken Bigley, pledging to help in "every way possible" to secure his release. Ultimately, his efforts - if he made them - failed.

Ironically, the ultimate success story of his life came a step closer in his final weeks. Late last month, the Israeli parliament voted in favour of Sharon's plan to pull all Jewish settlers out of the occupied Gaza Strip by next September. With Arafat suffering chronic stomach pains, it was left to Palestinian Authority spokesman Nabil Abu Rudeina to welcome the news.

"We are in favour of any withdrawal from occupied land, even one centimetre," he said.

For Yasser Arafat, it was too late to see what he spent decades fighting for - at least partially - become a reality.

He is survived by his wife and daughter.

DR. HAIDER ABDOUL SHAFI

1919-2007

"This is the moment of truth; you must have the courage to recognize it and the will to implement it for our truth can no longer be hidden away in the dark recesses of inadvertency or neglect. The people of Palestine look at you with a straightforward, direct gaze, seeking to touch your heart, for you have dared to stir up hopes that can't be



- **Read a 2002 Interview with Dr. Shafi from the Al-Ahram Weekly**

- **Read his obituary in the NY Times**

- **Read his obituary from**

The Economist

In the spring of 1948, around March as he remembered it, Haidar Abdel Shafi found himself at nightfall, waiting, in a small mud hut by the side of the main road in Deir al-Balah. Around him stretched groves of olive and orange trees. Palestine, in those days, was a community of peasants and landowners; a man was judged by how many trees he had. Haidar's father had had none, preferring—as he told the astonished neighbours—to save money for schooling his six children rather than buy plantations. The lanky boy, with his dark brows, had shaken the dust from his feet and gone away to study. But he was back now, defending the land.

Beside him lay a bag of first-aid equipment. He was a doctor, trained in Beirut and Jerusalem, now based in Gaza, and one of only

abandoned." --

--Dr. Haider Abdoul Shafi



Icon dies undefeated

by Ramzy Baroud from the Khaleej Times Online

October 2 2007

THE recent death of Dr Haider Abdel Shafi could not have come at a worse time. Bearing in mind the grim shortcomings within the Palestinian leadership, and the lack of any serious attempts to rectify the situation, the loss of this unique and iconic leader feels all the more acute.

Here was someone who always managed to transcend factionalism and religiosity, tribal politics and self-serving ideologies, maintaining his principles through any external difficulties. He co-founded the PLO in the 1960's and went on to start the Palestinian Crescent Society in Gaza in the 70's. The resilient man led the Palestinian delegation to Madrid peace talks in 1991, and in 1993 resigned the post after learning from his hotel radio that Yasser Arafat had reached a secret agreement in Olso without consulting with Palestinian negotiators in Spain. Abdel Shafi told me, in the only exchange I had with him, that learning of Arafat's secret crusade from the media was a particularly embarrassing moment for him.

In the same interview in 2002, Abdel Shafi also spoke at length about the Palestinian uprising, talks with Israel, internal corruption and division, democracy and more. Then aged 83, Abdel Shafi displayed the spirit of an idealistic young fighter with unswerving vision, while also demonstrating the wisdom borne of five decades of selfless struggle and steadfastness. For him despair was really never an option. Internal unity, democracy, resistance at all fronts and dialogue on equal basis were his ultimate goals. He seemed indefatigable, but his failing health was apparent his most significant enemy, as a few years later he was diagnosed with cancer and on Sept 25, 2007 he passed away.

I wonder if the ageing warrior knew of the painful details of the Palestinian internal strife, of the shameful and mutual crackdowns on Palestinian media and freedom of expression in the West Bank and Gaza and of the division at every turn in Palestinian life. The Palestine Abdel Shafi left behind was not the Palestine that he had fought for with astonishing dedication.

about a dozen practising in the whole southern sector of Palestine. With his few colleagues he had founded, in 1945, a southern branch of the Palestine Medical Society, and together they had attended the first Palestine Medical Congress. Since his student days, when he had first been inspired by Arab pan-nationalism, he had looked on doctoring as a form of resistance: to illness, to poverty and, by strengthening the common people, to political troubles and oppressions. When it came to organising Palestinians, a community not easily made coherent, a network of doctors, clinics and waiting rooms might serve as well as any political party. But crouching in a hut by the main road was not his normal mode of operation.

Somewhere ahead of him were a group of *fedayeen*, Arab guerrilla fighters, who had come to attack the Jewish settlement of Kfar Darom. The settlement, one of many built on purchased land in Palestine in the years before the establishment of Israel, was well-defended, surrounded by circle after circle of barbed wire. Within the circles the ground was mined, and the whole scene was overlooked by Jewish observation towers.

The battle, though it raged all night, was a bloody defeat for the *fedayeen*: 12 killed, with Dr Abdel Shafi's first-aid bag no match for the mines and the snipers. The Zionists seemed superbly organised. Indeed, it was usually so. All through his long career, in which he was a founder-member of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and represented Gaza on the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), the doctor's chief lament about his own people was their disarray. They had little notion of democracy, being loyal instead to Yasser Arafat, a strongman who monopolised all decision-making and surrounded himself with thieves. And they turned out in the end to have no capacity for national unity, splintering into factions—Hamas, Fatah, Islamic Jihad and the rest—who then fought one another. The Israelis, as he often pointed out, needed only to watch the Palestinians destroy themselves, as they had watched that March night from their high, dark towers.

Requiem for the olive trees

Dr Abdel Shafi was that rarest of figures, a secular and non-sectarian Palestinian leader whose integrity and outspokenness made him a model for all the rest. He was of the left, in an old socialist way, but was never a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; a doctor's role, he seemed to believe, was to stay detached from such affiliations. Far more useful was his decision to found and direct the Gaza branch of the Red Crescent, his own rallying organisation for Palestinian improvement. The Islamists attacked him, and in 1981 burned his clinic down; he noted then, stoically, that the Israelis who then ruled Gaza did not trouble to

In his fight, Abdel was not afraid to speak his mind and criticise what disrupted the struggle for Palestinian unity and true sovereignty. He blamed Arafat and his associates for many of the post-Oslo disasters that had befallen his people, chastising the Palestinian leadership for capitulating at Oslo, for accepting far less than what his people's rights and aspirations demanded. He refused to take part in the 'democracy' charade which instituted, among other pretences, a parliament that had no authority, neither to defy Arafat's will nor Israel's (whose oppressive occupation only intensified after the 'peace agreements' were signed).

Naturally, shortly after being voted to parliament, Abdel Shafi was the first to quit, lending his support instead to the Palestinian National Initiative which advocated for national unity, democracy and clean government. He saw clearly that while Palestinians may not be able to control Israel's actions, they were certainly capable of coordinating and correcting their own fallouts. This was really all that he asked.

In stark contrast, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas has decided to use the Israeli colonial project to his own advantage. Unlike Abdel Shafi, who would have challenged Israeli domination with a collective Palestinian stance of complete cohesion at home and abroad, Abbas (dubbed a 'moderate' and a 'pragmatic' leader by mainstream media) opted for the deadly option; he collaborated with the enemy. As Palestinians in Gaza are murdered at will, completely besieged and denied the most basic human rights, Abbas' 'pragmatic' advisers seem to have warned him against locking horns with the US and Israel. The strategy totally overlooks the fact that defeatism has never helped an oppressed nation recover its lands, its rights and its freedom.

Unfortunately Abdel Shafi is no longer there to infuse such timely reminders. The soil of Gaza has finally claimed him the same way it claimed the bodies of many resilient Palestinian men and women, young and old. One can only hope that the spirit of Abdel Shafi is now free to wander beyond the enclosed borders, the electric fences and the blocked military zones that turned the poor strip of land into a prison, comparable in its isolation to that of Robben Island where Nelson Mandela and his comrades were held for many years.

As long as Abbas and many in his Fatah party remain busy concocting schemes to weaken their rivals in Hamas, and while both parties plot to fortify their political positions in what must be the most embarrassing media circus in Palestinian history, Israel no longer faces any serious resistance. Instead, Israeli politicians now face a different sort challenge — how to widen the gap between the divided Palestinians? The Israeli media is filled with politicians' statements to validate the notion of division as fact. According to Avi Issacharoff (writing for Haaretz), the latest question is whether releasing Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti will help unify all ranks of Fatah, thus strengthening Abbas and accelerating the break-up of Hamas.

Unlike Abbas, the Palestinian doctor Abdel Shafi didn't fail his people, despite all of the hardships he had to endure. He did all that a single person can do on his own, and more. Shafi's funeral in Gaza reportedly united Palestinians of all factions. The man had spent much of his energy in achieving such a noble goal during his life; now at least his death has brought about a fleeting moment of unity, a reminder that such a thing is still possible.

In his speech at the peace conference in Madrid on October 31, 1991, Abdel Shafi recited a verse of Mahmoud Darwish's poetry: "My homeland is not a suitcase, and I am no traveller." At the time, my father's home in a Gaza refugee camp was crowded with neighbours who had come to listen to the televised speech and they all cried silently in response. I am sure that those of them still alive have wept again, this time at the passing of the Palestinian doctor, an icon of hope whose legacy, like his life, will always be cherished.

Ramzy Baroud, a veteran Arab American journalist, teaches mass communication at Australia Curtin University of Technology, Malaysia Campus.

~~~~~~

Biography

Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi (Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi): Physician; leading secular Palestinian nationalist leader in the Gaza Strip. Highly respected non-partisan figure, though with links to the Palestinian People's Party (formerly the Pal. Communist Party). Regularly commands 5-10% popular support in JMCC public opinion polls. Physician; head of the Red Crescent Society for the Gaza Strip; Commissioner-General of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights. A founding member of the Palestinian National Initiative, launched June 2002; also a member of the Birzeit University Board of Trustees.

Born in Gaza in 1919, just at the end of the Ottoman occupation of Palestine. One of six children of Sheikh Muheiddin Abdul Shafi, head of the Higher Islamic Council (Waqf - the authority which administered the affairs of the Muslims in Palestine) and custodian of the holy places in Gaza and (from 1925-27) Hebron.

intervene.

On both the PLO and the PLC he was a gadfly, denouncing corruption and resigning with much publicity from the PLC, in 1997, because it was doing nothing to counter Israeli ambitions. The Palestinian Authority infuriated him because it would not control the *intifada* and was allowing Palestinians (though, he stressed, they had every reason to rebel) to commit random violence against Jewish civilians. He never ran for president in the 1996 elections, but might have done well if he had.

Though the Israelis twice deported him and then confined him to Gaza for his long-term refusal to co-operate, he did not oppose the existence of Israel. The Jewish presence was a reality, and the Jewish state had to be accepted. Nor did he dislike Jews: at Sabbath dusks, as a boy, he had been in demand to light the lamps of his Jewish neighbours. But there had to be a spirit of "mutuality and reciprocity": two viable states, side by side, within the 1967 borders, and no Jewish settlers on Palestinian land. Until the settlements stopped entirely, he insisted, there was no point in any peace plan for the Middle East.

This was his message at the Madrid Conference in 1991 and at the Washington talks that followed—talks which he led and which were undermined, to his disgust, by secret accords made later at Oslo between Arafat and the Israelis. His speech at Madrid was perhaps the most eloquent the West had ever heard from a Palestinian: a plea for understanding, for sympathy and for territory. "What requiem can be sung", he asked, "for trees uprooted by army bulldozers? And...who can explain to those whose lands are confiscated and clear waters stolen, a message of peace? Remove the barbed wire. Restore the land."
~~~~~~

Attended primary school in Gaza; secondary education as a boarder at the Arab College in Jerusalem, graduated 1936. Left for Beirut, to study medicine at the American University, where he joined the Arab Nationalist Movement (dedicated to Arab nationalism and the founding of a Palestinian state). Graduated 1943, went to work at the British mandate government's Municipal Hospital (Mustashfa Al-Baladiya) in Jaffa.

In 1944 joined the Jaysh al-Badiah (desert army) of the British Jordanian Army, then part of a new British Ninth Army intended to open a second front - which never materialized - in the Balkans. Spent the war instead in various locations in Palestine: Al-Azraq, Ashona, Jericho, Gaza. Resigned his commission at war's end; returned to Gaza and entered private practice. Co-founded a branch of the Palestine Medical Society (1945), and participated in the first Palestine Medical Congress in 1946.

Provided medical support to Palestinian guerillas in the clashes between Jews and Arabs following the UN partition resolution in 1947. Ran a medical clearing station in Gaza the first Arab-Israeli war (1948), when Gaza was flooded with 200,000 refugees. Worked closely with the Quakers, who provided humanitarian relief for Gaza Palestinians until UNRWA was established in 1951. Left Gaza for the US, where he studied surgery at the Miami Valley Hospital in Dayton, Ohio. Returned to Gaza - now Egyptian-ruled - in 1954, worked as a surgeon for the Egyptians at the Tal Zahur Hospital.

Israel invaded and temporarily occupied Gaza in 1956, installing a municipal council with Abdel Shafi as one of its 10 members. Gained a reputation as troublemaker by comparing Israeli rule unfavourably to Egyptian control, and refusing to serve on council.

In 1957, married Hoda Khalidi, daughter of a prominent Jerusalem family, refugees in Alexandria since the 1948 war. Appointed by the Egyptians as head of medical services in the Gaza Strip, 1957-60; during this period, became a strong admirer and personal friend of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Returned to private practice 1960.

Served as chairman of the first Palestinian Legislative Council in Gaza (1962-4). Also a delegate to the first all-Palestinian conference (Palestinian National Congress) which convened in Jerusalem in 1964 and established the PLO (under Ahmed Shukeiry). Served as a member of the first PLO-Executive Committee (1964-5). Developed a constituency and political base through the Gaza clinic system, and by 1966 was the leading PLO figure in the Gaza Strip.

Worked as a volunteer at the Shifa hospital in Gaza during the 1967, in which Israel again occupied Gaza, this time for the long-term. Temporarily detained by Israel at war's end, suspected of support for the military activities of George Habash's PFLP, an offshoot of the Arab Nationalist Movement. (Abdel Shafi denies membership, but expresses sympathy for its goals). Upon release, he refused all co-operation with Israel's plans to tie Gaza to Israel through the development of a common infrastructure, as punishment Moshe Dayan expelled him for three months to the isolated Sinai village of Nahal in 1969. Deported again on 12 Sept 1970, this time to Lebanon for two months, along with 5 other prominent members of the Gazan leadership, in retaliation for a PFLP hijacking.

Founder and Director of Palestinian Red Crescent Society in the Gaza Strip from 1972, providing free medical care and a forum for cultural activities. Distanced himself from Egypt after the Camp David Accord of Sept 1978, which he saw as an Egyptian sell-out of the Palestinians to get back Sinai. After vocal opposition to the Accord, Israel confined him to Gaza, and threatened the Gaza Red Crescent with closure.

In May 1988, during the first intifada, he was one of three Palestinians (Saeb Erekat and Hanan Ashrawi were the others) to participate in ABC Nightline's Town Hall meeting from Jerusalem. First time that Palestinians had directly addressed an Israeli (and Western) audience. Turning point in Western perception of the PLO. Led the Palestinian element of the Pal-Jordanian delegation to the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, and subsequently led the Palestinian negotiation team for 22 months in the Washington talks (1992-3).

Resigned from delegation in April 1993 (over settlements). Resumed position under pressure - only to urge the suspension of Palestinian participation in the talks in May 1993: *"From the beginning*

when we started negotiations in Washington, we insisted that Israel should stop the settlement process, because it is a contradiction with the terms of reference. When Israel refused to stop, and the American sponsor did not compel Israel to abide by the terms of reference, the negotiation process then lost its credibility." Eventually made final break with the Palestinian negotiating team over Oslo. Abdel Shafi was one of the first to predict that the Oslo process would collapse, because it failed to tackle the issue of settlements.

Elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council in 1996 as member for Gaza, gaining highest number of votes of any member. Ran for speakership of the PLC, but lost to Ahmed Qurai' (Abu Alaa) by 57-31 votes; instead took up leadership of the PLC's political committee. Walked out of April 96 Palestine National Congress meeting, arguing that Arafat should not amend PN Charter to recognize Israel until Israel gives reciprocal recognition. (Though he does support the Two-State solution: *"There is no problem of coexistence. The Jewish presence is a reality to be acknowledged"*.) Announced intention to resign from PLC in October 1997 (effective from 30 March 1998) on the grounds that it did not have any real power to change the Palestinians' situation; also called for more democracy within the PNA, and a national unity leadership.

A long-time proponent of a less PA-centric (and less Arafat-centric) Palestinian leadership. In April 1998 initiated unity talks for all factions in Gaza, to include Fatah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and the left-wing PFLP and DFLP. Describes the Al-Aqsa intifada as a spontaneous rejection of ten years of fruitless negotiations which Israel has used to create facts on the ground; supports the right of the Palestinians to fight, but opposes suicide bombings and is critical of the disorganized nature of the resistance. Urged the PA to organize the intifada, rather than distance itself from it, and to widen its democratic base by forming a government of national unity, even if this means that PNA would be allied with groups unacceptable to Western public opinion, like HAMAS and Islamic Jihad: *"You see it is our right; it is not the business of the US nor of the European community how we manage our own affairs, to establish a national unity authority is our private concern"*.

Calls for a Pal unity govt to show the world the essentially defensive nature of Palestinian resistance by fighting only in the Occupied Territories and only against Israeli settlement activity, and its associated activities such as home demolitions and farmland expropriations: *"I think we should face the world with this position. I think that we should make this very clear to the American sponsor and to the Israelis. We should say we are not interested in killing Jews, but we will actually fight wherever Israel continues to establish settlements, or when they see it necessary to demolish a home or farm or trees, then we should fight. We must focus our fire on the illegal settlements - particularly new settlements. This is where we can stop the expansion of the Zionists, and where we are completely in our rights by international law, by the frame of reference, and supported by world public opinion"*.

Lukewarm over the Road Map, believes ending settlement activity should occupy all the energies of Pal resistance, and only thence move step by step to a two-state solution on the basis of the 1967 borders. Any negotiating activity while settlements continue to expand would be pointless and a waste of Palestinian energies.

Arrival in North Korea | Daily Press Briefing | What's New

KEYWORD SEARCH GO

Subject Index

Briefing on Secretary's Upcoming Travel to Ethiopia | Secretary's Remarks at FSI Shultz Center Groundbreaking | Briefing on Iraqi Refugee Issues | Fact Sheets on Avian and Pandemic Influenza | Diversity Visa Lottery Registration Ends Dec. 2 | Doors to Diplomacy Contest: Register Now! | Visit the Website for Students

Home | Issues & Press | Travel & Business | Countries | Youth & Education | Careers | About State

Video

You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office > Background Notes

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
September 2007

People
History
Government
Political Conditions
Economy
Foreign Relations
U.S. Relations
Travel/Business
Background Notes A-Z

Background Note: The Netherlands



PROFILE

OFFICIAL NAME:
Kingdom of the Netherlands

Geography
Area: 41,526 sq. km. (16,485 sq. mi.).
Cities: *Capital*--Amsterdam (pop. 744,736). *Other cities*--The Hague, seat of government (475,959); Rotterdam (583,853); Utrecht (283,893).
Terrain: Coastal lowland.
Climate: Northern maritime.

People
Population: 16.5 million.
Nationality: *Noun*--Dutchmen and Dutchwomen. *Adjective*--Dutch.
Ethnic groups: Predominantly Dutch; largest minority communities are Moroccans, Turks, Surinamese.
Religions: Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, other.
Language: Dutch.
Education: *Years compulsory*--10. *Attendance*--nearly 100%. *Literacy*--99%.
Health: *Infant mortality rate*--4.88/1,000. *Life expectancy*--79.1 yrs.
Work force (2006, 7.6 million): *Commercial services*--43.8%; *non-commercial services*--30.2%; *industry*--23.9%; *agriculture*--2.1%.

Government
Type: Parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarch.
Constitution: 1814 and 1848.
Branches: *Executive*--monarch (chief of state), prime minister (head of government), cabinet. *Legislative*--bicameral parliament (First and Second Chambers). *Judicial*--Supreme Court.
Subdivisions: 12 provinces.
Political parties: Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Labor Party (PvdA), Socialist Party (SP), Liberal Party (VVD), other minor parties.
Suffrage: Universal at 18.

Economy
GDP (2006 est.): $688 billion.
GDP real growth rate (2006 est.): 3.0%.
GDP per capita (2006 est.): $42,200.
Natural resources: Natural gas, petroleum, fertile soil.
Agriculture (2.1% of GDP): *Products*--dairy, poultry, meat, flower bulbs, cut flowers, vegetables and fruits, sugar beets, potatoes, wheat, barley.
Industry (19% of GDP): *Types*--agro-industries, steel and aluminum, metal and engineering products, electric machinery and equipment, bulk chemicals, natural gas, petroleum products, transport equipment, microelectronics.
Services (79% of GDP): *Types*--trade, hotels, restaurants, transport, storage and communication, financial (banking and insurance) and business services, care and other.
Trade (2006 est.): *Exports*--$413.8 billion (f.o.b.): mineral fuels, chemicals, machinery and transport equipment, processed food and tobacco, agricultural products. *Imports*--$373.8 billion (f.o.b.): mineral fuels and crude petroleum, machinery, transportation equipment, consumer goods, foodstuffs. *Major trading partners in 2005 (exports/imports)*--EU (76.8%/55.0%), Germany (23.6%/19.0%), Belgium (11.9%/10.7%), China (0.9%/7.7%), U. K. (9.3%/6.3%), U.S. (4.9%/8.0%).

HISTORY
The Dutch are primarily of Germanic stock with some Gallo-Celtic mixture. Their small homeland frequently has been threatened with destruction by the North Sea and has often been invaded by the great European powers.

Julius Caesar found the region which is now the Netherlands inhabited by Germanic tribes in the first century B.C. The western portion was inhabited by the Batavians and became part of a Roman province; the eastern portion was inhabited by the Frisians. Between the fourth and eighth centuries A.D., most of both portions were conquered by the Franks. The area later passed into the hands of the House of Burgundy and the Austrian Habsburgs. Falling under harsh Spanish rule in the 16th century, the Dutch revolted in 1558 under the leadership of Willem of Orange. By virtue of the Union of Utrecht in 1579, the seven northern Dutch provinces became the Republic of the United Netherlands.

During the 17th century, considered its "golden era," the Netherlands became a great sea and colonial power. Among other achievements, this period saw the emergence of some of painting's "Old Masters," including Rembrandt and Hals, whose works--along with those of later artists such as Mondriaan and Van Gogh--are today on display in museums throughout the Netherlands and the world.

The country's importance declined, however, with the gradual loss of Dutch technological superiority and after wars with Spain, France, and England in the 17th and 18th century. The Dutch United Provinces supported the Americans in the Revolutionary War. In 1795, French troops ousted Willem V of Orange, the Stadhouder under the Dutch Republic and head of the House of Orange.

Following Napoleon's defeat in 1815, the Netherlands and Belgium became the "Kingdom of the United Netherlands" under King Willem I, son of Willem V of Orange. The Belgians withdrew from the union in 1830 to form their own kingdom. King Willem II was largely responsible for the liberalizing revision of the constitution in 1848.

The Netherlands prospered during the long reign of Willem III (1849-90). At the time of his death, his daughter Wilhelmina was 10 years old. Her mother, Queen Emma, reigned as regent until 1898, when Wilhelmina reached the age of 18 and became the monarch.

The Netherlands proclaimed neutrality at the start of both world wars. Although it escaped occupation in World War I, German troops overran the country in May 1940. Queen Wilhelmina fled to London and established a government-in-exile. During the war, the Nazis rounded up the Jewish population before deporting them to camps in the East. Over 75% of the Netherlands' 140,000 Jews died at the hands of the Nazis. Shortly after the Netherlands was liberated in May 1945, the Queen returned. Crown Princess Juliana acceded to the throne in 1948 upon her mother's abdication. In April 1980, Queen Juliana abdicated in favor of her daughter, now Queen Beatrix. Crown Prince Willem Alexander was born in 1967.

Elements of the Netherlands' once far-flung empire were granted either full independence or nearly complete autonomy after World War II. Indonesia formally gained its independence in 1949, and Suriname became independent in 1975. The five islands of the Netherlands Antilles (Curacao, Bonaire, Saba, St. Eustatius, and a part of St. Maarten) and Aruba are integral parts of the Netherlands realm but enjoy a large degree of autonomy.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
The present constitution--which dates from 1848 and has been amended several times, most recently in 1983--protects individual and political freedoms, including freedom of religion. Although church and state are separate, a few historical ties remain; the royal family belongs to the Dutch Reformed Church (Protestant). Freedom of speech also is protected.

Government Structure
The country's government is based on the principles of ministerial responsibility and parliamentary government. The



De Haar Castle is reflected in the moat at Haarzuilens, central Netherlands, November 7, 1998. [• AP Images]



national government comprises three main institutions: the Monarch, the Council of Ministers, and the States General. There also are local governments.

The Monarch. The monarch is the titular head of state. The Queen's function is largely ceremonial, but she does have some influence deriving from the traditional veneration of the House of Orange, from which Dutch monarchs for more than three centuries have descended. Her influence also derives from her personal qualities as Queen and her power to appoint the "formateur," who forms the Council of Ministers following elections.

The Council of Ministers plans and implements government policy. The Monarch and the Council of Ministers together are called the Crown. Most ministers also head government ministries, although ministers-without-portfolio exist. The ministers, collectively and individually, are responsible to the States General (parliament). Unlike the British system, Dutch ministers cannot simultaneously be members of parliament.

The Council of State is a constitutionally established advisory body to the government that consists of members of the royal family and Crown-appointed members generally having political, commercial, diplomatic, or military experience. The Council of State must be consulted by the cabinet on proposed legislation before a law is submitted to the parliament. The Council of State also serves as a channel of appeal for citizens against executive branch decisions.

States General (parliament). The Dutch parliament consists of two houses, the First Chamber and the Second Chamber. Historically, Dutch governments have been based on the support of a majority in both houses of parliament. The Second Chamber is by far the more important of the two houses. It alone has the right to initiate legislation and amend bills submitted by the Council of Ministers. It shares with the First Chamber the right to question ministers and state secretaries.

The Second Chamber consists of 150 members, elected directly for a 4-year term--unless the government falls prematurely--on the basis of a nationwide system of proportional representation. This system means that members represent the whole country--rather than individual districts as in the United States--and are normally elected on a party slate, not on a personal basis. There is no threshold for small-party representation. Campaigns are relatively short, lasting usually about a month, and the election budgets of each party tend to be less than $1 million. The electoral system makes a coalition government almost inevitable. The last election of the Second Chamber was in November 2006.

The First Chamber is composed of 75 members elected for 4-year terms by the 12 provincial legislatures. It cannot initiate or amend legislation, but its approval of bills passed by the Second Chamber is required before bills become law. The First Chamber generally meets only once a week, and its members usually have other full-time jobs. The current First Chamber was elected following provincial elections in May 2007.

Courts. The judiciary comprises 62 cantonal courts, 19 district courts, five courts of appeal, and a Supreme Court that has 24 justices. All judicial appointments are made by the Crown. Judges nominally are appointed for life but actually are retired at age 70.

Local Government. The first-level administrative divisions are the 12 provinces, each governed by a locally elected provincial council and a provincial executive appointed by members of the provincial council. The province is formally headed by a queen's commissioner appointed by the Crown.

Current Government. General elections were held in November 2006. On February 22, 2007, a new center-left coalition government was sworn in, composed of the center-right Christian Democrats (CDA), Social Democrats (PvdA), and left-of-center orthodox Protestant Christian Union (CU) under CDA Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende. Given the consensus-based nature of Dutch politics, a change of government does not usually result in any drastic change in foreign or domestic policy. Descriptions of the four main parties follow.

The Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) was formed from the merger of the Catholic People's Party and two Protestant parties, the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the Christian-Historical Union. The merger process, begun in the early 1970s to try to stem the tide of losses suffered by religiously based parties, was completed in 1980. The CDA supports free enterprise and holds to the principle that government activity should supplement but not supplant communal action by citizens. On the political spectrum, the CDA sees its philosophy as standing between the "individualism" of the Liberals and the "statism" of the Labor Party. CDA has 41 seats in the current Second Chamber, more than any other party.

The Labor Party (PvdA), a classic European Social Democratic party, is left of center. It currently has 33 seats in the Second Chamber. Labor's program is based on greater social, political, and economic equality for all citizens, although in recent years the party has begun to debate the role of central government in that process. Although called the Labor Party, it has no formal links to the trade unions.

The Liberal (VVD) Party is "liberal" in the European, rather than American, sense of the word. It thus attaches great importance to private enterprise and the freedom of the individual in political, social, and economic affairs. The VVD is generally seen as the most conservative of the major parties. It currently has 22 seats in the Second Chamber.

The Socialist Party (SP) was founded as a grass root Marxist-Leninist movement in 1972. From the start Jan Maijnissen has been the driving force behind the party. Started at the local level, Marijnissen transformed the party into a working-class leftist alternative to the Labor Party and succeeded at being elected to parliament in 1994. At every subsequent election the party grew, and in November 2006 it obtained 25 seats, which made it the third largest party. The party is fundamentally nationalistic and opposes globalization, the European Union and Dutch participation in international peacekeeping. It also favors cutting defense spending by 40%.

Domestic Drug Policy
Despite intensified efforts by the Dutch Government to combat production of and trafficking in narcotic drugs, the Netherlands continues to be a significant transit point for drugs entering Europe (especially cocaine), an important producer and exporter of synthetic drugs, notably MDMA (Ecstasy), although MDMA production seems to be declining substantially. According to the National Police, three large seizures caused the number of ecstasy tablets seized in the U.S. that could be linked to the Netherlands to rise to 0.85 million in 2005 from 0.2 million in 2004. MDMA seizures are still down from the 1.1 million tablets seized in 2003 and 2.5 million in 2002. The successful five-year strategy (2002-2006) against production, trade, and consumption of synthetic drugs was reviewed at the end of 2006, and a new long-term plan was published in May 2007.

The Dutch Opium Act punishes possession, commercial distribution, production, import, and export of all illicit drugs. Drug use, however, is not an offense. The act distinguishes between "hard" drugs that have "unacceptable" risks (e.g., heroin, cocaine, ecstasy) and "soft" drugs (cannabis products). One of the main aims of this policy is to separate the markets for soft and hard drugs so that soft drug users are less likely to come into contact with hard drugs. The sale of a small quantity (under five grams) of soft drugs in "coffeeshops" is tolerated, albeit under strict conditions and controls. The United States continues to disagree with this aspect of Dutch drug policy. Overall, the Health Ministry coordinates drug policy, while the Ministry of Justice is responsible for law enforcement. Matters relating to local government and the police are the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. At the municipal level, policy is coordinated in tripartite consultations among the mayor, the chief public prosecutor, and the police.

The Netherlands has a wide variety of demand-reduction and "harm"-reduction programs reaching about 80% of the country's 26,000-30,000 opiate addicts. The number of opiate addicts has stabilized over the past few years, with the average age rising to 40, and the number of overdose deaths related to opiates stabilizing at between 30 and 50 per year.

Counterterrorism/Homeland Security
The Netherlands supports the global coalition against terrorism with leadership, personnel and material, including the deployment of troops to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Prime Minister stated the U.S. and his country stand "shoulder to shoulder" in the struggle for global security. The Netherlands is a party to all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions.

In August 2004, the Act on Terrorist Crimes, implementing the 2002 European Union (EU) framework decision on combating terrorism, became effective. The Act makes recruitment for the Jihad and conspiracy with the aim of committing a serious terrorist crime separate criminal offenses. In 2006, three packages of counterterrorism legislation were adopted by Parliament, namely a bill to permit the use of intelligence information in criminal proceedings, a bill to expand the use of special investigative methods, such as phone taps, surveillance and infiltration, in investigations and prosecutions of terrorist crimes, and a bill to ban organizations on the UN or EU terror lists. In 2006, there were successful trials against two terror groups leading to major convictions. In 2004, the government created a National Counterterrorism Coordinator's Office to streamline and enhance Dutch counterterrorism efforts. The Dutch have taken a leading role, particularly in the European Union, to establish financial protocols to combat terrorism. They have also donated to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide assistance to countries that lack the wherewithal to implement some of these measures immediately. They have taken steps to freeze the assets of individuals and groups included on the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. In March 2006, the Dutch hosted a major international terrorist financing conference.

The Netherlands is an active participant in the Container Security Initiative at Rotterdam, one of Europe's busiest ports. The Dutch have also installed radiological portal monitors at Rotterdam, in partnership with the Department of Energy's Megaport/Second Line of Defense initiative. The government also permitted U.S. CBP Immigration Liaison Officers to return to Schiphol Airport to assist with U.S.-bound passenger screening (the program is now known as the Immigration Assistance Program). In January 2005, the U.S. and Netherlands agreed to develop an International Registered Travelers program to facilitate travel between Schiphol Airport and JFK.

Principal Government Officials
Head of State--Queen Beatrix
Prime Minister--Jan Peter Balkenende
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance--Wouter Bos
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Youth and Family Affairs--Andr• Rouvoet
Foreign Minister--Maxime Verhagen
Defense Minister--Eimert van Middelkoop
Ambassador to the United States--Christiaan Kr•ner
Ambassador to the United Nations--Frank Majoor

The Netherlands' embassy in the U.S. is at 4200 Linnean Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20008; tel: 202-244-5300; fax: 202-362-3430.

ECONOMY
After a strong performance in the 1990s, which brought unemployment to below 3%, the Dutch economy struggled through 2002 and 2003, plagued by relatively high costs and weak domestic demand. Real GDP growth recovered to 2.0% in 2004, but fell back slightly in 2005 to 1.5% largely due to lagging corporate investment and decreased government consumption. The economy is expected to grow by 3.0% in both 2006 and 2007. Export growth slowed to an estimated 6.8% in 2005, after a 2004 rebound of 9.8%, and is expected to stay strong through 2006 and 2007.

Private consumption decreased by 1.2% in 2006, primarily due to reforms in the health care system which shifted health care spending from private to public consumption. Employment gains brought unemployment down to 5.5%, leading to projections of a 2.3% increase in private consumption for 2007. After a drop in the early 2000s, investment staged a recovery in 2005. This upward trend in investment continued into 2006 with an estimated increase of 3%. A further increase of up to 9% is projected for 2007.

In recent years, many firms in the Netherlands cited a loss of competitiveness as a major impediment to growth as unit labor costs outpaced those of their major competitors, including within the euro area. Low wage rises in 2004 and 2005 enabled firms to regain some lost ground. With many collective wage agreements signed when strong growth was not yet apparent, the 2006 growth level has not yet put upward pressure on overall wages, but wages are expected to go up in 2007 as the collective agreements come up for renegotiation. Inflation dropped to 1.2% in 2004, but increased to 1.7% in 2005. For 2006, it is again expected to drop to 1%, with projections suggesting it will return to 1.25% in 2007.

The Netherlands was one of the first EU member states to qualify for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Its fiscal policy has sought to strike a balance between further reductions in public spending and lower taxes and social security contributions. After an unexpected sharp economic downturn in 2003 caused the nominal deficit to breach the 3% GDP limit set by the EMU's Growth and Stability Pact, the center-right coalition government agreed to a package of spending cuts, which helped to lower the budget deficit to 1.8% of GDP in 2004 and further to 0.3% in 2005. The government achieved a 0.6% budget surplus in 2006 and a 0.2% surplus is expected for 2007.

Government Role
Although the private sector is the cornerstone of the economy, the Netherlands has an important and vibrant public sector. The government plays a significant role through permit requirements and regulations pertaining to almost every aspect of economic activity. The government combines a rigorous and stable microeconomic policy with wide-ranging structural and regulatory reforms. The government has gradually reduced its role in the economy since the 1980s, and privatization and deregulation continue unabated.

Trade and Investment
The Netherlands, which derives more than two-thirds of GDP from merchandise and services trade, continued to have a strongly positive balance of goods and services trade for 2005 of $42.2 billion--close to 7.7% of GDP, the main contributor to a current account surplus of close to 8.8% of GDP. Since there are no significant trade or investment barriers, the Netherlands remains a receptive market for U.S. exports and an important investment partner. The Netherlands is the eighth-largest U.S. export market, as well as the fourth-largest direct investor in the United States. Dutch accumulated direct investment in the United States in 2005 was $171 billion. The United States is the largest investor in the Netherlands with direct investment of $181 billion. There are more than 1,600 U.S. companies with subsidiaries or offices in the Netherlands. The Dutch are strong proponents of free trade and the staunchest allies of the U.S. in international fora such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

Sectors of the Economy
Services account for almost three quarters of the national income and are primarily in transportation, distribution, logistics, and financial areas, such as banking and insurance. Industrial activity generates about a fourth of the national product and is dominated by the metalworking, oil refining, chemical, and food processing industries. The agriculture and fisheries sector and traditional Dutch activities account for some 2% of GDP.

Although Dutch crude oil production is small, the Netherlands is a relatively large producer and distributor of natural gas. The Slochteren gas fields in Groningen Province in the north are among the world's larger producing natural gas fields. Total proven reserves of natural gas situated on the mainland currently amount to about 2 trillion cubic meters. Roughly 80% is accounted for by reserves on the mainland, the remaining 20% accounted for by relatively small deposits on the North Sea continental shelf. Current gas production is running at an annual average of around 75 billion cubic meters, roughly half of which is exported to EU member countries.

Environmental Policy
The Netherlands is a small and densely populated country. Its economy depends on industry, particularly chemicals and metal processing, intensive agriculture and horticulture, and on its infrastructure, which takes advantage of the country's geographical position at the heart of Europe's transportation network. These factors have led to major pressure on the environment.

The National Environmental Policy Plan (NMP) sets out Dutch environmental policy. Under NMP-4, published in 2001, the government seeks to cut back on all forms of pollution by 80%-90% within one generation, meaning that by 2010, the present generation should be able to pass on a clean environment to the next one.

Although the environmental quality in the Netherlands has improved significantly, some important targets, particularly with respect to nitrogen oxide and ammonia emissions, climate change, and noise reduction, will be difficult to reach.

The Dutch Government works closely with industry and nongovernmental organizations to reach environmental targets. In order to meet the Kyoto target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 6% in the 2008-2012 period from 1990 levels, the government reached an agreement with industry and the energy sector on emission rights trading. In May 2006, the government told parliament it had sufficient confidence the Kyoto targets would be reached provided planned additional measures are implemented.

FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Netherlands abandoned a long-standing policy of neutrality after World War II. The Dutch are engaged participants in international affairs. Dutch foreign policy is geared to promoting a wide variety of goals: the rule of law, human rights, and democracy. Priority is given to enhancing European integration, ensuring European security and stability (mainly through the mechanism of NATO and by emphasizing the important role the United States plays in the security of Europe), and participating in conflict management and peacekeeping missions.

The Netherlands generally pursues its foreign policy interests within the framework of multilateral organizations. The Netherlands is an active and responsible participant in the United Nations as well as other multilateral organizations such as NATO, the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE), the OECD, the WTO, and the International Monetary Fund. A centuries-old tradition of legal scholarship has made the Netherlands the home of the International Court of Justice; the Yugoslavia and Rwanda War Crimes Tribunals; the European judicial and police organizations Eurojust and Europol; the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and International Criminal Court. Dutch security policy is based primarily on membership in NATO, which the Netherlands joined as a charter member in 1949.

The Dutch have traditionally been strong advocates of European integration, and most aspects of their foreign, economic, and trade policies are coordinated through the European Union. However, Dutch voters rejected the EU constitutional treaty in June 2005. Along with other EU members, the Netherlands is debating the future role of the EU.

The Netherlands' post-war Customs Union with Belgium and Luxembourg (the Benelux group) paved the way for the formation of the European Community (precursor to the EU). Likewise, the Benelux abolition of internal border controls was a model for the wider Schengen accord, which today has 15 European signatories, including the Netherlands, pledged to common visa policies and free movement of people and goods across common borders.

The Dutch were key proponents of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and were the architects of the 1998 Treaty of Amsterdam. They have embraced the introduction of new member states and the common currency (euro). In recent years, however, the Dutch have become increasingly skeptical of the way the EU is run and of any further enlargements.

Foreign Aid
The Netherlands is among the world's leading aid donors, giving about 0.8% of its gross national product (about $5.6 billion in 2005) annually in development assistance, a ratio maintained as a firm policy target. The Dutch thus rank as the

sixth largest donor nation in dollar terms and the fifth most generous relative to GNP. The country consistently contributes large amounts of aid through multilateral channels, especially the UN Development Program, the international financial institutions, and EU programs. A portion of Dutch aid funds also are channeled through private ("cofinancing") organizations that have almost total autonomy in choice of projects. Minister for Development Cooperation Agnes van Ardenne oversees the aid portfolio.

Dutch development strategy is anchored in the Millennium Development Goals and as such focuses on poverty reduction. The priority programmatic areas for Dutch assistance are education, the environment and water, AIDS, and reproductive health care.

In 2004, the Netherlands introduced a new, more focused development aid strategy, under which a number of smaller aid programs in wealthier developing countries were phased out. The number of countries in which the Dutch operate bilateral assistance programs was thus cut from 49 to 36, and the number of sectors in which the Dutch will be active in each country was limited to two to three. Roughly half of Dutch aid is earmarked for Africa. In addition, the Dutch introduced a new policy instrument, the Stability Fund, which pushes the bounds of traditional development assistance by funding programs and activities, such as police training, that aim to create a security environment in which development can proceed. The Stability Fund, managed jointly by the Minister for Development Cooperation and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, spent $109 million in 2005.

The Dutch are the top donor of unearmarked assistance to UN humanitarian programs. For Afghanistan, the Netherlands spent $66 million on reconstruction in 2005, of which $33 million went to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), $10 million was spent on the elections, almost $7 million on the fight against drugs, and an additional $8 million on humanitarian relief. The Dutch contribution to the ARTF alone totaled $50.8 million in 2006. For 2007-2009, the Dutch have pledged $132 million. For Iraq, the Dutch have pledged $36 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance since March of 2003. In January 2006, the Netherlands signed a bilateral agreement with the Government of Iraq, canceling an amount of over $300 million in Iraqi debt, as part of an effort by the Paris Club to provide debt relief to Iraq.

In response to the Asian tsunami, the Dutch contributed $53 million in humanitarian relief and have promised $264 million over the next five years for reconstruction efforts in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In 2006, they pledged an additional $86 million for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias, of which $77 million to the Multi Donor Fund (MDF). The Netherlands has traditionally been a strong supporter of programs to help Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. The Balkans are another major recipient of Dutch assistance. The Dutch fund programs in Bosnia and Macedonia in the areas of education, good governance, and economic reform.

Despite their commitment to ODA, the Dutch also champion the role of trade and private enterprise for their contributions to development. In recent years, the government has devised new programs to support private sector development in developing countries.

In August 2006, the Center for Global Development, in conjunction with *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ranked the Netherlands number two in the world for its government's policies in support of development.

International Drug-Trafficking Control
The Dutch work closely with the United States and other countries on international programs against drug trafficking and organized crime. In July 2005, the two nations signed an agreement to expand information sharing and cooperative research on demand reduction. There is close Dutch-U.S. cooperation on joint counter-narcotics operations in the Caribbean. The Netherlands actively participates in the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). The 10-year Forward Operation Locations agreement between the U.S. and the Kingdom for the establishment of forward operating locations on Aruba and Curacao became effective in October 2001. The Netherlands is a signatory to international counternarcotics agreements, a member of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the 1990 Strasbourg Convention on Money Laundering and Confiscation, and is a major contributor to international counternarcotics projects.

U.S. RELATIONS
The U.S. partnership with the Netherlands is one of its oldest continuous relationships and dates back to the American Revolution. The excellent bilateral relations are based on close historical and cultural ties as well as a common dedication to individual freedom and human rights. The Netherlands shares with the United States a liberal economic outlook and is firmly committed to free trade. The United States attaches great value to its strong economic and commercial ties with the Dutch. The Netherlands is the third-largest direct foreign investor in the United States, and the United States is the third-largest direct foreign investor in the Netherlands.

The United States and the Netherlands often have similar positions on issues and work together both bilaterally and multilaterally in such institutions as the United Nations and NATO. The Dutch have worked with the United States at the WTO, in the OECD, as well as within the EU to advance the shared U.S. goal of a more open, honest, and market-led global economy. The Dutch, like the United States, supported the accession of 10 new members to the EU in 2004, and accession negotiations for Turkey in 2005.

The United States and the Netherlands joined NATO as charter members in 1949. The Dutch fought alongside the United States in the Korean War and the first Gulf War and have been active in global peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq. The Netherlands played a leading role in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign. They currently are contributing to EU peacekeeping forces in Bosnia. In the initial phase of the recent Iraq conflict, the Dutch deployed Patriot missiles to protect NATO ally Turkey, and sent a battalion of troops to Iraq to participate in stabilization operations. The Dutch also support and participate in NATO and EU training efforts in Iraq. They are active participants in the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials
Ambassador--Roland E. Arnall
Deputy Chief of Mission--Michael Gallagher
Political Counselor--Andrew J. Schofer
Economic and Integration Counselor--Karen Enstrom
Global Affairs Officer--Susan P. Garro
Legal Counselor--Heather Schildge
Public Affairs Counselor--Gary P. Keith
Management Counselor--Sarah A. Solberg
Regional Security Officer--Roberto C. Bernardo
Defense Attache--Devon G. Goldsmith
Office of Defense Cooperation--Col. David Kelly
Commercial Officer--Sheryl A. Maas
Agriculture Counselor--Roger A. Wentzel
Consul General, Amsterdam--Marjorie A. Ames

The U.S. Embassy is located at Lange Voorhout 102, 2514 EJ The Hague; tel: 31-70-310-2209; fax: 31-70-361-4688. The Consulate General is at Museumplein 19, 1071 DJ Amsterdam; tel: 31-20-575-5309; fax: 31-20-575-5310.

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION
The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program advises Americans traveling and residing abroad through Consular Information Sheets, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings. **Consular Information Sheets** exist for all countries and include information on entry and exit requirements, currency regulations, health conditions, safety and security, crime, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. **Public Announcements** are issued to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term conditions overseas that pose significant risks to the security of American travelers. **Travel Warnings** are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country because the situation is dangerous or unstable.

For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at http://www.travel.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings can be found. Consular Affairs Publications, which contain information on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad, are also available at http://www.travel.state.gov. For additional information on international travel, see http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Travel/International.shtml.

The Department of State encourages all U.S citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department's travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.

The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State's single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778). Customer service representatives and operators for TDD/TTY are available Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight, Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 877-FYI-TRIP (877-394-8747) and a web site at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet entitled "Health Information for International Travel" (HHS publication number CDC-95-8280) is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Further Electronic Information

Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at http://www.state.gov, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including Background Notes and daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website http://www.osac.gov

Export.gov provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.

STAT-USA/Internet, a service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides authoritative economic, business, and international trade information from the Federal government. The site includes current and historical trade-related releases, international market research, trade opportunities, and country analysis and provides access to the National Trade Data Bank.

BACK TO TOP

Updates | **Frequent Questions** | **Contact Us** | **Email this Page** | **Subject Index** | **Search**
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov | **Privacy Notice** | **FOIA** | **Copyright Information** | **Other U.S. Government Information**

Arrival in North Korea | Daily Press Briefing | What's New

KEYWORD SEARCH GO

Subject Index

Briefing on Secretary's Upcoming Travel to Ethiopia | Secretary's Remarks at FSI Shultz Center Groundbreaking | Briefing on Iraqi Refugee Issues | Fact Sheets on Avian and Pandemic Influenza | Diversity Visa Lottery Registration Ends Dec. 2 | Doors to Diplomacy Contest: Register Now! | Visit the Website for Students

Home | Issues & Press | Travel & Business | Countries | Youth & Education | Careers | About State

Video

You are in: Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs > Bureau of Public Affairs: Electronic Information and Publications Office > Background Notes

Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
July 2007

People
History
Government
Political Conditions
Economy
Foreign Relations
U.S. Relations
Travel/Business
Background Notes A-Z

Background Note: Spain



PROFILE

OFFICIAL NAME:
Kingdom of Spain

Geography
Area: 504,750 sq. km. (194,884 sq. mi.), including the Balearic and Canary Islands; about the size of Arizona and Utah combined.
Cities: *Capital*--Madrid (5.5 million). *Other cities*--Barcelona (4.9 million), Bilbao (353,950), Malaga (1.3 million), Seville (1.8 million), Valencia (2.3 million), Zaragoza (871,000).
Terrain: High plateaus, lowland areas such as narrow coastal plains, and mountainous regions.
Climate: Temperate. Summers are hot in the interior and more moderate and cloudy along the coast; winters are cold in interior and partly cloudy and cool along the coast.
Time zone: Spanish mainland and Balearic Isles--local time is 1 hour ahead of Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) in winter and 2 hours ahead in summer. Canary Islands are on GMT.

People
Nationality: *Noun*--Spaniard(s). *Adjective*--Spanish.
Population (2007 est.): 45,116,894.
Annual growth rate (2007 est.): 0.116%.
Ethnic groups: Distinct ethnic groups within Spain include the Basques, Catalans, and Galicians.
Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic; Protestant and Islamic faiths also have a significant presence.
Languages: Spanish (official) 74%, Catalan-Valenciana 17%, Galician 7%, Basque 2%.
Education: *Years compulsory*--to age 16. *Literacy* (2003 est.)--98%.
Work force (19.2 million): *Services*--65.1%; *agriculture*--5.2%; *construction*--12.5%; *industry*--17.2% (2005 est.).

Government
Type: Constitutional monarchy (Juan Carlos I proclaimed King November 22, 1975).
Constitution: 1978.
Branches: *Executive*--president of government nominated by monarch, subject to approval by democratically elected Congress of Deputies. *Legislative*--bicameral Cortes: a 350-seat Congress of Deputies (elected by the d'Hondt system of proportional representation) and a Senate. Four senators are elected in each of 47 peninsular provinces, 16 are elected from the three island provinces, and Ceuta and Melilla elect two each; this accounts for 208 senators. The parliaments of the 17 autonomous regions also elect one senator as well as one additional senator for every 1 million inhabitants within their territory (about 20 senators). *Judicial*--Constitutional Tribunal has jurisdiction over constitutional issues. Supreme Tribunal heads system comprising territorial, provincial, regional, and municipal courts.
Subdivisions: 47 peninsular and three island provinces; two enclaves on the Mediterranean coast of Morocco (Ceuta and Melilla) and three island groups along that coast--Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and the Chafarinas Islands.
Political parties: Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), Popular Party (PP), and the United Left (IU) coalition. Key regional parties are the Convergence and Union (CIU) in Catalonia and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) in the Basque country.

Economy
GDP (2006): $1.225 trillion (seventh-largest Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--OECD--economy).
Annual growth rate (2006 est.): 3.9%.
Per capita GDP (2006 est.): $27,422.
Natural resources: Coal, lignite, iron ore, uranium, mercury, pyrites, fluorspar, gypsum, zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, kaolin, hydroelectric power.
Agriculture and fisheries (2.8% of GDP, 2006 est.): *Products*--grains, vegetables, citrus and deciduous fruits, wine, olives and olive oil, sunflowers, livestock.
Industry (15.54% of GDP, 2006 est.): *Types*--processed foods, textiles, footwear, petrochemicals, steel, automobiles, consumer goods, electronics.
Trade (2006): *Exports*--$211.4 billion: automobiles, fruits, minerals, metals, clothing, footwear, textiles. *Major markets*--EU 70.35%, U.S. 4.41%. *Imports*--$289.8 billion: petroleum, oilseeds, aircraft, grains, chemicals, machinery, transportation equipment, fish, consumer goods. *Major sources*--EU 58.44%, U.S. 3.27%.
Average exchange rate (2006): 0.797 euros=U.S.$1.

PEOPLE
Spain's population density, lower than that of most European countries, is roughly equivalent to New England's. In recent years, following a longstanding pattern in the rest of Europe, rural populations are moving to cities. Urban areas are also experiencing a significant increase in immigrant populations, chiefly from North Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe.

Spain has no official religion. The constitution of 1978 disestablished the Roman Catholic Church as the official state religion, while recognizing the role it plays in Spanish society. More than 90% of the population is at least nominally Catholic. Among the remaining population, there are about 1.2 million evangelical Christians and other Protestants (2006 est.), 1 million Muslims (2006 est.) and 48,000 Jews (2006 est.).

Educational System
About 70% of Spain's student population attends public schools or universities. The remainder attend private schools or universities, the great majority of which are operated by the Catholic Church. Compulsory education begins with primary school or general basic education for ages 6-14. It is free in public schools and in many private schools, most of which receive government subsidies. Following graduation, students attend either a secondary school offering a general high school diploma or a school of professional education (corresponding to grades 9-12 in the United States) offering a vocational training program. The Spanish university system offers degree and post-graduate programs in all fields--law, sciences, humanities, and medicine--and the superior technical schools offer programs in engineering and architecture.

HISTORY
The Iberian Peninsula has been settled for millennia. In fact, some of Europe's most impressive Paleolithic cultural sites are located in Spain, including the famous caves at Altamira that contain spectacular paintings dating from about 15,000 to 25,000 years ago. The Basques, Europe's oldest surviving group, are also the first identifiable people of the peninsula.

Beginning in the ninth century BC, Phoenicians, Greeks, Carthaginians, and Celts entered the Iberian Peninsula. The Romans followed in the second century BC and laid the groundwork for Spain's present language, religion, and laws. Although the Visigoths arrived in the fifth century AD, the last Roman strongholds along the southern coast did not fall until the seventh century AD. In 711, North African Moors sailed across the straits, swept into Andalusia, and within a few years, pushed the Visigoths up the peninsula to the Cantabrian Mountains. The Reconquest--efforts to drive out the Moors--lasted until 1492. By 1512, the unification of present-day Spain was complete.

During the 16th century, Spain became the most powerful nation in Europe, due to the immense wealth derived from its presence in the Americas. But a series of long, costly wars and revolts, capped by the defeat by the English of the "Invincible Armada" in 1588, began a steady decline of Spanish power in Europe. Controversy over succession to the throne consumed the country during the 18th century, leading to an occupation by France during the Napoleonic era in the early 1800s and a series of armed conflicts throughout much of the 19th century.



Women wearing traditional Sevillana dresses attend the May fair in Cordoba, Spain, May 19, 2007. [• AP Images]



The 19th century saw the revolt and independence of most of Spain's colonies in the Western Hemisphere; three wars over the succession issue; the brief ousting of the monarchy and establishment of the First Republic (1873-74); and, finally, the Spanish-American War (1898), in which Spain lost Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines to the United States. A period of dictatorial rule (1923-31) ended with the establishment of the Second Republic. It was dominated by increasing political polarization, culminating in the leftist Popular Front electoral victory in 1936. Pressures from all sides, coupled with growing and unchecked violence, led to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936.

Following the victory of his nationalist forces in 1939, General Francisco Franco ruled a nation exhausted politically and economically. Spain was officially neutral during World War II but followed a pro-Axis policy. Therefore, the victorious Allies isolated Spain at the beginning of the postwar period, and the country did not join the United Nations until 1955. In 1959, under an International Monetary Fund stabilization plan, the country began liberalizing trade and capital flows, particularly foreign direct investment.

Despite the success of economic liberalization, Spain remained the most closed economy in Western Europe--judged by the small measure of foreign trade to economic activity--and the pace of reform slackened during the 1960s as the state remained committed to "guiding" the economy. Nevertheless, in the 1960s and 1970s, Spain was transformed into a modern industrial economy with a thriving tourism sector. Its economic expansion led to improved income distribution and helped develop a large middle class. Social changes brought about by economic prosperity and the inflow of new ideas helped set the stage for Spain's transition to democracy during the latter half of the 1970s.

Upon the death of General Franco in November 1975, Franco's personally designated heir Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon y Borbon assumed the titles of king and chief of state. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of post-Franco liberalization, he replaced Franco's last Prime Minister with Adolfo Suarez in July 1976. Suarez entered office promising that elections would be held within one year, and his government moved to enact a series of laws to liberalize the new regime. Spain's first elections since 1936 to the Cortes (Parliament) were held on June 15, 1977. Prime Minister Suarez's Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), a moderate center-right coalition, won 34% of the vote and the largest bloc of seats in the Cortes.

Under Suarez, the new Cortes set about drafting a democratic constitution that was overwhelmingly approved by voters in a national referendum in December 1978.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

Parliamentary democracy was restored following the death of General Franco in 1975, who had ruled since the end of the civil war in 1939. The 1978 constitution established Spain as a parliamentary monarchy, with the prime minister responsible to the bicameral Cortes (Congress of Deputies and Senate) elected every 4 years. On February 23, 1981, rebel elements among the security forces seized the Cortes and tried to impose a military-backed government. However, the great majority of the military forces remained loyal to King Juan Carlos, who used his personal authority to put down the bloodless coup attempt.

In October 1982, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), led by Felipe Gonzalez, swept both the Congress of Deputies and Senate, winning an absolute majority. Gonzalez and the PSOE ruled for the next 13 years. During that period, Spain joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Community.

In March 1996, Jose Maria Aznar's Popular Party (PP) won a plurality of votes. Aznar moved to decentralize powers to the regions and liberalize the economy, with a program of privatization, labor market reform, and measures designed to increase competition in selected markets. During Aznar's first term, Spain fully integrated into European institutions, qualifying for the European Monetary Union. During this period, Spain participated, along with the United States and other NATO allies, in military operations in the former Yugoslavia. President Aznar and the PP won reelection in March 2000, obtaining absolute majorities in both houses of parliament.

After the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001, President Aznar became a key ally in the fight against terrorism. Spain backed the military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan and took a leadership role within the European Union (EU) in pushing for increased international cooperation on terrorism. The Aznar government, with a rotating seat on the UN Security Council, supported the intervention in Iraq.

Spanish parliamentary elections on March 14, 2004 came only three days after a devastating terrorist attack on Madrid commuter rail lines that killed 191 and wounded over 1,400. With large voter turnout, PSOE won the election and its leader, Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, took office on April 17, 2004. Carrying out campaign promises, the Zapatero government immediately withdrew Spanish forces from Iraq but has continued to support Iraq reconstruction efforts. The Zapatero government has supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan, including maintaining troop support for 2004 and 2005 elections, supported reconstruction efforts in Haiti, sent troops to UNIFIL in Lebanon, and cooperated on counterterrorism issues and many other issues of importance to the U.S.

Local Government

The 1978 constitution authorized the creation of regional autonomous governments. By 1985, 17 regions covering all of peninsular Spain, the Canaries, and the Balearic Islands had negotiated autonomy statutes with the central government. In 1979, the first autonomous elections were held in the Basque and Catalan regions, which have the strongest regional traditions by virtue of their history and separate languages. Since then, autonomous governments have been created in the remainder of the 17 regions. The central government continues to devolve powers to the regional governments, which will eventually have full responsibility for health care and education, as well as other social programs.

Terrorism

The Government of Spain is involved in a long-running campaign against Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a terrorist organization founded in 1959 and dedicated to promoting Basque independence. ETA targets Spanish security forces, military personnel, Spanish Government officials, and politicians of the Popular Party and the Socialist Party (PSOE.) The group has carried out numerous bombings against Spanish Government facilities and economic targets, including a car bomb assassination attempt on then-opposition leader Aznar in 1995, in which his armored car was destroyed but he was unhurt. The Spanish Government attributes over 800 deaths to ETA terrorism since its campaign of violence began. In recent years, the government has had more success in controlling ETA, due in part to increased security cooperation with French authorities.

In November 1999, ETA ended a cease-fire it declared in September 1998. Following the end of that ceasefire, ETA conducted a campaign of violence and has been blamed for the deaths of some 46 Spanish citizens and officials. Each attack has been followed by massive anti-ETA demonstrations around the country, clearly demonstrating that the majority of Spaniards, including the majority of Spain's Basque populace, have no tolerance for continued ETA violence. In March 2006, ETA declared another ceasefire, which it ended in June 2007. The government continues to pursue vigorous counterterrorist policy and has worked closely with its international allies to foil several suspected ETA attacks.

Spain also contends with a resistance group, commonly known as GRAPO. GRAPO is an urban left-wing terrorist group that seeks to overthrow the Spanish Government and establish a Marxist state. It opposes Spanish participation in NATO and U.S. military presence in Spain and has a long history of assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings mostly against Spanish interests during the 1970s and 1980s.

In a June 2000 communiqu• following the explosions of two small devices in Barcelona, GRAPO claimed responsibility for several terrorist attacks throughout Spain during the past year. These attacks included two failed armored car robberies, one in which two security officers died, and four bombings of political party offices during the 1999/2000 election campaign. In 2002 and 2003, Spanish and French authorities were successful in hampering the organization's activities through sweeping arrests, including some of the group's leadership.

Al Qaeda is known to operate cells in Spain. On March 11, 2004, only three days before national elections, 10 bombs were detonated on crowded commuter trains during rush hour. Three were deactivated by security forces and one was found unexploded. Evidence quickly surfaced that jihadist terrorists with possible ties to the al Qaeda network were responsible for the attack that killed 191 people. Spanish investigative services and the judicial system have aggressively sought to arrest and prosecute suspected al Qaeda members and actively cooperate with foreign governments to diminish the transnational terrorist threat. A Spanish court convicted 18 individuals in September 2005 for their role in supporting al Qaeda, and Spanish police disrupted numerous Islamist extremist cells operating in the country. The trial against 29 people for their alleged participation in the Madrid March 11, 2004 terrorist attack started in February 2007, and was declared ready for judgment at the end of June. One of the 29 was absolved during the trial. The prosecutor asked for sentences as high as 30,000 years of jail for some of them. The court is expected to issue the sentence sometime in October 2007.

Principal Government Officials

Chief of State, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces--King Juan Carlos I
President of the Government (Prime Minister)--Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero
Minister of Foreign Affairs--Miguel Angel Moratinos
Ambassador to the United States--Carlos Westendorp y Cabeza

Spain maintains an embassy in the United States at 2375 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037 (tel. 202-452-0100) and consulates in many larger U.S. cities.

ECONOMY

Spain's accession to the European Community--now European Union (EU)--in January 1986 required the country to open its economy to trade and investment, modernize its industrial base, improve infrastructure, and revise economic legislation to conform to EU guidelines. In doing so, Spain increased gross domestic product (GDP) growth, reduced the public debt to GDP ratio, reduced unemployment from 23% in 1986 to 8.47% in first quarter 2007, and reduced inflation to under 3%. The fundamental challenges remaining for Spain include decreasing unemployment further, reforming labor laws lowering inflation, and raising per capita GDP.

Following peak growth years in the late 1980s, the Spanish economy entered into recession in mid-1992. The economy recovered during the first Aznar administration (1996-2000), driven by a return of consumer confidence and increased private consumption, although growth has slowed in recent years. Unemployment remains a problem at 8.47% (2007, first quarter), but this still represents a significant improvement from previous levels. Devaluations of the peseta during the 1990s made Spanish exports more competitive, but the strength of the euro since its adoption has raised recent concerns that Spanish exports are being priced out of the range of foreign buyers.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

After the return of democracy following the death of General Franco in 1975, Spain's foreign policy priorities were to break out of the diplomatic isolation of the Franco years and expand diplomatic relations, enter the European Community, and define security relations with the West.

As a member of NATO since 1982, Spain has established itself as a major participant in multilateral international security activities. Spain's EU membership represents an important part of its foreign policy. Even on many international issues beyond Western Europe, Spain prefers to coordinate its efforts with its EU partners through the European political cooperation mechanism.

With the normalization of diplomatic relations with Israel and Albania in 1986, Spain virtually completed the process of universalizing its diplomatic relations. The only country with which it now does not have diplomatic relations is North Korea.

Spain has maintained its special identification with Latin America. Its policy emphasizes the concept of Hispanidad, a mixture of linguistic, religious, ethnic, cultural, and historical ties binding Spanish-speaking America to Spain. Spain has been an effective example of transition from authoritarianism to democracy, as shown in the many trips that Spain's King and Prime Ministers have made to the region. Spain maintains economic and technical cooperation programs and cultural exchanges with Latin America, both bilaterally and within the EU.

Spain also continues to focus attention on North Africa, especially on Morocco. This concern is dictated by geographic proximity and long historical contacts, as well as by the two Spanish enclave cities of Ceuta and Melilla on the northern coast of Africa. While Spain's departure from its former colony of Western Sahara ended direct Spanish participation in Morocco, it maintains an interest in the peaceful resolution of the conflict brought about there by decolonization. These issues were highlighted by a crisis in 2002, when Spanish forces evicted a small contingent of Moroccans from a tiny islet off Morocco's coast following that nation's attempt to assert sovereignty over the island.

Meanwhile, Spain has gradually begun to broaden its contacts with Sub-Saharan Africa. It has a particular interest in its former colony of Equatorial Guinea, where it maintains a large aid program.

In relations with the Arab world, Spain has sought to promote European-Mediterranean dialogue. Spain strongly supports the EU's "Barcelona Process" which seeks to expand dialogue and trade between Europe and the nations of North Africa and the Middle East, including Israel. It is seen by some as too greatly favoring the European Union. Other proposals are on the table, including one put forward by French President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. The latest meeting on the Barcelona initiative was held on November 29, 2005.

Spain has been successful in managing its relations with its two European neighbors, France and Portugal. The accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU has helped ease some of their periodic trade frictions by putting these into an EU context. Franco-Spanish bilateral cooperation is enhanced by joint action against Basque ETA terrorism. Ties with the United Kingdom are generally good, although the question of Gibraltar remains a sensitive issue.

U.S.-SPANISH RELATIONS

Spain and the United States have a long history of official relations and are closely associated in many fields. In addition to U.S. and Spanish cooperation in NATO, defense and security relations between the two countries are regulated by a 1989 Agreement on Defense Cooperation, revised in 2003. Under this agreement, Spain authorized the United States to use certain facilities at Spanish military installations.

The two countries also cooperate in several other important areas. Under a 1964 agreement (currently being renegotiated), the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Spanish National Institute of Aerospace Technology (INTA) jointly operate the Madrid Deep Space Communications Complex in support of Earth orbital and solar system exploration missions. The Madrid Complex is one of the three-largest tracking and data acquisition complexes comprising NASA's Deep Space Network.

An agreement on cultural and educational cooperation was signed on June 7, 1989. A new element, supported by both the public and private sectors, gives a different dimension to the programs carried out by the joint committee for cultural and educational cooperation. These joint committee activities complement the binational Fulbright program for graduate students, postdoctoral researchers, and visiting professors, which became the largest in the world in 1989. Besides assisting in these exchange endeavors, the U.S. Embassy also conducts a program of official visits between Spain and the United States.

Spain and the U.S. are strong allies in the fight against terrorism.

Principal U.S. Embassy Officials

Ambassador--Eduardo Aguirre, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Mission--Hugo Llorens
Counselor for Management Affairs--Michael S. Hoza
Counselor for Agricultural Affairs--Stephen Hammond
Counselor for Commercial Affairs--Jim Wilson
Counselor for Consular Affairs--Daniel Keller
Counselor for Economic Affairs--James Dudley
Counselor for Political Affairs--Kathleen M. Fitzpatrick
Counselor for Public Affairs--Josie S. Shumake
Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation--Col. Ulysses S. Rhodes, USAF
Defense Attach•--Capt. Kevin Little, USN
Drug Enforcement Administration Attach•--Joseph Bond
NASA Representative--vacant
Regional Security Officer--John Young
Consul General Barcelona--Todd Robinson
Customs and Border Protection--vacant
Transportation Security Agency--Luz Ponce
Defense Communication Support Group (DCSG)--vacant

The U.S. Embassy is located at Serrano, 75, 28006 Madrid (tel. 34-91-587-2200; fax 34-91-587-2303). Consulate General, Barcelona, Paseo Reina Elisenda 23, Barcelona 08034 (tel. 34-93-280-2227; fax 34-93-205-5206).

TRAVEL AND BUSINESS INFORMATION

The U.S. Department of State's Consular Information Program advises Americans traveling and residing abroad through Consular Information Sheets, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings. **Consular Information Sheets** exist for all countries and include information on entry and exit requirements, currency regulations, health conditions, safety and security, crime, political disturbances, and the addresses of the U.S. embassies and consulates abroad. **Public Announcements** are issued to disseminate information quickly about terrorist threats and other relatively short-term conditions overseas that pose significant risks to the security of American travelers. **Travel Warnings** are issued when the State Department recommends that Americans avoid travel to a certain country because the situation is dangerous or unstable.

For the latest security information, Americans living and traveling abroad should regularly monitor the Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs Internet web site at http://www.travel.state.gov, where the current Worldwide Caution, Public Announcements, and Travel Warnings can be found. Consular Affairs Publications, which contain information on obtaining passports and planning a safe trip abroad, are also available at http://www.travel.state.gov. For additional information on international travel, see

http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Travel/International.shtml.

The Department of State encourages all U.S citizens traveling or residing abroad to register via the State Department's travel registration website or at the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate abroad. Registration will make your presence and whereabouts known in case it is necessary to contact you in an emergency and will enable you to receive up-to-date information on security conditions.

Emergency information concerning Americans traveling abroad may be obtained by calling 1-888-407-4747 toll free in the U.S. and Canada or the regular toll line 1-202-501-4444 for callers outside the U.S. and Canada.

The National Passport Information Center (NPIC) is the U.S. Department of State's single, centralized public contact center for U.S. passport information. Telephone: 1-877-4USA-PPT (1-877-487-2778). Customer service representatives and operators for TDD/TTY are available Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight, Eastern Time, excluding federal holidays.

Travelers can check the latest health information with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta, Georgia. A hotline at 877-FYI-TRIP (877-394-8747) and a web site at http://wwwn.cdc.gov/travel/default.aspx give the most recent health advisories, immunization recommendations or requirements, and advice on food and drinking water safety for regions and countries. A booklet entitled "Health Information for International Travel" (HHS publication number CDC-95-8280) is available from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402, tel. (202) 512-1800.

Further Electronic Information

Department of State Web Site. Available on the Internet at http://www.state.gov, the Department of State web site provides timely, global access to official U.S. foreign policy information, including Background Notes and daily press briefings along with the directory of key officers of Foreign Service posts and more. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) provides security information and regional news that impact U.S. companies working abroad through its website http://www.osac.gov

Export.gov provides a portal to all export-related assistance and market information offered by the federal government and provides trade leads, free export counseling, help with the export process, and more.

STAT-USA/Internet, a service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, provides authoritative economic, business, and international trade information from the Federal government. The site includes current and historical trade-related releases, international market research, trade opportunities, and country analysis and provides access to the National Trade Data Bank.

BACK TO TOP

Updates | **Frequent Questions** | **Contact Us** | **Email this Page** | **Subject Index** | **Search**
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.
About state.gov | **Privacy Notice** | **FOIA** | **Copyright Information** | **Other U.S. Government Information**

Felipe Gonzalez Marquez



"There is a hope which must not be dashed to the ground. We are aware of the complexity of the process, but we Spaniards know how cooperation among cultures and the union of collective efforts can generate peaceful coexistence. Peace is the necessary condition."

--Felipe Gonzalez Marquez

Felipe Gonzalez Marquez is one of Europe's most accomplished political figures of the 20th century. Behind his astute leadership skills and political acumen, Gonzalez was elected to an unprecedented four consecutive terms as Prime Minister of Spain. During his tenure in office, he pushed the nation into an era of economic growth it had not seen for over half a century, culminating in a successful integration into the European Union.

Felipe Gonzalez was born in Seville, Spain in 1942. While enrolled at the University of Seville in 1962, where he would eventually earn a degree in law, he joined the Spanish Socialists' Party (PSOE), which had been an illegal organization since the Spanish Civil War had returned power to the Tradionalist Conservatives in 1939. Soon after his graduation, Gonzalez found success teaching law in Seville while also representing workers in litigation cases.

With the death of General Francisco Franco in 1975, the PSOE's legality was restored and, behind the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez, assumed 118 (of 303) seats in Parliament and 29.2% of the vote in Spain's first post-Franco general election. Once reinstated into the National government, Gonzalez pushed rid the PSOE of their Marxist doctrines to appeal to all classes. He succeeded in 1979, and was named the party's Secretary General.

In the 1982 general election, the PSOE gained 48.3% of the vote and Felipe Gonzalez was named Prime Minister of Spain at the age of 40, making him Europe's youngest Head of Government. He went on to hold the office through four more elections until the Popular Party commanded control in the 1996 general election. During this 16-year span, Gonzalez pushed for liberal reforms and a restructuring of the economy, which had been long stagnant under the guidance of the old regime. The economic conditions of Spain saw vast improvements under the guidance of Gonzalez, including a landmark inclusion within the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, in 1986.

Felipe Gonzalez was awarded the Charlemagne Prize for distinguished service on behalf of European Unification in 1993 and in 1997, and was honored with the Great Golden Cross for Merit by the Republic of Austria.

Gonzalez resigned as the leader of the PSOE in 1997, though he still remains involved in its processes. He currently heads the Madrid based Global Progress Foundation (FPG), and enjoys tending to bonsai trees, many of which he has donated to the Royal Botanic Gardens of Madrid.

Front Page
World
UK
UK Politics
Business
Sci/Tech
Health
Education
Sport
Entertainment
Talking Point

On Air
Feedback
Low Graphics
Help

HISTORY

Monday, April 20, 1998 Published at 14:13 GMT 15:13 UK

Israel and the PLO



The former BBC Middle East correspondent, Tim Llewellyn, looks back at the history of Israel.

In the face of Israel's domination of the region after 1967 - the war and occupation of the West Bank pushed nearly 400,000 more Palestinians into Jordan - many Palestinians lost faith in the machinations of Arab regimes and began to build their own nationalist and resistance movement.

By the middle of the 1960s, organised Palestinian groups under the umbrella of Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) were carrying out border raids into Israel from Jordan and Syria, and after 1967 these intensified.



ISRAEL TODAY
PROFILES
MY ISRAEL
HISTORY
INTERNET LINKS

In this section

The return of the Jews to the promised land
The birth of Israel
Israel builds a nation
Israel in War and Peace
Israel and the PLO
Israel and the Intifada
The road to Oslo



Yasser Arafat

They were able to exploit a low-level war of attrition between Israel and Egypt and, until 1970, enjoyed the tacit support of the Jordanian and Syrian governments.

Entanglement in Lebanon

Israel retaliated against the guerrillas, striking at them in Jordan at first, then more decisively and extensively into Lebanon, where the Palestinian organisations fled after King Hussein of Jordan crushed and expelled them in 1970.

Israel had the better of the military exchanges, and in 1978 invaded Southern Lebanon, occupying an area across the Israeli border. It created and ran there a mainly Christian Lebanese militia led by a rebel Lebanese Army major.

But the PLO and its Lebanese allies continued to raid and shell northern Israel. The PLO also gained more and more international recognition, in the Arab world and beyond, even in the West, as the official representative of the Palestinian people.

Much to Israel's distress, the Palestinian movement was being seen worldwide as a legitimate nationalist resistance movement with a high political profile - rather than the bloodied terrorists of traditional Israeli propaganda.

The Palestinians in the occupied territories were also becoming increasingly active. There were riots and violence that Palestinian activists inside and outside the region were able to exploit at Israel's expense.



The international community continued to blame Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands and its settlements policy for these upheavals.

In June 1982, with a view to putting an end to the PLO as a force to be reckoned with, and quashing its support in the West Bank and Gaza, the Israel Defence Force acted. Israeli aircraft and troops began a supposedly retaliatory move into Lebanon (although the border was in fact quiet at the time).

This quickly became a full-scale invasion lasting more than two months and eventually rolling into the Lebanese capital Beirut itself. Tens of thousands of civilians, Lebanese and Palestinians, were killed and injured.



Sabra-Shatila - after the massacre

World and much of Israeli opinion was appalled. The outrage reached epic proportions when in September 1982, fighters of a Christian militia allied to Israel carried out a massacre of several hundred Palestinian civilians in a Beirut camp, Sabra-Shatila, that the Israeli Army was supposed to be controlling and guarding.

Again, many Arab and independent observers held Israel responsible for the massacre, or at least accused it of almost wilful criminal negligence in not controlling its Christian allies. And there were other, darker conspiracy theories.

An Israeli judicial commission found that the Israeli Army had failed in its duties and was indirectly responsible for

the massacre. Even wider worries were voiced in Israel itself as to whether during the invasion the government of Prime Minister Begin had ever really had control of events or the army itself.



Itzhak Shamir

Begin resigned, reduced and wearied by events, to be replaced by Itzhak Shamir, yet another former leader of an extremist underground organisation, the Stern Group, or Lehi, in the 1940s.

In May 1983, Israel signed a defence agreement with Lebanon, which was soon abrogated under Syrian pressure. By 1985 Israeli forces, harassed by Lebanese guerrillas, had pulled back from much of Lebanon. But they widened their "security zone" in South Lebanon.

New enemies



Defeated, but fighting on

The PLO, it was true, was no longer a military force in Lebanon - the Syrians finished off what pockets the Israelis had not reached. But new and more lethal enemies took up arms against Israel and its allies, the South Lebanon Army led by yet another rebel Lebanese officer. These guerrillas were mainly Lebanese Shi'ites of South Lebanon, particularly the Iranian-backed Hizbollah, or Party of God.

During the next 13 years, the so-called "security zone" in South Lebanon became more and more problematic for

Israel. By 1998, the Israelis were trying to find an acceptable way out of the Lebanese thicket.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian problem continued to grow.

The History of Israel

Part 1: The return of the Jews to the promised land
Part 2: The birth of Israel
Part 3: Israel builds a nation
Part 4: Israel in war and peace
Part 5: Israel and the PLO
Part 6: The Intifada
Part 7: The road to Oslo

Search

Advanced options | Search tips

ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Search

Go

RSS MFA NEWS

MFA newsletter

The Madrid Conference Speeches - October-November 1991

E-mail to a friend
Print the article
Add to my bookmarks

30 Oct 1991

THE MADRID CONFERENCE SPEECHES OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 1991

The Madrid Conference Opening Speeches
October 30-31, 1991

- Middle East Peace Conference - List of Participants
- Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, Prime Minister of Spain
- Mr. George Bush, President of the United States
- Mr. Mikhail Gorbachov, President of the U.S.S.R
- Mr. Hans Van Den Broek Minister for Foreign Affairs - Netherla
- Mr. Amre Moussa Min. of Foreign Affairs - Arab Republic of Eg
- Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel
- Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber Foreign Minister - Hashemite Kingdom of
- Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi - Head of the Palestinian Delegation
- Mr. Fares Bouez Minister of Foreign Affairs - Republic of Leba
- Mr. Farouk Al-Shara Min. of Foreign Affairs - Syrian Arab Repu

The Madrid Conference Closing Speeches
November 1, 1991

About the Ministry
MFA events
Foreign Relations
Facts About Israel
Government
Jerusalem
Treaties
History of Israel
Peace Process
Terrorism
The Iranian Threat
Anti-Semitism/Holocaust
Israel beyond politics
Int'l development
MFA Publications
Our Bookmarks
News Archive
MFA Library

- Mr. Yitzhak Shamir Prime Minister of Israel
- Dr. Kamel Abu Jaber Foreign Minister - Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
- Dr. Haider Abdul Shafi - Head of the Palestinian Delegation
- Mr. Fares Bouez - Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Lebanon
- Mr. Farouk Al-Shara Min. of Foreign Affairs - Syrian Arab Republic
- Mr. Amre Moussa Min. of Foreign Affairs - Arab Republic of Egypt
- Mr. Boris D. Pankin Minister of Foreign Affairs - U.S.S.R
- Mr. James A. Baker III - Secretary of State - U.S.A
- Mr. Hans Van Den Broek Minister of Foreign Affairs - Netherlands

© 2007 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - The State of Israel. All rights reserved. *Terms of use* *Use of cookies*

Front Page
World
UK
UK Politics
Business
Sci/Tech
Health
Education
Sport
Entertainment
Talking Point

On Air
Feedback
Low Graphics
Help

HISTORY

Monday, April 20, 1998 Published at 14:27 GMT 15:27 UK

The road to Oslo



Yitzhak Rabin: "There is a time for war, and there is a time for peace"

The former BBC Middle East correspondent, Tim Llewellyn, looks back at the history of Israel.

After the Gulf war, the United States tried to reshape Middle Eastern politics. With great effort the American government organised the first-ever effective Israel-Arab-Palestinian dialogue. The negotiations, based on the concept of "land for peace", were launched at Madrid in October 1991, and involved Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians.

Within two years the initiative foundered. But behind the scenes negotiations continued, with face-to-face talks in Norway between the PLO and the Israeli government. This

ISRAEL AT FIFTY

ISRAEL TODAY
PROFILES
MY ISRAEL
HISTORY
INTERNET LINKS

In this section

The return of the Jews to the promised land
The birth of Israel
Israel builds a nation
Israel in War and Peace
Israel and the PLO
Israel and the Intifada
The road to Oslo



Yitzhak Rabin signing the Oslo Treaty at the White House

resulted in the Oslo Accords of September 1993, approved by Israel's then prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, and endorsed by US President Bill Clinton.

Concentrating on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Israel at last recognised the PLO and gradually allowed the organisation's members and leadership to return to - some of - the occupied territories.

The agreements envisaged an interim period of Israeli withdrawals and redeployments from and in the territories and limited autonomy for the Palestinians, in return for peace and an end to Palestinian claims on Israel proper.

Open questions

However, the decisive questions of the status of Jerusalem and its Arab population, the settlements, the refugees and Israel's borders were put off until the interim period was over, towards the end of the decade.



Since then, the accords have foundered though have not yet been abandoned. Israel continued to expand its settlements mightily during the 1990s, both during and after - and in spite of - the Madrid peace conference and the Oslo accords. The Judaisation of Arab East Jerusalem proceeds apace.

Israel's negotiations with the

Jewish settlements continue being built, here at Har Homa in East Jerusalem

Syrians and Lebanese collapsed nearly two years ago. Only Jordan and Israel have made peace, albeit, like the Israeli treaty with Egypt, most of the Arab population is cool towards the treaty.

The future of Israel

Israel is an advanced, prosperous, industrialised Western-style implant in the Middle East, decades ahead of its neighbours in technological and military prowess.

It has its own military-industrial complex, has highly developed computer, construction and textile industries, and is the world's second-largest exporter of cut and polished diamonds.



American Jews fundraising for Israel

American irritation with its current leadership is unlikely to turn into significant withdrawal of military, financial, political or moral support. The Jewish lobby in the United States is as forceful as ever in seeing Israel's interests pursued without serious hindrance in the corridors of American power, especially Congress.

Israel's biggest dangers are internal. There is growing Palestinian resentment and frustration inside Israel and the occupied territories, which could soon lead to unprecedented bloodshed.

There are the tensions between Israelis themselves, between fractious and extremist



Modern Israel: ultra-orthodox and secular Jews have to learn to co-exist

religious groups and the secular majority, who see the nature of their pragmatic Zionist ideals being compromised by overly powerful and coddled religious fanatics; between right and left, that is anti- and pro-compromise with the Arabs; and between European and Oriental Jews - a clash of class status and ethnic origins.

For Israelis, May 15, 1998, is not a straightforward 'Happy 50th Birthday'.

The History of Israel

Part 1: The return of the Jews to the promised land
Part 2: The birth of Israel
Part 3: Israel builds a nation
Part 4: Israel in war and peace
Part 5: Israel and the PLO
Part 6: The Intifada
Part 7: The road to Oslo

Search

Advanced options | Search tips

Prospects for Peace

A joint project of The Century Foundation and the New America Foundation

« More Expert Voices on Political Islamists and the Dangers of Current Policy | Main | Day One of the New Blair Mission »

Israel and Palestine: an invitation to negotiate

Here is my attempt to be constructive on the President Bush speech from this week - an effort to grab some kind of victory from the jaws of defeat.

It is on the Guardian Online.

Can anything good possibly come out of President Bush's Middle East speech earlier this week and the flurry of diplomatic activity that will come in its wake beginning today with the Quartet meeting in Lisbon, Portugal?

First of all, let's be clear. The speech represented more of the same failed policies with even less chance of success. Anyone who thinks that the new speech was a constructive contribution should read an op-ed by Michael Oren in yesterday's Wall Street Journal that was distributed by the official White House Jewish Public Liaison, presumably signifying that Oren's interpretation has formal blessing.


Oren, of the Shalem Center, a Jerusalem-based, neocon-sympathetic creation of Benjamin Netanyahu, wrote the following: "Mr. Bush has not backtracked an inch from his revolutionary Middle East policy. Never before has any American President placed the onus of demonstrating a commitment to peace so emphatically on Palestinian shoulders...the bulk of his demands were directed at the Palestinians...Mr. Bush set unprecedented conditions for Arab participation in peace efforts."

I have detailed my own thoughts on the speech elsewhere, and the search for a silver lining is not an easy one. What I propose is a jujitsu move that leverages the expectations created by the speech toward achieving a constructive, if unlikely, outcome. To call this jujitsu move a long shot is an understatement, but it is worth a try. Here is how it could be done.

Despite White House efforts to lower expectations, Bush's speech did call for an international meeting in the fall that is being touted everywhere as a peace conference. In the speech, Bush committed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to chairing that meeting.

Her undoubted desire to avoid a huge flop is the point of departure. The Americans will be very keen to have key regional and international players at the table in the fall, which in turn gives the Arab states and the Quartet partners an invitation to negotiate the terms of reference for the conference should they choose to use it.

This would be the moment for the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians and the majority of European states who are uncomfortable with current American policy to articulate and bargain over a new approach. It is even conceivable that Rice herself would welcome a strong stand on the part of her interlocutors in order to use such a negotiation to carry the president toward a more realistic policy.


Photo by Jacob Silberberg
George H. W. Bush speaks at Tufts.

The model for diplomatic efforts should be the Madrid conference of 1991. There is of course an important similarity, but an even more important and complicating difference - the president's name then and now was Bush. But Bush the father showed commitment and courage in advancing peace efforts, while Bush the son is not on board. Rice would have to cast herself in the role of James Baker, this time with the additional challenge of having to convince her boss, the president.

At the closing of that Madrid Conference, Baker said, "The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, and an energizing force, and a driving force in the negotiating process." Rice would have to adopt that mantle and be all of those things and more.

Baker shuttled for eight months around the region putting together the conference and negotiating the terms of reference for Madrid, which appeared in the letter of invitation and to which all sides agreed. He succeeded in creating a peace process that brought together Israel, the Palestinians, all the neighbouring states and an additional 10 Arab countries, none of whom had formal relations with Israel.



The substance of the Madrid terms of reference contained four elements, crucial to its success.
First, the effort was comprehensive, involving not only the Palestinians and Jordanians (not yet at peace with Israel), but also the Lebanese and the Syrians.
Second, the terms for engagement represented at the time a breakthrough, namely the land-for-peace formula with a comprehensive settlement to be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.
Third, the letter of invitation provided a timetable for an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement. Finally, Madrid managed to bring Israel and the broader Arab world together, holding out the prospect of regional peace and acceptance that is so vital for Israelis.

Interestingly, Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was in attendance at Madrid. The conference set in motion five multilateral regional working groups to build confidence between Israel and the Arab world. Politicians and experts would meet to discuss the environment, economic developments, water, arms-control and regional security, and refugees in such places as Muscat, Rabat, Doha and Tunis.

A similarly ambitious approach calibrated to today's realty is what Rice should pursue. Of course it is far from clear whether she has the appetite for such a mission or whether Bush would agree. Perhaps new envoy Tony Blair can be helpful in this regard.

Pursuing such a course would also be the implementation of the recommendations of the Iraq Study Group and fulfill their call for a regional diplomatic peace effort to restore American credibility and alliance-building capacity, and to deal a blow to Salafist radicalism.

The president's speech may inadvertently have issued an invitation to Europe and the Arab states to start negotiating a contemporary version of the Madrid letter of invitation. These might include detailed terms of reference for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, provisions for a comprehensive, inclusive process with Syria on board, a reasonable timetable and modalities for implementing the Arab peace initiative. Forcing the frontloading of Arab deliverables outside of a broader comprehensive peace framework is likely to be a non-starter and recipe for diplomatic gridlock.

The alternative would be for this fall's meeting to resemble the January 2003 conference on Palestinian reform that was convened in London - an eminently forgettable experience.

The Madrid model offers one further clue on the way forward with regards to an even more thorny issue. At the time of Madrid, Israel and the PLO still did not recognize each other and Israel refused to talk to the PLO or to have its representatives officially in attendance. A formula was concocted whereby there would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Palestinian members of which could be claimed by Israel to not formally represent the PLO, but who themselves insisted that they were doing everything in coordination with the exiled PLO leadership.

Hamas today is the group whose name dare not be spoken in polite company. Yet a process, today, that excludes Hamas (just like excluding the PLO then) is unlikely to deliver sustainability, legitimacy or security. A peace process cannot be built on Palestinian division, and Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah leadership will have to be quietly and patiently climbed back down from the tree that they are so rapidly ascending.

Most of the European Union member states and the Arab states understand this. A discreet but crucial backchannel in the lead-up to any conference would have to be devoted to internal Palestinian reconciliation. This approach would ultimately have to be accepted by both the US and Israel. At least Blair, with his Northern Ireland experience, will have an informative frame of reference with regard to bringing militants into a peace process.

Like I said, it is a very long shot, but this is what I would argue that realists and genuine believers in peace should be advocating for. Today's Quartet meeting in Portugal will likely be all smiles and rhetorical platitudes, but the real work needs to begin and soon.

Posted by Daniel Levy on July 19, 2007 6:00 PM | Permalink

TrackBack

TrackBack URL for this entry:
http://www.prospectsforpeace.com/mt/mt-tb.cgi/170

Comments (3)

seth:

mr. oren's op-ed is just the beginning of a murdoch-owned WSJ. What a sad, sad thing...

I won't disagree that the demise of the WSJ's reporting will be a sad sight if it comes to pass, but have you read

the editorial page of the WSJ in past years? They're as nutty as they get. Michael Oren is positively sane and even keeled by their standards.

Posted by seth | July 25, 2007 9:56 PM

Posted on July 25, 2007 21:56

deb:

mr. oren's op-ed is just the beginning of a murdoch-owned WSJ. What a sad, sad thing...

Posted by deb | July 20, 2007 2:48 PM

Posted on July 20, 2007 14:48

Nyer:

I wish people like you understood the definition of realism. Didnt you study polisci. You are advocating a contructivist approach to the conflict. If the definition of realism is a theory "primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics" - than our actions and what you advocate is not a realist approach. Israel is the ideal - not an economic or security must. In fact ending Israel would be - which obvioulsy isnt an option. So stop using the term.

Posted by Nyer | July 20, 2007 12:52 AM

Posted on July 20, 2007 00:52

Post a comment

(If you haven't left a comment here before, you may need to be approved by the site owner before your comment will appear. Until then, it won't appear on the entry. Thanks for waiting.)

Name:

Email Address:

URL:

☐ Remember personal info?

Comments: (you may use HTML tags for style)

Preview Post



Menu

- **About**
- **Resources**
- **Events**

Search

Search this blog:

Search

Categories

Recent Posts

- Somebody's listening…and getting angry: an exchange with a British neo-con
- A little catch up on Israel-Palestine
- UK-US shadow dance over Iraq troop withdrawal
- Lebanon by-Elections
- Efraim Halevy in WSJ: "We don't need their recognition"
- Muslim Brotherhood Coverage on Al Jazeera
- Fayad on Resistance
- Brotherly Love?

- Another One Bites the Dust
- What Would a Diplomat Do?

Subscribe to this blog's feed
[What is this?]

Archives

- August 2007
- July 2007
- June 2007
- May 2007
- April 2007

Powered by
Movable Type 3.33

About

This page contains a single entry from the blog posted on **July 19, 2007 6:00 PM**.

The previous post in this blog was More Expert Voices on Political Islamists and the Dangers of Current Policy.


The next post in this blog is Day One of the New Blair Mission.

Many more can be found on the main index page or by looking through the archives.

Subscribe to this blog's feed
[What is this?]

The Sinai Peninsula

Despite large areas of arid desert, the Sinai Peninsula is a diverse area of desert, wetland, and reefs. It boasts abundant natural resources including oil and a bounty of diverse flora and fauna. Historically, it is home to St. Catherine's Monastary, the oldest monastery in the world, located at the base of Mt. Sinai, the biblical location where Moses received the ten commandments from God. Despite its natural oil resources, the primary strategic value lies in the peninsula's adjacence to the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran, which allows access to the Gulf of Aquba, both of which are critical shipping routes for Israel.





The Sinai Desert



St. Catherine's Monastary



Four Line Snake




A Leopard prowling the mountainous area of the souther part of the peninsula




A coral reef off of the Sinai Peninsula in the Red Sea



A man-made canal in Egypt, the canal seperates Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula and connects the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. 101 miles long and 984 ft. wide at its widest point, it is a critical two way shipping and travel route between Europe and Asia.




No5 Station
Buheirat-Marrat-el-Kubra
Great Bitter Lake
No6 Station
No7 Station
Buheirat-Marrat-el-Sughra
Little Bitter Lake
No8 Station
El Suweis
Suez
No9 Station
NORTH
GULF
of
SUEZ









Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
1915-1981

"Along the Syria border there were no farms and no refugee camps -- there was only the Syrian army... the kibbutzim saw the good agricultural land... and they dreamed about it... They didn't even try to hide their greed for the land... We would send a tractor to plow some area where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarized area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance further, until in the end the Syrians would get annoyed and shoot. And then we would use artillery and later the air force also, and that's how it was." 1976

Already a battle hardened by the end of his teens, Moshe Dayan gained his trademark eyepatch while fighting the Vichy French in Syria during WWII after a bullet struck his binoculars. Dayan's activities in the 1948 War of Independence began when he commanded the defense of Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley. He later commanded the battalion that attacked the city of Lydda and helped halt Egyptian forces on the southern front. In August 1948, he was appointed commander on the Jerusalem front. In 1949, he participated in armistice talks with Jordanian officials at Rhodes. Dayan's military prowess allowed him to rise to the rank of chief of operations at General Headquarters in 1952, and, in 1953, he was elected Chief of Staff of the armed forces[3].

Dayan became Chief of Staff during a time of severe Arab belligerence. Despite the military armistice of 1949, the surrounding Arab nations remained hostile, using maritime blockades,

reinforcing an economic boycott, promoting political and propaganda warfare and supporting terrorism in Israel. Dayan insisted on strong retaliation operations. His view was that the Arabs saw terrorism as a stage of war, and the longer the terrorist attacks continued, the longer the Arabs had to build up their military strength. He wanted to force the Arabs into open battle before they gained full military power[3]. In 1957, Dayan led the Israeli Defense Forces in the Suez Canal incident.

In 1958, Dayan left the military for politics and became a member of the Israeli Knesset in 1959. In 1964, Dayan resigned as Minister of Agriculture after an argument with then Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. Dayan returned to Eshkol's cabinet as Defense Minister in the days before the Six Day War and crafted Israel's war strategy along with Israeli Commander Yitzhak Rabin. His popularity soared after the Israeli victories.

Dayan's popularity waned significantly after the 1973 Yom Kippur war in which Israel was caught completely by surprise. Blame fell largely on Dayan as Defense Minister and he resigned his post in 1974. In a surprising turnaround from his hawkish past, Dayan was a lead negotiator with Egypt during the Camp David Accords. Dayan died in 1981 after a two year battle with cancer.



Commander Yitzhak Rabin
1922-1995

"*Jerusalem is united, it will never be divided again.*" June 1995


Joining the Israeli Defense Forces after their creation in 1948, Yitzhak Rabin rose to the rank of Major-General at the age of 32. Rabin established the IDF training doctrine and the leadership style which became known by the command "follow me." In 1962 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff and promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General. He developed the IDF fighting doctrine - based on movement and surprise - which was employed during the Six Day War. By 1967, he had risen to the position of commander of the Israeli Defense Forces.

In the tense waiting period between the Arab mobilization in May and the Six Day War, Rabin suffered a massive nervous breakdown, overwhelmed by the knowledge that a wrong decision on his part would allow the combined armies of 100 million Arab countrymen to strike and overwhelm his country of just 3 million citizens. However, Rabin recovered quickly and along with Moshe Dayan crafted a plan to strike at the Arab forces first, leading to "Operation Focus," and the beginning of the war.

At the conclusion of the Six Day War, Rabin retired his military post after a 26 year career. The next year, Rabin became Israel's representative ambassador to the United Nations. In 1973 he was

elected to the Israeli Knesset. In 1974 he became Prime Minister of Israel, however, he resigned the post after a series of minor scandels, including allowing the country to receive a shipment of F-16 fighter jets on the Sabbath. In 1992, Rabin once again became Prime Minister, and in 1994, he was a signatory of the Oslo Peace Accords, seen as the most significant step towards peaceful relations since the Camp David Accords. He was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with Yasser Arafat and Shimon Peres for his efforts.


On November 4, 1995, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Orthodox Jew who violently opposed the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords.



Israeli Commander Uziel Narkiss
1925-1997

"*What could I say? It was great. But what is great? Only a poet can put it into words - and I'm not a poet.*" Uzi Narkiss describes touching the Western Wall after the capture of East Jerusalem.





Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser
1918-1970

"*The Arab national aim is the elimination of Israel*" May, 1965.

The second president of Egypt, Nasser, then a Lieutenant Colonel in the Egyptian army, helped lead the overthrow of King Farouk in 1952. In 1956, Nasser was elected president and helped guide through ratification a constitution that declared Egypt a single party "Socialist State" recognizing Islam as its official religion. A staunch anti-colonialist, Nasser like other Arabs saw Israel as nothing more then colonial intrusion on Arab land. Nasser was a believer in the concept of Pan-Arabism, or the unification of the Arab world under his sole leadership. He saw himself as an agressive reformer who yearned to modernize Egypt and cleanse it of the corruption that had plagued Egyptian politics of years past.

Nasser soon began to have conflicts with other Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which opposed his aspirations to lead the Arab world. There were multiple attempts by Egyptian intelligence to assassinate Jordan's King Hussein, and in 1962 Egypt intervened in Yemen against royalists backed by Saudi Arabia. Expecting an easy victory, Egyptian forces instead got bogged down in a guerilla war. Nasser responded by attempting to subvert Saudi Arabia itself and by attacking supposed Yemeni royalist bases in Saudi Arabia. The attacks against Jordan and Saudi Arabia caused a marked deterioration in U S - Egyptian relations and

also harmed Nasser's reputation in the Arab world[1].

In May of 1967, Nasser expelled UN peacekeepers from the Sinai peninsula and announced a blockade of the Straits of Tiran to Israel-bound shipping. The blockade sealed off the major Israeli port of Eilat and violated the armistice agreements that had followed the 1956 Sinai war. These bold... moves provoked massive pro-Nasser street demonstrations in Arab capitals, and one after another Arab government endorsed Nasser's steps and put its military under direct Egyptian control. Open warfare had seemed a distant possibility before May, but now everything had changed. Nasser had engineered the Arab unity that he had judged necessary to confront Israel[1]. As June approached, Nasser's rhetoric became increasingly agressive.

Shortly after the Arab defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser attempted to resign the presidency, but thousands of Egyptians marched in his support through Cairo. For the next three years, Nasser did his best to rebuild the Egyptian army with some success. His death in 1970 of a heart attack sent shock waves throughout the Arab world. In a stunning display of emotion, millions of Egyptians followed his funeral procession through the streets of Cairo. Nasser remains a significant figure of Arab pride and nationalism to this day.



As-Sayyid Hussein Ibin Talal, King of Jordan
1935-1999

"It was a little after 11 A.M. The Norwegian General informed me that the Israeli Prime Minister had addressed an appeal to Jordan. Mr. Eshkol had summarily announced that the Israeli offensive had started that morning, Monday June 5, with operations directed against the United Arab Republic, and then he added: "If you dont intervene, you will suffer no consequences." By that time we were already fighting in Jerusalem and our planes had just taken off to bomb Israeli airbases..." Memoirs of King Hussein


Hussein... was proclaimed King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on August 11, 1952. A Regency Council was appointed until King Hussein's formal accession to the throne on May 2, 1953, when he assumed his constitutional powers after reaching the age of eighteen, according to the Islamic calendar[2]. Educated in the west, specifically in Britain, Hussein suffered rejection throughout his reign from other Arab leaders for what they saw as Hussein's close connections with western influence. He was the survivor of a number of assassination attempts.

Despite intense Israeli attempts to convince Hussein to keep Jordan out of any war that might erupt, Hussein reluctantly allowed the wave of pan-Arab nationalism that was flourishing in the days before the Six Day War to influence his policy. In May of 1967, Jordan signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt. After the Israeli air strikes on Egyptian targets on June 5, Hussein received what he believed to be information about a victorious Egyptian defense and counterattack, and initiated the Jordanian troops.

After the Six Day War, King Hussein played a central role in creating UNSC Resolution 242 which

calls for Israel to withdraw from all Arab lands occupied after the Six Day War in exchange for peaceful co-existance with its Middle Eastern neighbors. The resolution remains a central part of today's peace negotiations. He remained a central figure in the peace process from that day, and was seen as a stabilizing figure in many other Middle Eastern conflicts.

In 1998, King Hussein was diagnosed with non-Hodgkins lymphoma cancer. Despite agressive treatment in the United States, he passed away in February of 1999 to the great bereavement of his subjects.





Syrian General Secretary Hafez al-Assad
1930-2000

"Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian Army, with its finger on the trigger, is united... I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation." May 1967

A member of the Baath Arab Socialist Party, Assad began his military career in the Air Force, training as a fighter pilot in the former Soviet Union. He was discharged from the military in 1961 due to his outspoken stand against the Syrian cessation from Egypt. He was one of the primary leaders of the resistance movement that eventually established the Baath regime in 1963, becoming General Secretary in1966 after the overthrow of President Amin Hafiz. During the Six Day War, Assad was quick to align Syria with Egyptian President Nasser against Israel. However, after the breakout of the war on June 5, Assad ordered his military to take a cautious approach, and shell Israeli territory from behind Syrian borders.

After the disgrace of the performance of the Syrian military during the Six Day War, internal strife within the government forced Assad to quickly, though peacefully, purge the Baath party of political dissonents. In 1973, Assad joined Egypt in attacking Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Although Assad's stance towards Israel became less harsh in the nineties, he never formally recognized Israel as a country or acknowledged its right to exist. Hafez al-Assad died of a heart attack in 2000, and was suceeded by his son Bashar al-Assad who is the current president of Syria.



THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI
MARCH 1957
LEBANON
Beirut
Damascus
SYRIA
Safed
Haifa
Afula
Tel Aviv
Amman
Jerusalem
Port Said
Port Fuad
Khan Yunis
Rafah
Gaza
JORDAN
Beersheba
El Arish
Romani
Suez
Canal



Kantara
Ismailia
Abu Aweigila
Negev
Bir Gafgafa
EGYPT
Giddi Pass
Suez
Mitla Pass
Kuntilla
Nahel
Ras Sudr
Taba
Eilat
Sinai
Abu Zeneima
Abu Rudeis
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Aqaba
St. Catherine's Monastery
SAUDI ARABIA
Dahab
Makna
Tor
0 20 40 50
Miles
Sharm el-Sheikh
Evacuated by Israeli forces between 5 February and 6 March 1957
Israel, 1949 to 1967
Red Sea
© Martin Gilbert


Water Carrier

In 1964, Israel completed its National Water Carrier, a series of canals and pipelines to transport water from the relatively water-rich northern part of the country to the much dryer southern regions. This project promised to allow increased population growth and immigration, and also to spur industrial and agricultural development, and was therefore strenuously opposed by the Arab countries[1].

Syria, by now led by a Ba'athist regime hostile to Nasser, took the lead in demanding Arab action to destroy the Israeli water project... Nasser, however, did not believe at the time that the Arabs were unified enough to defeat Israel, and he chose to defer a confrontation until what he saw as a more propitious moment[1].




'Asqalan
Bethlehem
Gaza
Al Khalil
(Hebron)
Dead Sea
Khan Yunis
Rafah
Bi'r as Sabi'
Al Karak
Al 'Arish
Ma'an
Ras An Naqab
Al 'Aqaba
Red Sea
20
0
20 km


Kiryat Shemona
Nahariya
Safed
Haifa
Tiberias
Afula
Mediterranean Sea
Netanya
Jordan River
Tel Aviv-Yafo
Jerusalem
Ashkelon
Kiryat Gat
Dead Sea
Be'er Sheva
Yeroham
Sde Boker
NEGEV
Legend
National Water Carrier
Water Pipeline for Domestic Use and Irrigation
Recycled Water Pipeline, Effluent Water for Irrigation



Agricultural irrigation being provided by the National Water Carrier




The Golan Heights



A large volcanic plateu bordering Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, the Golan Heights is comprised of a wealth of arable land and an abundance of streams and rivers that flow into the Sea of Galilee and together contributes nearly fifteen percent of Israel's water supply throught the National Water Carrier.

Land use in the Golan Heights




The Golan Heights




The abundant farming available within and along the Golan Heights had attracted Israeli farmers, unable to produce crops in the arid south (referred to as "The Wastelands"), for some time.


Land Use in Israel



Southern Israel's "Wastelands"
Mean annual rainfall (Observe disparity between north and south)

Plant E cology





Panoramic Views





Tensions between Israel and Syria began after routine shelling by Syria of Israel from positions within the Golan Heights. In April 1967, a full scale incident between Israel and Syria breaks out after Syria repeatedly aims rocket fire at an Israeli tractor attempting to plow in the demilaterized zone. During the skirmish, Syria lost six MIG-21 fighters and Dassault Mirage III fighter aircraft from the Israeli Air Force strafed the Syrian capital of Damascus.

1967 Timeline Leading up to the Six Day War

January 1967

February 1967

March 1967

April 1967

-Dogfights between Israel and Syria after border incidents at the Golan Heights. Following an attack on the Israeli Water carrier at the water pump at Kibbutz Misgav Am, Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levi Eshkol resolved that after the next act of belligerence, Israel would position armored tractors deep into the demilitarized zones, wait to be hit, and then fire back[1]. Enusing skirmishes led to a dogfight over the Golan Heights resulting in the loss of six Syrian aircraft and Israeli Air Forces strafing the Syrian capital.



May 1967

- Egyptian President Nasser declares "The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel . . . . to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations."
- Egypt expels UN peacekeeping forces from the Sinai Peninsula.
- Egypt closes the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.

June 1967

-Israel Pre-emptively strikes Egypt in "Operation Focus."

- Egypt retreats from Sinai Peninsula.

-Israeli Defene Forces Paratroopers advance and capture East Jerusalem.



Modern day Jerusalem from Mt. of Olives


Jerusalem, located in the Judaen mountains between the Mediterranean Sea and the northern tip of the Dead Sea is one of the oldest cities in the world. The city is the holiest in all of Judaism, the third holiest city of Islam, and a site of great significance for Christianity. The walled area of Jerusalem, or the "Old City," constituted the entire city until the mid-nineteenth century, around the same time that its four traditional quarters were designated the Armenian, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim. Despite the small area of the Old City (.35 sq. miles), it is the home of several of the most important religious sites for the three western faiths; Judaism's Temple Mount and the Western Wall, Christianity's Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and Islam's Dome of the Rock and al-Aqsa Mosque.

First Century Jerusalem





15th-16th Century Watercolor





Jerusalem's significant historical sites: Actual 1949 armistice line shown in bold black.





Under the Mandate of Palestine, the city of Jerusalem was to remain in the control of a special "international regime" controlled by the United Nations. This plan was never fully implemented and the city was the source of vicious fighting during the 1949 Arab-Israeli War. The resulting armistice led to the dividing line between West and East Jerusalem; the west controlled by Israel, and the east controlled by the Jordanian ruled West Bank. After the war, access to the easter part of the city and its holy sites was cut off to Israelis by the Jordanian government, and extremely limited access was granted to visitors of East Jerusalem's holy Christian sites.

References

[2] B.O.C. (2001). *The office of King Hussein I of Jordan.* Retrieved November 21, 2007 from http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/office.html

[1] C A M E R A. (2007). *The Six Day War: Causes and consequences*. Retrieved November 21, 2007 from http://www.sixdaywar.org

Cashman, G.F. (1998). *A defender of Jerusalem*. Retrieved November 23, 2007 from http://info.jpost.com/1998/Supplements/30years/narkiss.html

Gilbert, M. (1993). *Atlas of the Arab-Israeli conflict*. New York: Oxford University Press.


Narkiss, U. (1983). *The liberation of Jerusalem*. London: Vallentine, Mitchell and Company Limited.

Israeli Disengagement In The West Bank And Gaza Strip

International Transition Assistance Group
Strategic Assessments Initiative

Sponsored by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague
and the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa

ITAG



West Bank Disengagement

Vacated Settlement Areas : 9 km2 = 0.15 % of the West Bank
Evacuated Settlers : 560 = 0.14 % of Total Settlers WBGS

MAP LEGEND

- Green Line
- Israeli Wall, Approved 20 February 2005
- Palestinian Autonomous Areas (Oslo Zones A and B)
- Area without Permanent Israeli Deployment after Disengagement
- Line of Israeli Disengagement
- Settlement Areas to be vacated under Disengagement
- Palestinian Cities and Larger Villages (> 3000 inhabitants)
- Palestinian Villages (< 3000 inhabitants)
- Palestinian District Boundary
- Israeli Settlements and surrounding fenced Perimeters and Greenhouses (Gaza Strip)
- Highways and Settlement Access Roads / Road Number
- Israeli Settlement Access Roads; Projected or Under Construction
- Israeli Controlled Major Crossing Points
- Selected Israeli Army Camps Existing, Temporary, Vacated
- Industrial Zone Under Construction (South of Tulkarm)
- Palestinian Roads
- Israeli-Constructed or Proposed Road Under/Overpasses
- Israeli Suggested Main Palestinian Thoroughfares

0 10 20 Km
0 5 10 (St) Miles

Map Projection: Transverse Mercator
Scale: 1: 250.000


Copyright © 2005, SAI - ITAG Jerusalem


Gaza Disengagement

Vacated Settlement Areas : 42 km2
= 11.5 % of the Gaza Strip

Evacuated Settlers: 8,330
= 2 % of Total Settlers WBGS

Gaza Strip Area : 364 km2
= 5.9% of WBGS




West Bank
ISRAEL
Jerusalem (Al Quds)
Ramallah
Nablus
Jenin
Tulkarm
Qalqilya
Bethlehem
Hebron (Al Khalil)
Jericho
Salfit
Tubas
Netanya
Ra'ananna
Kfar Sava
Petah Tiqva
Rosh Ha'ayin
Shoham
Modi'in
Ramla
Lyd
Tira
Kochav Ya'ir
Zufin
Oranit
Kafr Qasem
Al 'Ad
Harish
Hadera
Qalansuwa
Taybe
Zalafa
Salim
Mu'awiya
Um al Fahm
Kafr Qar'a
Ara
Ar'ara
Me Ami
Qatzir
Hinnanit
Shaqed
Rehan
Baqa Grb.
Jatt
Ibthan
Bir Sikka
Arraba
Jenin
Kadim
Gannim
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Faqqua
Jalbun
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Qabatiya
Zababdeh
Aqqaba
Mehola
Shadmot Mehola
Rotem
Brosh
N.Maskiyot
Tubas
Tammun
Sanur
Meithalun
Judeida
Siris
Jaba
Sa Nur
Silat adh Dhahr
Fandaqumiya
Homesh
Anabta
Tulkarm
Irtah
Shuweike
Iktaba
Bal'a
Deir al Ghusun
Attil
Illar
Seida
Zeita
Khermesh
Mevo Dotan
Nazlat Isa
Baqa Shr.
Nazla Grb.
Nazla al Wusta
Nzl. A.Nar
Qaffin
Firasin
Yabad
Zibda
Kufeirat
Kafr Qud
Al Araqa
Anin
Silat Harthiya
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Beit Qad
Mughayir
Mutilla
Bir al Basha
Mirka
Jarba
Raba
Kh.Bziq
Bardala
Kardala
Ein al Beida
Tell Himma
Ajja
Anza
Rama
Jarushiya
Kafr Ra'i
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Duwwara
Udeisa
Jalayil
Bani Na'im
Asfar
Arab Rashayda
Mizpe Shalem
Dead Sea
Jordan River
Yafit
Peza'el
Tomer
Gilgal
Netiv Hagdud
Niran
Yitav
Al Awja
N.Zori
No'omi
N.Elisha
Ein Sultan
Duyuk
Nu'eima
Agabat Jabr
Vered Yeriho
Mizpe Yeriho
N.En Hogla
Bet Ha'arava
Almog
Qalya
Qedar
Ma'ale Adumim
Mishor Adumim (Ind)
Azarya
Abu Dis
Sawahra Shr.
East Talpyot
Beit Safafa
Sur Bahir
Um Tuba
Sheikh Sa'ad
Kh. Hardbat
Wadi Hummus
Ubaydiya
Juhzum
Um Qassis
Rafat
Beitunia
Qalandiya RC
Ar Ram
Bir Nabala
Atarot (Ind)
Neve Ya'acov
Geva Binyamin
Sha'ar Binyamin (Ind.)
Kochav Ya'acov
Ma'ale Mukhmas
Kafr Adumim
Alon
Almon
Hizma
Ramot
Shufat
Shufat RC
Anata
Ar.Ka'abne
Pi.Hilil
Za'im
Ramat Shlomo
Har Shmuel
Har Homa
Gilo
Walaja
Battir
Husan
Beit Jala
Bethlehem
Khadr
Duha
Dheisha RC
Irtas
Beit Sahur
Breidha
Rat'al Wad
Um Salamuna
Beit Ummar
Arrub RC
Beit Fajjar
Hamrush
Kh. Kisan
Ma'ale Amos
Iraq Turad
Kuziba
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Halhul
Beit Kahil
Tarqumiya
Bir Musallam
Idhna
Telem
Adora
Taffuh
Qiryat Arba
Kharas
Nuba
Beit Ula
Karme Tzur
Surif
Kh. Safa
Ein Jinan
Kefar Etzion
Migdal Oz
Teqoa
Noqdim
Tuqu
Avnat
Mekhora
Massua
Argaman
Marj al Ghazal
Marj an Naja
Zbeidat
Ash Shuna
Jiftlik
Far'a Jiftlik
Kh.Jafa
Hamra
Frush Bt.Dajan
Beit Dajan
Beit Furik
Elon Moreh
Dr.al Hatab
Asmut
Salim
Tell
Sarra
Rujeib
Bracha
Burin
Madama
Asira Qbl.
Asira Shm.
Yizhar
Itamar
Awarta
Kh. Yanun
Yanun
Beita
Huwara
Einabus
Urif
Zawata
Bt.Iba
Bt.Wazan
Mt.Ebal
Nablus
Kh.Aqrabaniya
Beit Hassan
Ein Shibli
Ro'i
Hemdat
Beqa'ot
Frush Bt.Dajan
Qusin
Qedumim
Kafr Qaddum
Jit
Falamya
Kafr Jammal
Jayyus
Sir
K.Laqif
Funduq
Hajja
Immatin
Jurshafu
Qarne Shomron
Ma'ale Shomron
Nofim
Yaqir
Immanu'el
Wadi Kana
Azzun
Isla
Azzun Atma
Kafr Thulth
Mudawwar
Izb. Ashqar
Izb. Salman
Izb. Jalud
Izb. Tabib
Daba
Habla
Ras Atiah
Ras Tira
Ras Raqna
Alfe Menashe
Ar. Ramadin
Nabi Elyas
Kh.Abu Farda
Qalqilya
Zufin
Ar. Ramadin
Sal'it
Kafr Sur
Kur
Kochav Ya'ir
Tira
Kafr Qasem
Oranit
Shalare Tiqva
Elkana
Zawiya
Rafat
Ale Zahav
Brukhin
Deir Ballut
Peduel
Bet Arye
Lubban Grb.
Rantis
Ofarim
Abud
Dr.Abu Mashal
Shuqba
Shaalvim
Nili
Ni'lin
Qibya
Budrus
Na'ale
Dair Ammar
Kharbatha
Dair Qaddis
Karkar
Janiya
Talmon
Nahli'el
Abu Shukheidim
Kaubar
Burham
Beitillu
Mazra'a Qbl.
Jalazun RC
Dolev
Bil'in
Ein Qinya
Kafr Ni'ma
Deir Ibzi
Ein Arik
Saffa
Beit Ur Tht.
Beit Ur Fqa
Hashmonaim
Mattityahu
Shilat
Lapid
Menora
Kefar Ruth
Modi'in Illit
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Kh. al Misbah
Beit Liqya
Marj Anera
Bet Horon
Tira
Giv'at Ze'ev
Beit Inan
Beit Duqqu
Umm Lahim
Qubeiba
Qatanna
Giv'on Hahadasha
Biddu
Beit Iza
Haradar
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Mevo Horon
Ramot
Ramat Shlomo
Sha'ar Hagai
Ofra
Tayiba
Deir Jarir
Ein Yabrud
Bet El
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Dibwan
Psagot
Burqa
Kochav Hashahar
Rimmonim
Ramallah Al Bireh
Ein Sinya
Dura al Qar
Bir Zeit
Silwad
Yabrud
Mazra'a Shr.
Kafr Malik
Ateret
Halamish
Nabi Saleh
Um Safa
Ajlul
Jijilya
Deir Sudan
Abwein
Sinjil
Lubban Shr.
Ein Yabrud
Qaryut
Jalud
Eli
Shilo
Ma'ale Levona
Turmus Ayya
Kh. Abu Falah
Mughayir
Tomer
Farkha
Kh. Qeis
Ahmuniya
Mazari Nubani
Qarawa
Kafr Ein
Bani Zeid
Arura
Lubban Sharqiya
Rehelim
Migdalim
Qusra
Jurish
Iskaka
Titit
Majdal B. Fadil
Gittit
Ma'ale Efrayim
Yudma
Qabalan
Kfar Tappuah
Revava
Kifl Haritn
Qira
Jamma'in
Aqraba
Yasuf
Marda
Ariel
Barkan (Ind)
Etz Efrayim
Maale Tiqva
Sarta
Q.Bani Hassan
Biddya
Qiryat Netafim
Deir Istiya
Zeita
Einabus
Huwara
Beita
Yanun
Kh. Yanun
Awarta
Rehan
Barta'a Shr.
Barta'a Ghr.
Kh.Sh. Sa'id
Dhahr Malih
Tura Grb.
Tura Shr.
Um Dar
Nazl. Sh.Zeid
Kafr Qud
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Jalbun
Beit Qad
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Faqqua
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Kh. Suruj
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Rummana
Zububa
Salim
Zalafa
Jalama
Arrabuna
Taybe
Tirmmk
Me Ami
Ar'ara
Qatzir
Harish
Hadera
Netanya
Ra'ananna
Kfar Sava
Petah Tiqva
Rosh Ha'ayin
Shoham
Modi'in
Ramla
Lyd
Qalansuwa
Taybe
Tira
Kochav Ya'ir
Zufin
Qalqilya
Oranit
Kafr Qasem
Al 'Ad
Harish
Hadera
Mu'awiya
Um al Fahm
Kafr Qar'a
Ara
Ar'ara
Me Ami
Qatzir
Hinnanit
Shaqed
Rehan
Baqa Grb.
Jatt
Ibthan
Bir Sikka
Arraba
Jenin
Kadim
Gannim
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Faqqua
Jalbun
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Qabatiya
Zababdeh
Aqqaba
Mehola
Shadmot Mehola
Rotem
Brosh
N.Maskiyot
Tubas
Tammun
Sanur
Meithalun
Judeida
Siris
Jaba
Sa Nur
Silat adh Dhahr
Fandaqumiya
Homesh
Anabta
Tulkarm
Irtah
Shuweike
Iktaba
Bal'a
Deir al Ghusun
Attil
Illar
Seida
Zeita
Khermesh
Mevo Dotan
Nazlat Isa
Baqa Shr.
Nazla Grb.
Nazla al Wusta
Nzl. A.Nar
Qaffin
Firasin
Yabad
Zibda
Kufeirat
Kafr Qud
Al Araqa
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Beit Qad
Mughayir
Mutilla
Bir al Basha
Mirka
Jarba
Raba
Kh.Bziq
Bardala
Kardala
Ein al Beida
Tell Himma
Ajja
Anza
Rama
Jarushiya
Kafr Ra'i
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Duwwara
Udeisa
Jalayil
Bani Na'im
Asfar
Arab Rashayda
Mizpe Shalem
Dead Sea
Jordan River
Yafit
Peza'el
Tomer
Gilgal
Netiv Hagdud
Niran
Yitav
Al Awja
N.Zori
No'omi
N.Elisha
Ein Sultan
Duyuk
Nu'eima
Agabat Jabr
Vered Yeriho
Mizpe Yeriho
N.En Hogla
Bet Ha'arava
Almog
Qalya
Qedar
Ma'ale Adumim
Mishor Adumim (Ind)
Azarya
Abu Dis
Sawahra Shr.
East Talpyot
Beit Safafa
Sur Bahir
Um Tuba
Sheikh Sa'ad
Kh. Hardbat
Wadi Hummus
Ubaydiya
Juhzum
Um Qassis
Rafat
Beitunia
Qalandiya RC
Ar Ram
Bir Nabala
Atarot (Ind)
Neve Ya'acov
Geva Binyamin
Sha'ar Binyamin (Ind.)
Kochav Ya'acov
Ma'ale Mukhmas
Kafr Adumim
Alon
Almon
Hizma
Ramot
Shufat
Shufat RC
Anata
Ar.Ka'abne
Pi.Hilil
Za'im
Ramat Shlomo
Har Shmuel
Har Homa
Gilo
Walaja
Battir
Husan
Beit Jala
Bethlehem
Khadr
Duha
Dheisha RC
Irtas
Beit Sahur
Breidha
Rat'al Wad
Um Salamuna
Beit Ummar
Arrub RC
Beit Fajjar
Hamrush
Kh. Kisan
Ma'ale Amos
Iraq Turad
Kuziba
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Halhul
Beit Kahil
Tarqumiya
Bir Musallam
Idhna
Telem
Adora
Taffuh
Qiryat Arba
Kharas
Nuba
Beit Ula
Karme Tzur
Surif
Kh. Safa
Ein Jinan
Kefar Etzion
Migdal Oz
Teqoa
Noqdim
Tuqu
Avnat
Mekhora
Massua
Argaman
Marj al Ghazal
Marj an Naja
Zbeidat
Ash Shuna
Jiftlik
Far'a Jiftlik
Kh.Jafa
Hamra
Frush Bt.Dajan
Beit Dajan
Beit Furik
Elon Moreh
Dr.al Hatab
Asmut
Salim
Tell
Sarra
Rujeib
Bracha
Burin
Madama
Asira Qbl.
Asira Shm.
Yizhar
Itamar
Awarta
Kh. Yanun
Yanun
Beita
Huwara
Einabus
Urif
Zawata
Bt.Iba
Bt.Wazan
Mt.Ebal
Nablus
Kh.Aqrabaniya
Beit Hassan
Ein Shibli
Ro'i
Hemdat
Beqa'ot
Frush Bt.Dajan
Qusin
Qedumim
Kafr Qaddum
Jit
Falamya
Kafr Jammal
Jayyus
Sir
K.Laqif
Funduq
Hajja
Immatin
Jurshafu
Qarne Shomron
Ma'ale Shomron
Nofim
Yaqir
Immanu'el
Wadi Kana
Azzun
Isla
Azzun Atma
Kafr Thulth
Mudawwar
Izb. Ashqar
Izb. Salman
Izb. Jalud
Izb. Tabib
Daba
Habla
Ras Atiah
Ras Tira
Ras Raqna
Alfe Menashe
Ar. Ramadin
Nabi Elyas
Kh.Abu Farda
Qalqilya
Zufin
Ar. Ramadin
Sal'it
Kafr Sur
Kur
Kochav Ya'ir
Tira
Kafr Qasem
Oranit
Shalare Tiqva
Elkana
Zawiya
Rafat
Ale Zahav
Brukhin
Deir Ballut
Peduel
Bet Arye
Lubban Grb.
Rantis
Ofarim
Abud
Dr.Abu Mashal
Shuqba
Shaalvim
Nili
Ni'lin
Qibya
Budrus
Na'ale
Dair Ammar
Kharbatha
Dair Qaddis
Karkar
Janiya
Talmon
Nahli'el
Abu Shukheidim
Kaubar
Burham
Beitillu
Mazra'a Qbl.
Jalazun RC
Dolev
Bil'in
Ein Qinya
Kafr Ni'ma
Deir Ibzi
Ein Arik
Saffa
Beit Ur Tht.
Beit Ur Fqa
Hashmonaim
Mattityahu
Shilat
Lapid
Menora
Kefar Ruth
Modi'in Illit
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Kh. al Misbah
Beit Liqya
Marj Anera
Bet Horon
Tira
Giv'at Ze'ev
Beit Inan
Beit Duqqu
Umm Lahim
Qubeiba
Qatanna
Giv'on Hahadasha
Biddu
Beit Iza
Haradar
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Mevo Horon
Ramot
Ramat Shlomo
Sha'ar Hagai
Ofra
Tayiba
Deir Jarir
Ein Yabrud
Bet El
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Dibwan
Psagot
Burqa
Kochav Hashahar
Rimmonim
Ramallah Al Bireh
Ein Sinya
Dura al Qar
Bir Zeit
Silwad
Yabrud
Mazra'a Shr.
Kafr Malik
Ateret
Halamish
Nabi Saleh
Um Safa
Ajlul
Jijilya
Deir Sudan
Abwein
Sinjil
Lubban Shr.
Ein Yabrud
Qaryut
Jalud
Eli
Shilo
Ma'ale Levona
Turmus Ayya
Kh. Abu Falah
Mughayir
Tomer
Farkha
Kh. Qeis
Ahmuniya
Mazari Nubani
Qarawa
Kafr Ein
Bani Zeid
Arura
Lubban Sharqiya
Rehelim
Migdalim
Qusra
Jurish
Iskaka
Titit
Majdal B. Fadil
Gittit
Ma'ale Efrayim
Yudma
Qabalan
Kfar Tappuah
Revava
Kifl Haritn
Qira
Jamma'in
Aqraba
Yasuf
Marda
Ariel
Barkan (Ind)
Etz Efrayim
Maale Tiqva
Sarta
Q.Bani Hassan
Biddya
Qiryat Netafim
Deir Istiya
Zeita
Einabus
Huwara
Beita
Yanun
Kh. Yanun
Awarta
Rehan
Barta'a Shr.
Barta'a Ghr.
Kh.Sh. Sa'id
Dhahr Malih
Tura Grb.
Tura Shr.
Um Dar
Nazl. Sh.Zeid
Kafr Qud
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Jalbun
Beit Qad
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Faqqua
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Kh. Suruj
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Me Ami
Ar'ara
Qatzir
Harish
Hadera
Netanya
Ra'ananna
Kfar Sava
Petah Tiqva
Rosh Ha'ayin
Shoham
Modi'in
Ramla
Lyd
Qalansuwa
Taybe
Tira
Kochav Ya'ir
Zufin
Qalqilya
Oranit
Kafr Qasem
Al 'Ad
Harish
Hadera
Mu'awiya
Um al Fahm
Kafr Qar'a
Ara
Ar'ara
Me Ami
Qatzir
Hinnanit
Shaqed
Rehan
Baqa Grb.
Jatt
Ibthan
Bir Sikka
Arraba
Jenin
Kadim
Gannim
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Faqqua
Jalbun
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Qabatiya
Zababdeh
Aqqaba
Mehola
Shadmot Mehola
Rotem
Brosh
N.Maskiyot
Tubas
Tammun
Sanur
Meithalun
Judeida
Siris
Jaba
Sa Nur
Silat adh Dhahr
Fandaqumiya
Homesh
Anabta
Tulkarm
Irtah
Shuweike
Iktaba
Bal'a
Deir al Ghusun
Attil
Illar
Seida
Zeita
Khermesh
Mevo Dotan
Nazlat Isa
Baqa Shr.
Nazla Grb.
Nazla al Wusta
Nzl. A.Nar
Qaffin
Firasin
Yabad
Zibda
Kufeirat
Kafr Qud
Al Araqa
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Beit Qad
Mughayir
Mutilla
Bir al Basha
Mirka
Jarba
Raba
Kh.Bziq
Bardala
Kardala
Ein al Beida
Tell Himma
Ajja
Anza
Rama
Jarushiya
Kafr Ra'i
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Duwwara
Udeisa
Jalayil
Bani Na'im
Asfar
Arab Rashayda
Mizpe Shalem
Dead Sea
Jordan River
Yafit
Peza'el
Tomer
Gilgal
Netiv Hagdud
Niran
Yitav
Al Awja
N.Zori
No'omi
N.Elisha
Ein Sultan
Duyuk
Nu'eima
Agabat Jabr
Vered Yeriho
Mizpe Yeriho
N.En Hogla
Bet Ha'arava
Almog
Qalya
Qedar
Ma'ale Adumim
Mishor Adumim (Ind)
Azarya
Abu Dis
Sawahra Shr.
East Talpyot
Beit Safafa
Sur Bahir
Um Tuba
Sheikh Sa'ad
Kh. Hardbat
Wadi Hummus
Ubaydiya
Juhzum
Um Qassis
Rafat
Beitunia
Qalandiya RC
Ar Ram
Bir Nabala
Atarot (Ind)
Neve Ya'acov
Geva Binyamin
Sha'ar Binyamin (Ind.)
Kochav Ya'acov
Ma'ale Mukhmas
Kafr Adumim
Alon
Almon
Hizma
Ramot
Shufat
Shufat RC
Anata
Ar.Ka'abne
Pi.Hilil
Za'im
Ramat Shlomo
Har Shmuel
Har Homa
Gilo
Walaja
Battir
Husan
Beit Jala
Bethlehem
Khadr
Duha
Dheisha RC
Irtas
Beit Sahur
Breidha
Rat'al Wad
Um Salamuna
Beit Ummar
Arrub RC
Beit Fajjar
Hamrush
Kh. Kisan
Ma'ale Amos
Iraq Turad
Kuziba
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Halhul
Beit Kahil
Tarqumiya
Bir Musallam
Idhna
Telem
Adora
Taffuh
Qiryat Arba
Kharas
Nuba
Beit Ula
Karme Tzur
Surif
Kh. Safa
Ein Jinan
Kefar Etzion
Migdal Oz
Teqoa
Noqdim
Tuqu
Avnat
Mekhora
Massua
Argaman
Marj al Ghazal
Marj an Naja
Zbeidat
Ash Shuna
Jiftlik
Far'a Jiftlik
Kh.Jafa
Hamra
Frush Bt.Dajan
Beit Dajan
Beit Furik
Elon Moreh
Dr.al Hatab
Asmut
Salim
Tell
Sarra
Rujeib
Bracha
Burin
Madama
Asira Qbl.
Asira Shm.
Yizhar
Itamar
Awarta
Kh. Yanun
Yanun
Beita
Huwara
Einabus
Urif
Zawata
Bt.Iba
Bt.Wazan
Mt.Ebal
Nablus
Kh.Aqrabaniya
Beit Hassan
Ein Shibli
Ro'i
Hemdat
Beqa'ot
Frush Bt.Dajan
Qusin
Qedumim
Kafr Qaddum
Jit
Falamya
Kafr Jammal
Jayyus
Sir
K.Laqif
Funduq
Hajja
Immatin
Jurshafu
Qarne Shomron
Ma'ale Shomron
Nofim
Yaqir
Immanu'el
Wadi Kana
Azzun
Isla
Azzun Atma
Kafr Thulth
Mudawwar
Izb. Ashqar
Izb. Salman
Izb. Jalud
Izb. Tabib
Daba
Habla
Ras Atiah
Ras Tira
Ras Raqna
Alfe Menashe
Ar. Ramadin
Nabi Elyas
Kh.Abu Farda
Qalqilya
Zufin
Ar. Ramadin
Sal'it
Kafr Sur
Kur
Kochav Ya'ir
Tira
Kafr Qasem
Oranit
Shalare Tiqva
Elkana
Zawiya
Rafat
Ale Zahav
Brukhin
Deir Ballut
Peduel
Bet Arye
Lubban Grb.
Rantis
Ofarim
Abud
Dr.Abu Mashal
Shuqba
Shaalvim
Nili
Ni'lin
Qibya
Budrus
Na'ale
Dair Ammar
Kharbatha
Dair Qaddis
Karkar
Janiya
Talmon
Nahli'el
Abu Shukheidim
Kaubar
Burham
Beitillu
Mazra'a Qbl.
Jalazun RC
Dolev
Bil'in
Ein Qinya
Kafr Ni'ma
Deir Ibzi
Ein Arik
Saffa
Beit Ur Tht.
Beit Ur Fqa
Hashmonaim
Mattityahu
Shilat
Lapid
Menora
Kefar Ruth
Modi'in Illit
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Kh. al Misbah
Beit Liqya
Marj Anera
Bet Horon
Tira
Giv'at Ze'ev
Beit Inan
Beit Duqqu
Umm Lahim
Qubeiba
Qatanna
Giv'on Hahadasha
Biddu
Beit Iza
Haradar
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Mevo Horon
Ramot
Ramat Shlomo
Sha'ar Hagai
Ofra
Tayiba
Deir Jarir
Ein Yabrud
Bet El
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Dibwan
Psagot
Burqa
Kochav Hashahar
Rimmonim
Ramallah Al Bireh
Ein Sinya
Dura al Qar
Bir Zeit
Silwad
Yabrud
Mazra'a Shr.
Kafr Malik
Ateret
Halamish
Nabi Saleh
Um Safa
Ajlul
Jijilya
Deir Sudan
Abwein
Sinjil
Lubban Shr.
Ein Yabrud
Qaryut
Jalud
Eli
Shilo
Ma'ale Levona
Turmus Ayya
Kh. Abu Falah
Mughayir
Tomer
Farkha
Kh. Qeis
Ahmuniya
Mazari Nubani
Qarawa
Kafr Ein
Bani Zeid
Arura
Lubban Sharqiya
Rehelim
Migdalim
Qusra
Jurish
Iskaka
Titit
Majdal B. Fadil
Gittit
Ma'ale Efrayim
Yudma
Qabalan
Kfar Tappuah
Revava
Kifl Haritn
Qira
Jamma'in
Aqraba
Yasuf
Marda
Ariel
Barkan (Ind)
Etz Efrayim
Maale Tiqva
Sarta
Q.Bani Hassan
Biddya
Qiryat Netafim
Deir Istiya
Zeita
Einabus
Huwara
Beita
Yanun
Kh. Yanun
Awarta
Rehan
Barta'a Shr.
Barta'a Ghr.
Kh.Sh. Sa'id
Dhahr Malih
Tura Grb.
Tura Shr.
Um Dar
Nazl. Sh.Zeid
Kafr Qud
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Jalbun
Beit Qad
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Faqqua
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Kh. Suruj
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Me Ami
Ar'ara
Qatzir
Harish
Hadera
Netanya
Ra'ananna
Kfar Sava
Petah Tiqva
Rosh Ha'ayin
Shoham
Modi'in
Ramla
Lyd
Qalansuwa
Taybe
Tira
Kochav Ya'ir
Zufin
Qalqilya
Oranit
Kafr Qasem
Al 'Ad
Harish
Hadera
Mu'awiya
Um al Fahm
Kafr Qar'a
Ara
Ar'ara
Me Ami
Qatzir
Hinnanit
Shaqed
Rehan
Baqa Grb.
Jatt
Ibthan
Bir Sikka
Arraba
Jenin
Kadim
Gannim
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Faqqua
Jalbun
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Qabatiya
Zababdeh
Aqqaba
Mehola
Shadmot Mehola
Rotem
Brosh
N.Maskiyot
Tubas
Tammun
Sanur
Meithalun
Judeida
Siris
Jaba
Sa Nur
Silat adh Dhahr
Fandaqumiya
Homesh
Anabta
Tulkarm
Irtah
Shuweike
Iktaba
Bal'a
Deir al Ghusun
Attil
Illar
Seida
Zeita
Khermesh
Mevo Dotan
Nazlat Isa
Baqa Shr.
Nazla Grb.
Nazla al Wusta
Nzl. A.Nar
Qaffin
Firasin
Yabad
Zibda
Kufeirat
Kafr Qud
Al Araqa
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna
Jalama
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Beit Qad
Mughayir
Mutilla
Bir al Basha
Mirka
Jarba
Raba
Kh.Bziq
Bardala
Kardala
Ein al Beida
Tell Himma
Ajja
Anza
Rama
Jarushiya
Kafr Ra'i
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Duwwara
Udeisa
Jalayil
Bani Na'im
Asfar
Arab Rashayda
Mizpe Shalem
Dead Sea
Jordan River
Yafit
Peza'el
Tomer
Gilgal
Netiv Hagdud
Niran
Yitav
Al Awja
N.Zori
No'omi
N.Elisha
Ein Sultan
Duyuk
Nu'eima
Agabat Jabr
Vered Yeriho
Mizpe Yeriho
N.En Hogla
Bet Ha'arava
Almog
Qalya
Qedar
Ma'ale Adumim
Mishor Adumim (Ind)
Azarya
Abu Dis
Sawahra Shr.
East Talpyot
Beit Safafa
Sur Bahir
Um Tuba
Sheikh Sa'ad
Kh. Hardbat
Wadi Hummus
Ubaydiya
Juhzum
Um Qassis
Rafat
Beitunia
Qalandiya RC
Ar Ram
Bir Nabala
Atarot (Ind)
Neve Ya'acov
Geva Binyamin
Sha'ar Binyamin (Ind.)
Kochav Ya'acov
Ma'ale Mukhmas
Kafr Adumim
Alon
Almon
Hizma
Ramot
Shufat
Shufat RC
Anata
Ar.Ka'abne
Pi.Hilil
Za'im
Ramat Shlomo
Har Shmuel
Har Homa
Gilo
Walaja
Battir
Husan
Beit Jala
Bethlehem
Khadr
Duha
Dheisha RC
Irtas
Beit Sahur
Breidha
Rat'al Wad
Um Salamuna
Beit Ummar
Arrub RC
Beit Fajjar
Hamrush
Kh. Kisan
Ma'ale Amos
Iraq Turad
Kuziba
Sa'ir
Shuyukh
Halhul
Beit Kahil
Tarqumiya
Bir Musallam
Idhna
Telem
Adora
Taffuh
Qiryat Arba
Kharas
Nuba
Beit Ula
Karme Tzur
Surif
Kh. Safa
Ein Jinan
Kefar Etzion
Migdal Oz
Teqoa
Noqdim
Tuqu
Avnat
Mekhora
Massua
Argaman
Marj al Ghazal
Marj an Naja
Zbeidat
Ash Shuna
Jiftlik
Far'a Jiftlik
Kh.Jafa
Hamra
Frush Bt.Dajan
Beit Dajan
Beit Furik
Elon Moreh
Dr.al Hatab
Asmut
Salim
Tell
Sarra
Rujeib
Bracha
Burin
Madama
Asira Qbl.
Asira Shm.
Yizhar
Itamar
Awarta
Kh. Yanun
Yanun
Beita
Huwara
Einabus
Urif
Zawata
Bt.Iba
Bt.Wazan
Mt.Ebal
Nablus
Kh.Aqrabaniya
Beit Hassan
Ein Shibli
Ro'i
Hemdat
Beqa'ot
Frush Bt.Dajan
Qusin
Qedumim
Kafr Qaddum
Jit
Falamya
Kafr Jammal
Jayyus
Sir
K.Laqif
Funduq
Hajja
Immatin
Jurshafu
Qarne Shomron
Ma'ale Shomron
Nofim
Yaqir
Immanu'el
Wadi Kana
Azzun
Isla
Azzun Atma
Kafr Thulth
Mudawwar
Izb. Ashqar
Izb. Salman
Izb. Jalud
Izb. Tabib
Daba
Habla
Ras Atiah
Ras Tira
Ras Raqna
Alfe Menashe
Ar. Ramadin
Nabi Elyas
Kh.Abu Farda
Qalqilya
Zufin
Ar. Ramadin
Sal'it
Kafr Sur
Kur
Kochav Ya'ir
Tira
Kafr Qasem
Oranit
Shalare Tiqva
Elkana
Zawiya
Rafat
Ale Zahav
Brukhin
Deir Ballut
Peduel
Bet Arye
Lubban Grb.
Rantis
Ofarim
Abud
Dr.Abu Mashal
Shuqba
Shaalvim
Nili
Ni'lin
Qibya
Budrus
Na'ale
Dair Ammar
Kharbatha
Dair Qaddis
Karkar
Janiya
Talmon
Nahli'el
Abu Shukheidim
Kaubar
Burham
Beitillu
Mazra'a Qbl.
Jalazun RC
Dolev
Bil'in
Ein Qinya
Kafr Ni'ma
Deir Ibzi
Ein Arik
Saffa
Beit Ur Tht.
Beit Ur Fqa
Hashmonaim
Mattityahu
Shilat
Lapid
Menora
Kefar Ruth
Modi'in Illit
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Kh. al Misbah
Beit Liqya
Marj Anera
Bet Horon
Tira
Giv'at Ze'ev
Beit Inan
Beit Duqqu
Umm Lahim
Qubeiba
Qatanna
Giv'on Hahadasha
Biddu
Beit Iza
Haradar
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Mevo Horon
Ramot
Ramat Shlomo
Sha'ar Hagai
Ofra
Tayiba
Deir Jarir
Ein Yabrud
Bet El
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Dibwan
Psagot
Burqa
Kochav Hashahar
Rimmonim
Ramallah Al Bireh
Ein Sinya
Dura al Qar
Bir Zeit
Silwad
Yabrud
Mazra'a Shr.
Kafr Malik
Ateret
Halamish
Nabi Saleh
Um Safa
Ajlul
Jijilya
Deir Sudan
Abwein
Sinjil
Lubban Shr.
Ein Yabrud
Qaryut
Jalud
Eli
Shilo
Ma'ale Levona
Turmus Ayya
Kh. Abu Falah
Mughayir
Tomer
Farkha
Kh. Qeis
Ahmuniya
Mazari Nubani
Qarawa
Kafr Ein
Bani Zeid
Arura
Lubban Sharqiya
Rehelim
Migdalim
Qusra
Jurish
Iskaka
Titit
Majdal B. Fadil
Gittit
Ma'ale Efrayim
Yudma
Qabalan
Kfar Tappuah
Revava
Kifl Haritn
Qira
Jamma'in
Aqraba
Yasuf
Marda
Ariel
Barkan (Ind)
Etz Efrayim
Maale Tiqva
Sarta
Q.Bani Hassan
Biddya
Qiryat Netafim
Deir Istiya
Zeita
Einabus
Huwara
Beita
Yanun
Kh. Yanun
Awarta
Rehan
Barta'a Shr.
Barta'a Ghr.
Kh.Sh. Sa'id
Dhahr Malih
Tura Grb.
Tura Shr.
Um Dar
Nazl. Sh.Zeid
Kafr Qud
Burqin
Deir Abu Da'if
Jalbun
Beit Qad
Arrana
Deir Ghazala
Faqqua
Bet Shean (Beisan)
Kh. Suruj
Al Yamun
Kafr Dan
Anin
Silat Hartthiya
Rummana
Zububa
Taybe
Tirmmk
Arrabuna

Central Elections Commission Palestine		لجنـــة الانتخابـــات المركزيـــة فلسطيـــن

The Second 2006 PLC Elections
lists voter per districts

		The Alternative (1)		Independet Palestine (Mustafa Barghouthi and Independents) (2)		Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa (3)		Martyr Abu al-Abbas (4)		Freedom and Social Justice (5)		Change and Reform (6)	
No.	District	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *
01	**Jerusalem**	2,282	5.96%	1,986	5.18%	2,135	5.57%	336	0.88%	410	1.07%	16,035	41.85%
02	**Jenin**	2,629	3.53%	2,322	3.11%	3,657	4.90%	331	0.44%	440	0.59%	28,196	37.81%
03	**Tulkarem**	2,110	4.01%	1,253	2.38%	1,919	3.65%	124	0.24%	764	1.45%	22,883	43.52%
04	**Tubas**	808	4.87%	563	3.39%	709	4.27%	120	0.72%	64	0.39%	6,323	38.08%
05	**Nablus**	3,892	3.95%	2,359	2.40%	5,024	5.10%	222	0.23%	711	0.72%	44,000	44.71%
06	**Qalqilya**	756	2.94%	523	2.03%	783	3.04%	34	0.13%	338	1.31%	8,349	32.43%
07	**Salfit**	1,387	6.55%	1,201	5.67%	1,019	4.81%	72	0.34%	840	3.96%	7,501	35.41%
08	**Ramallah**	3,609	4.53%	3,210	4.03%	5,278	6.62%	384	0.48%	637	0.80%	33,686	42.24%
09	**Jericho**	437	3.75%	513	4.40%	421	3.61%	102	0.87%	133	1.14%	3,861	33.10%
10	**Bethlehem**	3,191	6.64%	2,008	4.18%	4,519	9.40%	114	0.24%	227	0.47%	15,140	31.51%
11	**Hebron**	3,190	2.57%	4,996	4.02%	4,103	3.31%	393	0.32%	1,138	0.92%	61,433	49.49%
12	**North Gaza**	1,266	1.66%	1,261	1.65%	4,973	6.53%	127	0.17%	153	0.20%	35,781	46.95%
13	**Gaza**	1,266	0.96%	2,116	1.60%	2,497	1.89%	227	0.17%	378	0.29%	74,816	56.72%
14	**Deir al- Balah**	656	1.08%	857	1.42%	2,328	3.85%	102	0.17%	257	0.42%	26,550	43.87%
15	**Khan Younis**	909	1.14%	1,174	1.47%	1,888	2.37%	229	0.29%	369	0.46%	35,070	43.96%
16	**Rafah**	585	1.14%	567	1.10%	848	1.65%	94	0.18%	268	0.52%	20,785	40.39%
	Total	**28,973**	**2.92%**	**26,909**	**2.72%**	**42,101**	**4.25%**	**3,011**	**0.30%**	**7,127**	**0.72%**	**440,409**	**44.45%**

*The percentage from the valid voted in the distrcit

Central Elections Commission Palestine		لجنـــة الانتخابـــات المركزيـــة فلسطيـــن

		The National Coalition for Justice and Democracy (7)		The Third Way (8)		Freedom and Independence (9)		The Palestinian Justice (10)		Fatah Movement (11)		Grand total on the districts level	
#	District	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *	Total No. of valid votes	% *
01	**Jerusalem**	116	0.30%	904	2.36%	233	0.61%	177	0.46%	13,698	35.75%	**38,312**	**100.00%**
02	**Jenin**	157	0.21%	2,402	3.22%	379	0.51%	255	0.34%	33,796	45.32%	**74,564**	**100.00%**
03	**Tulkarem**	87	0.17%	2,372	4.51%	328	0.62%	68	0.13%	20,667	39.31%	**52,575**	**100.00%**
04	**Tubas**	107	0.64%	741	4.46%	288	1.73%	208	1.25%	6,673	40.19%	**16,604**	**100.00%**
05	**Nablus**	71	0.07%	4,051	4.12%	199	0.20%	253	0.26%	37,635	38.24%	**98,417**	**100.00%**
06	**Qalqilya**	29	0.11%	870	3.38%	243	0.94%	58	0.23%	13,765	53.46%	**25,748**	**100.00%**
07	**Salfit**	93	0.44%	1,462	6.90%	296	1.40%	37	0.17%	7,278	34.35%	**21,186**	**100.00%**
08	**Ramallah**	84	0.11%	1,701	2.13%	136	0.17%	77	0.10%	30,939	38.80%	**79,741**	**100.00%**
09	**Jericho**	14	0.12%	309	2.65%	24	0.21%	19	0.16%	5,833	50.00%	**11,666**	**100.00%**
10	**Bethlehem**	80	0.17%	1,346	2.80%	100	0.21%	72	0.15%	21,255	44.23%	**48,052**	**100.00%**
11	**Hebron**	222	0.18%	3,322	2.68%	527	0.42%	145	0.12%	44,668	35.98%	**124,137**	**100.00%**
12	**North Gaza**	73	0.10%	755	0.99%	203	0.27%	61	0.08%	31,559	41.41%	**76,212**	**100.00%**
13	**Gaza**	302	0.23%	1,520	1.15%	348	0.26%	96	0.07%	48,328	36.64%	**131,894**	**100.00%**
14	**Deir al- Balah**	206	0.34%	549	0.91%	290	0.48%	42	0.07%	28,681	47.39%	**60,518**	**100.00%**
15	**Khan Younis**	106	0.13%	1,027	1.29%	559	0.70%	71	0.09%	38,384	48.11%	**79,786**	**100.00%**
16	**Rafah**	59	0.11%	531	1.03%	245	0.48%	84	0.16%	27,395	53.23%	**51,461**	**100.00%**
	Total	**1,806**	**0.18%**	**23,862**	**2.41%**	**4,398**	**0.44%**	**1,723**	**0.17%**	**410,554**	**41.43%**	**990,873**	**100.00%**

Central Elections Commission Palestine		لجنـــة الانتخابـــات المركزيـــة فلسطيـــن

The second 2006 PLC elections
The final distribution of PLC seats

	Political affiliation	No. of seats in the lists	No. of seats in the districts	Total No. of seats
1	Change and Reform	29	45	74
2	Fatah Movement	28	17	45
3	Martyr Abu Ali Mustafa	3	0	3
4	The Third Way	2	0	2
5	The Alternative	2	0	2
6	Independent Palestine	2	0	2
7	Independents	0	4	4
	Total	**66**	**66**	**132**



A(the) Case (s) for Peace







A GEOMAT Project by
Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

TODAY 5/25/2008

VII. Civic Infrastructure



G.1. Israeli land designation in the West Bank



G.2. Hospitals and clinics in the West Bank

■ Health Indicators in Palestine

	WBGS	WB (of which Jerusalem)	GS
Hospitals	78	54 (9)	24
of which: Ministry of Health	23	11 (0)	12
NGOs	31	21 (6)	10
Private	23	21 (3)	2
UNRWA	1	1 (0)	0
Hospital Type	78	54	24
of which: General	39	25	14
Specialized	14	7	7
Rehabilitation	4	3	1
Maternity	21	19	2
Hospital beds	4,679	2,762	1,917
of which: Ministry of Health	- 2,614	- 1,152	- 1,462
NGOs	- 1,489	- 1,073	- 416
Private	- 518	- 479	- 39
UNRWA	- 58	- 58	- 0
Primary Health Care Centers	619	516	103
of which: Ministry of Health	391	337	54
NGOs	187	145	31
UNRWA	51	34	17
Population/hospital ratio	47,922	43,844	57,098
Hospital per 100,000 population ratio	2.1	2.3	1.8
Crude birth rate per 1,000 population	27.2	25.1	30.8
Crude death rate per 1,000 population	2.7	2.4	3.2
Total fertility rate	3.89	3.4	4.7
Infant mortality rate (death under the age of one year) per 1,000 live births	24		
Child mortality rate (under 5 years) per 1,000 live births	20.1		
Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live births (women aged 15-49 years)	12.7	6.7	21.3

(Source: Ministry of Health, *Health Status in Palestine,* 2005.)

G.3. Health indicators in Palestine

G.4. Beds and patients' admissions and discharges in Jerusalem, by ward, '02-'03

G.5. Religious institutions in Jerusalem, '99 – '00, Religious institutions in the old city, as percentage of total religious institutions, '00

G.6. Sites, museums, entertainment & culture, (Tourism Portal of The Tourism Authority in Jerusalem: http://tour.jerusalem.muni.il/)

G.7. Court cases in Jerusalem, by type of court, type of case, and stage of proceeding, '02–'03

At a Glance:

Total Number of Schools	2,276	(WB: 1,715, GS: 561)
Total Number of Teachers	48,674	
Students enrolled (WBGS)	1,078,488	(WB: 637,613, GS: 440,875)
of which: - elementary	953,621	
- secondary	124,867	
Projected no. of students 2009/10	1,441,455	(male: 733,108, female: 708,347)
Classes	31,001	(WB: 20,390, GS: 10,611)
Literacy rate (2004)	92.3% (male: 96.5%, female: 88%)	
Repetition rate (2003/04):	1.4% (males: 1.5%, females: 1.2%)	
Drop-out rate (2003/04):	0.9% (males: 1.0%, females: 0.9%)	


(Sources: Ministry of Education, *Statistics about Palestinian General Education*, 2005/06; PCBS, *Palestinian Children - Rights and Numbers*, 2005.)

G.8. Education data of the West Bank

G.9. Pupils in the education system in Jerusalem, by sector, 2000/'01 - 2004/05

G.10. Pupils in the education system in Jerusalem, by class, '04/'05

G.11. Classes and pupils in the arab educational system in Jerusalem, '88/'89-'04/'05



G.12. Business centers in Israel (Hebrew)

G.13. The water and sewage network in Jerusalem, '95-'03

G.14. Electricity apply in Jerusalem, by type of consumption, '87-'03


Key Indicators of the Palestinian Economy (Excl. Jerusalem, selected years)

	1995	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003 (est.)	2004 (est.)
GDP (US$ million)	3,225	4,201	4,108	3,816	3,484	3,921	4,011
GNI (US$ million)	3,699	4,932	4,793	4,143	3,700	4,204	4,373
GDP per capita (US$)	1,380	1,478	1,386	1,229	1,073	1,158	1,146
GNI per capita (US$)	1,583	1,736	1,617	1,335	1,140	1,242	1,249
Real GDP growth (%)	6.1	8.6	-5.6	-6.6	-3.8	4.5	-1.0
Real GNI per capita growth (%)	7.9	4.1	-10.7	-16.1	-9.8	2.8	-4.2
Domestic expenditure (% of GDP)	151.8	163.0	155.4	143.3	161.0	153.0	164.4
Inflation (CPI - annual %)	10.8	5.5	2.8	1.2	5.7	4.4	3.0
Poverty rate[1] (% of population)		20	27	37	51	47	48
West Bank:		13	18	27	41	37	38
Gaza Strip		32	42	54	68	64	65

Source: UNCTAD. *Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People*. July 2005, except: [1] poverty rate: World Bank estimates (The World Bank, *Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements*, June 2004).

By the end of 2004, 61% of Palestinian households were estimated to live under a **poverty line** of $350 per household (comprising 2 adults and 4 children) per month. Households' median monthly income had fallen by about 45% from $610 in 2000 to $330 by the end of 2004. Consequently, 32% of Gaza and 20% of West Bank households are living in **extreme poverty**. The main reason for poverty is unemployment. (UNCTAD. *Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People*. July 2005).


Economic Structure, 2004 estimates (% of GDP)



G.15. Key indicators of the Palestinian economy


Labor Force Distribution by Sector (%)

(Source: PCBS *Labor Force Surveys*, July-Sept. 2005.)



G.16. Labor force distribution by sector

Operating Establishments (Private Sector, NGOs and Government Companies) by Sector, 2004



(Source: PCBS, 2004)

G.17. Operating establishments by sector

General Social Features

	West Bank	Gaza	WBGS (Average)
No. of Households (2005)	408,510	204,280	612,790
Projected no. of Households (2010)	502,807	271,180	771,604
Type of household (%) - 1997 Nuclear family:	74.0	71.8	73.2
Extended family:	21.7	25.3	23.0
Average household size (persons) - 2002:	6.1	6.8	6.4
Average housing density (persons/room) - 2004	--	--	1.8
First cousin marriages – 1997 (%):	27.2	31.6	
Marriages within extended family – 1997 (%):	47.4	51.8	
Polygamous marriages – 1997 (%):	3	4.4	
Median age at first marriage (2005) for females	19.5	19.1	19.3 years
Median age at first marriage (2005) for males	25.1	24.0	24.6 years
Marriages registered (*Shari'a* & Churches) (2004):	15,551	12,083	27,634
Divorces (*Shari'a*) (2004):	2,304	1,657	3,961


Religion:

Muslims (Sunni Islam, representing Shafe'i, Hanafi, Hanbali and Malki schools) WBGS 97%
Christians (concentrated in Jerusalem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahur, Bethlehem and Ramallah; WBGS 3%
(main denominations: Greek Orthodox - ca. 52.2%, Latin - 30%, Catholic - 6%) incl. Diaspora: 10%

(Sources: PCBS, *Population Statistics* and *Housing and Housing Conditions Statistics*).

G.18. General Palestinian social features

Hotel Guests in Palestine, 1996-June 2005



Nationality (Jan.-June 2005):

Palestinian (from abroad)	21,271
Arab	818
Israeli	8,170
US/Canada	6,230
South/Central America	333
Australia/New Zealand	167
EU	13,671
Other European	972
Asia	7,078
Africa	457
Total:	**59,167**

(Source: PCBS, *Tourism Statistics – Hotels Activity Survey*, 2005.)

G.19. Tourism in Palestine

Unless noted otherwise, the following data is provided by gis.cbs.gov.il, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics

G.20. Extent of poverty in Israel, Jerusalem, selected towns and districts, '00-'03

G.21. Extent of poverty in Jerusalem and Israel, by population group, '03

G.22. Extent of poverty in Jerusalem, by religion and type of family, '03



A(the) Case(s) for Peace







A GEOMAT
Project by
Esmaeel Reza
Dadashzadeh

TODAY
5/25/2008

IX.
Natural Landscape




I.1 Israeli land use




I.2. Israeli land designation in the West Bank/Gaza Strip




I.3. Selected natural resources in the West Bank/Gaza Strip




I.4. Gaza Strip economic activity




I.5. Golan Heights economic activity




I.6. Israel economic activity



I.7. Soil type in the West Bank/Gaza Strip



I.8. Jerusalem express noise map



Location: Palestine lies on the western edge of the Asian continent and the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bound to the north by Lebanon and Syria, to the west by the Mediterranean Sea, to the south by the Gulf of Aqaba and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and to the east by Jordan.
Geographic coordinates: **West Bank:** 32° 00 N, 35°15 E; **Gaza:** 31° 25 N, 34° 20 E

Area: **Land area:** 26,323 km² (= 10,162 miles²) **Water area:** 438 km² (approx.)
Palestinian Territories: 6,020 km²
- West Bank: 5,655 km²; 130 km long, 40-65 km in width
- Gaza Strip: 365 km²; 45 km long and 5-12 km in width (self-rule area: **210 km²**)

District	Area (km²)	Density (pers./km²)	District	Area (km²)	Density (pers./km²)
WEST BANK			GAZA STRIP		
Jenin	583	445	North Gaza	61	4,381
Tubas	402	118	Gaza	74	6,689
Tulkarem	246	697	Deir Al-Balah	85	3,512
Nablus	605	552	Khan Younis	108	2,528
Qalqilya	166	577	Rafah	64	2,617
Salfit	204	310	**Total**	**365**	**3,945.4**
Ramallah	855	333			
Jericho	593	73	**Grand Total**	**6,020**	
Jerusalem	345	1,189			
Bethlehem	659	270			
Hebron	997	535			
Total	**5,655**	**463.5**			

Land boundaries:

	West Bank	Gaza
Total:	404 km	62 km + 40 km Coastline
Borders:	Israel 307 km (Green Line)	Israel 51 km (Green Line)
	Jordan 97 km	Egypt 11 km

Green Line: approx. 320 km

Climate: Mediterranean: hot, dry summers and short, wet, cool winters; temperature and rainfall vary with altitude and location of the four climatic regions (Coastal Plain, the Hills, Jordan Valley, and Negab Desert).

Temperatures (C°) in 2004

	Gaza	Hebron	Jericho	Ramallah	Nablus	Jenin
Mean Air Temp.	20.8	16.6	23.5	16.8	18.1	20.1
Absolute Minimum Air Temp.	7.2 (Dec.)	-1.2 (Feb.)	2.0 (Dec.)	0.0 (Feb.)	0.8 (Feb.)	1.4 (Dec.)
Absolute Maximum Air Temp.	39.4 (May)	34.6 (July)	44.4 (July)	35.6 (May)	36.6 (May)	39 (May)

Rainfall in 2004

	Gaza	Hebron	Jericho	Ramallah	Nablus	Jenin
Total Quantity (mm)	408.3	570.8	128.5	524.3	638.5	424.8
No. of Rainfall Days	46	42	35	38	58	51

Topographic Features: (asl=above sea level; bsl=below sea level)

District	highest elevation	lowest elevation	average annual rainfall (1967-1998)
Bethlehem	900 m asl (Beit Jala)	400 m bsl (Dead Sea area)	700 (west)-100 (east) mm
Jericho	350 m asl (northeast border)	370 m bsl (adjacent to Dead Sea)	160 mm
Hebron	1,011 m asl (Halhul area)	100 m asl	588 mm
Ramallah	1,022 m asl (at Tal A'tur)	24 m bsl (southeast border)	694 mm
Nablus	918 m asl (Jabel 'Ibal)	349 m bsl (southeast border)	663 mm
Jenin	750 m asl (Jabel Hureish)	90 m asl (Al-Mukhabba)	475 mm
Tulkarem	500 m asl (Ras Rashin)	40 m asl	651 mm
Jerusalem	890 m asl ('Radar Hill')	367m bsl (adjacent to Dead Sea)	584 mm
Gaza			415 mm

I.9. Key West Bank/Gaza Strip land and climate demographics

Total Area of Palestinian Governorates (in km²)

Governorate	Total Area	Governorate	Total Area
Jenin	583	Hebron	997
Tubas	402	**Total WB**	**5,655**
Tulkarm	246	North Gaza	61
Qalqilya	166	Gaza	74
Salfit	204	Deir Balah	58
Nablus	605	Khan Younis	108
Ramallah	855	Rafah	64
Jerusalem[1]	345	**Total Gaza**	**365**
Jericho	593		
Bethlehem	659	**TOTAL WBGS**	**6,020**

(Source: PCBS, *Land Use Statistics*.) [1] excl. the annexed part.

Land Use (in km²)

	Total km²	Agricultural				Forest	Palestinian Built-up (2003)	Built-up in Israeli settlements	Other** (2003)
		Permanent Crops		Temporary Crops					
		irrigated	*rainfed*	*irrigated*	*rainfed*				
WB	5,655	26.7	1,069	52.3	230.6	88.5	531.9	187.0	3.519
GS	365	46.6	10.0	32.6	19.9	3.2	53.8		163.7
		73.3	**1,079**	**84.9**	**250.5**				
		1,152.7		**335.4**		**91.7**	**585.7**		**3,682.7**
Total	**6,020**	**1,488.1**						**187**	

(Source: PCBS, *Land Use Statistics, 2004*) ** Incl.: meadows, pastures, fallow and heath lands.


I.10. Palestinian land use data

The Agricultural Sector at a Glance, 2003/04


	WBGS
Total Cultivated area (dunums)	1,823,670
Agricultural land as % of total land area	25.2
Irrigated agricultural land as % of total agricultural land	10.7
Area of fruit trees - as % of total cultivated area	1,152,692 63.2%
Area of field crops - as % of total cultivated area	491,178 26.9%
Area of vegetables - as % of total cultivated area	179,468 9.9%
Area of cut flowers	332
No. of cattle	32,395
No. of sheep	811,864
No. of goats	398,821
No. of poultry	36,046
No. of beehives	59,946
Caught fish (metric tons)	2,994.5

(PCBS, *Agricultural Statistics*, 2003/04; *Land Use Statistics*, 2002).

I.11. Palestinian agriculture data



I.12. Number of Species in the West Bank & the Gaza Strip



I.13. Marine life along the Gaza coast




Figure 10.1: CO_2 Emissions (%)







Figure 10.2: CO Emissions (%)





I.14. Air quality in Palestine



I.15. Annual rainfall

Unless noted otherwise, the following data is provided by gis.cbs.gov.il, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics


I.16. Infrastructure, environment and sensitive zones to earthquake (Hebrew)

	I.17. Seismic waves in areas affected from 1927 Earthquake (Hebrew)
	I.18. Concentrations of air pollutants in commercial urban centers in T-A & Jerusalem 2003
	I.19. Waste water and toxic waste in Jerusalem, '99-'03
	I.20. Reports on climate and climate change in Palestine (PASSIA)
	I.21. Temperatures and relative humidity in Jerusalem, '03
	I.22. Precipitation in Jerusalem and other areas in Israel, '71 – '03
	I.23. Temperature and relative humidity in Jerusalem, '03
	I.24. Temperature in Jerusalem – long range averages, '68-'03
	I.25. Closed Israeli borders squeeze Gaza farmers (news article)

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...


Israeli Colonies in the Middle Part of the West Bank, (1990-2004)
توسع في المستعمرات الإسرائيلية في القسم الأوسط من الضفة الغربية (١٩٩٠-٢٠٠٤)
Israeli Outpost
Road Network
Existing Bypass Road
West Bank District Border
West Bank Boundary
Israeli Colony, 1990
Israeli Colony, 2004
Palestinian Built-up Area
Israeli Colony 1990
Israeli Colony 2004
Ariel
Israeli Colony 1990
Israeli Colony 2004
Maale Adummim
Mishor Adummim
JORDAN
Jordan River
Dead Sea
ISRAEL
Ariel
Mevaseret Tsiyon
Maale Adummim
North of Mishor Adummim
Mishor Adummim (Industrial Cent
Mizpe Yedude
Ketzar
Kokhav haShahar
Nahal Tzori
Nofim
Elisha
En Hogla (Moul Nevoh)
Beit HaArava
North Dead Sea
Almog
Ateret
Nevi'im
Rimmonim
Ofra
Shilo
Mizpe Rahel (Shvut Rahel)
South of Shilo
South East of Eli
Eli
Pezael (Fezael)
Yafit
Tomer
Fasayil
Netiv Hagedud
Giligal
Niran
Yitava
Maale Etrayim
Majedal Bani Fadil
Migdalim
Pisgat Amir
Pisgat Zeev
Neve Yaacov
Almon (Anatot)
Kfar Adummim
Neveh Erez
Mizpe Yeriho
Vered Yeriho
Aqabat Jaber Camp
Ein El Sultan Camp
Nuwei'ma
Dyouk El-Fuqa
Jericho
El Mashroa'
Adam (Geva Benyamin)
Sha'ar Binyamin
Kokhav Ya'acov
Maale Mikhmas
Mikhmas
Qalandya Camp
Qalandya
Ramallah
Al Quds (Jerusalem)
Bethlehem
Al Khalil (Hebron)
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarem
Qalqilya
Nablus
Arha
Jericho
Jerusalem Area
Jewish Quarter
West Jerusalem
Ras Al Amud
Abu Dis
Jabal Al Mukabir
East Talpiyot
Ad Thuri
Al Eizariya
Az Zaayyem
Wadi Al Juz
At Tur
Sawahra al Gharbiya
Hebrew University (Har Ha Tzofim)
Ramat Eshkol
Givat Shappira
Rekhes Shuafat
Kiryat Ya'arim
Har Adar (Givat HaRadar)
Neve Shamuel
Givat Hadasha B
Givat Hadasha
Givat Zeev
Beit Horon
Beit Horon B
Kh.El Misbah
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Saffa
Deir Ebzed
Modi'in Illit (Qiryat Sefer)
Hashmonaim Mattityahu
Lapidot
Menora
Shilta
Kfar Rut
Talmon
Talmon B
Talmon C
Dolev
Ofarim
Nili
Nahliel
Hallamish
Ateret
Beit Arye
Alei Zahav (Yeezer)
Har Alei Zahav
Kafr Eddik
Rodeel
Brukin
Gav'ot'el
Arial West Bank Industrial
Bargan Industrial
Elkana
Oranit
Shaare Tikva
Ariel
Kfar Qari'
Matzor Adiya
Kfar Tapuah
Matkhan Tappuah
Pnei Hever
Eshkolot
Kiryat Netafim
Revaya
Yakir
Kh Ghazalat
Zamarin
Beit Amein
Niriyya
Sannirya
Bidya
Sarta
Hairs
Kafr Haris
Zawiya
Azun El 'atma
Rafat
Luban
Rantis
Deir Ballut
Deir Ghassana
Luban Ash Sharaqiya
Farkha
Mazare' En Nabani
A'arura
Beit Rima
Deir Es Sudan
A'jul
El Nabi Saleh
A'aboud
Um Safa
Deir Abu Masha'l
Jibya
kouber
Burham
Shuqba
Qibya
Budrus
Shibteen
Dier Ammar
Beit Illa
Abu Sh'Kheidem
Ras Karkar
Ni'lin
Deir Qiddis
El-Midya
Kafr Ni'ma
Deir Ebzed
E'n Arik
Saffa
Beit Li'D El Tihta
Beit Li'D El Fuqa
Beit Leqia
Marj A'malyra
Meyer Horon
Canada Park Yalu
Latrun
Beit 'Anan
Beit Duqqu
Al Qubeiba
Qatanna
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Al Jib
Beit Iji'a
Beit Hanina al Balad
Bodu
Hizma
Beit Hanina
Shu'fat
Anata
Al 'Isawiya
Jaijuliya
Jalazona
E'n Yabroud
Beit El (A + B)
Sinjil
Tumas A'yya
El -Maghaiyer
Kh.Abu Falah
El Mazra'a Eshsharqiy
Kafr Malik
Silwad
Yabroud
E'n Sinya
Jifna
Al Taybeh
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Debwan
Al Bireh
Bitunia
Ramallah
Pesagot
Ein Qinya
Jalud
Duma
Qusra
Talfit
Es Sawiya
Yatma
Qabalan
Jurish
Qasrin
A'raba
Beita
Qusra
Jamma'in
Deir Istiya
Sarta
Iskaka
Mirda
Ariel
Yasuf
Qaryut
Maale Levona
Massua
Gilgal
Kafr Qari'
Zawiya
Gav'ot'el
Brukin
Alei Zahav (Yeezer)
Har Alei Zahav
Kafr Eddik
Rodeel
Deir Ballut
Luban
Beit Arye
Rantis
Ofarim
A'aboud
Deir Ghassana
Beit Rima
Deir Es Sudan
El Nabi Saleh
Hallamish
Um Safa
Ateret
Deir Abu Masha'l
Jibya
kouber
Burham
Shuqba
Qibya
Budrus
Shibteen
Nili
Dier Ammar
Beit Illa
Nahliel
Abu Sh'Kheidem
Talmon C
Talmon B
Talmon
Ras Karkar
Ni'lin
Deir Qiddis
El-Midya
Modi'in Illit (Qiryat Sefer)
Hashmonaim Mattityahu
Lapidot
Menora
Shilta
Kfar Rut
Kafr Ni'ma
Dolev
Ein Qinya
El Janiya
Deir Ebzed
E'n Arik
Saffa
Beit Li'D El Tihta
Beit Li'D El Fuqa
Makkabim
Beit Sira
Kh.El Misbah
Beit Horon
Beit Horon B
Beit Leqia
El-Tira
Marj A'malyra
Meyer Horon
Canada Park Yalu
Latrun
Beit 'Anan
Beit Duqqu
Givat Zeev
Givat Hadasha
Al Qubeiba
Qatanna
Givat Hadasha B
Neve Shamuel
Beit Surik
Beit Iksa
Har Adar (Givat HaRadar)
Mevaseret Tsiyon
Al Jib
Beit Iji'a
Beit Hanina al Balad
Bodu
Hizma
Beit Hanina
Shu'fat
Anata
Pisgat Zeev
Pisgat Amir
Neve Yaacov
Ram & Qanyiat al Bareed
Al Judeira
Qalandya
Qalandya Camp
Kokhav Ya'acov
Kafr 'Aqab
Mikhmas
Maale Mikhmas
Sha'ar Binyamin
Adam (Geva Benyamin)
Ataret
Al Jiba
Ramallah
Pesagot
Al Bireh
Ein Qinya
Dolev
Talmon
Talmon B
Talmon C
Ofra
Beit El (A + B)
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Debwan
Kokhav haShahar
Nahal Tzori
Nofim
Elisha
En Hogla (Moul Nevoh)
Beit HaArava
North Dead Sea
Almog
Lidjat Yehuda
Ateret
Nevi'im
Rimmonim
Yitava
El-'Auja
Niran
Giligal
Netiv Hagedud
Fasayil
Tomer
Pezael (Fezael)
Yafit
Maale Etrayim
Majedal Bani Fadil
Migdalim
Qusra
Talfit
Es Sawiya
Eli
South East of Eli
Qaryut
Jalud
Duma
Maale Levona
Shilo
Mizpe Rahel (Shvut Rahel)
South of Shilo
Sinjil
Tumas A'yya
El -Maghaiyer
Kh.Abu Falah
Silwad
Kafr Malik
El Mazra'a Eshsharqiy
Yabroud
E'n Sinya
Jifna
Al Taybeh
Rammun
Beitin
Deir Debwan
Al Bireh
Bitunia
Ramallah
Pesagot
Ein Qinya
Jalazona
E'n Yabroud
Beit El (A + B)
Ofra




Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...


Israeli Colonies in the Middle Part of the West Bank, (1990-2004)
توسع في المستعمرات الإسرائيلية في القسم الأوسط من الضفة الغربية (١٩٩٠-٢٠٠٤)
Israeli Outpost
Road Network
Existing Bypass Road
West Bank District Border
West Bank Boundary
Israeli Colony, 1990
Israeli Colony, 2004
Palestinian Built-up Area
Israeli Colony 1990
Israeli Colony 2004
Ariel
Maale Adummim
Modi'in Illit (Ciyyot Sefer)
Mevo Horon
Canada Park
Har Adar (Giv'at HaRadar)
Mevaseret Tsiyon
Ramallah
Al Quds (Jerusalem)
Bethlehem
Al Khalil (Hebron)
Nablus
Tulkarm
Jenin
Tubas
Qalqilya
Jordan River
Dead Sea
ISRAEL
JORDAN
Jordan River
Mizpe Yeriho
Almog
Beit HaArava
North Dead Sea
Ein Hogla (Moul Nevoh)
Veredot Yeriho
Aqabat Jaber Camp
Jericho
Elisha
Nuwei'ma
Ein El Sultan Camp
Dyouk El-Fuqa
El Mashroa'
Netiv Hagedud
Niran
Nahal Tzori
Yitav
Fasayil
Tomer
Pezael (Fezael)
Yafit
Massua
Gilgal
Kokhav haShahar
Rimmonim
Ofra
Shilo
Mizpe Rahel (Shvut Rahel)
South of Shilo
Eli
South East of Eli
Maale Levona
Rachalim (Shvut Rahel)
Matkhan Tappuah
Kfar Tappuah
Ariel
Mirda
Iskaka
Barqan Industrial
Arial West Bank Industrial
Elkana
Oranit
Zamarot
Kafr Qari'
Gav'i'el
Alei Zahav (Yeezer)
Har Arai Zahav
Rafat
Brukin
Rodel
Kafr Eddik
Dier Ballut
Luban
Beit Arye
Rantis
Qibya
Budrus
Shibteen
Nil'in
Dier Ammar
Modi'in Illit (Ciyyot Sefer)
Hashmonaim Mattityahu
Beit Sira
Makkabim
Kh.El Misbah
Beit Leqia
Beit Horon
Beit Horon B
El-Tira
Givat Zeev
Givat Hadasha
Givat Hadasha B
Neve Shamuel
Canada Park Yalu
Marj A'maiyra
Latrun
Beit Iksa
Beit Surik
Qatanna
Al Qubeiba
Beit 'Anan
Beit Duqqu
Beit Ijza
Al Jib
Beit Hanina al Balad
Hizma
Neve Yaacov
Pisgat Zeev
Pisgat Amir
Ramot
Rekhes Shu'fat
Kiryat Ya'arim
Shu'fat
Anata
Beit Hanina
Almon (Anatot)
Kfar Adummim
Neveh Erez
Alon
Adam (Geva Benyamin)
Ram & Dannyat al Bareed
Ataroth
Qalandya Camp
Qalandya
Sha'ar Binyamin
Mikhmas
Maale Mikhmas
Kokhav Ya'acov
Kafr 'Aqab
Jaba'
Ramallah
Al Bireh
Deir Debwan
Beitin
Ein Yabroud
Beit El (A + B)
Rammun
Jifna
Ein Qinya
Dolev
Talmon
Talmon B
Talmon C
El Janiya
Ras Karkar
Kafr Ni'ma
Shilta
Menora
Kfar Rut
Deir Ebzed
Saffa
Beit Ur El Tahta
Beit Ur El Fuqa
Bitunia
Ein Arik
Ramla
Pesagot
Ein Sinya
Al Jalazona
Srda
Al Taybeh
Yabroud
Jalud
Qaryut
Tamun
Sinjil
Tumus A'yya
Jaljuliya
Kh.Abu Falah
El -Maghaiyer
Duma
Majedal Bani Fadil
Migdalim
Qusra
Talfit
Es Sawiya
Yatma
Qabalan
Jurish
Qsarin
A'raba
Beita
Qoza
Yasuf
Kafr Qaddum
Deir Istiya
Jamma'in
Kh Ghazalat
Sannirya
Niriyya
Shaara Tikva
Ariel Ofra
Bidya
Kiryat Netafim
Revaya
Kafr Haris
Hairs
Sarta
Azun El 'atma
Mazor Aliza
Zawiya
Farkha
Lubban Ash Sharaqiya
Deir Ghassana
Mazare' En Nabani
A'arura
Beit Rima
Deir Es Sudan
A'baein
A'jul
El Nabi Saleh
A'aboud
Hallamish
Um Safa
Ateret
Ara
Deir Abu Masha'l
Jibya
kouber
Burham
Shuqba
Beit Illa
Nahliel
Beir Zeit
Abu Sh'Kheidem
Silwad
El Mazra'a Eshsharqy
Kafr Malik
Yabroud
Ni'lin
Deir Qiddis
El-Midya
Ein Yabroud
Ofra
Kokhav haShahar
Rimmonim
Nahal Tzori
Niran
Yitav
El-'Auja
Noomi
Jordan River
Deir Debwan
Nuwei'ma
Ein El Sultan Camp
Elisha
Dyouk El-Fuqa
Jericho
El Mashroa'
Aqabat Jaber Camp
Veredot Yeriho
En Hogla (Moul Nevoh)
Beit HaArava
North Dead Sea
Almog
Mizpe Yeriho
Almon (Anatot)
Kfar Adummim
Neveh Erez
Alon
Adam (Geva Benyamin)
Ram & Dannyat al Bareed
Ataroth
Qalandya Camp
Qalandya
Sha'ar Binyamin
Mikhmas
Maale Mikhmas
Kokhav Ya'acov
Kafr 'Aqab
Jaba'
Ramallah
Al Bireh
Deir Debwan
Beitin
Ein Yabroud
Beit El (A + B)
Rammun
Jifna
Ein Qinya
Dolev
Talmon
Talmon B
Talmon C
El Janiya
Ras Karkar
Kafr Ni'ma
Shilta
Menora
Kfar Rut
Deir Ebzed
Saffa
Beit Ur El Tahta
Beit Ur El Fuqa
Bitunia
Ein Arik
Ramla
Pesagot
Ein Sinya
Al Jalazona
Srda
Al Taybeh
Yabroud
Jalud
Qaryut
Tamun
Sinjil
Tumus A'yya
Jaljuliya
Kh.Abu Falah
El -Maghaiyer
Duma
Majedal Bani Fadil
Migdalim
Qusra
Talfit
Es Sawiya
Yatma
Qabalan
Jurish
Qsarin
A'raba
Beita
Qoza
Yasuf
Kfar Tappuah



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...






Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace







A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace

A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Click on the colored area to analyze proposed border change...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

Al-Ahram Weekly On-line
Published in Cairo by AL-AHRAM established in 1875

26 Sept. - 2 October 2002
Issue No. 605
Special

Beyond negotiations



Long-time activist Haidar Abdel-Shafi was at the negotiating table in the Spanish capital in 1991 when Yasser Arafat was conducting secret talks that ultimately lead to the Oslo deal of 1993. Abdel-Shafi was one of the first to predict that the Oslo process would collapse.

When elections for the first Palestinian parliament were held in 1996, Abdel-Shafi easily won a seat, reflecting his popularity in Gaza, where he lives. Less than two years later, he resigned from parliament, saying that he did not feel it had any real power. He now heads the Red Crescent Society for Gaza Strip and is the commissioner-general of the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights.

It's been two years since the Al-Aqsa Intifada began. How would you evaluate the uprising?

The Intifada is a genuine reaction of the people regarding what has been going on, and the negotiation process in particular. We know that Israel has been exploiting the negotiation process to expand its physical presence in the occupied territories -- that is, it has continued to establish more settlements under the cover of negotiations.

Does this mean that the achievements that came after Oslo have been erased?

Oslo did not really achieve anything. The agreement has been exploited to the benefit of Israeli aggression. The Intifada condemns this negotiating process and Oslo. It affirms the right of the Palestinians to fight in defence of their legitimate rights.



Israel claims that Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat orchestrated the Intifada. The

PA says the uprising was the natural result of Ariel Sharon's visit to Al-Aqsa mosque. Some analysts say that because the older generation that surrounded Arafat failed to achieve independence and good governance, Fatah's younger generation has taken up violence with the aim of forcing Israel to withdraw from Palestinian land as well as to weaken the older generation. What do you think?

Israel exploited the Oslo peace agreement to justify further aggression. The people see this, and of course, in the face of aggression, Palestinians will fight.

Owing to the Intifada, Palestinians are losing out when it comes to education, economic development, social problems and other areas. What do you think?

The Intifada is a spontaneous emotional reaction to the violations that are taking place on the ground under the cover of the negotiating process. This is obvious and reasonable, but the Intifada is, as I said, a spontaneous and unorganised action and, in this sense, it can make unnecessary mistakes. The leadership has a duty to organise the Intifada.

The leadership's failure to uphold this responsibility left the Intifada to proceed in a disorderly manner that played into Israel's hands. It provided a pretext for the brutality of the Israeli reaction against the Intifada. The parties that are making efforts in the context of the Intifada are various political organisations with distinct outlooks about how the Intifada should proceed. For this reason it is vital that all political forces come together to decide, in a democratic manner, on a unified position regarding the activities of the Intifada.

Unity has been repeatedly called for under the title of "The Necessity of National Unity Leadership". Such leadership would be responsible for decision-making with respect to the Intifada.

Because the PA did not take up this call, the Palestinians remain in evident disorder.

So, you blame Arafat's PA?

The PA is to blame for not realising the unity needed to organise the Intifada and for failing to attend to the needs of the people.

The latest polls show that more than two thirds of Palestinians continue to believe that armed confrontations have helped achieve Palestinian national rights in ways that negotiations could not. What do you think?

It's not possible to speak of any real achievements so far, and as I have said, the unorganised fighting in the context of the Intifada has been serving Israeli objectives.

I admit that in the effort to regain our rights, we need to fight; but I emphasise, again, the necessity of organising as a principle in whatever we do, whether peacefully or militarily.

What do you think of the attacks that target Israeli civilians?

I'm against these military attacks. First, they kill innocent people, and I claim that there are innocent people in Israel. More than that, though, there are Israelis who support our rights. Second, such actions deprive us the sympathy and support of the outside world. Third, such attacks provide the Israelis with reasons to unleash their military might against us in a very brutal and unrestricted manner.

Would you refer to these attacks as terrorist attacks?

I disagree with defining these acts as terrorist acts. In my opinion, the young person who commits these acts in which he sacrifices his or her life can't be condemned as a terrorist. A terrorist is someone who destroys the lives of others without exposing her- or himself to the possibility of death.

If there is any kind of Palestinian terrorism, then it was certainly preceded by Jewish terrorism that started in Palestine in the mid-1930s, with Jewish terrorists planting time-bombs in the markets of Jaffa, Haifa and other Palestinian cities.

Recent polls suggest that while support for political reform remains very high, it is less than it was last May, when support for such changes was 91 per cent. How would you explain the drop in the support for reform?

It's a bad sign, because I believe the need for reform is still there. Reform is imperative, and if there is less support for it now, I could only suggest that this means that people are becoming desperate about the possibility of achieving any reform.

When talking to people on the street, they stress one point: the American administration and the Israeli government are the ones pushing for reform for their own purposes. Palestinians feel they have been marginalised and doubt that such reform will lead to democracy.



Abdel-Shafi

Israeli and American talk about reform is immaterial. What the Palestinians need is strictly a Palestinian issue, and we can't tolerate any interference in this -- American, Israeli, or otherwise.

What do you think of the Palestinian Legislative Council's (PLC) open challenge to Arafat by forcing him to accept the resignation of his cabinet and to schedule presidential and parliamentary elections for January?

I consider it to be a good sign, and I hope it is an indication that the PLC has finally decided to attend to the responsibilities that it has neglected so far.

Why now, and not earlier? People are asking that question.

You ask them. There's no need to speculate why now; it's enough to express our satisfaction with this change.

You were the first and the only one to resign.

That was October 1997, because the council neglected and violated its responsibility as a legislating body and indirectly conceded that responsibility to Arafat.

Do you blame the PLC for not standing with you at that time?

I blame them for not standing earlier, too.

Hamas is gaining support. Ask university or high school students who they support, and they say "we support Hamas".

I don't want to comment on who is gaining or losing support. A unified Palestinian position remains the main requirement for the Palestinian cause. We should condemn this talk of factional strife, and we should put more emphasis on the necessity of unity.

Do you think that a civil war could break out here?

I hope not -- it would be a disaster. All responsible Palestinians must take every effort against internal civil strife.

Do you think a Palestinian state will be established?

If we organise better and are able to utilise our potential, we will certainly be on the road to achieving our national objective.

What roles do you think the American administration and the Arabs should play?

I'm against any American interference. We welcome all Arab support on the basis of consultation with the Palestinian leadership.

Israeli Defence Force Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon has said that he views the Palestinians as an invisible threat, like cancer. He said, "Some will say it's necessary to amputate organs but, at the moment, I'm applying chemotherapy." Do you think Israel will take even more stringent measures than it is currently pursuing?

What more can they do beyond the terrible brutality they are inflicting on the Palestinian people?

Related stories:
See **AL-AQSA INTIFADA SPECIAL**

© Copyright Al-Ahram Weekly. All rights reserved

Send a letter to the Editor | Recommend this page



Egypt | Region | Special | International | Economy | Opinion | Letters

Culture | Features | Living | Heritage | Travel | Sports | Profile | People | Time Out | Chronicles | Cartoons | Crossword

Submit query
Search for words and exact phrases (as quotes strings),
Use boolean operators (AND, OR, NEAR, AND NOT) for advanced queries

ARCHIVES
Letter from the Editor
Editorial Board
Subscription
Advertise!

WEEKLY ONLINE: www.ahram.org.eg/weekly
Updated every Saturday at 11.00 GMT, 2pm local time
weeklyweb@ahram.org.eg

Al-Ahram Organisation

Haidar Abdel Shafi, Who Led P.L.O. and Red Crescent, Dies at 88

Sign In to E-Mail or Save This
Print
Reprints
Share

ARTICLE TOOLS SPONSORED BY
THE SAVAGES

By ISABEL KERSHNER
Published: September 26, 2007

JERUSALEM, Sept. 25 — Haidar Abdel Shafi, a Palestinian leader, physician and founder of the Palestine Red Crescent Society in Gaza, died at his home in Gaza City early Tuesday. He was 88.

Enlarge This Image

The cause was colon cancer, his daughter Hind said.

Dr. Abdel Shafi, who studied medicine in Beirut and in the United States, founded the Gaza branch of the Palestine Red Crescent Society in 1972 and was its first director. The group was established to provide free medical care in Gaza. A Socialist long identified with the Palestinian secular left, he also helped establish the Palestine Liberation Organization in the 1960s.

More Articles in International »

<script language="JavaScript" type="text/javascript"> document.write (''); </ script><noscript></noscript>

MOST POPULAR

E-Mailed | Blogged | Searched

1. Frank Rich: Who's Afraid of Barack Obama?
2. Ending Famine, Simply by Ignoring the Experts
3. Everybody's Business: The Long and Short of It at Goldman Sachs
4. Op-Ed Contributor: Gospel Truth
5. U.S. Credit Crisis Adds to Gloom in Norway
6. Thomas L. Friedman: The People We Have Been Waiting For
7. Housing Crisis? Try Mobile McMansions
8. Maureen Dowd: O Brother, Where Art Thou?
9. Feminist Pitch by a Democrat Named Obama
10. A Broken City. A Tree. Evening.

Go to Complete List »



Ruth Fremson/The New York Times, 2002

Dr. Haidar Abdel Shafi.

Dr. Abdel Shafi was a soft-spoken, gentlemanly figure but also a fiercely independent politician who often went against the Palestinian mainstream. He was among the first of his people to call for the acceptance of Israel alongside a Palestinian state.

"In 1948, I was among the people who advocated the acceptance of the partition," he said in an interview decades later, referring to the United Nations partition plan for Palestine, which the Arab world rejected.

"In the 1960s, I wrote that it was time for the Arabs and Palestinians to call for the implementation of the partition and seek a peaceful resolution to the conflict," he said. "I was attacked then in the Arab press."

In 1991, he led the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference, which brought Israel together with its Arab neighbors. He later became the chief Palestinian negotiator in talks with Israel in Washington until 1993. Those talks ended after the disclosure of secret negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis, which led to the Oslo peace accords.

Dr. Abdel Shafi had already become frustrated with the peace process by then. In particular, he protested Israel's continued construction of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which he saw as a contradiction of the spirit of the process.

In 1996 he was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Palestinian Authority's Parliament, but he quit two years later, saying it was ineffective.

Dr. Abdel Shafi became a sharp critic of the centralization of power in the Palestinian territories under the rule of Yasir Arafat. In 2002 he helped found the Palestinian National Initiative, a civic organization advocating national unity, democracy and clean government.

Dr. Abdel Shafi had expressed his distress at the rising violence and chaos in his native Gaza in recent years. On his death, rival Palestinian factions, in a rare coalescence, issued statements of tribute. The secular Fatah Party hailed him as a "great national struggler." The Islamic movement Hamas, which seized control of Gaza in June, praised him as "one of the most important Palestinian figures in

The New York Times JOBS
nytimes.com/jobs



Are you looking for a new employee?
Also in Jobs:
- Gain access to over 45 million resumes
- How to test-drive new hires
- How to write effective online job postings

Advertisements

All the news that's fit to personalize.
Vanguard

NYTIMES.COM/TMAGAZINE
THE ONLY ADDRESS TO KNOW. ENTER.

Palestinian history."

Dr. Abdel Shafi is survived by his wife, four children and eight grandchildren.

More Articles in International »

Donate to the Neediest Cases today!

Ads by Google what's this?

Re-Write a Childs Future
Now you can make a difference! Sponsor an Orphan Today
www.cambodianorphanaid.org

Sponsor an orphan
A little child in India needs you! $18/month will care for an orphan
feedtheorphans.org

Give Children Hope
Your sponsorship dollars really devastated by Philippine typhoons.
www.givechildrenhope.org

Tips

To find reference information about the words used in this article, double-click on any word, phrase or name. A new window will open with a dictionary definition or encyclopedia entry.

Past Coverage

- $ Tanya Reinhart, 63, Pundit On Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (March 23, 2007)
- $ Israeli Raid Overshadows Olmert's Talks With Mubarak (January 5, 2007)
- MEDICAL RECORDS SAY ARAFAT DIED FROM A STROKE (September 8, 2005)
- $ Abdul-Majid Shoman, Banker in Jordan (July 8, 2005)

Related Searches

- Deaths (Obituaries)
- Palestinians
- Medicine and Health

Inside NYTimes.com

Fashion & Style » | Opinion » | Theater » | Travel » | Opinion » | Magazine »



The Oprah Party Wants You



Op-Ed: Middle East Peace Through Anxiety



‘Waiting for Godot’ in a Damaged New Orleans



The Skiing Travel Guide

Op-Ed: Giving You Christmas When You Want It

Get your whining out of the way and surrender to the fun of the holiday.





Anna Netrebko, a New Kind of Diva

Home WorldU.S.N.Y. / RegionBusinessTechnologyScienceHealthSportsOpinionArtsStyleTravelJobsReal EstateAutomobilesBack to Top

Copyright 2007 The New York Times Company Privacy PolicySearchCorrectionsRSSFirst LookHelpContact UsWork for UsSite Map

In the Spring of 1967, Israel had good reason to worry. The entire nation was well within Artillery and Missile range of its hostile neighbors, and if Jordan chose to enter the war, a massive push by Jordanian troops could split the country in two and separate reinforcements from moving throughout the country. On the eve of war, Israel was outnumbered by over 2:1.








'The Arab national aim is the elimination of Israel'


PRESIDENT NASSER OF EGYPT TO PRESIDENT AREF OF IRAQ, 25 MAY 1965

© Martin Gilbert



CENTRAL ISRAEL AND THE JORDAN BORDER
1949 – 1967
0 1 2 3 4 5
Miles
The cease-fire line between Israel and Jordan, 1949 - 1967
Principal built-up areas
Distances across Israel from the Jordanian border to the sea
Hadera
Jenin
Michmoret
11 miles
Zeita
Netanya
Shuweika
Nitzanei Oz
Tulkarm
10 miles



Tel Mond
Falama
Nablus
9 miles
Kalkilya
JORDAN
Kfar Saba
Habla
Herzliya
ISRAEL
Tel Aviv
Jaffa
Petah Tikva
Deir Ballut
15 miles
Kibya
Rishon le Zion
Lod
Nilin
Ramla
Ramallah
Rehovot
Beit Sira
18 miles
Beit Nuba
Latrun
© Martin Gilbert



THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
14-24 MAY 1967
0 20 40 60 80
Miles
The State of Israel, 1949-1967
United Nations troops acting as a buffer force in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip
TOTAL ARAB STRENGTH
547,000 Troops
2,504 Tanks
957 Combat Aircraft
ISRAEL
264,000 Troops
800 Tanks
300 Combat Aircraft
LEBANON
12,000 Troops
80 Tanks
18 Combat Aircraft
IRAQ
70,000 Troops
400 Tanks
200 Combat Aircraft
SYRIA
50,000 Troops
400 Tanks
120 Combat Aircraft
JORDAN
50,000 Troops
200 Tanks
40 Combat Aircraft
KUWAIT
5,000 Troops
24 Tanks
9 Combat Aircraft
Beirut
Damascus
Kuneitra
Jerusalem
Amman
Gaza
Port Said
Suez Canal
El Arish
Abu Aweigila
Cairo
Suez
Kuntilla


Eilat
Akaba
Sinai
SAUDI ARABIA
50,000 Troops
100 Tanks
20 Combat Aircraft
EGYPT
240,000 Troops
1,200 Tanks
500 Combat Aircraft
Dahab
Makna
Sharm el Sheikh
Straits of Tiran
UNITED NATIONS FORCE
978 Indians
795 Canadians
579 Yugoslavs
530 Swedes
430 Brazilians
61 Norwegians
Red Sea
ALGERIA
60,000 Troops
400 Tanks
100 Combat Aircraft
© Martin Gilbert

Annual Rainfall of the Middle East




ASHQELON
QIRYAT GAT
BIT LEHEM
HEVRON
AZZA
BE'ER SHEVA
ARAD
KARAK
DIMONA
TAFILA
MA'AN
MIZPE RAMON
YAM HA-MELAH
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
50
31°
30°


אילת
ELAT
שקמה
AQABA
1:1,000,000
1

Six Day War Timeline

June 1, 1967

- Newly apointed Defense Minister Moshe Dayan summons Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin and Southern Command Brigadier General Yeshayahu Gavish to present plans to attack and defend against Egypt.

June 2, 1967

- Jordan calls up reserve officers.

June 3, 1967

June 4, 1967

June 5, 1967

- At 7:45 a.m. Israel pre-emptively strikes Egyptian Air Forces during "Operation Focus"
- Battle of Abu-Ageila on the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian forces are defeated and the Egyptian Army is ordered to retreat from the peninsula.
- Jordanian troops begin moving into the area around Jerusalem and occupy the Government House.

June 6, 1967

- Israeli troops continue their push through the Sinai Peninsula
- Battle of Ammunition Hill

June 7, 1967


Israeli Defense Force Paratroopers capture East Jerusalem from Jordanian troops.

Operation Focus

At 7:45 a.m.on June 5, 1967, air sirens began to sound all over Israel as all but twelve of the countries nearly two hundred operational jets left the ground headed for Egypt. Flying low through previously discovered gaps in the Egyptian radar net, and approaching from unexpected directions, mostly from the west (that is, from the Mediterranean), the Israelis achieved complete tactical surprise. In the first day of fighting 80 percent of Egypt's bombers were destroyed along with 55 percent of its fighter jets. Those losses, combined with the devastation of the airbases and command and control centers demoralized the Egyptian high command, and gave Israel control of the skies over the southern front. Israeli losses totaled just 19 planes, mostly from ground fire[1].



The French made Dassault Mirage 3, the primary aircraft of the Israeli Air Forces





The Soviet made Mig-21 Fishbed, the primary fighter aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force.



The Soviet made TU-16 "Badger" Bombers, the primary bomber aircraft of the Egyptian Air Force.


A(the) Case(s) for Peace








A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




Yafa
Al Lid
Ar Ramlah
Ramallah
Ariha
(Jericho)
JORDAN
Asdod
Al Quds
(Jerusalem)
ISRAEL
Bethlehem
Dead Sea
Al Khalil
(Hebron)
0
5
10
Kilometers

Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace







A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Segregation Plan and the Distribution of Hospitals and Clinics

خطة العزل و توزيع المستشفيات و العيادات

- Main City
- Hospital
- MOH Clinic
- Israeli Checkpoint
- Israeli Roadblock
- Earth Mound
- Segregation Wall
- Trench
- Main Road
- Secondary Road
- Existing Bypass Road
- Israeli Planned Eastern Segregation Zone
- Palestinian Built-up Area
- Israeli Colony
- Israeli Built-up Area
- West Bank Boundary

Beisan
Jenin
Tubas
Tulkarm
Nablus
Qalqiliya
Salfit

Distribution of Clinics in the West Bank

District	Total
Jenin	33
Tulkarm	27
Nablus	36
Tubas	4
Qalqiliya	12
Salfit	16


Jericho	10
Ramallah	21
Jerusalem	11
Bethlehem	15
Hebron	102
Total	287

Hospitals and Clinics Affected by Segregation Zone

	Western Segregation Zone	Eastern Segregation Zone	Total
No.of Clinics	39	13	52
No. of MOH Hospitals	1	1	2
No. of NGO Hospitals	7	0	7
No. of Private Hospitals	2	0	2

Number of Hospitals and Number of Hospital Beds in the West Bank, 2004

District	No. MOH	No. NGO	No. Private	No. UNRWA	Total	No. Beds	Bed/1000 person
Jenin	1	1	2	0	4	96	0.47
Tulkarm	1	2	0	0	3	127	0.61
Nablus	2	2	2	0	6	360	1.04
Tubas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Qalqiliya	1	0	0	1	2	38	0.46
Salfit	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
Jericho	1	0	0	0	1	44	1.35
Ramallah	0	2	0	4	6	229	1.07
Jerusalem	0	5	2	0	7	642	1.95
Bethlehem	2	4	0	2	8	592	4.31
Hebron	1	2	5	0	8	310	0.76
Total	**10**	**18**	**11**	**7**	**46**	**2438**	**12.02**





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

■ Health Indicators in Palestine

	WBGS	WB (of which Jerusalem)	GS
Hospitals	78	54 (9)	24
of which: Ministry of Health	23	11 (0)	12
NGOs	31	21 (6)	10
Private	23	21 (3)	2
UNRWA	1	1 (0)	0
Hospital Type	78	54	24
of which: General	39	25	14
Specialized	14	7	7
Rehabilitation	4	3	1
Maternity	21	19	2
Hospital beds	4,679	2,762	1,917
of which: Ministry of Health	- 2,614	- 1,152	- 1,462
NGOs	- 1,489	- 1,073	- 416
Private	- 518	- 479	- 39
UNRWA	- 58	- 58	- 0
Primary Health Care Centers	619	516	103
of which: Ministry of Health	391	337	54
NGOs	187	145	31
UNRWA	51	34	17
Population/hospital ratio	47,922	43,844	57,098
Hospital per 100,000 population ratio	2.1	2.3	1.8
Crude birth rate per 1,000 population	27.2	25.1	30.8
Crude death rate per 1,000 population	2.7	2.4	3.2
Total fertility rate	3.89	3.4	4.7
Infant mortality rate (death under the age of one year) per 1,000 live births	24		
Child mortality rate (under 5 years) per 1,000 live births	20.1		
Maternal mortality rate per 100,000 live	12.7	6.7	21.3

births (women aged 15-49 years)	12.7	6.7	21.3

(Source: Ministry of Health, *Health Status in Palestine,* 2005.)

Source : PASSIA

לוח י"ד/3 - מיטות ותנועת חולים בירושלים, לפי מחלקה, 2002 - 2003

Table XIV/3 - Beds and Patients' Admissions and Discharges in Jerusalem, by Ward, 2002 - 2003

Ward	ממוצע ימי אשפוז Average days of hospitalization		אחוז תפוסה בפועל Percent of occupancy		ימי אשפוז Hospitalization days		Deaths פטירות				שחרורים[1] Discharges[1]		קבלות Admissions		מיטות תקניות Number of beds available by regulation standard		מחלקה
							אחוז[2] Percent[2]		סך-הכל Total								
	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	
Internal	4.5	4.4	120.6	116.4	238,407	231,488	3.0	2.7	1567	1373	51,506	50,970	51,625	50,747	565	561	פנימי
Intensive care	5.3	5.4	91.1	82.7	32,594	29,521	8.8	9.3	523	497	5,945	5,375	5,943	5,358	112	112	טיפול נמרץ
Pediatrics	5.0	5.1	90.1	89.9	107,349	107,925	0.9	0.8	185	169	21,142	20,765	21,071	20,764	326	351	ילדים
Surgery	3.3	3.4	80.5	75.5	236,598	222,334	0.2	0.3	146	163	70,356	64,491	70,270	64,894	828	840	כירורגי
Obstetrics	2.7	2.7	100.0	111.3	90,524	85,784	0.0	0.0	0	0	31,308	30,357	31,344	30,046	250	250	יולדות
Psychiatric[3]	125.7	147.9	81.1	85.5	174,913	175,086	0.1	0.3	2	7	2,304	2,213	2,302	2,188	591	591	בריאות הנפש[3]
Chronic Diseases	170.1	178.0	87.5	88.2	573,465	566,895	16.9	20.1	539	600	3,196	2,982	3,193	2,989	1,866	1,853	מחלות ממושכות
Rehabilitation	65.7	24.9	90.3	97.2	35,871	35,460	1.0	0.1	8	1	813	761	807	760	121	100	שיקום
Neonates	2.5	2.5	103.6	115.5	83,929	80,155	0.1	0.1	18	16	31,407	30,582	31,436	30,628	250	250	ילודים

1 Releases : those released in a particular year, including patients admitted in previous year. This explains incongruence in number of admissions and releases

2 Percent of admissions

3 Including "Eitanim" hospital - which is outside the municipal area of Jerusalem

1 שחרורים מייצגים את המשתחררים בשנה הנקובה, גם אם קבלתם היתה בשנה הקודמת. אי לכך לעתים עולה מספר השחרורים על מספר הקבלות

2 אחוז מתוך קבלות

3 כולל בית החולים "איתנים" שמחוץ לשטח השיפוט של ירושלים

לוח ט"ו/1 - עניינים שנידונו בבתי המשפט בירושלים, לפי סוג בית המשפט, סוג עניין ושלב פעולה, 2002 - 2003

Table XV/1 - Court Cases in Jerusalem, by Type of Court, Type of Case, and Stage of Proceedings, 2002 - 2003

Type of court	2003			2002			סוג בית משפט
	טרם נתבררו Pending	נתבררו Decided	הוגשו Entered	טרם נתבררו Pending	נתבררו Decided	הוגשו Entered	
Supreme court - total	**6,504**	**11,232**	**11,617**	**6,111**	**12,075**	**11,444**	**בית המשפט העליון - סה"כ**
Civil	3,618	5,093	5,013	3,665	6,079	5,515	אזרחיים
Criminal	950	3,840	3,818	969	3,650	3,618	פליליים
High Court of Justice	1,936	2,299	2,786	1,477	2,346	2,311	בג"ץ
District court - total	**4,972**	**10,025**	**7,873**	**7,413**	**10,693**	**9,812**	**בית המשפט המחוזי - סה"כ**
Civil	4,483	7,634	5,619	6,760	8,614	7,667	אזרחיים
Criminal	489	2,391	2,254	653	2,079	2,145	פליליים
Magistrates' court - total	**33,789**	**48,743**	**45,417**	**34,829**	**57,016**	**54,251**	**בית משפט השלום - סה"כ**
Civil	27,893	30,213	26,996	29,591	38,736	36,722	אזרחיים
thereof: small claims	1,281	4,303	3,841	1,522	4,957	4,438	מזה: תביעות קטנות
Criminal	5,896	18,530	18,421	5,238	18,280	17,529	פליליים
thereof: arrest cases	13	4,935	4,929	84	4,798	4,842	מזה: תיקי מעצרים
Magistrates' court of traffic & transportation - total	**3,052**	**21,696**	**21,644**	**2,438**	**26,079**	**24,145**	**בית משפט השלום לתעבורה - סה"כ**
Road accidents	720	1,375	1,462	600	1,856	1,638	תאונות דרכים
Other traffic offenses	2,206	15,065	14,945	1,696	15,615	14,838	עבירות תנועה אחרות
Different requests	126	5,256	5,237	142	8,608	7,669	בקשות שונות
Juvenile court - total	**989**	**2,270**	**2,342**	**879**	**2,580**	**2,288**	**בית משפט השלום לנוער - סה"כ**
Civil	68	625	603	83	641	520	אזרחיים
Criminal	921	1,645	1,739	796	1,939	1,768	פליליים
thereof: detention cases	55	441	233	12	631	612	מזה: תיקי מעצרים
Family court	**5,277**	**13,788**	**12,007**	**6,858**	**12,025**	**12,653**	**בית משפט לענייני משפחה**
Court of local affairs - total	**5,269**	**14,206**	**12,073**	**7,402**	**12,492**	**12,438**	**בית משפט לעניינים מקומיים - סה"כ**
thereof:							מזה:
Municipal by-law	2,167	10,062	9,139	3,090	9,152	8,660	חוקי עזר עירוניים
Licensing of business' act	342	468	383	427	512	483	חוקי רישוי עסקים
Planning and construction	2,674	3,267	2,092	3,849	1,895	2,361	חוק התכנון והבנייה
Public health ordinance	..	..	..	36	933	934	פקודת בריאות העם
Landlord-tenancy tribunal	**74**	**86**	**72**	**85**	**97**	**111**	**בית הדין לשכירות**
Regional labor court - total	**6,642**	**8,821**	**8,643**	**6,555**	**8,074**	**8,250**	**בית הדין האזורי לעבודה - סה"כ**
Civil	6,612	8,787	8,590	6,537	8,033	8,209	אזרחיים
Criminal	30	34	53	18	41	41	פליליים
National labor court - total	**6,970**	**2,470**	**2,204**	**1,942**	**2,773**	**2,378**	**בית הדין הארצי לעבודה - סה"כ**
Civil	1,693	2,459	2,189	1,924	2,762	2,367	אזרחיים
Criminal	21	11	15	18	11	11	פליליים
Execution office	**..**	**106,709**	**223,671**	**..**	**12,529**	**26,857**	**לשכת ההוצאה לפועל**



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

At a Glance:

Total Number of Schools	2,276	(WB: 1,715, GS: 561)
Total Number of Teachers	48,674	
Students enrolled (WBGS)	1,078,488	(WB: 637,613, GS: 440,875)
of which: - elementary	953,621	
- secondary	124,867	
Projected no. of students 2009/10	1,441,455	(male: 733,108, female: 708,347)
Classes	31,001	(WB: 20,390, GS: 10,611)
Literacy rate (2004)	92.3% (male: 96.5%, female: 88%)	
Repetition rate (2003/04):	1.4% (males: 1.5%, females: 1.2%)	
Drop-out rate (2003/04):	0.9% (males: 1.0%, females: 0.9%)	

(Sources: Ministry of Education, *Statistics about Palestinian General Education*, 2005/06; PCBS, *Palestinian Children - Rights and Numbers*, 2005.)

Source : PASSIA

לוח י"ג/3 - תלמידים במערכת החינוך בירושלים , לפי מגזר, תשס"א - תשס"ה

Table XIII/3 - Pupils in The Education System in Jerusalem, by Sector , 2000/01 - 2004/05

תשס"ה 2004/05	תשס"ד 2003/04	תשס"ג 2002/03	תשס"ב 2001/02	תשס"א 2000/01	
208,625	**209,879**	**204,457**	**195,669**	**192,496**	**סך - כולל**
The Jerusalem Education Authority				המנהלה לחינוך ירושלים	
125,402	128,429	124,941	119,536	118,570	סך - הכל
62,339	63,952	64,712	65,336	66,581	חינוך עברי
9,405	9,715	9,706	9,398	9,273	גני-ילדים[1]
23,647	23,924	24,227	24,700	25,700	חינוך יסודי
27,656	28,259	28,779	29,349	29,722	חינוך על-יסודי
1,631	2,054	2,000	1,889	1,886	חינוך מיוחד
42,063	43,477	39,229	33,200	30,989	חינוך ערבי עירוני
3,505	3,228	3,342	3,163	2,824	גני-ילדים[1]
20,671	23,150	21,029	17,882	17,008	חינוך יסודי
17,210	16,427	14,244	11,598	10,609	חינוך על-יסודי
677	672	614	557	548	חינוך מיוחד
21,000	21,000	21,000	21,000	21,000	חינוך ערבי פרטי[2]
Ultra-Orthodox Educational Division				האגף לחינוך חרדי	
83,223	81,450	79,516	76,133	73,926	סך - הכל
17,511	17,189	16,519	16,057	15,619	גני-ילדים
40,564	40,368	40,370	39,095	38,218	חינוך יסודי
24,048	22,847	21,656	20,136	19,017	חינוך על - יסודי[3]
1,100	1,046	971	845	1,072	חינוך מיוחד

1 Including non-municipal kindergartens

2 Estimate

3 Including 13th-14th grades

1 כולל גני ילדים לא עירוניים

2 אומדן

3 כולל כיתות י"ג-י"ד

לוח י"ג/4 - תלמידים במערכת החינוך בירושלים, לפי כיתה, תשס"ה

Table XIII/4 - Pupils in the Education System in Jerusalem, by Class, 2004/05

	Class כיתה					סך-הכל Total	
	יג-יד 13th-14th	י-יב 10th-12th	ז-ט 7th-9th	א-ו 1st-6th	גני ילדים Kinder-gartens		
	pupils				תלמידים		
Total	**4,307**	**37,504**	**39,242**	**75,430**	**31,384**	**187,867**	**סה"כ**
Hebrew education - total[1]	**4,307**	**30,881**	**28,345**	**54,524**	**[1] 27,747**	**145,804**	**חינוך עברי - סה"כ[1]**
Hebrew Education - The Jerusalem Education Authority	183	15,823	13,408	23,249	[1] 9,873	62,536	חינוך עברי - מנח"י
State education	77	9,688	7,613	12,518	4,271	34,167	חינוך ממלכתי
State-religious education	106	5,711	5,518	10,072	3,934	25,341	חינוך ממלכתי-דתי
Special needs education- State and state-religious		424	277	659	468	1,828	חינוך מיוחד- ממלכתי וממלכתי-דתי
Ultra-Orthodox education - total	4,124	15,058	14,937	31,275	17,874	83,268	חינוך עברי - חרדי
Ultra-Orthodox education	4,124	14,927	14,723	30,872	17,522	82,168	חינוך חרדי
Ultra-Orthodox - special needs education	-	131	214	403	352	1,100	חינוך מיוחד - חרדי
Arab education - total[2]		**6,623**	**10,897**	**20,906**	**3,637**	**42,063**	**חינוך ערבי - סה"כ[2]**
Municipal Arab education (The Jerusalem Education Authority)		6,542	10,668	20,671	3,505	41,386	חינוך ערבי - עירוני (מנח"י)
Arab - special needs education		81	229	235	132	677	חינוך מיוחד - ערבי

1 Including 1,200 pupils in non-municipal kindergartens

2 Not including private schools & Wakf schools

1 כולל 1,200 תלמידים בגני ילדים לא עירוניים

2 לא כולל בתי ספר פרטיים ובתי ספר של הוואקף

לוח י"ג/4 - תלמידים במערכת החינוך בירושלים, לפי כיתה, תשס"ה (המשך)

Table XIII/4 - Pupils in the Education System in Jerusalem, by Class, 2004/05 (Cont.)

	Class כיתה					סך-הכל Total	
	יג-יד 13th-14th	י-יב 10th-12th	ז-ט 7th-9th	א-ו 1st-6th	גני ילדים Kinder-gartens		
Total	2.3	20.0	20.9	40.2	16.7	**100.0**	סה"כ
	percent			אחוזים			
Hebrew education - total[1]	3.0	21.2	19.4	37.4	19.0	**100.0**	חינוך עברי - סה"כ[1]
Hebrew Education - The Jerusalem Education Authority	0.3	25.3	21.4	37.2	15.8	**100.0**	חינוך עברי - מנח"י
State education	0.2	28.4	22.3	36.6	12.5	**100.0**	חינוך ממלכתי
State-religious education	0.4	22.5	21.8	39.7	15.5	**100.0**	חינוך ממלכתי-דתי
Special needs education- State and state-religious	0.0	23.2	15.2	36.1	25.6	**100.0**	חינוך מיוחד- ממלכתי וממלכתי-דתי
Ultra-Orthodox education - total	5.0	18.1	17.9	37.6	21.5	**100.0**	חינוך עברי - חרדי
Ultra-Orthodox education	5.0	18.2	17.9	37.6	21.3	**100.0**	חינוך חרדי
Ultra-Orthodox - special needs education	-	11.9	19.5	36.6	32.0	**100.0**	חינוך מיוחד - חרדי
Arab education - total[2]	0.0	15.7	25.9	49.7	8.6	**100.0**	חינוך ערבי - סה"כ[2]
Municipal Arab education (The Jerusalem Education Authority)	0.0	15.8	25.8	49.9	8.5	**100.0**	חינוך ערבי - עירוני (מנח"י)
Arab - special needs education	0.0	12.0	33.8	34.7	19.5	**100.0**	חינוך מיוחד - ערבי

לוח י"ג/8 - כיתות ותלמידים במערכת החינוך הערבי בירושלים[1], תשמ"ט-תשס"ה

Table XIII/8 - Classes and Pupils in the Arab Educational System in Jerusalem[1], 1988/89-2004/05

Year	בתי-ספר לחינוך מיוחד Special Needs Education schools	בתי-ספר על-יסודיים Post-primary schools כיתות י'-י"ב 10th-12th grade	 כיתות ז'-ט 7th-9th grade	בתי-ספר יסודיים (כיתות א'-ו') [2] Primary schools (1st-6th grade) [2]	גני-ילדים Kindergartens	סך-הכל Total	שנה
		Classes			כיתות		
1988/89	33	80	125	306	48	**592**	תשמ"ט
1989/90	33	93	124	307	47	**604**	תש"נ
1990/91	38	84	127	300	48	**597**	תשנ"א
1991/92	39	98	180	286	48	**651**	תשנ"ב
1992/93	39	98	135	338	49	**659**	תשנ"ג
1993/94	37	103	169	347	58	**714**	תשנ"ה
1996/97	40	101	175	383	64	**763**	תשנ"ז
1997/98	47	111	183	418	70	**829**	תשנ"ח
1998/99	48	126	192	457	77	**900**	תשנ"ט
1999/00	60	127	199	492	80	**958**	תש"ס
2000/01	63	126	212	528	100	**1,029**	תשס"א
2001/02	67	153	236	602	105	**1,163**	תשס"ב
2002/03	71	187	278	683	111	**1,330**	תשס"ג
2003/04	75	216	319	721	108	**1,439**	תשס"ד
2004/05	82	230	316	631	118	**1,377**	תשס"ה
		Pupils			תלמידים		
1988/89	110	2,412	3,524	9,145	1,301	**16,492**	תשמ"ט
1989/90	180	2,518	3,724	9,343	1,304	**17,069**	תש"נ
1990/91	135	2,557	3,880	9,471	1,181	**17,224**	תשנ"א
1991/92	286	2,771	4,164	9,857	1,481	**18,559**	תשנ"ב
1992/93	310	2,890	4,235	10,090	1,510	**19,035**	תשנ"ג
1993/94	313	3,096	4,956	10,995	1,701	**21,061**	תשנ"ה
1996/97	347	3,201	5,748	12,963	1,908	**24,167**	תשנ"ז
1997/98	394	3,441	6,047	13,963	2,190	**26,035**	תשנ"ח
1998/99	445	3,743	6,377	14,977	2,273	**27,815**	תשנ"ט
1999/00	511	3,910	6,388	16,020	2,354	**29,183**	תש"ס
2000/01	548	3,856	6,753	17,008	2,824	**30,989**	תשס"א
2001/02	557	4,177	7,421	18,169	2,876	**33,200**	תשס"ב
2002/03	614	5,165	9,079	21,029	3,342	**39,229**	תשס"ג
2003/04	672	5,921	10,506	23,150	3,228	**43,477**	תשס"ד
2004/05	677	6,542	10,668	20,671	3,505	**42,063**	תשס"ה

1 Municipal institutions only (under the supervision of The Jerusalem Education Authority and Ministry of Education

2 Including classes and pupils of Special Education integrated in regular schools

1 מוסדות עירוניים בלבד (בפיקוח מנח"י ומשרד החינוך)

2 כולל כיתות ותלמידים לחינוך מיוחד המשולבים בבתיה"ס הרגילים




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Source : The Center for Educational Technology: cet.org.il/)

לוח ט/7 - מערכת המים והביוב בירושלים, 1995 - 2003

Table IX/7 - The Water and Sewage Network in Jerusalem, 1995 - 2003

	הגידול לעומת שנה קודמת (אחוזים) Increase over previous year (percent)	2003	2002	2000	1998	1995	
Physical Infrastructure							תשתית פיזית
Length of water network (km.)	1.0	1,123	1,112	1,097	1,069	1,005	אורך קווי רשת המים (ק"מ)
Average age of water network (years)	1.4	14.3	14.1	15.9	14.5	13.1	גיל ממוצע של רשת המים (שנים)
Number of ponds	0.0	20	20	18	17	17	מספר בריכות
Number of water-pumping stations	8.2	53	49	10	10	10	מספר תחנות לשאיבת מים
Water storage capacity (cu.m.)[1]	0.0	335,400	335,400	305,400	265,400	265,400	כושר איגום מים (מ"ק)
Length of sewage and drainage network (km.)	1.6	1,276	1,256	1,152	1,122	1,067	אורך קווי רשת הביוב והניקוז (ק"מ)
Water Consumption							צריכת מים
Quantity of water supplied to Jerusalem (thousand cu.m.)[2]	1.7	58,019	57,030	59,404	56,382	49,600	כמות המים שסופקה לירושלים (אלפי מ"ק)[2]
Quantity of water sold to consumers (thousand cu.m.)[2]	2.4	52,003	50,791	52,956	48,168	44,000	כמות המים שנמכרה לצרכנים (אלפי מ"ק)[2]
Wastage (%)	-4.6	10.4	10.9	10.9	13.9	11.3	פחת (%)
Number of water meters	0.5	175,171	174,350	162,300	154,300	144,200	מספר מדי מים
Number of consumers	1.3	165,785	163,672	160,400	154,130	144,789	מספר צרכנים
Average annual consumption per capita (cu.m.)	-2.8	72.8	74.9	75.1	76.5	72.1	צריכה שנתית ממוצעת לנפש (מ"ק)
Number of water samplings	11.8	7,082	6,336	4,698	3,867	5,349	מספר דגימות מים
Percentage of faulty water samplings		..	..	0.02	0.72	0.56	% דגימות לקויות מסך דגימות המים

1 Increase in water storage capacity is due to openning of new pond in Bet Ha-Kerem, with the size of 40,000 cu.m.

2 Not including water supplied to Ma'ale Adummim

1 גידול בכושר איגום המים נובע מפתיחה של בריכה חדשה בבית הכרם, בעלת כושר איגום של 40,000 מ"ק

2 לא כולל אספקת מים למעלה אדומים

לוח ט/8 - אספקת חשמל בירושלים[1], לפי סוג צריכה, 1987 - 2003

Table IX/8 - Electricity Supply in Jerusalem[1], by Type of Consumption, 1987-2003

צריכה תעשייתית Industrial consumption		צריכה מסחרית וציבורית[3] Commercial and public consumption[3]		צריכה ביתית Domestic consumption				סה"כ צריכה[2] (מיליוני קוט"ש) Total consumption[2] (million kWh)	שנה Year
צריכה (מיליוני קוט"ש) Consumption (million kWh)	מס' צרכנים (אלפים) Number of consumers (thousands)	צריכה (מיליוני קוט"ש) Consumption (million kWh)	מס' צרכנים (אלפים) Number of consumers (thousands)	צריכה ממוצעת[4] (קוט"ש) Average consumption[4] (kWh)		צריכה (מיליוני קוט"ש) Consumption (million kWh)	מס' צרכנים (אלפים) Number of consumers (thousands)		
				ירושלים Jerusalem	ישראל Israel				
The Israel Electric Corporation						חברת החשמל לישראל			
118.9	1.4	751.8	10.1	2,990	3,193	251.9	83.6	1,131.0	1987
148.9	1.6	680.3	12.0	3,451	3,684	412.9	122.6	1,277.9	[5] 1988
163.9	1.6	714.2	12.5	3,634	3,880	472.6	129.9	1,403.6	[6] 1989
183.9	1.8	906.8	13.1	4,494	4,766	608.8	135.5	1,746.4	1992
222.3	2.0	1,077.3	14.2	4,354	5,069	629.8	144.7	2,049.4	1994
238.5	2.2	1,174.5	14.6	4,714	5,231	696.9	147.8	2,238.5	1995
253.7	2.2	1,312.1	15.3	4,745	5,377	732.8	154.4	2,433.1	1996
256.0	2.1	1,446.3	15.4	5,127	5,651	801.6	156.0	2,626.0	1997
271.9	2.2	1,578.0	15.8	5,073	5,781	810.0	161.0	2,800.5	1998
283.6	2.3	1,706.0	16.3	4,971	5,766	805.0	164.4	2,945.4	1999
292.0	2.5	1,911.6	16.8	5,584	6,403	926.3	167.1	3,316.8	2000
289.8	2.6	1,038.0	17.3	5,584	6,527	939.8	169.4	3,320.3	2001
296.9	2.5	1,088.6	17.9	5,626	6,620	962.7	172.9	3,408.2	2002
301.4	2.6	1,139.0	18.0	5,900	6,817	1026.7	175.3	3,578.3	2003

1 Not including the East Jerusalem District Electricity Company

2 Including consumption for unlisted "agricultural settlements" and "water pumping", which are not detailed

3 Including "bulk" - see introduction 4 By consumer per year

5 Including 10,800 consumers outside the municipal area of Jerusalem

6 As of 1989 - Greater Jerusalem

1 לא כולל חברת החשמל המזרח ירושלמית

2 כולל צריכה עבור "יישובים חקלאיים" ו"שאיבת מים" אשר אינם מפורטים

3 כולל "צובר" - ראה הסבר במבוא 4 לצרכן לשנה

5 כולל 10,800 צרכנים מחוץ לתחום המוניציפלי של ירושלים

6 משנת 1989 ואילך - ירושלים רבתי



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Key Indicators of the Palestinian Economy (Excl. Jerusalem, selected years)

	1995	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003** (est.)	**2004** (est.)
GDP (US$ million)	3,225	4,201	4,108	3,816	3,484	3,921	4,011
GNI (US$ million)	3,699	4,932	4,793	4,143	3,700	4,204	4,373
GDP per capita (US$)	1,380	1,478	1,386	1,229	1,073	1,158	1,146
GNI per capita (US$)	1,583	1,736	1,617	1,335	1,140	1,242	1,249
Real GDP growth (%)	6.1	8.6	-5.6	-6.6	-3.8	4.5	-1.0
Real GNI per capita growth (%)	7.9	4.1	-10.7	-16.1	-9.8	2.8	-4.2
Domestic expenditure (% of GDP)	151.8	163.0	155.4	143.3	161.0	153.0	164.4
Inflation (CPI - annual %)	10.8	5.5	2.8	1.2	5.7	4.4	3.0
Poverty rate[1] (% of population)		20	27	37	51	47	48
West Bank:		13	18	27	41	37	38
Gaza Strip		32	42	54	68	64	65

Source: UNCTAD. *Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People*. July 2005, except: [1] poverty rate: World Bank estimates (The World Bank, *Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements*, June 2004).


By the end of 2004, 61% of Palestinian households were estimated to live under a **poverty line** of $350 per household (comprising 2 adults and 4 children) per month. Households' median monthly income had fallen by about 45% from $610 in 2000 to $330 by the end of 2004. Consequently, 32% of Gaza and 20% of West Bank households are living in **extreme poverty**. The main reason for poverty is unemployment. (UNCTAD. *Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People*. July 2005).

Economic Structure, 2004 estimates (% of GDP)

Agriculture &
Fishing, 12.4

Services & Others

Mining



Source : PASSIA


A(the) Case(s) for Peace



A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Labor Force Distribution by Sector (%)

(Source: PCBS *Labor Force Surveys*, July-Sept. 2005.)



Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Operating Establishments (Private Sector, NGOs and Government Companies) by Sector, 2004



(Source: PCBS, 2004)

Source : PASSIA



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

■ General Social Features

	West Bank	Gaza	WBGS (Average)
No. of Households (2005)	408,510	204,280	612,790
Projected no. of Households (2010)	502,807	271,180	771,604
Type of household (%) - 1997 Nuclear family:	74.0	71.8	73.2
Extended family:	21.7	25.3	23.0
Average household size (persons) - 2002:	6.1	6.8	6.4
Average housing density (persons/room) - 2004	--	--	1.8
First cousin marriages – 1997 (%):	27.2	31.6	
Marriages within extended family – 1997 (%):	47.4	51.8	
Polygamous marriages – 1997 (%):	3	4.4	
Median age at first marriage (2005) for females	19.5	19.1	19.3 years
Median age at first marriage (2005) for males	25.1	24.0	24.6 years
Marriages registered (*Shari'a* & Churches) (2004):	15,551	12,083	27,634
Divorces (*Shari'a*) (2004):	2,304	1,657	3,961

Religion:

Muslims	(Sunni Islam, representing Shafe'i, Hanafi, Hanbali and Malki schools)	WBGS	97%
Christians	(concentrated in Jerusalem, Beit Jala, Beit Sahur, Bethlehem and Ramallah;	WBGS	3%
	(main denominations: Greek Orthodox - ca. 52.2%, Latin - 30%, Catholic - 6%)	incl. Diaspora: 10%	

(Sources: PCBS, *Population Statistics* and *Housing and Housing Conditions Statistics*).

Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

■ Hotel Guests in Palestine, 1996-June 2005



Nationality (Jan.-June 2005):

Palestinian (from abroad)	21,271
Arab	818
Israeli	8,170
US/Canada	6,230
South/Central America	333
Australia/New Zealand	167
EU	13,671
Other European	972
Asia	7,078
Africa	457
Total:	**59,167**

(Source: PCBS, *Tourism Statistics – Hotels Activity Survey,* 2005.)

Source : PASSIA

לוח ו/1 - תחולת העוני[1] בישראל, בירושלים, בערים נבחרות ובמחוזות, 2002-2003

Table VI\1 - Extent of Poverty[1] in Israel, Jerusalem, Selected Towns and Districts, 2002-2003

Town / Area	ההכנסה הפנויה הממוצעת לנפש תקנית כאחוז מההכנסה הפנויה הממוצעת בכלל האוכלוסיה Average uncommitted income per standard person as percent of average uncommitted income of total population		Poverty Rate (%) תחולת עוני						עיר / אזור
			ילדים Children		נפשות Persons		משפחות Families		
	2003	§2002	2003	§2002	2003	§2002	2003	§2002	
Israel	100.0	100.0	30.8	29.6	22.4	21.1	19.3	18.1	ישראל
Jerusalem	**81.8**	**84.6**	**53.3**	**51.7**	**41.8**	**40.8**	**33.2**	**32.5**	**ירושלים**
Thereof: Jews	**..**	**..**	**38.3**	**..**	**28.5**	**..**	**23.5**	**..**	**מזה: יהודים**
Tel-Aviv - Yafo	137.9	125.9	18.2	21.0	11.9	13.3	10.9	12.8	תל-אביב - יפו
Haifa	107.2	115.6	16.5	19.6	14.9	12.1	17.5	13.2	חיפה
Ashdod	86.9	80.0	25.6	31.2	19.9	22.3	17.9	19.6	אשדוד
Be'er Sheva	93.3	92.9	18.2	15.7	17.4	15.9	21.8	17.6	באר-שבע
Netanya	92.0	93.5	24.4	27.0	17.4	18.4	17.3	16.4	נתניה
Rishon le-Zion	116.6	109.8	15.3	13.0	7.7	7.5	8.2	7.8	ראשון לציון
Ramat Gan	129.4	121.5	10.9	9.7	10.3	9.0	11.1	10.5	רמת גן
Districts[2]									מחוזות[2]
Jerusalem district	83.8	85.9	51.2	50.3	40.3	39.8	32.3	31.9	מחוז ירושלים
Northern district	76.4	71.9	43.1	43.9	33.0	33.2	29.5	29.5	הצפון
Haifa district	99.3	102.8	25.9	24.4	19.4	16.6	18.1	15.8	חיפה
Central district	109.1	109.1	18.8	18.3	13.9	12.7	13.1	11.2	המרכז
Tel-Aviv district	120.1	116.7	20.0	22.5	14.1	14.1	13.1	13.0	תל אביב
Southern district	85.8	85.2	30.1	26.8	22.8	20	21.3	18.2	הדרום
Development areas[2]	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	אזורי פיתוח[2]
Development areas-North	84.1	79.6	27.6	24.8	20.2	20.3	18.9	21.5	אזורי פיתוח צפון
Development areas-South	84.1	85.6	28.8	26.5	22.3	19.7	21.9	18.6	אזורי פיתוח דרום

1 After transfer payments and direct taxes

2 Only localities with population over 10,000 inhabitants

1 לאחר תשלומי העברה ומסים

2 כולל רק יישובים שאוכלוסייתם מונה 10,000 תושבים ומעלה

לוח ו/2 - תחולת העוני[1] בירושלים ובישראל לפי קבוצת אוכלוסייה, 2003

Table VI/2 - Extent of Poverty[1] in Jerusalem and Israel, by Population Group, 2003

	Children ילדים		Persons נפשות		Families משפחות		
	ירושלים Jerusalem	ישראל Israel	**ירושלים Jerusalem**	ישראל Israel	**ירושלים Jerusalem**	ישראל Israel	
	Thousands			אלפים			
Jews & Others	**61,800**	330,100	**123,800**	803,600	**30,500**	246,700	יהודים ואחרים
Arabs	**80,300**	322,300	**151,400**	623,200	**26,500**	119,700	ערבים
	Percent			אחוזים			
Jews & Others	**38.3**	21.2	**28.5**	15.6	**23.5**	14.9	יהודים ואחרים
Arabs	**76.5**	57.5	**67.9**	50.9	**63.5**	48.4	ערבים

1 After transfer payments and direct taxes

1 לאחר תשלומי העברה ומסים

לוח ו/3 - תחולת העוני[1] בירושלים לפי דת וטיפוס משפחה, 2003

Table VI\3 - Extent of Poverty[1] in Jerusalem by Religion and Type of Family, 2003

Type of Family	ערבים Arabs		יהודים ואחרים Jews & Others		סוג המשפחה
	אחוזים Percent	מס' מוחלטים Absolute numbers	אחוזים Percent	מס' מוחלטים Absolute numbers	
Household headed by an elderly person	76.8	2,700	18.2	5,200	משק בית שראשו קשיש
Household with children	69.2	21,400	29.2	16,400	משק בית עם ילדים
Household with 1-3 children	57.7	9,800	22.3	9,000	משק בית עם 1-3 ילדים
Household with 4 children or more	83.2	11,600	46.5	7,400	משק בית עם 4 ילדים ויותר
Household headed by a working person	54.0	16,300	8.8	7,300	משק בית שראשו עובד
Household headed by a non-working person in working age	93.1	7,500	75.7	18,000	משק בית שראשו לא עובד בגיל העבודה
Household headed by a new immigrant (from 1990 and up)	..	..	26.7	5,800	משק בית שראשו עולה (משנת 1990)
Single family	..	..	23.0	1,700	משפחה חד הורית
Families headed by 2 breadwinners	28.0	1,600	2.6	900	משפחות שבראשן שני מפרנסים

1 After transfer payments and direct taxes

1 לאחר תשלומי העברה ומסים





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh



Jewish Land Use on Israeli-Controlled Land in the Gaza Strip and West Bank







Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Selected Natural Resources in the Gaza Strip and West Bank





Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Names in italics are Israeli settlements.

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

- Light industry (handicrafts, wood-working, and furniture)
- Food processing
- Tourism
- Textiles

LAND USE

- Permanent crops (grapes, dates, citrus, and other fruits)
- Arable land (supporting grains)
- Irrigated farming (supporting vegetables)
- Wasteland
- Urban or built-up area

SCALE 1:700,000

0 5 10 Kilometers

0 5 10 Miles

Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




Mediterranean Sea
ISRAEL
Dead Sea
EGYPT



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem





A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh





Source : sviva.gov.il



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Location: Palestine lies on the western edge of the Asian continent and the eastern extremity of the Mediterranean Sea. It is bound to the north by Lebanon and Syria, to the west by the Mediterranean Sea, to the south by the Gulf of Aqaba and the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula, and to the east by Jordan.
Geographic coordinates: **West Bank:** 32′ 00 N, 35′15 E; **Gaza:** 31′ 25 N, 34′ 20 E

Area: **Land area**: 26,323 km² (= 10,162 miles²) **Water area**: 438 km² (approx.)

Palestinian Territories: 6,020 km²
- West Bank: 5,655 km²; 130 km long, 40-65 km in width
- Gaza Strip: 365 km²; 45 km long and 5-12 km in width (self-rule area: **210 km²**)

District	Area (km²)	Density (pers./km²)	District	Area (km²)	Density (pers./km²)
WEST BANK			GAZA STRIP		
Jenin	583	445	North Gaza	61	4,381
Tubas	402	118	Gaza	74	6,689
Tulkarem	246	697	Deir Al-Balah	85	3,512
Nablus	605	552	Khan Younis	108	2,528
Qalqilya	166	577	Rafah	64	2,617
Salfit	204	310	**Total**	**365**	**3,945.4**
Ramallah	855	333			
Jericho	593	73	**Grand Total**	**6,020**	
Jerusalem	345	1,189			
Bethlehem	659	270			
Hebron	997	535			
Total	**5,655**	**463.5**			



Land boundaries:

	West Bank	Gaza
Total:	404 km	62 km + 40 km Coastline
Borders:	Israel 307 km (Green Line)	Israel 51 km (Green Line)
	Jordan 97 km	Egypt 11 km

Green Line: approx. 320 km

Climate: Mediterranean: hot, dry summers and short, wet, cool winters; temperature and rainfall vary with altitude and location of the four climatic regions (Coastal Plain, the Hills, Jordan Valley, and Naqab Desert).

Temperatures (C⁰) in 2004

	Gaza	Hebron	Jericho	Ramallah	Nablus	Jenin
Mean Air Temp.	20.8	16.6	23.5	16.8	18.1	20.1
Absolute Minimum Air Temp.	7.2 (Dec.)	-1.2 (Feb.)	2.0 (Dec.)	0.0 (Feb.)	0.8 (Feb.)	1.4 (Dec.)
Absolute Maximum Air Temp.	39.4 (May)	34.6 (July)	44.4 (July)	35.6 (May)	36.6 (May)	39 (May)

Rainfall in 2004

	Gaza	Hebron	Jericho	Ramallah	Nablus	Jenin
Total Quantity (mm)	408.3	570.8	128.5	524.3	638.5	424.8

Total Quantity (mm)	408.3	570.8	128.5	524.3	638.5	424.8
No. of Rainfall Days	46	42	35	38	58	51

Topographic Features: (asl=above sea level; bsl=below sea level)

District	highest elevation	lowest elevation	average annual rainfall (1967-1998)
Bethlehem	900 m asl (Beit Jala)	400 m bsl (Dead Sea area)	700 (west)-100 (east) mm
Jericho	350 m asl (northeast border)	370 m bsl (adjacent to Dead Sea)	160 mm
Hebron	1,011 m asl (Halhul area)	100 m asl	588 mm
Ramallah	1,022 m asl (at Tal A'sur)	24 m bsl (southeast border)	694 mm
Nablus	918 m asl (Jabel 'Ibal)	349 m bsl (southeast border)	663 mm
Jenin	750 m asl (Jabel Hureish)	90 m asl (Al-Mukhabba)	475 mm
Tulkarem	500 m asl (Ras Rashin)	40 m asl	651 mm
Jerusalem	880 m asl ('Radar Hill')	367m bsl (adjacent to Dead Sea)	584 mm
Gaza			415 mm



Source : PASSIA



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Total Area of Palestinian Governorates (in km^2)

Governorate	Total Area	Governorate	Total Area
Jenin	583	Hebron	997
Tubas	402	**Total WB**	**5,655**
Tulkarm	246	North Gaza	61
Qalqilya	166	Gaza	74
Salfit	204	Deir Balah	58
Nablus	605	Khan Younis	108
Ramallah	855	Rafah	64
Jerusalem[1]	345	**Total Gaza**	**365**
Jericho	593		
Bethlehem	659	**TOTAL WBGS**	**6,020**

(Source: PCBS, *Land Use Statistics*.)

[1] excl. the annexed part.

Land Use (in km^2)

	Total km^2	Agricultural				Forest	Palestinian Built-up (2003)	Built-up in Israeli settlements	Other** (2003)
		Permanent Crops		Temporary Crops					
		irrigated	*rainfed*	*irrigated*	*rainfed*				
WB	5,655	26.7	1,069	52.3	230.6	88.5	531.9	187.0	3.519
GS	365	46.6	10.0	32.6	19.9	3.2	53.8		163.7
		73.3	**1,079**	**84.9**	**250.5**				
		1,152.7		**335.4**		**91.7**	**585.7**		**3,682.7**

Total	**6,020**	**1,488.1**			**187**	

(Source: PCBS, *Land Use Statistics, 2004*) ** Incl.: meadows, pastures, fallow and heath lands.

Source : PASSIA



A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

The Agricultural Sector at a Glance, 2003/04

	WBGS
Total Cultivated area (dunums)	1,823,670
Agricultural land as % of total land area	25.2
Irrigated agricultural land as % of total agricultural land	10.7
Area of fruit trees - as % of total cultivated area	1,152,692 63.2%
Area of field crops - as % of total cultivated area	491,178 26.9%
Area of vegetables - as % of total cultivated area	179,468 9.9%
Area of cut flowers	332
No. of cattle	32,395
No. of sheep	811,864
No. of goats	398,821
No. of poultry	36,046
No. of beehives	59,946
Caught fish (metric tons)	2,994.5

(PCBS, *Agricultural Statistics*, 2003/04; *Land Use Statistics*, 2002).

Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh



Source : PASSIA




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh



Source : PASSIA



A(the) Case (s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by
Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




Figure 10.1: CO_2 Emissions (%)








Figure 10.2: CO Emissions (%)









Source : PASSIA





A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh




LOD
RAMALLAH
YERUSHALAYIM
JERICHO
ASHDOD
ASHQELON
QIRYAT GAT
BIT LEHEM
HEVRON
AZZA
BE'ER SHEVA
ARAD
DIMONA
KARAK
TAFILA
MIZPE RAMON
SALT
YAM HA-MELAH
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
50
32°
31°



Source : gis.cbs.gov.il

משרד התיירות

מדיניות ותכנון

תאריך: 19.8.2004


תרשים מדיניות אזורית

רמת הגולן: 5

רמת הגולן - מרחב תכנון מקומי

תרשים מדיניות אזורית לבניה

תאריך:



ירושלים 2003


משרד התשתיות הלאומיות

המכון הגיאולוגי

סיכוני רעידות אדמה בירושלים

מפה 7. עוצמות סייסמיות בישובים שנפגעו ברעידת האדמה בשנת 1927

על רקע מפה משנת 1934



מקורות

הערכות נזק - אבני, 1999

מיקום מוקד רעידת 1927 - אבני, 1999

Jerusalem and Bethlehem maps, sheet 8 and 11, 1:100,000 series, 1934, Survey of Palestine

סיכוני רעידות אדמה - עמוס סלמון, עודד כץ

עריכה בממ"ג - און כרובי

עיריית ירושלים
מהנדס העיר
מינהל התיכנון
האגף לתכנון העיר
תכנית מתאר מקומית ירושלים 2000

לוח ב/7 - ריכוזים של מזהמי אוויר במרכזים מסחריים-עירוניים בירושלים ובתל-אביב - יפו, 1998 - 2003

Table II/7 - Concentrations of Air Pollutants in Commercial Urban Centers, in Jerusalem and in Tel-Aviv - Yafo, 1998 - 2003

Micrograms per cubic meter atmosphere — מיקרוגרמים למטר מעוקב אוויר

Carbon Monoxide CO פחמן חד-חמצני			Ozone O_3 אוזון			Sulphur Dioxide SO_2 גופרית דו-חמצנית			Nitrogen Oxides NOx תחמוצות חנקן			שנה Year
מספר חריגות מקסימלי מתקן חצי שעתי No. of irregularities from maximal half-hour standard	ערך חצי שעתי מרבי Maximal half hour value	ערך מרבי ל-8 שעות Maximal value for 8 hours	מספר חריגות מקסימלי מתקן חצי שעתי No. of irregularities from maximal half-hour standard	ערך חצי שעתי מרבי Maximal half hour value	ערך מרבי ל-8 שעות Maximal value for 8 hours	מספר חריגות מקסימלי מתקן חצי שעתי No. of irregularities from maximal half-hour standard	ערך חצי שעתי מרבי Maximal half hour value	ערך מרבי ל-24 שעות Maximal daily value	מספר חריגות מקסימלי מתקן חצי שעתי No. of irregularities from maximal half-hour standard	ערך חצי שעתי מרבי Maximal half hour value	ערך מרבי ל-24 שעות Maximal daily value	
	60,000	11,000		230	160		[1] 500	280		940	560	תקן ישראלי Israeli standard (100%)
Jerusalem - Safra Square						**ירושלים - כיכר ספרא**						
0	7,900	3,700	49	328	169	0	301	52	0	702	154	1998
0	8,200	4,100	9	238	163	0	136	38	0	677	214	1999
0	5,250	3,530	1	249§	157	0	83	22	0	604	158	2000
0	22,800	4,340	4	247	137	0	133	24	0	504	135	2001
0	3,436	2,290	0	208	135	0	115	16	0	414	115	2002
0	4,581	2,290	0	208	143	0	183	21	0	589	141	2003
Tel aviv - Yafo - Old Central Bus Station						**תל-אביב - יפו - התחנה המרכזית הישנה**						
			2	241	135	0	228	100	70	3,119	929	1998
			2	275	145	0	189	63	105	2,513	871	1999
			0	163	121	0	130	35	28	1,850	540	2000
			0	122	228	0	102	34	54	2,241	653	2001
			0	198	133	0	81	29	53	2,657	487	2002
			0	173	122	0	71	16	39	1,565	549	2003

1 99.75% standard — 1 תקן של 99.75%

לוח ב/8 - שפכים ופסולת רעילה בירושלים, 1999 - 2003

Table II/8 - Waste Water and Toxic Waste in Jerusalem, 1999 - 2003

כמויות פסולת רעילה שהובלו לרמת חובב

Quantity of toxic waste transported to Ramat Hovav site

Waste producing area	כמות (טון לשנה) Quantity (tons per year)					אזור ייצור פסולת
	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	
Jerusalem - Total	**1410.3**	**1166.3**	**1166.3**	**1037.0**	**1137.2**	**ירושלים - סה"כ**
Giv'at Ram	20.2	18.2	37.5	30.3	20.7	גבעת רם
Giv'at Sha'ul	542.3	352.9	209.1	52.6	58.5	גבעת שאול
Har Ha-Hozvim	653.1	671.7	790.2	819.7	918.9	הר החוצבים
Mt. Scopus	-	0.3	0.2	0.3	-	הר הצופים
Malha	-	1.6	0.9	16.1	8.9	מלחה
City Center	27.3	11.1	15.7	14.1	23.5	מרכז העיר
Atarot	59.5	32.4	50.1	71.6	75.9	עטרות
En Kerem	35.3	26.7	25.3	7.6	12.5	עין כרם
Romema	52.3	40.1	32.0	24.4	16.5	רוממה
Sha'are Zedek	20.3	11.3	5.3	0.3	1.8	שערי צדק

שפכים

Waste-water

Stream name	ספיקה יומית ממוצעת (מ"ק)[1] Average daily flow (cu.m.)[1]					שם הנחל
	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	
Sorek + Refa'eem	76,000	73,000	73,000	70,000	..	שורק + רפאים
Thereof: Industrial waste water	7,500	7,300	7,300	7,000	..	מזה: שפכי תעשייה
Kidron + Dragot	25,000	23,000	22,000	21,000	..	קדרון + דרגות
Thereof: Industrial waste water	0	0	0	0	..	מזה: שפכי תעשייה
Ogg	20,000	17,000	16,000	15,000	..	אוג
Thereof: Industrial waste water	2,000	1,700	1,600	1,500	..	מזה: שפכי תעשייה

1 Industrial waste water - approximate values

1 שפכי תעשייה - ערכים מקורבים

Chapter Eleven 11

Climate

The geographical location of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) is between 31°13' and 32°33' Latitude, and between 34°13' and 35°34' Longitude. This location makes the area highly influenced by the Mediterranean climate. The Gaza Strip, in particular, is part of the Mediterranean coast. The Mediterranean climate is characterized by a long, hot, dry summer and short, cool, rainy winter. Rainfall is limited to the winter and spring months. The rainy season usually starts in the middle of October and continues up to the end of April. Snow and hail, although uncommon, occur in areas of the West Bank, with the greatest frequency falling in the west of, and over, the highlands (Rofe & Raffety, 1965).

Climate within the relatively small area of the West Bank is affected by diverse ranges in topography and altitude. Accordingly, the West Bank is divided into four main climatic regions, including the Jordan Valley, the Eastern Slopes, the Central Highlands, and the Western Slopes.

The mountainous areas in the West Bank, which stretch from north to south, serve as a barrier to the passage of moist air coming from the western direction. The western air is always wet as it is coming from the Mediterranean Sea. The marine influence passes deep into the Tulkarm and Jenin Governorates. It also reaches the western edges of the Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron Governorates. It does not pass deep into these Governorates, due to the presence of highlands that counter the wind. In the southern area of the West Bank, the marine influence decreases as the Mediterranean shore bends to the southwest, thus increasing the distance between the sea and the West Bank. In the northern part of West Bank, there are no hills to block the sea winds. Therefore, the marine influence passes easily across the open lands of the Marj Ben Amer Plain and reaches to the Jordan Valley. This explains the increased quantity of rain in the northern part of Jordan Valley, despite the fact that most of it is below Sea Level. The southern part of Jordan Valley has a different transitional climate, varying between dry steppe and the extreme desert conditions of the Dead-Sea region.

The climate of the West Bank, especially in the south, is influenced by the vast nearby Negev and Arabian deserts. Especially during the spring and early summer, desert storms move through with hot winds full of sand and dust (known as "khamaseen"). These storms increase the temperature and decrease the humidity.

11.2 Temperature

Temperature varies according to the geographical position, altitude, and exposure to marine influences, etc. In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, temperature is relatively high. The highest temperature is in the Jericho Governorate in the Jordan Valley. Temperature of the Jordan Valley increases from north to south, contrary to altitude. The highest temperatures are registered at the Dead-Sea region, at the deepest point (375 m below Sea Level) (ARIJ, 1997). The Dead Sea is situated in the lowest altitude area in the world and surrounded by a series of high mountains from both east and west, creating a natural greenhouse climate. The northern mountains around Nablus register the lowest average temperature of the northern part of the West Bank, while the average temperature in Tulkarm, which has a lower altitude, is the highest in the northern region of the West Bank and the second highest temperature in all regions of the OPT (Figure 11.1).




Figure 11.1: Monthly Mean of Air Temperature (Celius) in the OPT in 2005.
Sources: Meteorology Office-Ministry of Transport-Palestinian National Authority; Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ).

11.3 Sunshine Duration

The OPT has a sunny climate. Inhabitants of the OPT depend on this renewable source of energy for heating of water. Solar radiation, reaching the area of the OPT, varies from one place to another. The longest hours of sunlight occur in June or July and the shortest from December to February (Figure 11.2).




Figure 11.2: Mean of Sunshine Duration (Hours/Day) in the OPT in 2005.
Source: Meteorology Office-Ministry of Transport-Palestinian National Authority

In the summer, solar radiation is strengthened by almost completely clear skies. In the winter, a reduction in solar radiation occurs due to cloud cover. The solar radiation reaches its lowest value in December, when the sun is over the Tropic of Capricorn (Southern Tropic) and the days are short. Table 11.1 shows the variations of the mean monthly solar radiation in the West Bank.

Table 11.1: Variations of mean monthly of solar radiation (MJ/m²/day) in the West Bank for the period 1968-1992							
Month	Jerusalem	Hebron	Bethlehem1	Jericho	Nablus	Tulkarm2	Jenin2
Jan	10.2	9.6	10.2	9.7	9.5	9.9	10.1
Feb	14.1	11.6	14.1	12.2	11.4	12.3	12.4
Mar	17.4	16.2	17.4	18.0	16.1	16.2	16.5
Apr	22.5	20.7	22.6	21.5	20.8	20.1	20.3
May	26.7	23.2	26.7	24.7	23.1	23.2	24.3
Jun.	28.5	22.5	28.5	27.2	22.6	25.5	26.9
Jun.	27.8	24.2	27.8	27.4	24.2	24.3	26.4
Aug	26.3	25.1	26.3	25.8	25.0	22.1	23.7
Sep.	21.7	21.9	21.7	21.7	21.8	19.2	20.4
Oct.	15.2	18.3	15.2	17.1	18.2	15.5	16.2
Nov.	10.3	12.4	10.3	12.4	12.3	11.9	12.0
Dec.	10.0	9.0	10.1	9.2	9.0	9.4	9.6
Source: Israeli Meteorological Service, 1994. 1 Sunshine hours recorded for 1994-1995, at ARIJ Electronic Meteorological Station. 2 Sunshine hours recorded from data compiled by FAO-Agrometeorological group for 42 years							

11.4 Relative Humidity

The relative humidity has an influence on people and on all living organisms, especially the very low humidity experienced during the Khamaseen. Hot winds may cause damage to the skin of people and animals. Agricultural crops are also affected, especially when the dry wind blows during the flowering period; the first stage of fruiting. The Gaza Strip (which is part of the Mediterranean coast) has the highest annual mean relative humidity, increasing from winter to summer. On the other hand, Jericho (in the Jordan Valley) has the minimum relative humidity, decreasing from winter to summer. Jenin also has high relative humidity, because of its location close to the Mediterranean Sea, and due to the lack of topographic barriers. For data on relative humidity, see table 11.2.

Table 11.2: Mean of Relative Humidity (%) in the OPT in 2005.							
	Gaza	Hebron	Jericho	Nablus	Tulkarm	Jenin	ARIJ-Bethlehem
January	59	69	70	67	64	70	66
February	63	71	66	61	71	75	70
March	64	62	55	57	63	67	60
April	64	51	42	50	52	61	51
May	69	55	43	54	58	58	55
June	71	55	44	60	58	65	57
July	73	52	43	59	60	65	52
August	70	59	47	65	60	64	61
September	64	63	47	61	57	63	62
October	61	61	48	57	53	61	60
November	61	65	59	60	59	65	64
December	66	57	66	61	69	67	58
Average	65	60	53	59	60	65	60
Source: Meteorology Office-Ministry of Transport-Palestinian National Authority; Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ).							

11.5 Precipitation

The rainy season starts in October and continues to the end of April. In the northern West Bank, it tends to start a little earlier and last a little longer, with frequent exceptions. Almost 70% of the annual rainfall occurs between November and February. January is the highest rainfall month in the year in most stations in the OPT (Figure 11.3).

In the winter, depressions, passing from west to east over the Mediterranean, bring westerly rain-bearing winds. The rising ground of mountains of the West Bank acts to force the moist air upwards, causing it to shed its moisture on the ridge. The areas in the rain shadow and on slopes, facing east and southeast, receive lower quantities of rainfall. This is because, as the air flows downhill, it warms and rainfall ceases. However, if there is a break in the mountain ridge, the marine influence can move further interior. This is the case in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, where the lack of mountains allows the Mediterranean winds to flow across the Marj Ben Amer Plain and into the Jordan Valley, where rain is precipitated. This part of the Jordan Valley receives more rainfall than other parts, despite its low altitude.

Precipitation decreases from north to south. The northern part of the West Bank is closer to the usual track of storms, coming from the northwest. The pressure gradients cause the air masses to rise at steep angles, cool, and gain in relative humidity. The larger vapor content reaches the saturation point earlier and increases the chance of precipitation.




Figure 11.3: Rainfall Quantity (mm) in the OPT in 2004/05 and 2005/06.
Source: Meteorology Office-Ministry of Transport-Palestinian National Authority; Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem (ARIJ).

11.5 Evaporation

Evaporation is particularly high in the summer, due to the rise in temperature, intensive sunshine, and low humidity. Towards the coastal plain, the rate of evaporation decreases, because of the year around exposure to the humid sea breeze. Evaporation rate is relatively low during the winter months when the solar radiation is lowest (Figure 11.4). Only water surfaces,

which are in contact with the air, are fully affected by evaporation. Water that has seeped into the ground is, for the most part, protected. Rainfall is concentrated in the winter season, when evaporation is at its lowest. The highest evaporation rates in the OPT occur in the summer months in the Jordan Valley. Evaporation from the Dead Sea is particularly high (averaging 2600 mm annually), due to intense solar radiation and low relative humidity. Evaporation in the Gaza Strip is the lowest anywhere in the OPT, due to high relative humidity, lack of surface water and less intense solar radiation and fewer hours of sunlight.




Figure 11.4: Total Evaporation Quantity (mm) in the OPT for each month of the year 2005

Source: Meteorology Office-Ministry of Transport-Palestinian National Authority

12

Chapter Twelve

Climate Change

12.1 Introduction

Climate change refers to long-term fluctuations in temperature, precipitation, wind, and other elements of the Earth's climate system. It is recognized as a major issue of global concern with serious and long-term challenges that have the potential to affect every part of the globe, including the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). Climate change varies naturally on all timescales, ranging from decades to millions of years, due to changes in climate elements. Recently, however, human influences are thought to be bringing about a rapid change in the climate, due to massive emissions of greenhouse gases. This has both direct and indirect long-term climate impacts on every region of the globe, causing alteration of oceanic and atmospheric currents that lead to shifts in precipitation patterns and changes in air temperature. In addition, a rise in the Sea Level, due to melting of the polar ice-caps and glaciers, threatens coastal regions with flooding. Figure 12.1 shows the average global temperature for the period 1880–2005. It shows clearly that a trend of temperature increase has occurred during the last 25 years, with a general increase of about 1.2°C.

According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 'IPCC', which is a global body of more than 1,500 scientists, the average global temperature is projected to rise by between 1.4°C to 5.8°C by the end of the 21st Century.




Figure 12.1: Average Global Temperature 1880–2005 (GISS, 2005)

However, considerable uncertainty does exist over projected climate changes at the regional scale, due to the weaknesses and limitations of the different types of global circulation models in assessing regional climate variations. Nevertheless, simple models of the climate system can be used and developed, in order to gain physical insight into major features of the behavior of the climate system, and to produce climate projections for a range of assumptions about emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. But year-to-year and longer time-frame variations in climate are difficult to predict. This is due, primarily, to the chaotic nature of the climate system. This means that small errors in predictions of climate variations quickly grow to become very large errors. Thus, this behavior would place very strong limits on the potential predictability for climate variations. In spite of such limitations, there is still some skill in predicting future climate, which comes from the ability to predict slowly changing parts of the climate system, including, for instance, the relative humidity or number of extreme events per year. This summary aims to briefly highlight the issue of climate-change risks in the OPT.


12.2 Observed Climate Change in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, Including the OPT

The OPT is located in the region where both mid-latitude and equatorial atmospheric processes play major roles during the wet season (November to April). This, in turn, makes any weather prediction very hard. However, a number of physical elements (discussed in the case study below) have been clearly affected by the global trends of climate change, which is the core problem of the 21st Century.

CASE STUDY I: Relative Humidity of the Dead Sea and Jordan Valley Region

The Dead Sea and the Jordan Valley form a unique microclimate. The Dead Sea itself is the terminal lake of the Jordan Rift Valley, which extends from 35°30'00'' to 35°34'05'' East and from 30°58'01'' to 31°46'01'' North. It is the lowest point on the surface of the Earth, and its water has the highest density and salinity of any sea in the world. Because of its low elevation and its position in a deep basin, the climate of the Dead Sea area is unusual. Its actual evaporation from its surface ranges between 1,300-1,600 mm/yr, and depends on several climatic variables (e.g., wind speed, relative humidity, temperature, surface water temperature, water salinity and density).

Figure 12.2 illustrates the variations of monthly average relative humidity in a two-time series in Jericho city (the largest community in the region). Series 1 represents the historical time series data (1925–1934), which was derived from the "Climate Data Imaging Project", held by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Series 2 represents the newest available time series data (1987-2004). The Figure clearly indicates that a decrease of about 5 units in relative humidity has occurred recently, during the dry season (April-September). This might be attributed due to the decrease in evaporation rates during the past 20 years. This phenomenon can be considered as an indicator of climate change in the region as a whole.




	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Series1	70.9	69.2	56.9	49.7	45.6	48.9	49.3	52.4	55.9	51.7	56.7	66.6
Series2	69.6	66.6	58.5	45.2	40.0	42.0	43.4	47.5	49.1	53.2	58.1	69.3

Figure 12.2: Monthly average relative humidity in a two time series

However, it must be kept in mind that other factors (other than evaporation) may be behind the observed trend (illustrated in Figure 12.2). However, the continuous increase in the Dead Sea salinity, during the past 50 years, is mainly due to the less in flow of fresh water to the Dead Sea.

CASE STUDY II: Evaporation Reduction in the Gaza Strip

The climate of the Gaza Strip is a transitional one between the arid climate of the Sinai Peninsula and the temperate semi-humid climate of the Mediterranean Sea. This study is the first attempt to assess how a specific region in the Gaza Strip is reacting to climate change. Specifically speaking, changes that affecting the evaporation rates, are demonstrated based on two averaged data sets. These include the first time series (old) covering a 10-year interval (1925-1934), and the second time series (new) covering a 9-year interval (1997-2005). Figure 12.3 shows the average monthly evaporation rate for both time series.



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Series1	96.1	110.0	133.3	177.0	201.5	183.0	207.7	198.4	174.0	158.1	123.0	102.3
Series2	82.3	84.8	118.0	140.9	170.8	190.1	194.6	191.6	168.5	131.9	103.7	83.3

Figure 12.3: Average monthly evaporation in the Gaza Strip

Contrary to the well-known fact that global warming is supposed to increase surface air temperature and, hence, increase the evaporation rate, it was found here that an apparent decrease in the average monthly evaporation rate has taken place. This reveals a remarkable feature in this unique coastal region. This unusual behavior can only be explained by noting that physical factors (e.g., humidity, soil texture, vegetation, salinity, etc.), other than air temperature, must be taken into account. For example, the rate of evaporation decreases exponentially as soil dries out, simply because further evaporation depends on rise of soil water and groundwater to the surface. 1% increase in salinity will result of approximately 1% decrease in evaporation.

The results are consistent with the observed increasing salinity levels in the soil of the Gaza Strip during the past 60 years, due to the increasing demand for groundwater, which leads to an increase in the soil salinity. Besides, the increase of the amount of aerosols in the air has a direct effect on the amount of solar radiation, hitting the Earth's surface and, therefore, it can play a vital role in the evaporation decline. This outcome is called the "global dimming" effect (gradual reduction in the amount of global direct irradiance at the Earth's surface). This, in turn, creates a cooling effect that may have partially masked the effect of greenhouse gases on global warming (Stanhill et. al, 2001). This suggests that land-use changes induce regional climate change. At the first look, it seems that increasing salinity plays an important role in climate mitigation in the Gaza Strip, but it has critical and destructive effects on domestic water quality, biodiversity, and the agricultural industry.

12.3 Precipitation Patterns

The global water cycle is a fundamental component of the climate system, in which water is cycled between its major components (ocean, atmosphere, and biosphere). According to the available Global Climate Models' predictions, there will be substantial changes in water availability (quantity, quality, and flow) over the globe as a whole. On average, some areas will become drier and others wetter.

The Middle-East region has an arid climate with very scarce water resources, which are under heavy and increasing stress. Therefore, it is vulnerable to climate change that will eventually reduce rainfall, due to changes in oceano-atmospheric circulation patterns. According to climate models, it was found that a decrease in precipitation is likely to occur around the 300N latitude belt (Schlesinger et. al, 1989). Since the OPT lies around this belt, the consequences of any such projection may be hazardous for the status of its ecosystems.

The probable continuous decline in precipitation can be explained by the fact that an increase of temperature (due to increase in greenhouse gases) will decrease the occurrence of frequency of the mid-latitude cyclones in the Eastern Mediterranean, which play a major role in precipitation enhancement. However, land use changes may enhance rainfall events. For example, a decrease in surface albedo (the ratio of reflected to incident electromagnetic radiation power) in an arid region will boost convection processes and, hence, may cause an increase in precipitation events (Ben-Gai et. al, 1993). General assessments of the impact of climate change on precipitation can be done by obtaining long-term climatic data from the Global Climate Models (GCMs).The GCMs are a class of computer-driven models for weather forecasting and predicting climate change. The Regional Climate Models (RCMs) are useful tools for generating high resolution climate-change scenarios for use in climate impacts and adaptation studies in order to be used as input to the basin hydrological models. Unfortunately, such data are unavailable in the OPT. If presumably available, they don't have the required time-span that permits reliable statistical correlation of inputs (e.g., precipitation patterns) and outputs (e.g., evaporation, runoff, etc.).

12.4 Extreme Weather Events

Extreme weather events, such as droughts, heat waves, floods, cyclones, and hurricanes are sometimes catastrophic for human life and ecosystems. The frequency of such extreme weather events is expected to increase with climate change, due to perturbation of oceano-atmospheric circulation patterns. Statistical analysis and predictions in such systems are complicated, due to the fact that, on the one hand, extreme events may appear as "outliers", whose statistical properties do not seem to conform with the bulk of the data. On the other hand, they dominate the tails of the probability distributions and the scaling of high moments, leading to "multiscaling."

Temperature increase trend

The increase in temperature over the past 20th Century was obvious. That increase was by no means, uniform during the last decade, with the year 1998 being the warmest. This trend continues until 2005, which surpassed 1998 to end as the hottest year globally in the 125 years, since reliable records have been kept. Generally speaking, heat waves have become longer and more intense.

Precipitation Intensity

The OPT, along with its neighboring countries of the Mediterranean region, has experienced tumultuous rains and flooding. Such events were not frequent in the past. An increase in rain intensity, combined with a decrease in the overall precipitation, will certainly increase the surface runoff, and, thus, soil erosion and salinization income will also increase. Moreover, by the end of the last Century, the autumn of 1999 across the OPT was worse than any year in the decade, which increased the drought to a critical value.

Table 12.1: Extreme weather events in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) during the last few years (1997-2004)

DATE	EVENT
March 18-19, 1997	A heavy storm hit the central and southern parts of the West Bank. It was the second heaviest storm to occur in March in the past 60 years.
July-August, 1998	The summer was the hottest summer in the past 35 years in the region. Temperature rises up to 46.8 °C in Jericho.
September- November, 1998	The driest and warmest autumn in the past 58 years in the OPT.
January 24, 1999	Hailstorm hit Jerusalem, with hailstones as big as marbles (about 1.3 cm diameter).
November 28, 1999	Unusually cold and dry weather hit the OPT. Temperature in Jerusalem reached down to -6° C.
July 2000	Hottest July in the OPT in the last 50 years, with a mean temperature 4°C higher than average. Highest recorded temperature (41°C) in Jerusalem since 1888.
February 2003	February was the wettest month since December 1991, and the wettest February ever recorded.
May 29-30, 2003	Lowest pressure (995 mb) ever recorded in May, accompanied by incredible sand storm that covered the entire OPT and the region, with thick red sand and dust.
May 9-10, 2004	Very intense heat affected the OPT, especially during the night of May 9, when 32°C was recorded in Jerusalem. Amazingly, the following night's temperature in Jerusalem was 20 oC lower than noon's temperature.

ARIJ, 2006.

In conclusion, weather events that may appear unpredictable on relatively short-time horizons are actually a consistent part of a multiscaling statistics on longer-time horizons.

12.5 Recent Anthropogenic Factors

This section presents up-to-date preliminary observations originating primarily from Israeli destructive operations in the Palestinian environment. It reveals insights of direct anthropogenic factors that may severely affect our climate on the individual and community levels.

Segregation Wall and Uprooting of Trees

There are almost 93 major forests in the West Bank and 13 in the Gaza Strip, covering about 230 km^2 and 2 km^2 respectively. Forests cover approximately 4% of the total area of the West Bank and 0.5% of the Gaza Strip. It is well-known that forests alter the environment by moderating climate, improving air quality, conserving water, and harboring wildlife. Climate control is obtained by moderating the effects of sun, wind, and rain. Radiant energy from

the sun is absorbed or deflected by leaves on deciduous trees in the summer and is filtered by their branches in winter.

The Palestinian natural ecosystems are a casualty of the Israeli Occupation, due to the systematic uprooting of both natural and planted trees, to the demolition of fertile agricultural land, and to the destruction of groundwater aquifers. The construction of the Segregation Wall, upon completion, will intensify these problems. Tens of thousands of trees were uprooted and other trees of thousands are being uprooted in the West Bank. In addition, the Wall itself will act as a physical barrier to the terrestrial ecosystem disrupting wildlife corridors and, hence, wildlife mobility.

Over 1.3 million trees have been uprooted by the Israeli Occupation Forces between September 2000 and March 2006 (WHO, 2006). This will have a destructive effect on the OPT's climate, by disrupting the natural carbon sequestration process, in which carbon dioxide (CO_2) from the atmosphere is absorbed by trees, plants and crops through photosynthesis, and is stored as carbon in biomass (tree trunks, branches, foliage and roots) and soils. Trees that sequester carbon, when subjected to anthropogenic disturbances, can suddenly or gradually release the carbon back to the atmosphere. Practices that increase carbon losses and decrease sequestration generally devastate the quality of soil, water, air, wildlife habitat, and the ecosystem in general.

Industry and Human activities

The increased population and industrial zones, and the expanded human and industrial activities (especially in the lack of regulations and as a result of 40 years of the ongoing military Occupation) in the OPT have increased the amount of smoke and hazardous gases, which contain greenhouse gases emitted into the air. Transportation is one of the major contributors to air pollution. The increased use of automobiles (especially the older ones) in the OPT emits tons and tons of hazardous gases, such as carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), sulfur oxides (SO_x), and hydrocarbons (HC). Also burning vegetation and the increased amounts of fossil fuels used as a source of energy emit large amounts of carbon dioxide (CO_2).

There are many industrial zones and industrial activities in the OPT. Certain industries emit smoke, hazardous and toxic gases in huge amounts, which have increased the level of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. For example, some metal factories reuse the used motor oil as fuel, and the pottery industry use tires as a source of energy. In both cases, large quantities of toxic gases including CO, CO_2, and NO_x are produced and emitted into the air. Also, the charcoal industry produces large amounts of CO, and CO_2. Moreover, ozone (O_3), which is a powerful greenhouse gas, is also produced from the photochemical reaction of the nitrogen and carbon molecules, present in the atmosphere. In addition, there are many Israeli industrial sites throughout the West Bank, which pollute the atmosphere with huge amounts of greenhouse gases.

12.6 Climate Change Impacts

The following points summarize the major physical and socio-economic impacts of climate change in the OPT. It should be borne in mind that spatial and temporal climate change complexities make their impacts on ecosystems and human communities also complex.

Water Resources

Interest in water resources in the Mediterranean countries has risen significantly in recent years. This is largely due to the increased populations and their concentrations within urban areas.

human and ecosystem uses. Some parts of the world has already experienced a reduction in resource availability, while others has seen an increase.

The demand for water in the OPT is dominated by three major user groups: agricultural irrigation, domestic use, and industry. Even if no climate change takes place at all, the population growth rate is one of the highest worldwide (3.06% in the West Bank and 3.71% in the Gaza Strip (CIA Fact book, 2007), while that of the world averages 1.14%. A correspondingly rapid growth in agricultural and industrial output will be required to sustain this population which, in turn, will advance the water scarcity problem that is already severe in the OPT.

Agriculture

In the OPT, fruit production is a significant commercial and, to a large extent, a primary source of revenue for agricultural areas. It is extremely vulnerable to damage from temperature extremes, particularly minimum temperature extremes. The following are some expected climate change (directly or indirectly related) impacts on agriculture:

- Increase of temperature and frequency of extreme events will reduce crop yield (some crops are more tolerant than others).
- Modification of mean temperature will induce changes of the agricultural distribution of crops.
- Increase of temperature will negatively affect marginal land and its farmers.
- Scarcity of water resources will force farmers to abandon marginal land, and will increase desertification.
- Socio-economic impacts associated with loss of agricultural and other related jobs, resulting in the increase of unemployment, loss of income, and political disorder.

Sea Level

The Gaza Strip is located along 40 km of the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, which is expected to rise due to global warming. This rise will increase erosion along the Gaza Strip beaches. Also, some low lying coastal structures in the Gaza Strip would be affected by this rise. They could be lost and damaged through flooding or erosion, causing a huge loss in valuable lands and buildings and, in turn, forcing the inhabitants of these areas to immigrate. The Gaza Strip is a mere 11 km in width, and will be seriously affected if severe flooding occurs.

Biodiversity

Global warming in the last Century was fast enough that the resultant shifts in species ranges may lead to extensive biodiversity losses (Houghton, 1990). The OPT's biodiversity is considered as one of the 25 recently-defined as "global biodiversity hotspots" (Myers et. al., 2000). The OPT's biodiversity is predominantly rich, as it is positioned at a crossroad between African, Asian and Mediterranean biogeographic regions, each contributing to its different species. The speed and magnitude of climate change may elicit different responses at different levels of ecological organization, namely the population, the species, and the community, as well as the whole ecosystem level.

Human Health

Climate change is expected to have critical impacts on human health in the Middle East in general, and in the OPT, in particular. This is not because of the change itself but also due to the lack of indispensable advanced medical care. Climate change will have both direct and indirect impacts on the Palestinian society.

Direct Impacts

People who suffer from pollen and dust allergies will suffer more by any abrupt change in climate as the allergy season will start earlier, last longer and become more intense. In the past, the allergy season was starting in May but now it is starting in March (http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/30/eveningnews/main1772819.shtml). As a result, an increase in respiratory diseases is expected among children, elderly, and people with chronic diseases. In addition the very young, very old, and very weak are likely to be affected by heat waves and, thus, mortality rates may increase in these groups.

Indirect Impacts

Indirect impacts may appear in the term of diseases that occur from contact with insects and other living organisms. In the case of climate change, attention should be focused on diseases caused by insects, because insects have a shorter life span than other developed organisms. So, the life cycle of these insects will be affected by climate change. Many diseases may spread in the OPT, but the cause of greatest concern is the possible spread of malaria.

Malaria is caused by Protozoan Parasites of the Genus Plasmodium. The malaria parasites are transmitted from one person to another by the female Anopheline Mosquito. The symptoms of the disease are fever, shivering, pain in the joints, and headache. The spread of the mosquitoes depends on the presence of humidity (water). Because of the change in rainfall distribution and rainfall intensity in the OPT (due to the predicted climate change), ponds may form, which increase the available breeding habitat of mosquitoes and, hence, leads to the population's increase. The effects of this phenomenon are expected to be most severe in the Gaza Strip.

12.7 Outlook

Certain measures may be taken early to ameliorate the probable effects of climate change in the OPT. The most severe impacts of climatic change are likely to be in terms of desertification, water resources' scarcity and degradation, and the subsequent impacts of these two phenomena on the agricultural industry and, hence, on food security of the OPT's population.

Desertification

It is well known that desertification (along with urbanization) could have contributed to a small fraction of the overall warming. So, the following are some options considered necessary for combating desertification:

- Forestation in regions of over 100 mm annual rainfall. This will reduce soil erosion and will enhance precipitation at a mesoscale level.
- Enhancement of soil moisture and decreasing leakage of water and nutrients.
- Increasing plant productivity and diversity.

Water Resources

One of the essential steps to reduce the adverse impact on water resources' supply in the OPT, is to take appropriate alleviating actions, by introducing more careful and integrated water management, especially for the agriculture sector. Moreover, the most vulnerable area in the OPT must be specified, in order to introduce an effective disaster preparedness strategy.

Agriculture

Agricultural production in the OPT can be fragile and the Palestinian farmers may have to rely on off-farm income to manage any future risk, resulting from climate change. As a result, farmers may move to other more economically secure options. Adaptation and coping with challenges can be achieved by considering the uncertain environment facing most Palestinian producers, which require:

- Predictable governmental programs and reliable resources of weather events' data.
- Publicly funded research programs for reliable and unbiased findings, acceptable by the public.
- Technological advances in irrigation systems and, to a certain extent, genetic modification of plants that tolerate extreme events.
- Viable support systems for high-risk production (e.g., strawberries).

לוח ב/1 - טמפרטורות ולחות יחסית בירושלים, 2003

Table II/1 - Temperatures and Relative Humidity in Jerusalem, 2003

Month	לחות יחסית - ממוצע יומי (%) Relative humidity - daily average	Temperature °C טמפרטורה							חודש
		Absolute מוחלטת				Mean ממוצעת			
		תאריך Date	מינימום Minimum	תאריך Date	מקסימום Maximum	מינימום יומי Daily minimum	מקסימום יומי Daily maximum	יומית Daily	
	Central					**מרכז**			
January	64	20	5.8	12	24.4	8.7	14.5	11.6	ינואר
February	71	25	- 0.2	18	20.1	5.5	11.3	8.4	פברואר
March	75	26	0.7	15	22.0	6.6	13.2	9.9	מרץ
April	51	22	7.7	5	33.8	12.0	21.0	16.5	אפריל
May	32	28	13.6	12	33.4	19.6	28.8	48.4	מאי
June	48	4	14.0	25	32.8	18.4	28.2	23.3	יוני
July	54	15	16.5	6	34.8	19.6	29.5	24.6	יולי
August	57	6	18.0	1	33.6	20.2	30.4	25.3	אוגוסט
September	64	27	15.6	2	32.2	18.0	27.5	22.8	ספטמבר
October	58	30	10.9	23	33.0	17.1	26.0	21.6	אוקטובר
November	58	11	9.6	2	30.2	13.4	20.3	16.9	נובמבר
December	70	18	3.9	14	19.7	8.0	13.8	10.9	דצמבר

לוח ב/5 - משקעים בירושלים, בהר כנען, בחיפה, בתל-אביב, בבאר שבע ובאילת, 1971-2000, 2002/2003

Table II/5 - Precipitation in Jerusalem, Har Kena'an, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, Be'er Sheva and Elat, 1971-2000, 2002/2003

Multi-annual averages; mm; rain year

ממוצעים רב שנתיים; מ"מ; שנת גשם

Station	VI-VIII	V	IV	III	II	I	XII	XI	X	IX	סך-הכל Total	תקופה Period	תחנה
Jerusalem,	**-**	**0.1**	**20.4**	**151.2**	**329.1**	**90.4**	**186.6**	**22.4**	**18.4**	**0.0**	**818.6**	**2002/2003**	**ירושלים,**
Center	**-**	**3.2**	**24.5**	**92.7**	**118.3**	**133.2**	**105.7**	**60.8**	**15.4**	**0.3**	**554.1**	**2000-1971**	**מרכז**
Har Kena'an	-	7.6	21.4	194.4	315.6	171.3	233.9	46.0	9.3	1.9	1001.4	2002/2003	הר כנען
	-	5.7	43.1	94.9	129.7	158.8	138.4	85.5	24.5	1.5	682.1	2000-1971	
Haifa, bay	-	6.2	18.1	157.7	201.6	145.2	232.0	32.1	15.3	0.0	808.2	2002/2003	חיפה, מפרץ
	-	2.7	23.6	52.8	92.2	124.9	135.5	77.4	28.0	1.2	538.3	2000-1971	
Tel Aviv	-	0.0	15.3	132.7	231.1	179.6	200.8	3.5	23.6	0.7	787.3	2002/2003	תל-אביב,
Sede Dov	-	2.3	18.0	60.6	90.1	126.9	126.4	79.3	26.3	0.4	530.3	2000-1971	שדה דב
Be'er Sheva	-	0.0	14.3	34.6	19.5	30.5	111.4	13.0	42.6	0.0	265.9	2002/2003	באר שבע
	-	2.7	12.9	30.7	40.4	49.8	41.9	19.7	5.8	0.4	204.1	2000-1971	
Elat	-	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	1.2	5.6	4.3	0.0	12.0	2002/2003	אילת
	-	1.0	1.7	3.7	5.8	3.5	6.0	3.5	3.5	0.0	28.7	2000-1971	

לוח ב/3 - טמפרטורות בירושלים - ממוצעים רב שנתיים, 1968 - 2003

Table II/3 - Temperatures in Jerusalem - Long - Range Averages, 1968 - 2003

°C °C

Month	Mean ממוצע 2003 - 1968		חודש
	מקסימום יומי Daily maximum	מינימום יומי Daily minimum	
	Central	**מרכז**	
January	12.0	6.5	ינואר
February	13.1	6.9	פברואר
March	16.0	8.8	מרץ
April	21.3	12.3	אפריל
May	25.4	15.8	מאי
June	27.6	17.8	יוני
July	28.9	19.3	יולי
August	29.0	19.3	אוגוסט
September	27.7	18.4	ספטמבר
October	24.6	16.4	אוקטובר
November	18.9	12.4	נובמבר
December	13.6	8.2	דצמבר




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section A, Rollover image...



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by
Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section C, Rollover Image....



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace






A GEOMAT Project by
Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section B





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section E



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section D



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section F, Rollover Image...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section F, Rollover Image...



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem






A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section H, Rollover Image...



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section I, Rollover Image...



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem




A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section J, Rollover Image...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace





A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section K, Rollover Image...





Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem

A(the) Case(s) for Peace








A GEOMAT Project by Esmaeel Reza Dadashzadeh

Section L, Rollover Image...



Source : Applied Research Institute, Jerusalem



Uzi Narkiss, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin approach the Western Wall

On July 7, 1967, at 8:30 a.m., Israeli Defense Force paratroopers launched a three-pronged assault on Jerusalem from the hills surrounding the city taken from the Jordanians in the previous two days of fighting. Israeli Colonel Motta Gur led his battallion into the Old City through St. Stephen's Gate where they met little resistance. Climbing to the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, Gur radioed a message to Israeli commanders stating "The Temple Mount is in our hands."

Watch Footage of Paratroopers Entering the City